续贷限制与企业技术创新

本文以2007年的银行续贷政策改革作为“准自然实验”,采用双重差分模型探讨了续贷限制对企业技术创新的影响。研究发现,续贷限制显著抑制了企业的技术创新,且经过一系列稳健性检验后,该结论依然成立。进一步研究发现,该政策的作用效果因专利类型的不同而存在较大差异,具体表现为,在续贷限制之后,相较于低质量非发明专利,企业高质量发明专利下降幅度更大,进而企业创新质量降低。作用机制检验发现,续贷限制会降低企业信贷规模、缩短企业信贷期限以及增加企业融资成本,进而抑制企业技术创新。上述结果表明,“一刀切”式地收紧续贷标准会强化企业的融资约束,限制信贷资金对企业技术创新的支持作用,最终不利于企业的转型升级。本文研究为当前的续贷政策提供了来自企业创新视角的理论依据和实践参考。     

续贷限制对企业盈余管理的影响——来自上市公司的经验证据

本文以《贷款风险分类指引》的颁布作为续贷限制的政策冲击，基于A股上市企业的数据，采用倾向得分匹配双重差分法研究续贷限制对企业盈余管理的影响。结果表明，续贷限制会增强企业的盈余管理行为。进一步研究发现，非国有企业比国有企业受续贷限制政策的影响更明显；相比于低融资约束的企业，高融资约束的企业受政策影响更显著。机制检验发现，续贷限制会降低企业短期贷款的规模，弱化债务监督机制，进而增强企业盈余管理行为。     

绿色信贷政策的绿色效果及影响机制——基于中国上市公司绿色专利数据的证据

本文以2012年颁布的《绿色信贷指引》为例构造准自然实验,采用双重差分法检验了《绿色信贷指引》的实施对企业绿色创新活动的影响.研究发现:相较非重污染企业,绿色信贷政策的实施整体上抑制了重污染企业的绿色创新,从政策的动态效应上看抑制作用逐渐减弱,该政策促进了积极履行社会责任的重污染企业进行绿色转型.机制检验表明绿色信贷政策通过抑制企业的信贷融资,尤其是长期借款,对上市公司绿色创新行为产生负向影响,且该影响主要集中在申请绿色发明专利、非国有以及所在地区金融发展程度低的企业中.     

绿色信贷政策抑制“两高”行业发展了吗？——基于融资约束和企业创新视角

本文以2012年颁布的《绿色信贷指引》为政策研究对象，构造准自然实验，采用双重差分模型检验了绿色信贷政策对“两高”行业企业融资和创新的影响。研究发现：相较于非“两高”企业，绿色信贷政策的实施显著抑制了“两高”企业的债务融资，尤其是中长期债务融资；绿色信贷政策通过发挥激励约束作用，有效促进了“两高”企业创新，使得创新成果显著增加；绿色信贷政策的实施效果在不同“两高”企业间存在差异，对国有企业、社会责任评级较低企业形成更强的融资约束，对非国有企业、评级较高企业具有更强的创新促进作用。     

盈余管理是否会阻碍企业绿色创新

基于2010—2020年A股上市非金融企业财务数据样本，实证检验了盈余管理对企业绿色创新“质”与“量”的影响，研究发现，企业盈余管理行为会显著抑制企业绿色创新活动，并且对企业绿色发明专利的抑制作用强于绿色实用专利。进一步研究发现，企业正向盈余管理行为不利于企业绿色创新，负向盈余管理行为则有助于提升企业绿色创新能力；增加生产操纵和酌量性费用操纵对企业绿色创新活动能够发挥更显著的抑制作用。机制检验表明，融资约束和债务融资成本是真实盈余管理影响企业绿色创新的内在作用机制。针对经济后果检验表明，真实盈余管理活动对企业盈利能力及企业价值会产生持续性的抑制作用。     

绿色信贷政策的减污效应研究

本文以2012年《绿色信贷指引》政策为准自然实验,构建双重差分模型检验绿色金融政策对“两高”企业污染排放的影响。研究发现,《绿色信贷指引》实施后,“两高”企业主要污染物SO₂排放量显著下降;机制分析表明,融资约束程度的上升与绿色创新技术的提高是绿色信贷政策降低“两高”企业SO₂排放量的主要途径。此外,地区产业结构升级以及金融发展规模扩大会促进绿色信贷政策的减污效果。     

绿色信贷政策能够促进企业绿色创新吗？——基于政策效应分化的视角

本文实证检验了绿色信贷政策影响重污染企业和节能环保企业绿色创新的不同效应。研究发现,绿色信贷政策对绿色创新的影响在两类企业之间存在分化:政策能更有效提升节能环保企业的绿色创新,对重污染企业绿色创新的促进作用相对有限。从银行信贷决策视角看,政策效应的分化一定程度上源于政策对信贷融资的影响存在差异:政策使重污染企业融资规模降低、融资成本提升的同时,促进了节能环保企业融资规模的增加。从企业绿色行为决策视角看,政策效应的分化一定程度上源于政策对企业绿色行为的影响存在差异:重污染企业采用“低成本策略”,节能环保企业则采用“竞争优势策略”。绿色信贷政策的效应还受企业所有权性质、现金持有以及企业规模的影响,而竞争性的银行业结构和政府补助有助于发挥政策对重污染企业绿色创新的促进作用。本文研究对评估绿色信贷政策的经济效果,推动政策进一步精准发力具有一定参考意义。     

数字经济如何推动企业合作创新——基于融资约束与交易成本视角

数字经济能够激发信息、数据作为新生产要素的重要作用,实现资源优化配置,降低经济运行成本,提升全要素生产率,从而推动我国经济高质量发展。因此,研究数字经济如何通过企业创新融资和交易成本影响企业合作创新绩效具有现实意义。本文从融资约束和交易成本视角出发,基于2011—2019年沪深A股上市公司数据,实证检验数字经济对企业合作创新绩效的影响。研究发现,数字经济能显著提高企业合作创新绩效,且经过一系列稳健性检验、内生性讨论后该结论仍然成立。机制分析表明,数字经济可以通过缓解融资约束,显著提高企业研发投入,降低企业合作成本,进而促进企业合作创新。此外,政府补助在数字经济和企业合作创新之间起到调节作用,并且数字经济通过加强企业合作创新进而提高全要素生产率。本文的研究结论对发展数字经济以及促进企业合作创新提供了政策启示。     

银行价格竞争、融资约束与企业研发投资——基于“中介效应”模型的实证研究

近年来我国利率市场化改革积极推进,实体经济发展积极向创新驱动转型,一个亟须研究厘清的关键问题是,银行业竞争如何驱动企业创新活动？本文关注银行价格竞争对企业创新的影响,以2013—2018年沪深两市的上市企业为样本,采用“中介效应”因果分析模型,实证检验了银行价格竞争对企业研发投资的影响,并识别出以融资约束为中介渠道的作用机制。研究发现,银行价格竞争不仅会提高银行的风险容忍度,直接增加R&D投资的信贷供给意愿,而且还会通过降低贷款价格和增加贷款可得性来缓解企业整体的融资约束,间接促进企业创新活动。这一机制在解除贷款利率管制之后以及在民营企业层面体现得更加明显。本文的研究结果对于深化金融市场化改革、改善金融服务实体经济效果以及实施经济创新驱动发展战略,具有明确的政策启示。     

影子银行监管优化与企业创新——基于《资管新规》的准自然实验

影子银行在一定程度上弥补了中国正规金融发展不足,但也可能放大系统性金融风险,有悖于宏观审慎原则。本文以《资管新规》政策为准自然实验,选择2015-2021年中国沪深A股上市企业为研究样本,检验影子银行监管优化对企业创新的影响及作用机制。研究发现,影子银行监管优化能够提升企业创新;机制检验发现,影子银行监管优化通过抑制企业金融化、降低投资风险,进而促进企业创新,支持了“影子银行风险观”假说;异质性检验发现,促进效应在国有企业、创新密集度和治理水平低的企业,以及产品市场竞争、影子银行发展和市场化程度较低的地区更为显著。本文不仅证实《资管新规》政策监管有效,还揭开了降低影子银行风险在微观企业创新层面的价值,为国家贯彻落实宏观审慎目标、引导金融有效服务实体经济提供政策启示。     

Debt maturity dispersion and the cost of bank loans

This paper examines the relation between corporate debt maturity dispersion and the pricing and terms of bank loans. Analyzing a sample of U.S. bank loans from 2002 to 2016, we find that firms with a dispersed debt maturity structure pay a lower interest rate. The rate-reduction effect is significant only for firms without a credit rating. For these firms, spreading debt maturity dates also results in lower commitment fees, fewer covenant restrictions, and less collateral in their loan contracts. The impact of debt maturity dispersion on the pricing and structure of bank loans is stronger when borrowers have higher rollover risk or when the need for monitoring is greater. Our results suggest that dispersion in debt maturity structure mitigates the agency problem associated with shareholder–creditor conflicts by reducing rollover risk and alleviating the need for monitoring, which results in borrowers receiving more favorable terms in loan contracts.     

年报风险信息披露与银行贷款利率

既有文献较少从银行视角关注年报风险信息披露的经济后果。银行更有能力解读年度风险信息,银行利益也更直接受到年报风险信息的影响,银行贷款利率更能体现年报风险信息披露的经济后果。本文基于2008-2017年单笔银行贷款利率数据的研究发现:总体上我国年报风险信息披露降低了银行贷款利率,说明我国年报风险信息披露更符合趋同观假说。中介效应检验发现:我国年报风险信息披露通过提高信息透明度,降低银行风险感知水平进而降低了银行贷款利率,即信息质量和风险是我国年报风险信息披露影响银行贷款利率的不完全中介。进一步分析发现:我国年报风险信息披露与银行贷款利率的负相关关系主要体现在货币政策紧缩组、非国有企业组以及公司治理水平较高组。本文首次研究银行贷款利率与年报风险信息披露的关系,有助于丰富风险信息披露文献和银行贷款文献。     

Bank Monitoring and Environmental Risk

Abstract:  Loan announcement effects for 152 Canadian companies are examined to investigate the efficiency of monitoring by banks facing lender environmental liability. Market reaction to the announcement of bank debt to 'environmental' firms is more positive and significant than for 'non-environmental' firms and, for firms in industries with a higher likelihood of experiencing spill events, is more positive and significant, reinforcing earlier results that establish a relationship between specific loan/borrower characteristics and announcement period excess returns and providing further evidence on the 'uniqueness' of bank loans by demonstrating the superior ability of banks to monitor corporate borrowers exposed to environmental liability.     

银行对企业经营的监督效应研究——基于控股股东掏空行为的视角

从控股股东掏空行为的视角,采用中国上市公司的贷款数据分析中国的商业银行对企业的监督作用。研究发现,银行对控股股东的掏空行为具有一定的监督作用,在银行贷款数量多、贷款期限长的公司中,控股股东的掏空行为明显减少。对不同所有制的企业,银行的监督作用存在异质性。目前,银行的监督作用主要体现在国有银行中,而国有银行能有效监督的对象仅限于地方政府和私人控制的企业,国有银行对中央企业的监督能力较弱。从事后监督来看,银行会对控股股东的掏空行为做出贷款政策的调整,对于控股股东掏空严重的企业,续新贷款的银行数量、续新贷款比例显著下降,而且贷款利率显著提高。     

The role of culture in firm-bank matching

We assemble a unique dataset containing population-level information on loan applications in a region hosting two cultural groups to study the role of culture in firm borrowing decisions. We find that firms are more likely to apply for loans from culturally close banks. This effect is stronger for opaque firms, but not for less performing firms, indicating that firms do not expect preferential treatment from same-culture banks. Loan applications to culturally distant banks increase sharply with firms’ size and age, suggesting a role of information asymmetry in firm-bank matching. In contrast, we find no effect of cultural proximity on loan supply. Overall, our results show that demand-side factors play a key role in the formation of same-culture lending relationships.     

Corporate misreporting and bank loan contracting

This paper is the first to study the effect of financial restatement on bank loan contracting. Compared with loans initiated before restatement, loans initiated after restatement have significantly higher spreads, shorter maturities, higher likelihood of being secured, and more covenant restrictions. The increase in loan spread is significantly larger for fraudulent restating firms than other restating firms. We also find that after restatement, the number of lenders per loan declines and firms pay higher upfront and annual fees. These results are consistent with banks using tighter loan contract terms to overcome risk and information problems arising from financial restatements.     

Did securitization affect the cost of corporate debt?

This paper investigates whether the securitization of corporate bank loan facilities had an impact on the price of corporate debt. Our results suggest that loan facilities that are subsequently securitized are associated with a 17 basis point lower spread than that of facilities that are not subsequently securitized. We consider facility characteristics that are associated with the likelihood of securitization and estimate the extent to which these characteristics are related to spreads. We document that Term Loan B facilities, facilities of B-rated firms, and facilities originated by banks that originate CLOs are securitized more frequently than other facilities. Spreads on facilities estimated to be more likely to be subsequently securitized have lower spreads than otherwise similar facilities. The results are consistent with the view that securitization caused a reduction in the cost of capital.     

Did quantitative easing reduce the borrowing costs of firms? The risk-taking channel

This paper examines the effect of the Federal Reserve's quantitative easing (QE) on the cost of bank loans and documents large heterogeneous effects across different firms. In QE1, the average loan spread is 22.7 percent lower compared to the non-QE period. This effect falls in QE2 and OT and then rises in QE3 and the tapering period. The rates of riskier loans are restrained more than less risky loans during QEs as banks take more risks by offering lower rates to attract risky borrowers. The Fed mortgage-backed securities purchases have a larger impact in narrowing the borrowing cost difference between riskier and safer loans than the Fed Treasury purchases. Our results are robust to borrower, year-quarter and bank fixed effects. Overall, our findings support that the risk-taking channel of QE plays a significant role in the corporate bank loan market.     

Distance, Lending Relationships, and Competition

We study the effect on loan conditions of geographical distance between firms, the lending bank, and all other banks in the vicinity. For our study, we employ detailed contract information from more than 15,000 bank loans to small firms comprising the entire loan portfolio of a large Belgian bank. We report the first comprehensive evidence on the occurrence of spatial price discrimination in bank lending. Loan rates decrease with the distance between the firm and the lending bank and increase with the distance between the firm and competing banks. Transportation costs cause the spatial price discrimination we observe.