Emission trading in Europe with an exchange rate

This paper explores the analytical and empirical properties of a new method for emission trading according to a fixed exchange rate. The exchange rate is based on the ratios of the marginal costs of abatement in the optimal solution in order to account for the impact of the location of emission sources on the deposition. It is shown that, generally, this system will not achieve the optimal solution and does not guarantee that environmental deposition constraints are not violated, although total abatement costs are always reduced. A routine was developed to mimic trading as a bilateral, sequential process, subject to an exchange rate. In the example used, results for SO₂ emissions in Europe show that, starting from a uniform reduction, exchange-rate trading achieves higher cost savings than one-to-one trading, without achieving the cost minimum. Sulfur deposition targets are not violated since the initial emission allocation overfulfilled targets at many places. The results are sensitive to: pre-trade emission levels, the transaction costs, the availability of information on potential cost savings and assumptions made on the behavior of trading partners.     

Efficiency Gains Under Exchange-Rate Emission Trading

In the case of emission of non-uniformly dispersed pollutants such as SO2 the negative effects depend on the location of the sources. A unit increase at one source must be compensated by either a larger or smaller reduction at another source to keep the negative effects at the same level. Emission trading between countries is possible under the Second Sulphur Protocol. Exchange rate trading and third party problems are studied within a simultaneous model facilitating impositions of various environmental constraints. Simulations based on the negotiated emission quotas are offered. Results indicate potential cost savings of 19%.     

Trading Sulphur Emissions in Europe: `Guided Bilateral Trade'

In this paper a system of `guided permit trading' is developed for SO₂emissions reduction which considers permit trading as a bilateral andsequential process. This implies that in order to meet the deposition targetsat the end of the trading process, not every single trade transaction hasto meet the deposition targets. To ensure that the target is ultimately met,the number of permits traded should be controlled by a trade coordinatinginstitution. A simulation of the system of guided bilateral trading ofSO₂ permits among European countries on the basis of the SecondSO₂ Protocol indicates that some non-profitable trade transactionstake place. This prevents the cost effective emission allocation from beingfully achieved. However, the calculations show that guided bilateral permittrading may generate substantial cost savings while contributing toenvironmental protection.     

International emissions trading with endogenous allowance choices

This paper compares endogenous choices of tradable and non-tradable emission allowances by non-cooperative countries. I find that the cost savings of trading do not necessarily lead to less pollution. In particular, environmentally more concerned countries usually choose less allowances if these are tradable, but this may be offset by the choice of more allowances on the side of environmentally less concerned countries. Moreover, if the establishment of a trading system requires the unanimous approval of all countries, there may be no agreement on trading even if it were to lead to less pollution overall. Conversely, a trading system may find unanimous approval even if it induces more pollution.     

Beyond fuelwood savings: Valuing the economic benefits of introducing improved biomass cookstoves in the Purépecha region of Mexico

Half of the world population relies on biomass for cooking, with very significant health as well as climate change impacts. Improved cookstoves have been disseminated as an alternative to reduce these impacts. However, few detailed studies about the economic benefits of improved cookstoves (ICS) interventions, including environmental and health co-benefits, exist to date. In this paper we perform a comprehensive economic evaluation of a dissemination program of ICS in rural Mexico. The resulting cost–benefit analysis (CBA) of the Patsari improved cookstove is presented, utilizing estimation of direct costs and benefits, including fuelwood savings, income generation, health impacts, environmental conservation, and reduction in greenhouse gas emissions. The analysis is based on comprehensive data obtained through monitoring studies carried out in the Study Area from 2003 to the present. Results show that Patsari cookstoves represent a viable economic option for improving living conditions of the poorest inhabitants of rural Mexico, with benefit/cost ratios estimated between 11.4:1 and 9:1. The largest contributors to economic benefits stemmed from fuelwood savings and reductions in health impacts, which constituted 53% and 28% of the overall benefit, respectively.     

The welfare effects of innovative pharmaceuticals: an international perspective from the Dutch experience

Policy discussions on new medicines are often focused on cost containment rather than on the benefits they produce, such as health gains and cost savings in other sectors. In this study, we identify systematic differences in policies towards pharmaceuticals between countries and calculate the welfare gains of 39 innovative pharmaceuticals introduced in the Dutch market after 1997. Welfare gains are defined as the difference between the value of a QALY gained by innovative pharmaceuticals and their costs. The review shows that there are systematic differences among pharmaceutical policies and regulations between countries. It is further found that the welfare gains of pharmaceuticals are substantial and amount to €77 per capita per year in the Netherlands. The welfare gains could be higher if institutional barriers for an efficient utilization of innovative pharmaceuticals are removed.     

Industry-level emission trading between power producers in the EU

This paper investigates how restrictions for emission trading to the energy-intensive power sector will affect the magnitude and distribution of abatement costs across EU countries vis-à-vis a comprehensive EU emission trading regime. It is found that emission trading between European power sectors allows the harvest of a major part of the efficiency gains provided by full trade as compared to strictly domestic action. However, trade restrictions may create a more unequal distribution of abatement costs across member states than is the case for a comprehensive trade regime. The reason for this is that restricted permit trade enhances secondary terms-of-trade benefits to EU member countries with low marginal abatement costs at the expense of the other EU member states.     

In or out: efficient inclusion of installations in an emissions trading scheme?

Regulators around the world are currently considering national emissions trading schemes (ETS) as cost-effective instruments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. In the process, they are confronted with numerous design issues. The coverage of installations in an ETS is one such issue. While “blanket coverage” that includes all industrial emitters of greenhouse gases in an economy has some intuitive appeal, and seems equitable, it does not take into full account all the costs related to the extent of coverage. This paper shows that an alternative approach of “partial coverage” based on benefit–cost analysis can achieve the same emission reduction outcome at lower social cost. The approach is based on maximizing the benefits from inclusion of installations in an ETS at the same time as taking all relevant transaction costs into account. A broad definition of transaction costs is used, which covers the regulatory costs to the government as well as regulatory costs imposed on covered installations. We find that particularly for relatively modest emissions reduction targets the cost savings of a “partial coverage” compared to “blanket coverage” are significant.     

Environmental Regulations,Producer Responses,and Secondary Benefits: Carbon Dioxide Reductions Under the Acid Rain Program

This paper derives a production analysis framework for modeling secondary benefits from environmental regulation, i.e. induced changes in yet unregulated pollutants. We emphasize the various ways in which the producers can respond to environmental regulations, and evaluate them in terms of their costs and their generation of secondary benefits. An application on the US electricity sector illustrates our main point: In our case, abatement technologies that reduce regulated emissions while leaving the plants’ unregulated emissions unchanged appear to be among the least costly producer responses to the existing sulfur and nitrogen regulations, but at the expense of limited secondary reductions in carbon dioxide emissions. This finding raises questions about the magnitude of the much debated secondary benefits from future regulations on carbon dioxide emissions, since similar abatement technologies are currently being developed for carbon dioxide. With new environmental issues emerging over time, our findings suggest that regulators should signal the possibilities of new regulations on connected pollutants to producers. Such information may be relevant for producers when choosing current abatement strategies—with minor cost increases to deal with today’s issues, overall compliance costs for near-future environmental problems may be lowered.     

论开展电力排污权交易的几个关键问题及挑战

排污权交易强调用市场配置环境资源,改变了政府配置环境资源的管理传统,这将引起环境管理体制和运行机制的全面调整。文章从创造政策环境、建立和电力市场相适应的排污权交易市场、制订中长期总量目标等制度层面分析了我国开展电力排污权交易需要具备的5个前提条件,并针对当前环境管理面临的挑战进行了探讨。     

Strategic Investment in Climate Friendly Technologies: The Impact of Global Emissions Trading

Our point of departure is that a group of industrialized countries invest in research and development (R&D) of greenhouse gas (GHG) abatement technologies. R&D investments influence the future GHG abatement choices of both industrialized and developing countries. We distinguish between investments that reduce industrialized countries’ abatement costs and investments that reduce developing countries’ abatement costs. Unlike earlier contributions, we include global trading in emission permits. This changes the nature of the game. With global permit trading, industrialized countries should in many cases invest strategically in technologies that only reduce abatement costs at home. This comes in addition to investments abroad. Second, we show that R&D investments always decrease total emissions. Finally, we find that the developing region receiving investments always benefits.     

Transboundary air pollution and soil acidification: A dynamic analysis of an acid rain game between Finland and the USSR

Transboundary air pollution is analysed as a dynamic game between Finland and the nearby areas of the Soviet Union. Sulphur emissions are used as the environmental control variables and the acidities of the soils as the state variables. Acidification is consequently considered to be a stock pollutant having long-lasting harmful effects on the environment. The state dynamics consist of two relationships: first, of a sulphur transportation model between the regions and, second, of a model describing how the quality of the soil is affected by sulphur deposition. The countries are assumed to be interested in maximizing the net benefits from pollution control as measured by the impacts on the values of forest growth net of the abatement costs. Cooperative and noncooperative solutions of the game are compared to assess the benefits of bilateral cooperation. Using empirical estimates of abatement costs, acidification dynamics and impacts on forest growth it is shown that cooperation is beneficial to Finland but not to the Soviet Union. Consequently, Finland has to offer monetary compensation to induce her neighbor to invest in environmental protection.     

Bio-economic modeling of water quality improvements using a dynamic applied general equilibrium approach

An integrated bio-economic model is developed to assess the impacts of pollution reduction policies on water quality and the economy. Emission levels of economic activities to water are determined based on existing environmental accounts. These emission levels are built into a dynamic economic model for the Dutch economy and subsequently coupled to a national water quality model. The modular approach has the advantage that the impacts on the economy and water quality are evaluated simultaneously, but each within their own domain based on the appropriate scale and level of detail. The dynamic nature of the economic model allows us to also evaluate a derogated water policy as foreseen in the European Water Framework Directive. The indirect costs of different water quality improvement policy scenarios are at least as high as the direct costs related to investments in pollution abatement technology. The stricter the policy scenario, the more important the role of economic adjustment and restructuring mechanisms at the macro-economic level. Significant water quality improvements can be achieved through stringent domestic emission reductions. However, reaching water quality standards is highly dependent on water quality improvement policy in surrounding river basin countries and climate change.     

An analysis of differing abatement incentives

In general, climate policies are evaluated with respect to their costs and benefits. But regularly an important category of benefits is omitted: ancillary or secondary benefits. In contrast to the main strand of literature on climate change the study presented here will analyze countries’ decisions on greenhouse gas abatement in an impure public good model which considers ancillary benefits. As can be shown by integrating ancillary benefits into the analysis, environmental regulations independent of the climate problem may well have an effect on countries’ greenhouse gas control. Consequently, different environmental programs should be coordinated carefully and should not be considered as being independent.     

A study of legal attributes of carbon emission rights in carbon trading

Clean Development Mechanism （CDM） has given birth to an international carbon trading market prosperity, which provides developing countries with valuable opportunity to address climate change issues right along with economic development and environmental improvement to achieve sustainable development. However, most studies of CDM focus on economics, and few on its legal problems. CDM involves too many aspects. And the clear legal attribute of trading object is the basis of progress of the transaction and also the start point of legal protection. Therefore, this paper in accordance with the inherent principle of property rights economics, and environmental economics in CDM, only discusses CDM carbon emission right legal interpretation and its attribution. The paper recommends that in order to ensure and promote the carbon emission right trading, carbon emission right should be attributed into the system of real rights to be regulated by Real Right Law. In this way, carbon emission right can gain exclusive power of possession and use, which can achieve a clear right definition of environmental goods in line with Coase＇s theory to protect Chinese profit in carbon trading market and promote the development of the carbon trading market further.     

Alternative standards and instruments for air pollution control in Poland

Like other Central European countries, Poland faces the twin challenges of improving environmental quality while also fostering sustainable economic development. In this study we examine the costs of different standards for air pollution control, and the cost savings from using incentive-based policy instruments in lieu of more rigid command-and-control policies. The comparisons are based on the results of a simulation model of energy use and air pollution control for the Polish economy over 1990–2015. The model simulates least-cost energy supply decisions under different environmental policy assumptions, the corresponding emissions, and the cost of achieving the specified policy objectives. The model results suggest that incentive-based policies will have efficiency gains over command policies that are at least worthy of consideration and may be quite substantial. The size of the gains in practice depends in part on how much flexibility is built into the command approach, e.g., capacity for intrafirm trading as well as alack of technology-specific requirements. To achieve these gains, an increase in the current levels of emissions fees is desirable both to strengthen abatement incentives and to improve the capacity of the Polish government to overcome past environmental damages. However, it seems highly unlikely in practice that fees could be raised to the levels necessary to meet current Polish emissions standards. To make further headway, an evolutionary approach to emissions trading patterned after (and profiting from the experience with) emissions trading in the U.S. seems useful. The program could start out relatively modestly and increase in ambitiousness as the Polish economic transition proceeds.     

Strategic partitioning of emission allowances under the EU Emission Trading Scheme

The EU Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) is breaking new ground in the experience with emission trading regimes across multiple jurisdictions. Since the EU ETS covers only some industries, it implies a hybrid emission control scheme where EU member states must apply complementary domestic emissions regulation for the non-trading sectors of their economies in order to comply with their national emission reduction targets. The EU ETS thus opens up for strategic partitioning of national emissions budgets by the member states between trading and non-trading sectors. In this paper we examine the potential effects of such strategic behavior on compliance cost and emissions prices. We show that concerns on efficiency losses from strategic partitioning are misplaced. In turn, our analysis implicitly indicates significant political economy forces behind EU climate policy, as both cost-effective and strategically motivated partitioning of national emission budgets are far off from the actual break-down between trading and non-trading sectors.     

Timber harvest adjacency economies,hunting, species protection,and old growth value: seeking the dynamic optimum

Forests have the potential to provide ecosystem services, timber, mature growth aesthetics, and wildlife and endangered species protection. Forest managers are faced with complex ecosystem management decisions due to competing and complementary social values, and differential interactions of these social values with timber production. As a result, management strategies can have dramatic aggregate and intertemporal welfare implications. This paper portrays the trade-offs and externalities in choosing or changing the forest management objective, and the resulting rankings of management policies. In addition, the paper analyzes the role of economies of scale in harvest area, where larger harvest areas generate average cost savings in harvesting and reseeding, thereby promoting more intensive harvesting at the expense of environmental benefits.     

Dividing Online and Offline: A Case Study

Every new method of trade offers an opportunity for economic agents to compare its costs and benefits relative to the status quo. Such comparison motivates sorting across market segments and reshapes the whole marketplace. The Internet provides an excellent example: it introduces substantial search cost savings over brick and mortar retail stores but imposes new obstacles for sellers to convey quality. Using sports card trading as a case study, we provide empirical evidence on (1) the sorting of product quality between the online and offline segments, (2) the changes for retail outlets after the Internet came into place, and (3) how supporting industries such as professional grading and card manufacturing adapted to take advantage of the new market.