IMF治理机制基本框架的演变、困境与变革前景

作为二战后建立起来的最重要的国际金融组织,IMF在维护国际金融稳定方面发挥了重要作用。文章介绍了IMF治理机制的基本框架及演变,分析了其治理结构中存在的问题,如决策权更多地被欧美发达国家所主导,危机处理能力不足等,指出IMF应顺应国际经济金融格局的变化,不断完善机构自身治理,更好地反映发展中国家的权益,提升维护国际金融稳定的能力。     

Does Basel compliance matter for bank performance?

The global financial crisis underscored the importance of regulation and supervision to a well-functioning banking system that efficiently channels financial resources into investment. In this paper, we contribute to the ongoing policy debate by assessing whether compliance with international regulatory standards and protocols enhances bank operating efficiency. We focus specifically on the adoption of international capital standards and the Basel Core Principles for Effective Bank Supervision (BCP). The relationship between bank efficiency and regulatory compliance is investigated using the Simar and Wilson (2007. J. Econ. 136 (1), 31) double bootstrapping approach on an international sample of publicly listed banks. Our results indicate that overall BCP compliance, or indeed compliance with any of its individual chapters, has no association with bank efficiency.     

金融危机背景下中国证券公司的治理及其完善

金融危机给全球金融市场造成了极大的冲击.由于我国的金融市场尚未全面开放,我国的证券公司在此次金融危机中所受影响并不严重.但是,全面开放是大势所趋,而日前我国的证券公司还远未做好迎接金融市场全面开放的准备.以此次金融危机为契机,加快完善我国的证券公司治理,无疑是迫切而意义重大的.     

宏观审慎政策协调能否抑制国际性银行危机传染？——基于跨境金融关联视角的实证研究

本文基于跨境金融关联视角对宏观审慎政策能否抑制国际性银行危机传染这一重要的理论与实践问题进行了实证研究。选取亚洲金融危机和全球金融危机时期遭受冲击的10个代表性国家作为样本,构建Logit模型和多元回归模型探讨本国及具有金融关联的国家协调实施宏观审慎政策对本国系统性银行危机传染的影响。研究表明,具有金融关联的国家出现金融危机会显著增加本国系统性银行危机的发生概率,具有金融关联的国家实施宏观审慎政策对本国信贷的影响比对房价的影响更明显,本国及具有金融关联的国家协调实施宏观审慎政策会显著降低本国系统性银行危机的发生概率。在调整银行危机指标及考虑贸易关联和流动性风险的影响后,研究结果依然保持稳健。本文的研究结论揭示了加强宏观审慎政策协调有助于维护全球金融稳定,对于中国政策当局强化宏观审慎管理具有极其重要的政策含义。     

Financial liberalization,bureaucratic corruption and economic development

We study the effect of international financial integration on economic development when the quality of governance may be compromised by corruption. Our analysis is based on a dynamic general equilibrium model of a small economy in which growth is driven by capital accumulation and public policy is administered by government-appointed bureaucrats. Corruption may arise due to the opportunity for bureaucrats to embezzle public funds, an opportunity that is made more attractive by financial liberalization which, at the same time, raises efficiency in capital production. Our main results may be summarized as follows: (1) corruption is always bad for economic development, but its effect is worse if the economy is open than if it is closed; (2) the incidence of corruption may, itself, be affected by both the development and openness of the economy; (3) financial liberalization is good for development when governance is good, but may be bad for development when governance is bad; and (4) corruption and poverty may coexist as permanent, rather than just transitory, fixtures of an economy.     

Covid-19 pandemic,a catalyst for aggressive earnings management by banks?

This paper investigates the effects of the Covid-19 pandemic on the financial reporting quality of European banks by examining the occurrence of earnings management specifically income smoothing. Using a sample of listed European banks, we employ panel estimation to compare income smoothing in the pre-pandemic period (2019Q1-2019Q4) and the pandemic period (2020Q1-2021Q4). We find that earnings management has significantly increased during the pandemic years, evidencing how the quality of financial reporting is affected during the crisis period. Our findings further suggest that amid the crisis, governance quality limits the incidence of earnings management and emphasizes how the strength of country-level governance and institutional framework affects the quality of financial reporting. Further analysis shows that though banks are inclined to manage earnings during a crisis, nevertheless, the presence of high-quality audit is a limiting factor on the incidence of earnings management in the face of crisis. Our findings which are relevant to investors, market participants, and regulators among others make a significant contribution to the accounting literature and specifically complement the strand of literature on the discretionary use of loan loss provision for earnings management during crisis.     

Risk management,corporate governance,and bank performance in the financial crisis

The recent financial crisis has raised several questions with respect to the corporate governance of financial institutions. This paper investigates whether risk management-related corporate governance mechanisms, such as for example the presence of a chief risk officer (CRO) in a bank’s executive board and whether the CRO reports to the CEO or directly to the board of directors, are associated with a better bank performance during the financial crisis of 2007/2008. We measure bank performance by buy-and-hold returns and ROE and we control for standard corporate governance variables such as CEO ownership, board size, and board independence. Most importantly, our results indicate that banks, in which the CRO directly reports to the board of directors and not to the CEO (or other corporate entities), exhibit significantly higher (i.e., less negative) stock returns and ROE during the crisis. In contrast, standard corporate governance variables are mostly insignificantly or even negatively related to the banks’ performance during the crisis.     

Comply or Explain: Investor Protection Through the Italian Corporate Governance Code

Nearly 86% of listed Italian companies now claim to be in formal compliance with the provisions of the Italian Corporate Governance Code, which, like many codes in EU countries, give companies the option to either comply or explain their decision not to do so. But in the wake of the recent financial crisis, the effectiveness of such self‐regulatory corporate governance codes has been subjected to increasing skepticism. In particular, critics wonder whether such governance codes actually encourage the adoption of best practices and promote better governance. This article presents a governance indicator (CoRe) devised by the authors that attempts to assess the actual, or effective, levels of compliance with the Italian Corporate Governance Code in terms of listed companies' procedures for dealing with related party transactions (RPTs). The authors report that the companies' level of effective compliance with regard to RPTs is considerably lower than their publicly reported levels of formal compliance. The authors also report that higher levels of effective compliance tend to be found in companies where (1) minority shareholders have appointed one or more directors; (2) independent directors serve on important committees; and (3) there are significant holdings by institutional investors—particularly foreign investors—who participate in general shareholder meetings.     

Does compliance with corporate governance codes help to mitigate financial distress?

This paper analyzes whether the compliance with corporate governance codes helps to mitigate the financial distress of firms. We examine three different levels of compliance: overall compliance, the compliance with the recommendations regarding the board of directors and the compliance with the recommendations on board subcommittees. Our results reveal that only the fulfillment with the recommendations about the board of directors leads to a reduction in the likelihood of financial distress. These findings extend the academic debate concerning the role of governance codes and their impact on firm outcomes, and have practical implications for both professionals and firms. Moreover, our findings emphasize the need to distinguish between the different types of recommendations to investigate the effects of these codes. In addition, the results can be useful for policymakers in the configuration of new requirements and recommendations regarding corporate governance structures. Furthermore, our results contribute to the literature, delving into the determinants of the financial distress of firms.     

“逆全球化”下建设国际金融新体制的中国方案——基于“一带一路”研究视角

全球金融危机后,国际经济治理体系呈现"逆全球化"抬头新趋势,国际金融治理结构、国际金融监管体系和国际信用机制已无法满足中国"一带一路"倡议投融资需要。中国可主导构建"一带一路"国际金融新体制,引领区域金融治理,参与全球金融治理。具体而言,中国需要秉承促进金融合作、提高国际地位、推动全球金融治理改革的目标和"开放包容、兼收并蓄、公平公正、合作共赢"的基本原则,从国际金融组织、国际货币体系和国际金融监管体制三个方面落实建设"一带一路"国际金融新体制,为携手应对国际金融风险,推动新型全球化发展,实现世界经济持续增长贡献中国智慧,提出中国方案。     

Perpetuating traditional influences: Voluntary disclosure in Malaysia following the economic crisis

Prior research on listed companies in Malaysia, Hong Kong and Singapore during and before the 1997 financial crisis has reported a significant association between ownership structure and the extent of voluntary disclosure in annual reports. We examine data for Malaysia after the 1997 financial crisis to assess whether the regulatory reaction to the crisis increased the awareness of disclosure as a tool of corporate governance and reduced the influence of insider domination on voluntary disclosure. We contrast director ownership and government ownership as determinants of voluntary disclosure in Malaysian company annual reports. Additionally, we include consideration of proprietary costs by testing whether industry competitiveness has an impact on voluntary disclosure.We find that director ownership is significantly associated with the extent of voluntary disclosure while government ownership, new governance initiatives and industry competitiveness are not significant in pointing companies towards greater transparency. We conclude that, despite the upheaval of the economic crisis, traditional influences of director ownership and family domination of the board outweigh the effect of government-backed accountability initiatives in determining the extent of voluntary disclosure.     

Repoliticalization of accounting standard setting—The IASB,the EU and the global financial crisis

Since its inception, the IASB has been able to set standards with relatively little political influence in its governance or standard setting process. But this changed with the outbreak of the global financial crisis. Political bodies began to view accounting standards as a contributing factor that amplified the consequences of the crisis on banks, financial markets and the overall economy. Regaining control over accounting standard setting was seen as imperative. In this article, we investigate how the EU sought to gain control over the IASB and how the global standard setter responded to limit political influence. Our findings show that a re-balancing of power in favor of political interests has occurred between the stakeholders of international accounting standard setting. Further research in this area looks promising. We suspect that the heightened influence of political actors may lead to further power struggles and efforts to cope with on-going changes in the institutional environment.     

Economic shock,owner-manager incentives,and corporate restructuring: Evidence from the financial crisis in Korea

We examine how owner-managers incentives and firm-specific measures of corporate governance affect restructuring decisions during an economy-wide shock. Using a large sample of Korean firms that had experienced a severe financial crisis during 1997–1998, we find that the likelihood of restructuring is negatively related to the divergence of cash flow rights and control rights of controlling shareholders, and that the announcements of restructuring by chaebol firms with such divergence are greeted more negatively by investors. However, firm-specific measures of corporate governance such as total debt, bank loans, and equity ownership by unaffiliated financial institutions mitigate these negative effects, thereby influencing firms to choose value-maximizing restructuring policies. Our results suggest that the controlling shareholders' incentives to expropriate other investors are high during an economic shock. Our results also highlight the importance of corporate governance in mitigating such expropriation incentives, and provide important implications for the role of corporate governance during an economic shock, such as the 2007–2008 global financial crisis.     

Corporate governance in the 2007–2008 financial crisis: Evidence from financial institutions worldwide

This paper investigates the influence of corporate governance on financial firms' performance during the 2007–2008 financial crisis. Using a unique dataset of 296 financial firms from 30 countries that were at the center of the crisis, we find that firms with more independent boards and higher institutional ownership experienced worse stock returns during the crisis period. Further exploration suggests that this is because (1) firms with higher institutional ownership took more risk prior to the crisis, which resulted in larger shareholder losses during the crisis period, and (2) firms with more independent boards raised more equity capital during the crisis, which led to a wealth transfer from existing shareholders to debtholders. Overall, our findings add to the literature by examining the corporate governance determinants of financial firms' performance during the 2007–2008 crisis.     

国际信用评级体系改革与中国评级业发展展望

国际金融危机和欧洲主权债务危机的爆发,凸显出现行国际信用评级体系存在的种种弊端。该文指出,现行国际信用评级体系的根本缺陷在于高度垄断,为此应通过加强内部治理和外部监管推动现有评级行业的改革,并推动国际信用评级行业新秩序的建立。中国应从宏观政策层面出台措施,扶持和推动本国自主信用评级体系的做大做强,并参与到国际信用评级体系的重建中。     

The Changing International Transmission of Financial Shocks: Evidence from a Classical Time‐Varying FAVAR

We study the changing international transmission of financial shocks over the period 1971–2012. Global financial shocks are measured as unexpected changes of a U.S. financial conditions index (FCI), developed by Hatzius et al. (2010). We model the FCI jointly with a large international data set through a time‐varying parameter factor‐augmented VAR and find that financial shocks have a considerable impact on growth in the nine countries considered. Moreover, financial shocks during the global financial crisis are found to be large by historical standards. They explain approximately 20% of GDP growth variation on average over 2008–9, compared to an average of 5% prior to the crisis.     

国际金融危机冲击、经济结构与经济增长——对辽宁省与江苏省的比较

本轮国际金融危机给我国经济带来巨大冲击。但由于我国幅员辽阔,各省经济结构不同,经济发展水平不同,因而受到的冲击也不同。通过对典型外向型经济省份江苏省与非外向型经济省份辽宁省的比较发现,国际金融危机冲击对对江苏省影响十分巨大,单纯依靠宽松的货币政策很难恢复到危机以前的情况,货币政策对其效果有限。相对来讲,国际金融危机冲击对于辽宁省的影响却十分有限,其经济增长主要是受货币政策和GDP自身趋势影响。另外,通过实证分析发现,国际金融危机对江苏省经济的影响在2009年和2010年最严重,到2011年情况可能会好转。     

Crises,contagion and cross-listings

We investigate whether cross-listing shares in the form of depositary receipts in overseas markets benefits investors in emerging market countries during periods of local financial crisis from 1994 to 2002. We regress cumulative abnormal returns for three windows surrounding the crisis events on the cross-listing status while controlling for cross-sectional differences in firm age, trading volume, foreign exposure, disclosure quality and corporate governance. Further, we examine cross-listing effects in countries popularly thought to experience contagious effects of these crises. We find that cross-listed firms react significantly less negatively than non-cross-listed firms, particularly in the aftermath of the crisis. The results on contagious cross-listing effects are however mixed. Our findings are consistent with predictions based on theories of market segmentation as well as differential disclosure/governance between developed and emerging markets. We do not find evidence that foreign investors “panic” during a currency crisis.     

The State of Asian Corporate Governance: A Presentation by Jamie Allen: CARE Conference | Hong Kong Polytechnic University | June 9, 2014

Since the 1998 Asian financial crisis, there has been considerable corporate governance reform in the region. But such reform has proceeded on two tracks. On one track, international rules are dominant, and common accounting and financial reporting standards are essentially accepted as necessary for trade and investment. On the second track, however, local cultural norms continue to exert a strong influence on the functioning of the boards, the quality of dialogue with shareholders, and the way they manage related party transactions and capital raising. As a consequence, in these matters of internal governance—where legacy issues and culture, and not international standards, continue to be the main driving force behind governance—there continue to be significant differences among Asian countries. And thus even as convergence is occurring in certain aspects of governance, it is expected to remain limited, particularly in the functioning of boards and internal governance. As for the case of China, there was such a flurry of rule‐making in the early 2000s—a national Code of Corporate Governance in 2002, and a Directive on Quarterly Reports in 2003—that people in Hong Kong used to enjoy saying that China's corporate governance standards were higher than Hong Kong's. But if that may have been true on paper, the reality has been quite different.     

Banking Globalization and Monetary Transmission

Globalization of banking raises questions about banks’ liquidity management, their response to liquidity shocks, and the potential for international shock propagation. We conjecture that global banks manage liquidity on a global scale, actively using cross‐border internal funding in response to local shocks. Having global operations insulates banks from changes in monetary policy, while banks without global operations are more affected by monetary policy than previously found. We provide direct evidence that internal capital markets are active in global banks and contribute to the international propagation of shocks. This feature was at play during the financial crisis of 2007–2009.