Strategic Interactions Among Central Bank and National Fiscal Authorities in a Monetary Union Subject to Asymmetric Country Shocks

In this paper we extend Nordhaus’ (Brookings Pap Econ Act (2):139–199, 1994) results to an environment which may represent the current European situation, characterised by a single monetary authority and several fiscal bodies. We show that, even assuming that the monetary and the fiscal authorities share the same ideal targets, in the presence of asymmetric shocks the “symbiosis” result found by Dixit and Lambertini (J Int Econ 60:235–247, 2003) no longer obtains. Thus, fiscal rules as those envisaged in the Maastricht Treaty and in the Stability and Growth Pact may work as monetary/fiscal coordination devices that improve welfare. The imposition of common targets, however, may work as a substitute for policy coordination only if these are made state contingent, an aspect that the recent version of the Stability and Growth Pact takes into account in a more appropriate way than its original version.

Fiscal Policy and Macroeconomic Stabilizations: What are the Gains from Cooperation?

In this paper we extend the open-economy stochastic framework of Obstfeld and Rogoff (Q J Econ. 117:503–36, 2002) to include distortionary taxation, when prices are flexible but wages are sticky. We use the model to analyze the optimal design of tax rules that respond to productivity shocks, under non-cooperation and cooperation between the fiscal authorities, and evaluate the gains from coordination. We show that, although monetary policy would be preferred to fiscal policy as a stabilization tool both under competition (Nash) and under cooperation, there is a role for procyclical fiscal stabilization in a monetary union where the monetary authority cannot respond to asymmetric shocks. Moreover, we show that in the Nash game there will be an incentive for the fiscal authorities to try to manipulate the terms-of-trade in their favor, and we estimate the potential gains from fiscal policy coordination. The size of the gains depends crucially on the value of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply. For lower values of the Frisch elasticity (more in line with microeconometric estimates) the gains are relatively small, but for more elastic labor supplies (more in agreement with the business cycle literature) the gains can be very large.

Implications of Monetary Union for Catching-up Member States

We examine the implications of monetary union for macroeconomic stabilization in catching-up participating countries. We allow member states’ supply conditions to differ, especially with regard to sectoral characteristics. Sectoral productivity shocks of the type associated with the Balassa–Samuelson effect tend to hamper the stabilization properties of a currency union. In the face of aggregate supply disturbances, the stabilization costs of renouncing monetary autonomy diminish with a steeper supply curve (as induced by higher trade openness) and—barring idiosyncratic shocks—with a larger reference country size, more homogeneous supply slopes and a higher preference for price stability.

Reforms,Exchange Rates and Monetary Commitment: A Panel Analysis for OECD Countries

The paper investigates the link between monetary policy and structural reforms in open economies. We test three hypotheses: (a) the Calmfors hypothesis that the degree of reforms is higher in the case of autonomous policy and lower in the case of commitment, (b) the TINA hypothesis which implies a positive impact of a monetary policy rule on the extent of reforms, and (c) a third factors hypothesis. In our empirical analysis on panel data of 23 OECD countries from 1980–2000 we find little evidence for the Calmfors hypothesis, but evidence in favor of the TINA argument for labor market and regulatory reform.

The Transfer Problem in the Euro Area

Building on the celebrated Keynes–Ohlin debate and on Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (Rev Econ Stat 86:841–857, 2004), the paper investigates the transfer problem for the Euro area vis-à-vis the rest of the world. The analysis is developed in a theoretically and statistically consistent way and is intended as a contribution to the empirical literature on EMU. The main result of the paper is that the accumulation of net foreign asset in the Euro area is consistent with real exchange appreciation, largely through the relative price of nontradables rather than through the terms of trade.

Operators are not Parameters, the Dimensions of Operators and Variables Must be Invariant, and Indices may not be Dimensioned: Rejoinder to Professors Folsom and Gonzalez

What is certain is that mathematics cannot possibly be a valid means (to advances in economic understanding) unless and until it is used properly. That means that dimensions must be used consistently and correctly. Barnett (Barnett, Quart J Austrian Econ, pp. 27–46, 2003) is about problems with the use of mathematics in economics involving the failure to use dimensions/units consistently and correctly. Professor Emeritus Folsom and Professor Gonzalez (Folsom and Gonzalez, Quart J Austrian Econ, pp. 45–65, 2005), hereinafter F&G, say, essentially, that what is correct therein is not new and that what is new is not correct. Additionally, they imply, by raising them, that I did not address issues that I should have, e.g., how to introduce dimensions into introductory economics and problems with the Cobb-Douglas (CD) function unrelated to dimensions. Herein, because of space limitations, I respond only to some of their criticisms. Responses to others are posted on the Ludwig von Mises Institute Working Papers site.

The Costs of Increasing Transparency

In their seminal paper, Morris and Shin (Amer Econ Rev 92(5): 1521–1534, 2002a) argued that increasing the precision of public information is not always beneficial to social welfare. Svensson (Amer Econ Rev 96: 448–451, 2006) however has disputed this by saying that although feasible, the conditions for which this was true, were not all that likely. In that respect, therefore, increasing ‘transparency’ remains most of the times beneficial to social welfare. In this paper, we extend the Morris and Shin attempt by setting it up as an explicit interactive game between the Central Bank, the objectives of which we model explicitly, and the private sector. We show that in the absence of costs, both players benefit from transparency in the manner described previously in the literature, and point the differences in their gains. Following that, we then introduce the fact that increasing transparency comes at some costs and show how both players face incentives to free ride on each other as a result. The presence of costs thus alters the way in which greater transparency is attained.

Fiscal Leadership and Coordination in the EMU

We analyze the role of fiscal-monetary policy interactions and fiscal coordination in EMU under the assumption of strategic wage setting in unionized labour markets. We find that production subsidies and real wage distortions are strategic complements. The literature on macroeconomic stabilisation policies and policy games usually neglects this point and reaches overoptimistic conclusions about the desirable effects of accommodating fiscal policies. Central bank preferences also affect the desirability of fiscal coordination in a monetary union. In fact, contrary to Beetsma and Bovenberg (1998), we find that fiscal coordination improves outcomes in the case of a conservative central banker, whereas it leads to worse outcomes with a populist one.

Taking Advantage of an Untapped Pool: Assessing the Success of African American Head Coaches in the National Football League

Noting that only five African American coaches had been hired to lead National Football League (NFL) teams from 1989–2002, Madden (J of Sports Econ, 5(1):6–19 2004) found that teams coached by African Americans in the NFL outperformed their counterparts in the regular season but were significantly below average in the playoffs. This analysis, with data that includes nine African American coaches and extends through 2007, reconfirms Madden’s finding that African American head coaches outperform their rivals in the regular season, but also finds that African American coaches no longer suffer from poor playoff performance. Using fixed effects pooled cross section time series models, this analysis confirms that teams with African American head coaches can expect more wins in the regular season than their peers, other things equal. However, there is some evidence that as the pool of African American coaching talent diminishes from additional hires their extraordinary performance may be slightly regressing. The playoff analysis shows that that when controlling for seeding, organizational strength and regular season wins, African American coaches perform at the same level as their counterparts.

International Financial Aggregation and Index Number Theory: A Chronological Half-century Empirical Overview

This paper comprises a survey of a half century of research on international monetary aggregate data. We argue that since monetary assets began yielding interest, the simple sum monetary aggregates have had no foundations in economic theory and have sequentially produced one source of misunderstanding after another. The bad data produced by simple sum aggregation have contaminated research in monetary economics, have resulted in needless “paradoxes,” and have produced decades of misunderstandings in international monetary economics research and policy. While better data, based correctly on index number theory and aggregation theory, now exist, the official central bank data most commonly used have not improved in most parts of the world. While aggregation theoretic monetary aggregates exist for internal use at the European Central Bank, the Bank of Japan, and many other central banks throughout the world, the only central banks that currently make aggregation theoretic monetary aggregates available to the public are the Bank of England and the St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank. No other area of economics has been so seriously damaged by data unrelated to valid index number and aggregation theory. In this paper we chronologically review the past research in this area and connect the data errors with the resulting policy and inference errors. Future research on monetary aggregation and policy can most advantageously focus on extensions to exchange rate risk and its implications for multilateral aggregation over monetary asset portfolios containing assets denominated in more than one currency. The relevant theory for multilateral aggregation with exchange rate risk has been derived by Barnett (J Econom 136(2):457–482, 2007) and Barnett and Wu (Ann Finance 1:35–50, 2005).

Market structure and the link between migration and trade

Many recent studies have looked at the impact of international migration on trade and found a significant effect. They posit that migration fosters trade by lowering costs or by means of a preference bias. However, to my knowledge, market structure has not as yet been considered. Using data from Switzerland, this paper empirically assesses the extent to which migration affects trade, taking goods differentiation into account. A monopolistic model with a multisector economy (Chaney in Am Econ Rev 98(41):1707–1721, 2008) is then empirically estimated. The findings show that market structure explains the different channels through which migration affects trade.

Economic,Political, and Institutional Prerequisites for Monetary Union Among the Members of the Gulf Cooperation Council

The paper reviews the arguments for and against monetary union among the six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council—the United Arab Emirates, the State of Bahrain, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Sultanate of Oman, the State of Qatar and the State of Kuwait. Both technical economic arguments and political economy considerations are discussed. I conclude that there is an economic case for GCC monetary union, but that it is not overwhelming. The lack of economic integration among the GCC members is striking. Without anything approaching the free movement of goods, services, capital and persons among the six GCC member countries, the case for monetary union is mainly based on the small size of all GCC members other than Saudi Arabia, and their high degree of openness. Indeed, even without the creation of a monetary union, there could be significant advantages to all GCC members, from both an economic and a security perspective, from greater economic integration, through the creation of a true common market for goods, services, capital and labour, and from deeper political integration. The political arguments against monetary union at this juncture appear overwhelming, however. The absence of effective supranational political institutions encompassing the six GCC members means that there could be no effective political accountability of the GCC central bank. The surrender of political sovereignty inherent in joining a monetary union would therefore not be perceived as legitimate by an increasingly politically sophisticated citizenry. I believe that monetary union among the GCC members will occur only as part of a broad and broadly based movement towards far-reaching political integration. And there is little evidence of that as yet.

Whither A Currency Union in Greater China?

The paper attempts to evaluate the prospect of creating a currency union in the “Greater China” economic area. Despite of the political deadlock and military confrontation in the Taiwan Strait, the Greater China area has experienced rapid and spontaneous regional integration in the past decades as a result of increasingly cross-border trade, foreign direct investment (FDI), technology contracts, and other arrangements in accordance with changes in comparative advantage and industrial upgrading in these economies. In this study, we focus on the symmetry in shocks that is perceived as one of the major preconditions of a currency union. In contrast to the previous studies, we investigate the time-varying correlation of supply, REER and monetary shocks by using the Kalman filter technique to assess the dynamic changes in structural similarity and convergence among the Greater China economies. We also examine the costs of forming a currency union in the area due to the loss of monetary autonomy in each economy. Our results suggest that there is a rising structural symmetry between the Greater China economies, and this area has become increasingly a better candidate for a monetary union.

Policy coordination in East Asia and across the Pacific

In this paper, we construct a macro-econometric model that describes the economic activity in the Asia-Pacific area and provide quantitative insights into the recent policy debates on monetary and currency coordination among the East Asian economies. The model includes a wide variety of monetary and currency policy rules that the East Asian economies adopt and allows for one country's policymaking to have substantial effects on foreign countries. We apply the model to three current policy issues: (1) the desirability of currency basket pegs in East Asia, (2) the anticipated effects of China's currency policy reform, and (3) the non-negativity constraint on Japanese nominal interest rates. The simulation analyses show the external economy effects of policy rules quantitatively and suggest the difficulty of monetary and currency policy coordination among the East Asian economies.

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Monetary Policy in Illiquid Markets: Options for a Small Open Economy

Two impediments to effective monetary policy operation include illiquidity in bond markets and the zero bound of interest rates. Under these conditions alternative means of enacting monetary policy may be required. This paper empirically explores policy options implemented through equity and currency markets that will generate similar inflation responses at different time horizons. In terms of GDP loss the least costly means of achieving a particular long run inflation outcome is via the current monetary policy arrangements. Currency market alternatives are volatile but less expensive than the equity market in terms of output loss for short term inflation horizons.

Currency Unions: Some Lessons from the Euro-Zone

Whilst there are many sizeable benefits from currency union, the main disadvantage is often the difficulty of adjusting to an asymmetric shock. Such adjustment is easier when the separate countries (regions) in such a union have flexible labour markets, and when there is a federal fiscal system to ease the adjustment process. The euro-zone has neither. We show that the trends in relative unit labour costs have in several recent cases been worsening relative competitiveness, thereby putting the euro-zone under greater centrifugal pressure. Nevertheless the costs of ‘exit’ are so high that it would only probably occur as a consequence of political mis-calculation.

Optimal Taxes and Tariffs with Private Information

The implications of private information regarding a worker’s skills for optimal tax policy in an open economy are explored. Two cases are considered. In one general skills are private information and in the other sector-specific skills are private information. It is shown that for a small open economy tariffs and other equivalent trade distortions are not part of the optimal tax policy in either case. In both cases the optimal policy distorts the labor–leisure choice but only in the case of sector-specific skills as private information are labor allocation decisions distorted. For a large country, distortions that are equivalent to the standard optimal tariff formula characterize the optimal tax policy.

Introducing Instruments of Central Bank Accountability in a Monetary Union

With an increasing number of independent central banks, accountability of central banks is also getting more attention. This paper analyses the possibility of introducing instruments of central bank accountability in a monetary union. In our model, monetary policy is influenced by the governments of the member states according to the degree of independence granted to the central bank. Instruments of democratic accountability are introduced which generate different expected losses for a government. The amount of the expected loss will determine the approval of a government to the implementation of a particular mechanism. We show that the agreement between the governments will only be unanimous for the definition of the inflation target of the central bank.

Resurrecting Keynes to Stabilize the International Monetary System

We adapt the basic principles of the Keynes Plan and argue for the creation of a supranational bank money (SBM) that would coexist along side national currencies and for the establishment of a new international clearing union (NICU). These principles remain timely because the fundamental causes of the instability of the international monetary system are as valid today as they were in the early forties. The new supranational money would be created against domestic earning assets of the Fed and the ECB and its quantity would be demand-driven. Our proposal is not an agreement on exchange rates, which while possible is not essential to the functioning of the SBM. NICU would not hold open positions in assets denominated in national currency and consequently would not bear exchange rate risk. NICU would be more than an office recording credit and debit entries of the supranational bank money. The financial tsunami that hit the world economy in 2007–2008 provides a unique opportunity for a coordinated strategy.