Towards a History of American Institutional Economics

This paper focuses on a number of issues that have arisen in my efforts to deal with the history of American institutional economics in the interwar period. The specific issues addressed here are (1) the choice of time frame; (2) the definition of institutionalism in terms of its commonly held ideas; (3) the treatment of the network of personal contacts that make up the institutional movement; (4) the treatment of certain institutional and cross-disciplinary connections and supports; and (5) the variety of reasons lying behind the relative decline in the position of institutional economics after World War II. Each of these issues is discussed in light of historical material and examples and with a view to detailing the specific challenges and possible solutions involved.     

Inside Institutions of Progressive-Era Social Sciences: The Interdisciplinarity of Economics and Sociology

In the Progressive Era, sociology and institutional economics shared some important methodological principles and theoretical constructs. This study explores some of these similarities, focusing on the ideas and theories of Albion Small and Franklin Giddings, who were the most important sociologists in the United States at the turn of the twentieth century. Since the literature on the history of the interdisciplinarity of economics and sociology is somewhat scarce, this study aims to contribute to this historiography by considering the methodological and theoretical underpinnings of early institutional economics — mainly from the standpoint of Veblenian institutional economics.     

马克思主义与制度经济学

新制度经济学是对古典制度经济学的复归,而马克思的政治经济学则是古典制度经济学的集大成者.从古典制度经济学到新制度经济学的发展,体现了经济学演进历史的内在逻辑性.但是,马克思制度经济学与新制度经济学存在着根本分歧:前者以揭示经济制度的本质为目的;后者以为市场经济运行服务为目的.这种根本分歧的存在,决定了我们不应将二者的理论基点和研究方法混为一谈.     

制度经济学三大流派的比较与评析

20世纪二三十年代之后,西方经济学在经济理论上陷入持久的危机。制度经济学派就是在批判传统的主流经济学——新古典主义的基础上发展起来的。制度经济学按其类型一般分为以凡勃仑、康芒斯为代表的早期制度经济学,以加尔布雷斯、缪尔达尔为代表的后制度经济学和以科斯、诺斯为代表的新制度经济学。它们分别代表了三种制度观和三种研究思路与方法,各有其合理性和局限性。目前,国内经济学界往往热衷于新制度经济学的研究与介绍,而对于另外两大制度学派的研究却甚为冷清。只知晓其中一种而忽视其他,很难说就掌握了制度理论的精髓。只有了解制度学派的全貌,并对它们进行比较和鉴别,才能更为深入地了解制度经济学学说,才有可能形成较为客观的认识与判断。     

中国经济学三大理论的局限性

作为致用之学的经济学理论在中国已经形成了西方经济学、马克思经济学、马克思主义经济学、发展经济学、制度经济学等流派,从而打破了20世纪80年代以前马克思主义经济学一统天下的格局,实现了经济学理论的多元化。但是,由于中国具体的经济实践和制度环境上的原因,西方经济学、马克思主义经济学和发展经济学三大经济学理论的中国化具有十分重要的理论意义和现实意义。     

An Analysis of the Marginal Products of the One- and Two-Semester Introductory Economics Courses

The authors examine whether the administrative location of an economics department in a business versus liberal arts school alters the character of the economics program provided to undergraduate majors. To test this hypothesis, they constructed a curricular character index (CCI) based on a detailed accounting of assorted dimensions of an economics major. The CCI served as the dependent variable in a regression model that controlled for other institutional attributes that could influence curricular character. The sample of 148 primarily undergraduate institutions was selected to impose some semblance of a ceteris paribus environment. Contrary to earlier findings, the empirical results strongly indicate that the administrative location of an economics department in business versus liberal arts schools significantly changes the character of the program offered to majors.     

Planning and Urban Growth: An Anglo-American Comparison

Understanding the complexity of institutional change is a necessary step in gaining deeper knowledge of economic performance over time, and it is one of the main challenges in the research agenda of institutionalism. Institutional change can be studied using a variety of theoretical approaches. We study some of the main approaches to institutional change in original economic institutionalism and new institutional economics. First, after comparing the approaches of Émile Durkheim and Thorstein Veblen, we focus on the contributions of the instrumental value theory and other original institutional traditions in the study of institutional change. Second, new institutional economics improved on the weak points of rational choice institutionalism regarding institutional change and incorporated the “institutions-as-rules” approach (Douglass North) and the “institutions-as-equilibria” approach (Avner Greif, Masahiko Aoki). We analyze both approaches to institutional change. Furthermore, we present an updated nonintegral overview of approaches to institutional change, show several interconnections between original and new institutionalisms, and conclude that the dialogue between the different theories of institutional change is relevant and beneficial.     

制度变迁是自然无序的还是历史必然?——论演化思潮的复兴对马克思主义经济学发展的意义

马克思主义经济学与现代演化经济学具有相同的研究传统,都强调用历史和演化的观点来分析经济问题,都强调技术进步在制度变迁中的意义,但两者的制度演化观有着本质区别。前者强调生产力在社会发展中的决定意义,并认为社会由低级向高级的发展是历史的必然。后者强调创造性的个人心智在制度变迁中的源泉作用,并强调演化的无目的性、无方向性和多样性。因此前者贯彻的是唯物哲学观,后者渗透的是唯心观。霍奇逊的演化标准从侧面印证现代演化论者决不是马克思主义者。     

Are We Forgetting Something? Remarks on the Connections Between Douglass North’s Contributions and Original Institutional Economics

Douglass North’s latest works have become central to the current discussion regarding the differences and similarities between new institutional economics (NIE) and original institutional economics (OIE). We seek to contribute to this debate by offering a specific analytical perspective to evaluating North’s contributions. After defining a set of philosophical and methodological principles that specifies OIE, we endeavor to verify if and how North’s work relates to these foundations. We believe that this methodological perspective brings to light a fundamental issue not stressed by earlier analyses: the profound difference between the institutionalisms regarding the role of market order as a mechanism of human sociability.     

Property and Economic Power as Issues in Institutional Economics

In the first part of this two-part paper, I presented an "irenic" reconciliation of the three apparently contradictory definitions of "institution" within original institutional economics (OIE), employing the methodology of critical institutionalism. The critical institutionalist reconciliation of these definitions conceptualizes institutions as an emergent process by which the internal and necessary relations of social structure as collective action, mediated through agency, results in the control, expansion, and liberation of the individual action of social actors in transactions. In short, an institution is the emergent process of social structure actualized in transactions (social action). Institutions, therefore, not only have a structural existence, but also an actual existence as they are the process of the emergence of the actual (in transactions) from the structural. Institutions are multi-level processes and cannot be reduced to structures, actions, behaviors, or patterns of behaviors. In this part, I demonstrate the significance of this reconciliation in two areas. The first is its ability to further differentiate the institutional definition of economics as "the science of social provisioning" from the mainstream definition of economics as "a relationship between ends and scarce means" by decomposing the institutional definition into its productive and distributive processes. The second is its usefulness in modeling the interaction of non-economic social institutions with economic institutions at varying levels of detail. I also introduce critical institutional analysis, and use as a method, for model-building and use it to build models of communal, feudal, and industrial capitalist economies.     

Narrativity and identity in the representation of the economic agent

We critically survey explicit discussions of the narrativity of economic agents by economists. Narrativity broadly refers to the way humans construct and use stories, notably to define their personal identity. We borrow from debates outside of economics to provide the critical dimension of our survey. Most contributions on the narrativity of economic agents do not discuss one another. To establish communication, we suggest a structure of oppositions that characterize these contributions taken as a whole. These oppositions are notably characterized by three tensions: in terms of methodological attitudes (‘scientism’ vs. ‘humanism’), of underlying theories of personal identity postulating the existence of a unique sense of self or not (‘diachronicity’ vs. ‘episodicity’) and of the normative implications of narrativity (‘welfare-increasing’ vs. ‘welfare-decreasing’). The main goal is to clarify the structure of opposite positions within a more or less explicit debate about the identity of individuals in economics.     

What If There Are No Conventional Price Mechanisms?

Inspired by Frederic (“Fred”) S. Lee’s theoretical contribution to institutional-heterodox economics, I make the case that the neoclassical price mechanism is not only flawed, but also irrelevant for the study of actual coordination mechanisms, hence the price mechanism — as a theory as well as a way of thinking — should be discarded. While this position was addressed by early institutionalists, starting with Thorstein Veblen, later institutionalists have not completely rejected the price mechanism. The sympathy for the price mechanism has prevented institutionalists (and other heterodox economists) from fully developing an alternative theoretical framework concerning how actual economic activities are organized. I, therefore, provide an institutionalist-heterodox framework of the provisioning process focusing on business enterprise activities. This framework shows how institutional economics becomes more refined and useful when it is married to other traditions in heterodox economics, in particular, Marxian, social, and post-Keynesian economics. Such an integrative approach is what Fred Lee showed through his work toward producing a better theory and policy for the underlying population.     

Theoretical Issues of Gender in the Transition from Socialist Regimes

Institutional economics is often presented by its critics as a tradition in political economy purporting a mechanistic, robot-like, view of the human agent. In this paper this portrayal of institutional economics is rejected and choice is reclaimed for institutionalism. In fact, institutional economics is not committed to an understanding of behavior as mere stimulus-response. Notwithstanding the fact that institutionalism places great emphasis on habit in human conduct, this does not mean that it excludes autonomy, volition or rationality.

The paper addresses the notion of habit within the pragmatist-institutionalist tradition with the aim of clarifying this concept, disentangling it from current misconceptions. With the intention of contributing to the development of a theory of choice in institutionalism, it then deals with deliberation and choice in the pragmatist literature, namely in John Dewey's Human Action and Conduct. Finally, the implications of deliberation thus conceived, namely in respect to collective action and institutional change, are highlighted.     

The Legal-Economic Nexus from the Perspective of New Institutional Economists and Original Institutional Economists

There are two institutional economics approaches to law and economics. New institutional economists prescribe that arbitrators foster efficiency in setting economic disputes and original institutional economists focus on creating reasonable values – that is, balancing efficiency and justice. Disequilibrium between desired efficiency and perceived fairness triggers agency and is a source of coevolution of law and economics.     

经济学中的行为研究

经济学的行为研究总的来说遵循由隐含的、先验的幕后假设逐步走向台前的路径.以对主流经济学的经济人行为假设的修正为起点,行为研究的枝蔓逐渐扩散开来,并在行为经济学、实验经济学和制度经济学等分支中扎根,从多角度认识经济行为的细微末节,将经济学研究推向更为微观的领域,逐步实现向有限理性的真实经济活动面貌回归.     

Progress,Inconsistencies, and Neglect in the Social Control of Railway Freight Transport

We focus on the complementarity between original institutional economics, Mario Bunge’s framework of systemism, and the formal tools developed by complexity economists, especially in the context of agent-based modeling. We assert that original institutional economics might profit from exploiting this complementarity.     

经济地理学与经济学关系的历史考察

经济地理学发展不仅与人文地理的其他分支交互发展,并从包括经济学在内的社会科学内吸收营养。文章通过历史性地考察经济地理学与经济学关系,尝试探索经济地理学未来的发展趋势。通过考察发现:古典经济地理学时期,经济地理学与经济学相互交织、彼此影响;1930、1940时代到1970、1980年代,经济学引领经济地理发展,而经济地理学者没有对主流经济学产生重大影响;1980年代末和1990年代初期,经济地理学吸收经济学相关理论,实现了文化、制度和关系的转向,同时主流经济学则出现了地理化趋势,出现了新经济地理学运动。1980年代以来,演化思想在经济学界逐渐兴盛起来,演化经济学理论已得到越来越多的经济学家的重视,在20世纪90年代,经济地理学家接受了演化经济学的基本概念,开始尝试构建演化经济地理学理论框架。演化经济地理学是经济地理和经济学的下一个交叉点。     

A probabilistic ghost in the experimental machine

This paper focuses on the opposition between two contemporary research programs in economics: behavioral economics (BE) and experimental market economics (EME). Our claim is that the arguments of this opposition can be clarified through the lens of another opposition in the philosophy of probability and in probability theory, between Bayesianism and frequentism. We show how this probabilistic opposition has indirectly shaped a controversy in psychology that opposes two research programs – Heuristics and Biases and Ecological Rationality – which play respective roles in the foundations of individual rationality in BE and EME. To understand these theoretical interrelationships, we investigate the 1996 controversy between Kahneman, Tversky, and Gigerenzer. Those psychologists held different views on how probabilistic representations influence the context-dependency of rationality. This provides a rationale to suggest that a probabilistic ghost may be haunting the experimental machine in economics, and explains how and why the oppositions between BE and EME are structured around the interplay between the norms of rationality and the context in which rationality is exercised.     

Inside the Organizational Institutions of Institutional Economics: Why Are There Two Institutionalist Associations?

The institutionalist-inspired Association for Evolutionary Economics (AFEE), officially founded in 1965, was the first heterodox association to break with the American Economic Association (AEA). In 1979, another institutionalist association, the Association for Institutional Thought (AFIT), was founded. Using mainly archival evidence, this paper provides historical reasons for the presence of two institutionalist associations.