Getting offshoring right

The prospect of offshoring and outsourcing business processes has captured the imagination of CEOs everywhere. In the past five years, a rising number of companies in North America and Europe have experimented with this strategy, hoping to reduce costs and gain strategic advantage. But many businesses have had mixed results. According to several studies, half the organizations that have shifted processes offshore have failed to generate the expected financial benefits. What's more, many of them have faced employee resistance and consumer dissatisfaction. Clearly, companies have to rethink how they formulate their offshoring strategies. A three-part methodology can help. First, companies need to prioritize their processes, ranking each based on two criteria: the value it creates for customers and the degree to which the company can capture some of that value. Companies will want to keep their core (highest-priority) processes in-house and consider outsourcing their commodity (low-priority) processes; critical (moderate-priority) processes are up for debate and must be considered carefully. Second, businesses should analyze all the risks that accompany offshoring and look systematically at their critical and commodity processes in terms of operational risk (the risk that processes won't operate smoothly after being offshored) and structural risk (the risk that relationships with service providers may not work as expected). Finally, companies should determine possible locations for their offshore efforts, as well as the organizational forms--such as captive centers and joint ventures--that those efforts might take. They can do so by examining each process's operational and structural risks side by side. This article outlines the tools that will help companies choose the right processes to offshore. It also describes a new organizational structure called the extended organization, in which companies specify the quality of services they want and work alongside providers to get that quality.     

Building breakthrough businesses within established organizations

Many companies assume that once they've launched a major innovation, growth will soon follow. It's not that simple. High-potential new businesses within established companies face stiff headwinds well after their inception. That's why a company's emphasis must shift: from ideas to execution and from leadership excellence to organizational excellence. The authors spent five years chronicling new businesses at the New York Times Company, Analog Devices, Corning, Hasbro, and other organizations. They found that a breakthrough new business (referred to as NewCo) rarely coexists gracefully with the established business in the company (called CoreCo). The unnatural combination creates three specific challenges--forgetting, borrowing, and learning--that NewCo must meet in order to survive and grow. NewCo must first forget some of what made CoreCo successful. NewCo and CoreCo have elemental differences, so NewCo must leave behind CoreCo's notions about what skills and competencies are most valuable. NewCo must also borrow some of CoreCo's assets--usually in one or two key areas that will give NewCo a crucial competitive advantage. Incremental cost reductions, for example, are never a sufficient justification for borrowing. Finally, NewCo must be prepared to learn some things from scratch. Because strategic experiments are highly uncertain endeavors, NewCo will face several critical unknowns. The more rapidly it can resolve those unknowns--that is, the faster it can learn--the sooner it will zero in on a winning business model or exit a hopeless situation. Managers can accelerate this learning by planning more simply and more often and by comparing predicted and actual trends.     

The ambidextrous organization

Corporate executives must constantly look backward, attending to the products and processes of the past, while also gazing forward, preparing for the innovations that will define the future. This mental balancing act is one of the toughest of all managerial challenges--it requires executives to explore new opportunities even as they work diligently to exploit existing capabilities--and it's no surprise that few companies do it well. But as every businessperson knows, there are companies that do. What's their secret? These organizations separate their new, exploratory units from their traditional, exploitative ones, allowing them to have different processes, structures, and cultures; at the same time, they maintain tight links across units at the senior executive level. Such "ambidextrous organizations," as the authors call them, allow executives to pioneer radical or disruptive innovations while also pursuing incremental gains. Of utmost importance to the ambidextrous organization are ambidextrous managers--executives who have the ability to understand and be sensitive to the needs of very different kinds of businesses. They possess the attributes of rigorous cost cutters and free-thinking entrepreneurs while also maintaining the objectivity required to make difficult trade-offs. Almost every company needs to renew itself through the creation of breakthrough products and processes, but it shouldn't do so at the expense of its traditional business. Building an ambidextrous organization is by no means easy, but the structure itself, combining organizational separation with senior team integration, is not difficult to understand. Given the executive will to make it happen, any company can become ambidextrous.     

Launching a world-class joint venture

More than 5,000 joint ventures, and many more contractual alliances, have been launched worldwide in the past five years. Companies are realizing that JVs and alliances can be lucrative vehicles for developing new products, moving into new markets, and increasing revenues. The problem is, the success rate for JVs and alliances is on a par with that for mergers and acquisitions--which is to say not very good. The authors, all McKinsey consultants, argue that JV success remains elusive for most companies because they don't pay enough attention to launch planning and execution. Most companies are highly disciplined about integrating the companies they target through M&A, but they rarely commit sufficient resources to launching similarly sized joint ventures or alliances. As a result, the parent companies experience strategic conflicts, governance gridlock, and missed operational synergies. Often, they walk away from the deal. The launch phase begins with the parent companies' signing of a memorandum of understanding and continues through the first 100 days of the JV or alliance's operation. During this period, it's critical for the parents to convene a team dedicated to exposing inherent tensions early. Specifically, the launch team must tackle four basic challenges. First, build and maintain strategic alignment across the separate corporate entities, each of which has its own goals, market pressures, and shareholders. Second, create a shared governance system for the two parent companies. Third, manage the economic interdependencies between the corporate parents and the JV. And fourth, build a cohesive, high-performing organization (the JV or alliance)--not a simple task, since most managers come from, will want to return to, and may even hold simultaneous positions in the parent companies. Using real-world examples, the authors offer their suggestions for meeting these challenges.     

Lead from the center. How to manage divisions dynamically

Conventional wisdom holds that a company's divisions should be given almost total autonomy--especially under conditions of uncertainty--because they are closer to emerging technologies, customers, and competitors than corporate headquarters could ever be. But research from Michael Raynor and Joseph Bower suggests that the corporate office should be more, not less, directive in turbulent markets. Rapid changes in an industry make it difficult to predict where and when synergies among divisions might emerge. With so many possibilities and such uncertainty, companies can't afford to sacrifice their ability to flexibly execute business strategy. Corporate headquarters must play an active role in defining the scope of division-level strategy, the authors say, so that divisions do not act in ways that undermine opportunities to collaborate in the future. But neither can companies afford to sacrifice the competitiveness of their divisions as stand-alone businesses. In creating corporate-level strategic flexibility, a corporate office must balance the need for divisional autonomy now with the potential need for cooperation in the future. Through an examination of four corporations--Sprint, WPP, Teradyne, and Viacom--the authors challenge traditional approaches to diversification in which a company's divisions are either related (they share resources and collaborate) or unrelated (they compete for resources and operate as stand-alone businesses). They argue that companies should adopt a dynamic approach to cooperation among divisions, enabling varying degrees of relatedness between divisions depending on strategic circumstances. The authors offer four tactics to help executives manage divisions dynamically.     

To succeed in the long-term, focus on the middle-term

When a mature company fails to endure over the long term, it's often due to the "Horizon 2 vacuum," argues Moore, author of Crossing the Chasm and several other books on innovation strategy, and managing director of the consulting firm TCG Advisors. The reference is to the strategic horizons outlined by McKinsey's Mehrdad Baghai and colleagues in The Alchemy of Growth: Horizon 1 is today's cash-generating business, Horizon 2 is the set of innovations just being commercialized, and Horizon 3 consists of forward-thinking R&D. Most companies understand they must invest in their future, so the funding and management of Horizon 3 is not the problem. The trouble starts when those innovations are brought to market and must compete with the mainstay business for company resources. They disappear from top management's radar screen and suffer a level of neglect few ventures could survive. Cisco Systems is one company that has recognized the problem and tried to address it. To begin with, CEO John Chambers has insulated Horizon 2 projects from many of the pressures of Horizon 1--for example, by reorchestrating sales coverage so that emerging markets won't be neglected. He has also kick-started some Horizon 2 businesses by augmenting them with acquisitions, increasing their scale, and giving them more management attention. For the same reason, he has challenged his head of product development to think in terms of new businesses, not simply new products--knowing that the latter tend to get lost in salespeople's bags. Most important, Cisco is handicapping its Horizon 2 projects so that they need not compete head-to-head with established businesses. Their success is judged by metrics that are appropriate to new businesses, and they are given the benefit of Cisco's best managerial talent.     

Beyond offshoring: assess your company's global potential

In the past few years, companies have become aware that they can slash costs by offshoring: moving jobs to lower-wage locations. But this practice is just the tip of the iceberg in terms of how globalization can transform industries, according to research by the McKinsey Global Institute (MGI). The institute's yearlong study suggests that by streamlining their production processes and supply chains globally, rather than just nationally or regionally, companies can lower their costs-as we've seen in the consumer-electronics and PC industries. Companies can save as much as 70% of their total costs through globalization--50% from offshoring, 5% from training and business-task redesign, and 15% from process improvements. But they don't have to stop there. The cost reductions make it possible to lower prices and expand into new markets, attracting whole new classes of customers. To date, however, few businesses have recognized the full scope of performance improvements that globalization makes possible, much less developed sound strategies for capturing those opportunities. In this article, Diana Farrell, director of MGI, offers a step-by-step approach to doing both things. Among her suggestions: Assess where your industry falls along the globalization spectrum, because not all sectors of the economy face the same challenges and opportunities at the same time. Also, pay attention to production, regulatory, and organizational barriers to globalization. If any of these can be changed, size up the cost-saving (and revenue-generating) opportunities that will emerge for your company as a result of those changes. Farrell also defines the five stages of globalization-market entry, product specialization, value chain disaggregation, value chain reengineering, and the creation of new markets-and notes the different levers for cutting costs and creating value that companies can use in each phase.     

Cracking the code of change

Today's fast-paced economy demands that businesses change or die. But few companies manage corporate transformations as well as they would like. The brutal fact is that about 70% of all change initiatives fail. In this article, authors Michael Beer and Nitin Nohria describe two archetypes--or theories--of corporate transformation that may help executives crack the code of change. Theory E is change based on economic value: shareholder value is the only legitimate measure of success, and change often involves heavy use of economic incentives, layoffs, downsizing, and restructuring. Theory O is change based on organizational capability: the goal is to build and strengthen corporate culture. Most companies focus purely on one theory or the other, or haphazardly use a mix of both, the authors say. Combining E and O is directionally correct, they contend, but it requires a careful, conscious integration plan. Beer and Nohria present the examples of two companies, Scott Paper and Champion International, that used a purely E or purely O strategy to create change--and met with limited levels of success. They contrast those corporate transformations with that of UK-based retailer ASDA, which has successfully embraced the paradox between the opposing theories of change and integrated E and O. The lesson from ASDA? To thrive and adapt in the new economy, companies must make sure the E and O theories of business change are in sync at their own organizations.     

Selection bias and the perils of benchmarking

To find the secrets of business success, what could be more natural than studying successful businesses? In fact, nothing could be more dangerous, warns this Stanford professor. Generalizing from the examples of successful companies is like generalizing about New England weather from data taken only in the summer. That's essentially what businesspeople do when they learn from good examples and what consultants, authors, and researchers do when they study only existing companies or--worse yet--only high-performing companies. They reach conclusions from unrepresentative data samples, falling into the classic statistical trap of selection bias. Drawing on a wealth of case studies, for instance, one researcher concluded that great leaders share two key traits: They persist, often despite initial failures, and they are able to persuade others to join them. But those traits are also the hallmarks of spectacularly unsuccessful entrepreneurs, who must persist in the face of failure to incur large losses and must be able to persuade others to pour their money down the drain. To discover what makes a business successful, then, managers should look at both successes and failures. Otherwise, they will overvalue risky business practices, seeing only those companies that won big and not the ones that lost dismally. They will not be able to tell if their current good fortune stems from smart business practices or if they are actually coasting on past accomplishments or good luck. Fortunately, economists have developed relatively simple tools that can correct for selection bias even when data about failed companies are hard to come by. Success may be inspirational, but managers are more likely to find the secrets of high performance if they give the stories of their competitors'failures as full a hearing as they do the stories of dazzling successes.     

MarketBusting: strategies for exceptional business growth

If company leaders were granted a single wish, it would surely be for a reliable way to create new growth businesses. Business practitioners'overwhelming interest in this subject prompted the authors to conduct a three-year study of organizational growth--specifically, to find out which growth strategies were most successful. They discovered, somewhat to their surprise, that even companies in mature industries found rich new sources of growth when they reconfigured their unit of business (what they bill customers for) or their key metrics (how they measure success). In this article, the authors outline these and other moves companies can make to redefine their profit drivers and realize low-risk growth. They offer plenty of real-world examples. For instance: CHANGING YOUR UNIT OF BUSINESS: Once a conventional printing house, Madden Communications not only prints promotional materials for customers but also manages the distribution and installation of those materials on-site. Its revenues grew from dollars 1o million in 1990 to dollars 133 million in 2004, in an industry that many had come to regard as hopelessly mature. IMPROVING YOUR KEY METRICS-PARTICULARLY PRODUCTIVITY: Lamons Gasket, with dollars 80 million in revenues, built a Web site that radically improved its customers' ability to find, order, and pay for goods. The firm's market share rose along with its customer retention rate. The authors also suggest ways to identify your unit of business and associated key metrics and recognize the obstacles to changing them; review the key customer segments you serve; assess the need for new capabilities and the potential for internal resistance to change; and communicate to internal and external constituencies the changes you wish to make in your unit of business or key metrics.     

The ambidextrous CEO

Although most managers publicly acknowledge the need to explore new businesses and markets, the claims of established businesses on company resources almost always come first, especially when times are hard. When top teams allow the tension between core and speculative units to play out at lower levels of management, innovation loses out. At best, leaders of core business units dismiss innovation initiatives as irrelevancies. At worst, they see the new businesses as threats to the firm's core identity and values. Many CEOs take a backseat in debates over resources, ceding much of their power to middle managers, and the company ends up as a collection of feudal baronies. This is a recipe for long-term failure, say the authors. Their research of 12 top management teams at major companies suggests that firms thrive only when senior teams lead ambidextrously--when they foster a state of constant creative conflict between the old and the new. Successful CEOs first develop a broad, forward-looking strategic aspiration that sets ambitious targets both for innovation and core business growth. They then hold the tension between innovation unit demands and core business demands at the very top of the organization. And finally they embrace inconsistency, allowing themselves the latitude to pursue multiple and often conflicting agendas.     

CRM done right

Disappointed by the high costs and elusive benefits, early adopters of customer relationship management systems came, in the post dot-com era, to view the technology as just another overhyped IT investment whose initial promise would never be fulfilled. But this year, something unexpected is happening. System sales are rising, and executives are reporting satisfaction with their CRM investments. What's changed? A wide range of companies are successfully taking a pragmatic, disciplined approach to CRM. Rather than use it to transform entire businesses, they've directed their investments toward solving clearly defined problems within their customer relationship cycle. The authors have distilled the experiences of these CRM leaders into four questions that all companies should ask themselves as they launch their own CRM initiatives: Is the problem strategic? Is the system focused on the pain point? Do we need perfect data? What's the right way to expand an initial implementation? The questions reflect a new realism about when and how to deploy CRM to best advantage. Understanding that highly accurate and timely data are not required everywhere in their businesses, CRM leaders have tailored their real-time initiatives to those customer relationships that can be significantly enhanced by "perfect" information. Once they've succeeded with their first targeted CRM project, they can use it as a springboard for solving additional problems. CRM, in other words, is coming to resemble any other valuable management tool, and the keys to successful implementation are also becoming familiar: strong executive and business-unit leadership, careful strategic planning, clear performance measures, and a coordinated program that combines organizational and process changes with the application of new technology.     

Value acceleration: lessons from private-equity masters

The most successful private-equity firms regularly spearhead dramatic business transformations, creating exceptional returns for their investors. To understand how those firms do it, the authors studied more than 2,000 PE transactions over the past ten years and discovered that the top performers' success stems from the rigor with which they manage their businesses. This article describes the four management disciplines vital to the success of the best PE firms. First, for each business, they define an investment thesis: a brief, clear statement of how to make the business more valuable within three to five years. The thesis, which guides all actions by the company, usually focuses on growth. PE firms know that the demonstration of a path to strong growth produces the big returns on investment. Second, they don't measure too much. They zero in on a few financial indicators that most clearly reveal the business's progress in increasing its value. They watch cash more closely than earnings and tailor performance measures to each business, rather than imposing one set of measures across their entire portfolio. Third, they work their balance sheets, mining undervalued assets, turning fixed assets into sources of financing, and aggressively managing their physical capital. Last, they make the center the shareholder. Corporate staffs in PE firms make unsentimental investment decisions, buying and selling businesses when the price is right and bringing in new management when performance falters. These firms also keep their corporate centers extremely lean. By adopting these four disciplines, executives at public companies should be able to reap significantly greater returns from their own business units.     

后危机时代：建立企业和社会之间的新契约

金融危机是当前世界面临的重要挑战,在危机中,我们发现,注重可持续性的企业往往更容易走出低谷,渡过难关。事实上,在人类发展的整个历史当中,经济都是有起起伏伏变化的,未来还会有金融危机的事情发生。那么,在后危机时代,企业的中心任务是什么？应该如何做好应对下一次危机的准备呢？为此,《国际融资》杂志记者采访了美国商务社会责任国际协会（BSR）总裁兼首席执行官阿伦·克拉默（AronCramer）先生。     

The post-capitalist executive. Interview by T George Harris

For half a century, Peter F. Drucker has influenced senior executives across the globe with his rare insight into socioeconomic forces and practical advice for navigating often turbulent managerial waters. In his latest contribution to HBR, Drucker discusses the impact of the ideas in his latest work, Post-Capitalist Society, on the day-to-day lives and careers of managers. Drucker argues that managers must learn to negotiate a new environment with a different set of work rules and career expectations. Companies currently face downsizing and turmoil with increasing regularity. Once built to last like pyramids, corporations are now more like tents. In addition, businesses in the post-capitalist society grow through many and varied complicated alliances often baffling to the traditional manager. Confronted by these changes, managers must relearn how to manage. In the new world of business, information is replacing authority as the primary tool of the executive. And, Drucker advises, one embarks on the road toward information literacy not by buying the latest technological gadget but by identifying gaps in knowledge. As companies increasingly become temporary institutions, the manager also must begin to take individual responsibility for himself or herself. To that end, the executive must explore what Drucker calls competencies: a person's abilities, likes, dislikes, and goals, both professional and personal. If executives rise to these challenges, a new organizational foundation will be built. While a combination of rank and power supported the traditional organization, the internal structure of the emerging organization will be mutual understanding and trust.     

Networked incubators. Hothouses of the new economy

Business incubators such as Hotbank, CMGI, and Idealab! are a booming industry. Offering office space, funding, and basic services to start-ups, these organizations have become the hottest way to nurture and grow fledgling businesses. But are incubators a fleeting phenomenon born of an overheated stock market, or are they an important and lasting way of creating value and wealth in the new economy? The authors argue that one type of incubator, called a networked incubator, represents a fundamentally new and enduring organizational model uniquely suited to growing businesses in the Internet economy. It shares certain features with other incubators--mainly, it fosters a spirit of entrepreneurship and offers economies of scale. But its key distinguishing feature is its ability to give start-ups preferential access to a network of potential partners. Such incubators institutionalize their networking--they have systems in place to encourage networking, helping start-ups, for example, to meet with potential business allies. That doesn't mean incubatees get preferential treatment; it means only that they have built-in access to partnerships that might not have existed without the incubator. Even with this advantage, however, networked incubators can easily follow the road to ruin. To avoid failure, they must create a portfolio of companies and advisers that their incubatees can leverage. That can be done by strategically investing in portfolio firms and by enlisting a large set of business allies. It can also be done by establishing connections and relationships that are anchored more to the incubator than to particular individuals.     

The founder's dilemma

Why do people start businesses? For the money and the chance to control their own companies, certainly. But new research from Harvard Business School professor Wasserman shows that those goals are largely incompatible. The author's studies indicate that a founder who gives up more equity to attract cofounders, new hires, and investors builds a more valuable company than one who parts with less equity. More often than not, however, those superior returns come from replacing the founder with a professional CEO more experienced with the needs of a growing company. This fundamental tension requires founders to make "rich" versus "king" trade-offs to maximize either their wealth or their control over the company. Founders seeking to remain in control (as John Gabbert of the furniture retailer Room & Board has done) would do well to restrict themselves to businesses where large amounts of capital aren't required and where they already have the skills and contacts they need. They may also want to wait until late in their careers, after they have developed broader management skills, before setting up shop. Entrepreneurs who focus on wealth, such as Jim Triandiflou, who founded Ockham Technologies, can make the leap sooner because they won't mind taking money from investors or depending on executives to manage their ventures. Such founders will often bring in new CEOs themselves and be more likely to work with their boards to develop new, post-succession roles for themselves. Choosing between money and power allows entrepreneurs to come to grips with what success means to them. Founders who want to manage empires will not believe they are successes if they lose control, even if they end up rich. Conversely, founders who understand that their goal is to amass wealth will not view themselves as failures when they step down from the top job.     

Building an innovation factory

New ideas are the precious currency of the new economy, but generating them doesn't have to be a mysterious process. The image of the lone genius inventing from scratch is a romantic fiction. Businesses that constantly innovate have systematized the production and testing of new ideas, and the system can be replicated by practically any organization. The best innovators use old ideas as the raw materials for new ideas, a strategy the authors call knowledge brokering. The system for sustaining innovation is the knowledge brokering cycle, and the authors discuss its four parts. The first is capturing good ideas from a wide variety of sources. The second is keeping those ideas alive by playing with them, discussing them, and using them. Imagining new uses for old ideas is the third part--some knowledge brokers encourage cross-pollination by creating physical layouts that allow, or even force, people to interact with one another. The fourth is turning promising concepts into real services, products, processes, or business models. Companies can use all or part of the cycle. Large companies in particular desperately need to move ideas from one place to another. Some will want to build full-fledged consulting groups dedicated to internal knowledge brokering. Others can hire people who have faced problems similar to the companies' current problems. The most important lesson is that business leaders must change how they think about innovation, and they must change how their company cultures reflect that thinking.     

Disruptive change. When trying harder is part of the problem

When a company faces a major disruption in its markets, managers' perceptions of the disruption influence how they respond to it. If, for instance, they view the disruption as a threat to their core business, managers tend to overreact, committing too many resources too quickly. But if they see it as an opportunity, they're likely to commit insufficient resources to its development. Clark Gilbert and Joseph Bower explain why thinking in such stark terms--threat or opportunity--is dangerous. It's possible, they argue, to arrive at an organizational framing that makes good use of the adrenaline a threat creates as well as of the creativity an opportunity affords. The authors claim that the most successful companies frame the challenge differently at different times: When resources are being allocated, managers see the disruptive innovation as a threat. But when the hard strategic work of discovering and responding to new markets begins, the disruptive innovation is treated as an opportunity. The ability to reframe the disruptive technology as circumstances evolve is not an easy skill to master, the authors admit. In fact, it might not be possible without adjusting the organizational structure and the processes governing new business funding. Successful companies, the authors have determined, tend to do certain things: They establish a new venture separate from the core business; they fund the venture in stages as markets emerge; they don't rely on employees from the core organization to staff the new business; and they appoint an active integrator to manage the tensions between the two organizations, to name a few. This article will help executives frame innovations in more balanced ways--allowing them to recognize threats but also to seize opportunities.