共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
Summary. This paper discusses and develops “non-welfaristic” arguments on distributive justice à la J. Rawls and A. K. Sen, and formalizes,
in cooperative production economies, “non-welfaristic” distribution rules as game form types of resource allocation schemes.
First, it conceptualizes Needs Principle which the distribution rule should satisfy if this takes individuals' needs into
account. Second, one class of distribution rules which satisfy Needs Principle, a class of J-based Capability Maximum Rules, is proposed. Third, axiomatic characterizations of the class of J-based Capability Maximum Rules are provided.
Received: July 30, 1999; revised version: March 11, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" We are grateful to an anonymous referee of this journal, Professors Marc Fleurbaey, Nicolas Gravel, Ryo-ichi Nagahisa,
Prasanta Pattanaik, Kotaro Suzumura, Koich Tadenuma, and Yongsheng Xu for their fruitful comments. An earlier version of this
paper was published with the title name, “A Game Form Approach to Theories of Distributive Justice: Formalizing Needs Principle”
as the Discussion Paper No. 407 of the Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, and in the proceedings
of the International Conference on Logic, Game, and Social Choice held at Oisterwijk in May 1999. That version was also presented
at the 3rd Decentralization Conference in Japan held at Hitotsubashi University in September 1997, at the annual meeting of
the Japan Association of Economics and Econometrics held at Waseda University in September 1997, and the 4th International
Conference of Social Choice and Welfare held at University of British Colombia in July 1998. This research was partially supported
by the Japanese Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Health and Welfare.
Correspondence to: N. Yoshihara 相似文献
2.
Ulrich Witt 《Journal of Evolutionary Economics》2003,13(2):77-94
Economic policy making is discussed from three different angles: the political economy of actual policy making (“what policy
does do”), the analysis of policy instruments for given ends (“what policy could do”), and the debate on policy goals and
their legitimization (“what policy ought to do”). Center stage in the evolutionary perspective is new, positive and normative
knowledge which is unfolding during the policy making process and in its aftermath. It is argued that this implies regularities
and constraints which extend and modify the comparative-static interpretations of public choice theory, economic policy making
theory, and social philosophy.
RID="*"
ID="*" The author should like to thank three anonymous referees of this journal and the editor for helpful comments on an
earlier version of the paper. 相似文献
3.
The economic effects of restrictions on government budget deficits: imperfect private credit markets
Summary. The present paper is an extension of Ghiglino and Shell [7] to the case of imperfect consumer credit markets. We show that
with constraints on individual credit and only anonymous (i.e., non-personalized) lump-sum taxes, strong (or “global”) irrelevance
of government budget deficits is not possible, and weak (or “local”) irrelevance can hold only in very special situations.
This is in sharp contrast to the result for perfect credit markets. With credit constraints and anonymous consumption taxes,
weak irrelevance holds if the number of tax instruments is sufficiently large and at least one consumer's credit constraint
is not binding. This is an extension of the result for perfect credit markets.
Received: August 28, 2001; revised version: March 25, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" We thank Todd Keister, Bruce Smith, and two referees for helpful comments.
Correspondence to: C. Ghiglino 相似文献
4.
Steven Russell 《Economic Theory》2003,22(1):111-140
Summary. This paper uses a general equilibrium model to study the determination of the exchange rate in an economy with fundamental
uncertainty. The model has steady state equilibria in which the exchange rate is constant. These equilibria may coexist with
“quasi-fundamental” equilibria – nonstationary equilibria in which the exchange rate displays stochastic fluctuations that
are correlated with the fluctuations in fundamental random variables. The quasi-fundamental equilibria are Pareto dominated
by the corresponding constant-exchange-rate steady states. They also converge to these steady states, inevitably or with positive
probability.
Received: October 2, 1999; revised version: March 26, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" This paper began as a joint project with Alex Mourmouras, who has made many helpful comments and suggestions but is
not responsible for any errors or deficiencies. In addition, I thank an anonymous referee for helpful comments. 相似文献
5.
This paper suggests a class of stochastic collective learning processes exhibiting very irregular behavior. In particular,
there are multimodal long run distributions. Some of these modes may vanish as the population size increases. This may be
thought of as “bubbles” persistent for a finite range of population sizes but disappearing in the limit. The limit distribution
proves to be a discontinuous function of parameters determining the learning process. This gives rise to another type of “bubbles”:
limit outcomes corresponding to small perturbations of parameters are different. Since an agent's decision rule involves imitation
of the majority choice in a random sample of other members of the population, the resulting collective dynamics exhibit “herding”
or “epidemic” features.
RID="*"
ID="*" We are grateful to two anonymous referees for the comments and suggestions.
Correspondence to: L. Gaio 相似文献
6.
Kevin Davis 《Journal of Regulatory Economics》2006,29(1):103-122
Some access pricing regimes derive allowable cash flows to provide investors with an expectation of receiving a required real
pre-(company) tax rate of return, with compensation for inflation built in via the allowable return of capital (depreciation).
The required real pre-tax return is derived from nominal (or real) post-tax required returns. Techniques commonly used to
transform post-tax into real pre-tax returns are biased, because they fail to capture accurately the characteristics of tax
depreciation allowances. There is no general solution to this “transformation problem”, but alternative approaches can achieve
the benefits prompting the use of a “real pre-tax” approach without suffering from this problem
*I am grateful to the referee for valuable comments. 相似文献
7.
Summary. This note studies conditions under which sequences of state variables generated by discrete-time stochastic optimal accumulation
models have law of large numbers and central limit properties. Productivity shocks with unbounded support are considered.
Instead of restrictions on the support of the shock, an “average contraction” property is required on technology.
Received: August 27, 2001; revised version: January 9, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*"The author thanks John Creedy and Rabee Tourky for helpful comments, and the Economic Theory Center, University of Melbourne
for financial support. 相似文献
8.
John Geanakoplos 《Economic Theory》2003,21(2-3):585-603
Summary. The existence of Nash and Walras equilibrium is proved via Brouwer's Fixed Point Theorem, without recourse to Kakutani's
Fixed Point Theorem for correspondences. The domain of the Walras fixed point map is confined to the price simplex, even when
there is production and weakly quasi-convex preferences. The key idea is to replace optimization with “satisficing improvement,”
i.e., to replace the Maximum Principle with the “Satisficing Principle.”
Received: July 9, 2001; revised version: February 25, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" I wish to thank Ken Arrow, Don Brown, and Andreu Mas-Colell for helpful comments. I first thought about using Brouwer's
theorem without Kakutani's extension when I heard Herb Scarf's lectures on mathematical economics as an undergraduate in 1974,
and then again when I read Tim Kehoe's 1980 Ph.D dissertation under Herb Scarf, but I did not resolve my confusion until I
had to discuss Kehoe's presentation at the celebration for Herb Scarf's 65th birthday in September, 1995.
RID="*"
ID="*"Correspondence to: C. D. Aliprantis 相似文献
9.
Inefficient Markov perfect equilibria in multilateral bargaining 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Hongbin Cai 《Economic Theory》2003,22(3):583-606
We study a complete-information alternating-offer bargaining game in which one “active” player bargains with each of a number
of other “passive” players one at a time. In contrast to most existing models, the order of reaching agreements is endogenously
determined, hence the active player can “play off” some passive players against others by m oving back and forth bargaining
with the passive players. We show that this model has a finite number of Markov Perfect Equilibria, some of which exhibiting
wasteful delays. Moreover, the maximum number of delay periods that can be supported in Markov Perfect Equilibria increases
in the order of the square of the number of players. We also show that these results are robust to a relaxing of the Markov
requirements and to more general surplus functions.
Received: November 19, 2001; revised version: August 20, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*"This paper grew out of my dissertation submitted to Stanford University. I am deeply indebted to my advisor, Paul Milgrom,
for his insights and guidance. I would also like to thank Douglas Bernheim, Sushil Bikhchandani, Harold Demsetz, Bryan Ellickson,
Avner Greif, Peter Hammond, David Levine, Bentley Macleod, Joe Ostroy, John Pencavel, Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, David Starrett,
Robert Wilson, Bill Zame and especially John Riley and Jeff Zwiebel for their helpful comments. I am grateful to an anonymous
referee for extremely constructive suggestions. 相似文献
10.
We study the optimal timing of adoption of a cleaner technology and its effects on the rate of growth of an economy in the
context of an AK endogenous growth model. We show that the results depend upon the behavior of the marginal utility of environmental
quality with respect to consumption. When it is increasing, we derive the capital level at the optimal timing of adoption.
We show that this capital threshold is independent of the initial conditions on the stock of capital, implying that capital-poor
countries tend to take longer to adopt. Also, country-specific characteristics, as the existence of high barriers to adoption,
may lead to different capital thresholds for different countries. If the marginal utility of environmental quality decreases
with consumption, a country should never delay adoption; the optimal policy is either to adopt immediately or, if adoption
costs are “too high”, to never adopt. The policy implications of these results are discussed in the context of the international
debate surrounding the environmental political agenda.
相似文献
11.
Summary. Using a general equilibrium framework, this paper analyzes the equilibrium provision of a pure public bad commodity (for
example pollution). Considering a finite economy with one desired private good and one pure public “bad” we explicitly introduce the concept of Lindahl equilibrium and the Lindahl prices into a pure public bad economy. Then, the Lindahl provision
is analyzed and compared with the Cournot-Nash provision. The main results for economies with heterogeneous agents state that
the asymptotic Lindahl allocation of the pure public bad is the null allocation. In contrast, the asymptotic Cournot-Nash
provision of the public bad might approach infinity. Other results were obtained in concert with the broad analysis of the
large finite economies with pure public bad commodities.
Received: July 26, 2001; revised version: March 12, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" We are indebt to Nicholas Yannelis and anonymous referee for their valuable comments and suggestions.
Correspondence to: B. Shitovitz 相似文献
12.
Günther Rehme 《Journal of Economics》2007,91(1):1-40
Many models show that redistribution is bad for growth. This paper argues that in a non-cooperative world optimizing, redistributing
(“left-wing”) governments mimic non-redistributing (“right-wing”) policies for fear of capital loss if capital markets become
highly integrated and the countries are technologically similar. “Left-right” competition leads to more redistribution and
lower GDP growth than “left-left” competition. Efficiency differences allow for higher GDP growth and more redistribution than one's opponent. Irrespective of efficiency differences, however, “left-wing” governments have higher
GDP growth when competing with other “left-wing” governments. The results may explain why one observes a positive correlation
between redistribution and growth across countries, and why capital inflows and current account deficits may be good for relatively
high growth. 相似文献
13.
Summary. Suppose a large economy with individual risk is modeled by a continuum of pairwise exchangeable random variables (i.i.d.,
in particular). Then the relevant stochastic process is jointly measurable only in degenerate cases. Yet in Monte Carlo simulation,
the average of a large finite draw of the random variables converges almost surely. Several necessary and sufficient conditions
for such “Monte Carlo convergence” are given. Also, conditioned on the associated Monte Carlo -algebra, which represents macroeconomic risk, individual agents' random shocks are independent. Furthermore, a converse to
one version of the classical law of large numbers is proved.
Received: October 29, 2001; revised version: April 24, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" Part of this work was done when Yeneng Sun was visiting SITE at Stanford University in July 2001. An early version
of some results was included in a presentation to Tom Sargent's macro workshop at Stanford. We are grateful to him and Felix
Kübler in particular for their comments. And also to Marcos Lisboa for several discussions with Peter Hammond, during which
the basic idea of the paper began to take shape.
Correspondence to: P.J. Hammond 相似文献
14.
We study a simple bilateral oligopoly model in which individual agents, who are initially endowed with capital, decide sequentially (1) whether they want to act as producers (entrepreneurs) or as capital lenders (rentiers) and, then (2) which quantity of capital they would like to borrow or lend, though exchange of capital units against units of the produced good. Production takes place under increasing returns to scale. We show the existence of “natural equilibria”, at which wealthier capital owners become entrepreneurs while the remaining ones decide to be rentiers. We also study the efficiency of equilibria which is shown to increase by replication of the economy, but sometimes to decrease as a consequence of wealth redistribution.We thank an anonymous referee for his insightful comments 相似文献
15.
Schumpeter and the revival of evolutionary economics: an appraisal of the literature 总被引:5,自引:1,他引:4
Jan Fagerberg 《Journal of Evolutionary Economics》2003,13(2):125-159
During the last two decades we have seen a revival of interest in the works of Joseph Schumpeter and “evolutionary” ideas
in economics more generally. A professional society honouring Schumpeter's name has been founded, and linked to it we have
had for more than fifteen years now a professional journal devoted to this stream of thought. However, it has been argued
that, despite these developments, the link between Schumpeter's own work and the more recent contributions to evolutionary
economics is in fact rather weak. This paper considers this claim. Based on an analysis of Schumpeter's contribution to economics
the paper presents an overview and assessment of the more recent literature in this area. It is argued that although there
are important differences between Schumpeter's work and some of the more recent contributions, there nevertheless remains
a strong common core that clearly distinguishes the evolutionary stream from other approaches (such as, for instance, so-called
“new growth theory”).
RID="*"
ID="*" Many people have contributed to this paper in various ways. Jon Hekland at the Norwegian Research Council started it
all by asking me to make an overview of the contribution from “evolutionary economics” to our understanding of contemporary
economies. Several people helped me on the way by supplying written material, comments and suggestions, and I am indebted
to all of them. Brian Arthur, Stan Metcalfe, Keith Pavitt, Erik Reinert, Paolo Saviotti and Bart Verspagen may be particularly
mentioned. A preliminary version was presented at the conference “Industrial R&D and Innovation Policy Learning – Evolutionary
Perspectives and New Methods for Impact Assessment” organised by the Norwegian Research Council (“SAKI”) at Leangkollen, Asker,
April 18–19.2002. I wish to thank the discussant, Tor Jakob Klette, and the participants at the conference for useful feedback.
Moreover I have benefited from comments and suggestions from the editors and referees of this journal. The final responsibility
is mine, however. Economic support from the Norwegian Research Council (“SAKI”) is gratefully acknowledged. 相似文献
16.
We study the effects of an economic policy in an endogenous growth general equilibrium framework where production of consumption
goods requires two resource inputs: a polluting non-renewable resource and a non-polluting labour resource. The use of the
former contributes to the accumulation of pollution in the atmosphere, which affects welfare. There is a specific research
sector associated with each of those resources. We provide a full welfare analysis, and we describe the equilibrium paths
in a decentralized economy. We go on to study the effects of three associated economic policy tools: a tax on the polluting
resource, and two research subsidies. We show that the optimal environmental policy has two main effects; it delays the extraction
of the resource and with it the level of polluting emissions and it reallocates research efforts, decreasing the amount put
into “grey” research to the benefit of “green” research. We also show that the environmental policy is grey-biased in the
short-term, and green-biased in the long-term. Finally, we compute the optimal values for these tools.
相似文献
17.
Summary. This paper characterizes the existence and stability properties of steady state solutions as well as the nature of transition
paths of a two-sector growth model with heterogeneous capital. It compares the properties of a Cobb-Douglas–Leontief economy
with heterogeneous capital with the properties of the same economy with homogeneous capital. The model with heterogeneous capital reveals a set of characteristics different to those of the model with homogeneous
capital. These include the saddle-path stability of the non-trivial steady state as well as the possibility of overshooting
and in contrast to the homogeneous capital case, the possibility of damped oscillations along the transition path for realistic
parameter values.
Received: September 21, 2001; revised version: November 21, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" We thank Costas Azariadis, and Laurie Conway for helpful comments on a previous draft. The paper has substantially
benefited from the feedback of an anonymous referee.
Correspondence to: R. Wendner 相似文献
18.
Beth Allen 《Economic Theory》2003,21(2-3):527-544
Summary. This paper examines the ex ante core of a pure exchange economy with asymmetric information in which state-dependent allocations are required to satisfy
incentive compatibility. This restriction on players' strategies in the cooperative game can be interpreted as incomplete
contracts or partial commitment. An example is provided in which the incentive compatible core with nontransferable utility
is empty; the game fails to be balanced because convex combinations of incentive compatible net trades can violate incentive
compatibility. However, randomization of such strategies leads to ex post allocations which satisfy incentive compatibility and are feasible on average. Hence, convexity is preserved in such a model
and the resulting cooperative games are balanced. In this framework, an incentive compatible core concept is defined for NTU
games derived from economies with asymmetric information. The main result is nonemptiness of the incentive compatible core.
Received: December 26, 2001; revised version: June 11, 2002
RID="*"
ID"*" This work was financed, in part, by contract No 26 of the programme “P?le d'attraction interuniversitaire” of the Belgian
government, and, in part, by research grant SBR93-09854 from the U.S. National Science Foundation. Much of my thinking about
this topic was developed during a wonderful visit to CORE for the 1991–1992 academic year (on sabbatical from the University
of Pennsylvania). This paper was originally circulated in December 1991 as CARESS Working Paper #91-38, Center for Analytic
Research in Economics and the Social Sciences, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and in February 1992 as
CORE Discussion Paper 9221, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics, Université Catholique de Louvain, Louvain-la-Neuve,
Belgium.
RID="*"
ID="*" At the very start of my research, Jean-Fran?ois Mertens was almost a co-author. Fran?ois Forges provided detailed comments
at a later stage, during my visit to THEMA, Université Cergy-Pontoise, in Spring 1997. They are entitled to the customary
disclaimer. 相似文献
19.
This paper examines Bayesian methods of examining posterior distributions of inequality, concentration, tax progressivity
and social welfare measures. Use is made of an explicit income distribution assumption and two alternative assumptions regarding
the distribution of pre-tax mean incomes within each income group. The methods are applied to a simulated distribution of
individual incomes and tax payments. It is possible to identify a minimum acceptable number of income classes to be used.
The results suggest support for the use of group means in practical applications, particularly where large sample sizes are
available.
First version received: August 2000/Final version received: July 2001
RID="*"
ID="*" This research was supported by a Melbourne University Faculty of Economics and Commerce Research Grant. We should
like to thank Bill Griffiths and two referees for comments on an earlier draft. 相似文献
20.
Firm reputation with hidden information 总被引:3,自引:0,他引:3
Steven Tadelis 《Economic Theory》2003,21(2-3):635-651
Summary. An adverse selection model of firm reputation is developed in which short-lived clients purchase services from firms operated
by overlapping generations of agents. A firm's only asset is its name, or reputation, and trade of names is not observed by
clients. As a result, names are traded in all equilibria regardless of the economy's horizon The general equilibrium analysis
links the value of a name to the market for services. This causes a non-monotonicity that precludes higher types from sorting
themselves through the market for names, and leads to “sensible” dynamics: reputations, and name prices, increase after success
and decrease after failure.
Received: July 31, 2001; revised version: December 20, 2001
RID="*"
ID="*" I thank Jon Levin, Eric Maskin and Drew Fudenberg for valuable discussions, and Heski Bar-Isaac for comments on an
earlier draft. Financial support from the National Science Foundation (NSF grants SBR-9818981 and SES-0079876) is gratefully
acknowledged. This paper replaces an older (and incomplete) working paper titled “Reputation with Hidden Information”. 相似文献