COMPETITION POLICY AND CARTEL SIZE

This article examines endogenous cartel formation in the presence of a competition authority. Competition policy is shown to make the most inclusive stable cartels less inclusive. In particular, small firms that might have been cartel members in the absence of a competition authority are no longer members. Regarding the least inclusive stable cartels, competition policy can either decrease or increase their size and, in the latter case, the collusive price can rise.     

Firm-specific information and explicit collusion in experimental oligopolies

We experimentally study the effect of information about competitors’ actions on cartel stability and firms’ incentives to form cartels in Cournot markets. As in previous experiments, markets become very competitive when individualized information is available and participants cannot communicate. In contrast, when communication is possible, results reverse: markets become less competitive and cartels become more stable when individualized information is available. We also observe that the extra profits that firms obtain thanks to the possibility to communicate are higher when individualized information is present, suggesting that firms have greater incentives to form cartels in that situation.     

Endogenous cartel formation: Experimental evidence

In a Bertrand-oligopoly experiment, firms choose whether or not to engage in cartel-like communication and, if so, they may get fined by a cartel authority. We find that the four-firm industries form cartels more often than the duopolies because they gain less from a hysteresis effect after cartel disruption.     

A Study of Collusion in First-Price Auctions

This paper examines the bidding for school milk contracts in Florida and Texas during the 1980s. In both states firms were convicted of bid-rigging. The data and legal evidence suggest that the cartels in the two states allocate contracts in different ways: One cartel divides the market among members, while the other cartel also uses side payments to compensate members for refraining from bidding. We show that both forms of cartel agreements are almost optimal, provided the number of contracts is sufficiently large.
In the auction the cartel bidder may face competition from non-cartel bidders. The presence of an optimal cartel induces an asymmetry in the auction. The selected cartel bidder is bidding as a representative of a group and has on average a lower cost than a non-cartel bidder. The data support the predicted equilibrium bidding behaviour in asymmetric auctions in accordance with optimal cartels.     

FARSIGHTED COALITIONAL STABILITY OF A PRICE LEADERSHIP CARTEL

This paper analyzes the farsighted behaviour of firms that form a dominant price leadership cartel. We consider stability concepts such as the farsighted core, the farsighted stable sets, and the largest consistent set. We show that: (i) the farsighted core is either an empty set or a singleton set of the grand cartel; (ii) any Pareto efficient cartel is itself a farsighted stable set; and (iii) the set of cartels in which fringe firms enjoy higher profits than the firms in the minimal Pareto efficient cartel is the largest consistent set.     

Asymmetric Research Joint Ventures and Market Concentration

This paper studies two asymmetric R&D cooperation structures. In the first structure some firms in an industry organize a research joint venture (RJV) cartel while the remainder engage in independent R&D. In the other structure, each firm joins one of a number of competing RJV cartels. The findings indicate that cooperative R&D may lead to a more concentrated post-innovation industry than standard R&D competition owing to the technology advantage of the (large) cartel obtained from R&D co-operation. Under certain conditions these asymmetric structures are more efficient, but they result in a redistribution of income towards the firms in the (large) cartel.
JEL Classification Numbers: D43, L13, O31.     

On the possibility of welfare-enhancing hard core cartels

The conventional wisdom is that cartels which merely lead to lower production levels and higher prices are detrimental to social welfare. This paper explores the extent to which this is generally valid. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a hard core cartel that is beneficial for firms and society at large. Considering both strong (with side payments) and weak (without side payments) hard core cartel contracts, we find that (i) both strong and weak welfare-enhancing cartels exist when at least one firm makes a loss on part of its sales in competition, (ii) a welfare-enhancing strong cartel exists whenever there is a difference in unit cost at competitive production levels, and (iii) a welfare-enhancing weak cartel exists when the profit margin on all sales is positive and the cost difference is sufficiently large.     

Semicollusion vs. Full Collusion: The Role of Demand Uncertainty and Product Substitutability

We examine the profitability of two different cartel organizational forms: full collusion, under which firms collude on both price and quality, and semicollusion, under which firms collude on price only. We show that, in the presence of demand uncertainty that cannot be contracted upon in the cartel agreement, firms may be better off limiting their collusive agreement to price only. However, a positive relationship between demand uncertainty and the relative profitability of semicollusion exists only for low levels of demand substitutability. The converse is true for high levels of demand substitutability. Therefore, if demand substitutability is sufficiently high, no level of demand uncertainty will make semicollusion the optimal organizational form. In contrast, semicollusion is guaranteed to be optimal for a sufficiently low level of demand substitutability. The market structure described is motivated by and closely parallels that of shipping cartels. Received September 29, 2000; revised version received December 10, 2001 Published online: November 11, 2002     

产品差异与技术差距影响研发溢出的理论探讨

在传统研发溢出效应假设基础上，通过技术差距将溢出效应与产品差异有机联系起来，并通过构建双寡头企业两阶段博弈模型对研发卡特尔、生产卡特尔、完全合作等不同形式合作联盟的均衡水平和福利变化进行分析比较。研究证实：当企业间技术差距较小时，完全合作或研发卡特尔能有效提高企业利润和社会福利；而当技术差距较大时，研发阶段的合作不仅无法激励企业进行研发投入，还会抑制企业创新的积极性。此外，与完全合作相比，局部合作具有更强的稳定性和可持续性，尤其是在产品差异程度较大的情况下，研发卡特尔最为稳定。     

Bidder collusion

We analyze bidder collusion at first-price and second-price auctions. Our focus is on less than all-inclusive cartels and collusive mechanisms that do not rely on auction outcomes. We show that cartels that cannot control the bids of their members can eliminate all ring competition at second-price auctions, but not at first-price auctions. At first-price auctions, when the cartel cannot control members’ bids, cartel behavior involves multiple cartel bids. Cartels that can control bids of their members can suppress all ring competition at both second-price and first-price auctions; however, shill bidding reduces the profitability of collusion at first-price auctions.     

A note on cartel stability and endogenous sequencing with tacit collusion

We use the concept of cartel stability defined by d’Aspremont et al. (Can J Econ 16(1):17–25, 1983) to obtain that the sequence of play between the cartel and the fringe affects cartel stability in a quantity-competition setting where firms tacitly collude. We also prove that an endogenous sequence of play between a cartel and a fringe depends on the discount factor. If the discount factor is large enough, the cartel and the fringe simultaneously choose quantities since the stable cartel may contain more firms under simultaneous play than under cartel leadership. This is due to the fact that under simultaneous play cartel firms have incentives to participate in the cartel because otherwise no collusion is possible.      

When imperfect collusion is profitable

This paper studies cartel stability under the assumption that member firms can choose intermediate degrees of collusion as well as the joint-profit-maximizing solution in determining the quota to be produced by each firm. After showing that firms can increase the number of participants by decreasing the degree of collusion, I prove that individual members' profits are maximized when firms choose a (possibly low) degree of collusion such that all firms in the industry want to take part in the cartel. More precisely, if the number of firms in the industry is four or less, then all of them want to take part in the cartel even if the maximum degree of collusion is chosen (i.e., the monopoly output is produced); if the number of firms is greater than four, firms will still create an industry-wide cartel but they will produce a higher quantity than the monopoly output.     

Cartel formation and managerial incentives

We study the formation of cartels within two different contexts. First, we consider internal–external stability based models which, due to firms’ free-riding incentives, lead to the inexistence of stable cartels. Second, we introduce the dynamic aspect of coalition formation. That is, when considering a cartel we consider also any cartel that can be reached through a succession of moves. Despite firms’ free-riding incentive, the dynamic process predicts that the collusion of the whole industry can occur with some regularity. We show that free-riding incentives decrease and incentives to merge increase when firms’ owner delegate production decisions to managers.      

Legal Principles in Antitrust Enforcement

We study antitrust enforcement that aims to channel price‐fixing incentives of cartels through setting fine schedules and detection levels. Fines obey legal principles, such as the punishment should fit the crime, proportionality, bankruptcy considerations, and minimum fines. Bankruptcy considerations limit maximum fines, ensure abnormal cartel profits, and impose a challenge for optimal antitrust enforcement. We derive the fine schedule and detection level that are constrained‐optimal under legal principles and sustainability of cartel prices. This fine schedule lies below the maximum fine, makes collusion on lower prices more attractive than on higher prices, and, hence, relates to the body of literature on marginal deterrence.     

政府产品创新补贴下的企业R＆D策略选择

为了研究在政府产品创新补贴政策下企业的R＆D策略选择问题,建立了双寡头市场中面向工艺R＆D的三阶段博弈模型：第一阶段政府以社会福利最大为目标选择产品创新补贴率;第二阶段企业进行R＆D投资以降低生产成本;第三阶段企业在产品市场中进行古诺竞争。根据双寡头在第二和第三阶段是否合作,给出了研发竞争、研发卡特尔、技术共享联盟和研究共同体等四种R＆D策略,得到了相应的政府最优R＆D补贴率。研究表明：从企业的R＆D投入和产品产量的角度看,当溢出效应较高时,研发竞争策略优于研发卡特尔策略;当溢出效应较低时,研发卡特尔策略优于研发竞争策略。研发卡特尔策略与研发竞争策略相比,研发卡特尔更能推动企业利润的提高并且可以改善社会总福利。从产品产量、企业利润和社会总福利最大化角度考虑,研究共同体为四种策略中的最优策略。     

Cartel Stability in a Delivered Pricing Oligopoly

Using the spatial price discrimination framework, the relationship between the locations of firms and their ability to collude is investigated. Gupta and Venkatu (2002) show that in a duopoly model agglomeration at one point is the most stable location. We find that agglomeration stabilizes the cartel when there are three firms, too. When there are more than three firms, however, agglomeration of all firms is never the most stable location. With four firms, the following location pattern produces the most stable cartel: two firms at one point and the other two at the farthest point from the first two.     

ON THE SUSTAINABILITY OF COLLUSION IN A DIFFERENTIATED OLIGOPOLY WITH A CARTEL AND A FRINGE

We discuss the effects of the existence of non‐colluding (fringe) firms on cartel sustainability. We obtain, using trigger strategies, that with product differentiation collusion is always more easily sustained when firms compete in prices than when firms compete in quantities. This is true basically because (i) price competition is more intense than quantity competition, and (ii) fringe firms exacerbate the fact that cartel firms have more incentives to deviate from the agreement under quantity competition. This result reverses previous findings where, in the absence of fringe firms, product differentiation plays a crucial role in determining the effectiveness of price or quantity competition in sustaining collusion.     

The Robustness of Cartels Facilitated by Anti-Dumping Regulations

This study formulates Prusa's (1992 ) theory that anti-dumping regulations facilitate the formation of cartels between an exporter and import-competing firms. It demonstrates that interest rates and product differentiation are two key factors that may determine the robustness of the cartels. It builds a Bertrand duopoly model with differentiated products that explains how anti-dumping regulations might encourage the creation of cartels. To highlight the circumstances under which an import-competing firm is seriously hurt by dumped exports, this study adopts the following setting. First, both the exporter and the import-competing firms sell only in the home market. Second, if the exporter's product is sold at a cheaper price than the product of an import-competing firm in the home market, this is a sufficient condition to initiate an anti-dumping petition. Although the setting might also provide the circumstances under which the anti-dumping authority could be over-protecting the import-competing firm, it makes it possible to view the exporter as a predator. Since the setting enables the exporter to be free from the need to make profits in its own market, it sets a lower price for its product only if it decides to undertake predatory activities against an import-competing firm.     

The Process of Government Centralization: A Constitutional View

Government centralization is not a law of nature. It can be explained on the one hand by the endeavor of locally elected representatives of national assemblies to form tax and expenditure cartels, on the other hand by the constitutional power of the federal government to take over state tax legislation and to act as a cartel enforcer. A case study provides empirical evidence and moreover shows that such cartels generate a higher tax level and perform badly in interregional equalization of per capita income. The relevance of constitutional power for explaining centralization seems to be confirmed in various countries.     

Stable cartels revisited

Summary. This paper analyzes cartel stability when firms are farsighted. It studies a price leadership model á la D Aspremont et al. (1983), where the dominant cartel acts as a leader by determining the market price, while the fringe behaves competitively. According to D Aspremont et al. s (1983) approach a cartel is stable if no firm has an incentive to either enter or exit the cartel. In deciding whether to deviate or not, a firm compares its status quo with the outcome its unilateral deviation induces. However, the firm fails to examine whether the induced outcome will indeed become the new status quo that will determine its profits. Although the firm anticipates the price adjustment following its deviation, it ignores the possibility that more firms may exit (or enter) the cartel. In other words, the firm does not consider the fact that the outcome immediately induced by its deviation may not be stable itself. We propose a notion of cartel stability that allows firms to fully foresee the result of their deviation. Our solution concept is built in the spirit of von Neumann and Morgensterns (1944) stable set, while it modifies the dominance relation following Harsanyis (1974) criticism. We show that there always exists a unique, non-empty set of stable cartels.Received: 20 August 2002, Revised: 11 August 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: C79, D43, D49, L13.On page 921, the final paragraph as well as the two references by Rothschild were inserted.This revised version was pulished in February 2005.I would like to thank Joseph Greenberg, Licun Xue, Daniel Arce M. and Curtis Eberwein for their helpful suggestions on an earlier draft. I am indebted to an anonymous referee for his very constructive comments.