Nonfinancial Performance Measures and Promotion-Based Incentives

In this paper, I examine the sensitivity of promotion and demotion decisions for lower‐level managers to financial and nonfinancial measures of their performance and investigate the extent to which the behavior of lower‐level managers reflects promotion‐based incentives. Additionally, I test for learning versus effort‐allocation effects of promotion‐based incentives. I find that promotion and demotion decisions for store managers of a major U.S.‐based fast‐food retailer (QSR) are sensitive to nonfinancial performance measures of service quality and employee retention after controlling for financial performance. The likelihood of demotion in this organization is also sensitive to nonfinancial performance on the dimension of service quality, while the probability of exit is primarily sensitive to financial performance measures rather than nonfinancial performance measures. I also find evidence that the behavior of lower‐level managers is consistent with the incentives created by the weighting of nonfinancial performance measures in promotion decisions. Managers in locations where there is a higher ex ante probability of promotion and a higher potential reward upon promotion demonstrate significantly higher levels and rates of performance improvement in service quality. Finally, consistent with promotion‐based incentives inducing both effort‐allocation and learning effects, I find that performance‐improvement rates for service quality: (1) are higher in prepromotion periods in markets where promotions occur, (2) decrease immediately after the occurrence of a promotion in the same market area, and (3) remain higher than in markets where promotions do not occur. These findings provide some of the first empirical evidence on an alternative to the explicit weighting of nonfinancial metrics in compensation contracts as a mechanism for generating improvements in nonfinancial dimensions of performance.     

Nonfinancial performance measures,externalities and target setting: A comparative case study of resolutions through planning

This paper presents an analysis of the resolution of organisational externalities through the use of nonfinancial performance measures for planning. Using a comparative case study, this paper illustrates how centralised controllers’ choice of nonfinancial performance measures and target setting in two companies provides critical information to decentralised agents regarding how to balance their performance with the performance of other decentralised agents in their organisation. This work complements current management accounting research in that it focuses on the role of nonfinancial performance measures with respect to the design of performance plans for decentralised agents that can be used to internalise externalities. To date, discussions of externalities in management accounting research have primarily focused on how performance measurements can be used as a price mechanism to provide decentralised agents with incentives to internalise externalities. In addition, this case study illustrates some of the difficulties related to acquiring general knowledge about the externalities of nonfinancial performance measures and, therefore, about whether specific nonfinancial performance measures are appropriate for a particular type of organisation.     

Accountants’ Relief Foundation (ARF): A not-for-profit case examining contribution receipts and distributions

The Accountants’ Relief Foundation case study exposes students to not-for-profit (NFP) transactions and performance evaluation. Your task is to: (1) explain the advantages and restrictions associated with NFPs, (2) describe and calculate customary NFP performance metrics and assess risks, (3) determine the existence of liabilities and expenses, (4) discuss contract-timing issues, (5) evaluate differences between discretionary and non-discretionary power, (6) evaluate contribution alternatives, and (7) use primary and secondary accounting literature to solve the case.     

Customer service quality and financial performance among Australian retail financial institutions

This paper seeks to explore empirically the relationship between customer service quality and financial performance among a representative cross-section of Australian banks and credit unions by correlating customer service quality scores from a sample of retail customers with financial performance measures over a five-year period.Results show that all financial performance measures (interest margin, expense/income, return on assets and capital adequacy) are positively correlated with customer service quality scores. They also show that the credit unions strongly out-perform the banks in customer service quality and also for some measures of financial performance (interest margin and return on assets). The positive link between financial performance and customer service is thus supported in this study. Implications for the three groups of institutions are also discussed.     

Accounting for organizational performance: The construction of the customer in the privatized water industry

The concept of the customer exercising market power to obtain the desired combination of attributes in terms of price and quality of the product to be purchased has been integral to the Conservative Government's justification of privatization. However the practical import of giving effect to customer sovereignty was problematic if it was not accompanied by an increase in competition and choice for customers. This is particularly true of the recently privatized Water industry, where the monopoly character of the industry has remained unaltered. To give effect to its claims that customers would benefit, and to prevent overcharging and to protect standards of service, the Government had to introduce a new regulatory system operated by the Office of Water Services (Ofwat). In pursuing these objectives the Director General of Ofwat has stated that his aim is to secure for the customer a place that he/she would have were the companies operating in a competitive market. This paper, drawing on Miller and Rose's analysis of Governing economic life, examines the attempts that have been made to give effect to this “place for customers”. In doing so much of the analysis focuses on exploring how notions of “the customer”, and “customer service”, have been constructed through new forms of accounting and accountability, and how this new accounting for customer service has enabled the concept of “the customer” to be made operational within the newly privatized Water plcs, even though their monopoly status has remained unaltered. Central to this has been Ofwat's determination of performance indicators on levels of service to customers, its measurement of company performance against these indicators, and assessments based on these measures of companies' success in “serving customers”. The paper seeks to demonstrate how these new accounts of organizational performance required of the Water plcs by Ofwat have only been made possible by rendering “customer service” a calculable and comparable entity. The paper also looks at some of the ways in which this accounting for customer service has been incorporated into other accounts of managerial and organizational performance.     

WHY COST-REIMBURSED NOT-FOR-PROFITS USE DEBT FINANCING DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF TAX INCENTIVES

This paper explains why cost-reimbursed not-for-profits (NFPs) have incentives to use debt financing when purchasing capital assets. When the purchase is internally financed (i.e., through retained earnings), NPV is negative and the NFP lacks incentives for efficient investment. But when financed through debt with reimbursed ('passed through') interest, earlier reimbursed depreciation recovery relative to delayed principal costs can lead to positive NPV and excessive reimbursement. This analysis may thus help explain an empirical regularity, namely that NFPs tend to be highly leveraged despite the absence of tax shields or the availability of internal funds. This regularity cannot be explained either by the 'trade-off' or by the 'pecking order' theories of capital structure.     

Pointers: Pay; Housing; NHS; Regional policy; Public expenditure; Industrial support; US deficits

Using performance indicators to drive improved service delivery and cost‐effectiveness has been a recognized management technique in the public sector for many years. Most managers are now convinced of the possible benefits, at least in theory. Reality, though, is much less encouraging. Partial coverage, poor implementation and unrealized expectations are still the norm. Yet the potential for radical improvement by making the most of performance measurement is even greater than most people would believe. The question is how to unlock this potential.     

The long-term effects of loan guarantees on SME performance

We estimate the treatment effect of guaranteed loans on the growth of a large sample of French small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). The nature of our sample allows us to estimate the treatment effect up to 10 years after the treatment and to consider several performance measures and moderating factors. Our findings indicate that beneficiaries of guaranteed loans experience significantly higher growth in sales, employment, and total assets than otherwise similar companies. The effects are long lasting, do not entail a slowdown in productivity growth, are mostly driven by organic growth rather than by external acquisitions, and are larger in firms that are typically more financially constrained (young or small). Guaranteed-loan beneficiaries are also more likely to survive than non-beneficiaries. Our results are consistent across different identification strategies (matching, difference-in-differences, instrumental variable estimation) and control group choices.     

International equity funds,performance, and investor flows: Australian evidence

This is the first paper in the Australian literature to examine the investment performance of actively managed international equity funds (domiciled in Australia). Both institutional and retail international equity funds are assessed together with the impacts of investor fund flows on portfolio returns. Performance is also evaluated using conditional measures that account for public information in the global economy, however, despite an improvement in the measurement of risk-adjusted returns, performance remains consistent with an efficient global market. These findings support prior research, which concludes that active management does not provide investors with superior returns to passive indices. When consideration is given to the liquidity service provided by active managers, fund flows are shown to negatively impact on performance.     

Do Not‐For‐Profits Need Their Own Conceptual Framework?

This paper raises the issue of whether not‐for‐profit (NFP) oganisations require a conceptual framework that acknowledges their mission imperative and enables them to discharge their broader accountability. Relying on publicly available documentation and literature, it suggests the current Conceptual Frameworks for the for‐profit and public sectors are inadequate in meeting the accountability needs of NFPs. A NFP‐specific conceptual framework would allow the demonstration of broader NFP‐specific accountability and the formulation of NFP‐appropriate reporting practice, including the provision of financial and non‐financial reporting. The paper thus theoretically challenges existing financial reporting arrangements and invites debate on their future direction.     

Different uses of performance measures: The evaluation versus reward of production managers

This study examines how the importance that is attributed to a variety of financial and non-financial performance measures depends on the type of use – evaluation versus reward. Survey data, collected on a sample of industrial companies, provide consistent evidence of a difference in the importance attached to performance measures for these two uses. More importance is attached to both financial and non-financial performance measures for the periodic evaluation than for variable rewards. The study also shows that the influence of production strategy and departmental interdependence on the importance attached to performance measures differs for evaluation and reward uses. A production strategy focused on differentiation by product-performance has a negative effect on the importance attached to financial measures for variable rewards but no effect on their importance for periodic evaluation. Moreover, departmental interdependence decreases the importance attached to financial measures for variable rewards but not for periodic evaluation. Departmental interdependence also has only a positive effect on non-financial measures for periodic evaluation and no effect on non-financial measures for variable rewards. Overall, the data suggest that it is essential to distinguish between different uses when studying performance measurement choices and their determinants.     

Identifying the effect of managerial control on firm performance

Using a unique sample, we attempt to identify the consequence of the separation between inside ownership and control for firm performance. We exploit the fact that banking institutions may hold their own shares in trust to construct a clean measure of the wedge between inside voting control and cash flow rights. These shares provide managers with no monetary incentives, since their dividends accrue to trust beneficiaries. However, managers may have the authority to vote these shares. Contrary to the belief that managerial control is purely detrimental, we find that it has positive effects on performance over at least some range.     

Influence of perceptual metrics on customer profitability: The mediating effect of behavioural metrics

Accountability of marketing actions is a topic of ongoing interest. In accordance with the growing importance of the subject, a multitude of customer metrics has been developed intended to measure and value marketing investments and link their returns to financial results and performance. Managers widely acknowledge the need for quantitative measures of marketing performance but now face the challenge of deciding which metrics to measure and how to interpret them. One of the main difficulties lies in the interdependencies of metrics. Those interdependencies may lead to serious misinterpretation and have been widely neglected in the existing literature. Therefore, this study empirically tests if the influence of customer perceptual metrics (for example, customer satisfaction) on customer profitability persists when customer behavioural metrics are considered. We use data from a large European financial service provider. Our findings support the relevance of mediating effects of customer behavioural metrics (for example, cross-selling ratio) on the relationship between customer perceptual metrics and customer profitability. The article contributes significantly to the body of knowledge about interdependencies between different customer metric combinations by considering direct and indirect links, testing for mediator effects, and evaluating their impact on customer profitability.     

Public Interest, Ethics, and the Balanced Scorecard: Implications for the Accounting Profession

The accounting profession bos been grappling with the issue of public interest responsibility for a number of years. The aim of this paper is to examine how a balanced scorecard (BSC) model can be used by the accounting profession to more effectively incorporate a public interest responsibility in its strategic framework. By using a BSC model, the paper provides an integrated framework for translating strategic values into a comprehensive set of objectives, performance measures and improvement actions .     

Subjective adjustments to objective performance measures: The influence of prior performance

This field study examines whether and how supervisors’ subjective adjustments to objective performance measures are influenced by their prior subjective evaluations of employees. Evaluations were determined entirely subjectively in the sample internal audit organization in 2005. In 2006, the organization introduced a pay-for-performance incentive plan that established four objective measures of audit manager performance. Then, knowing the challenges of objectively measuring manager performance, the organization gave supervisors the discretion, mandate, and training to subjectively adjust each of the objective measures when performance as indicated on the individual measures misrepresented managers’ true performance.     

Delivering the goods at TNT: the role of the performance measurement system

This paper explores the characteristics of the performance measurement system atTNT (UK) Ltd.which facilitate the translation of strategy into action.TNTis a successful and growing service organization and a market leader in the overnight distribution of parcels within the U.K. The performance measurement system and how it is used atTNTare described in detail. The authors then draw on the management accounting literature to provide an analysis framework which answers three central questions for performance measurement systems: whatdimensionsof performance to measure, how to setstandardsfor those measures and whatrewardsare to be associated with the achievement of those standards. The performance measurement system atTNTis appraised against this framework. AtTNTthere are five properties of the performance measurement system which have facilitated the translating of strategy into action. Three of these relate to the framework above; the company measures the right things in that dimensions are consistent with corporate strategy, it provides standards for performance through internal benchmarking, and adopts a mixture of financial and non-financial based rewards. In addition, however, there are two further properties of the system; the use of league tables to report the relative performance of the depots, and the presence of a strong corporate champion who drives the message and importance of the performance measurement system from the centre to the depots.     

Exploring attitudes to financial reporting in the Australian not‐for‐profit sector

The current level of satisfaction among different stakeholders about the current approaches and practises of financial reporting of not‐for‐profit (NFP) entities is underexplored ( Christensen and Mohr, 2003 ; Lee, 2004 ; Gray et al., 2006 ; Parker, 2007 ). This paper uses content analysis to examine submissions to the 2008 Australian Senate Economics Standing Committee for its inquiry into the disclosure regimes of charities and NFP organisations, which aimed to explore attitudes about financial reporting in the NFP sector. Financial reporting is viewed as an important part of accountability, but the sector identifies deficiencies in the current regime in terms of consistency, efficiency and transparency. Respondents to this inquiry believed that a sector‐specific accounting standard was important. Financial reporting standards, regulations and legal structures should be uniform across the entire sector, but with some variation allowed for smaller NFPs. The cost of complying with standards was a significant issue for smaller NFPs.     

保单贷款相关问题初探

近几年来,以保单为质押的贷款形式正在中国迅速发展。保单贷款作为一种新型的融资工具,对投保人、保险公司及其他金融机构、被保险人或受益人有重要影响。本文通过对保单贷款的特征及所引起的法律、监管问题的分析,提出了加强保单贷款管理的对策,包括完善保险法律、法规,明确保单贷款的地位和经营规范;加强监管,规范保单贷款的运作;保险公司加强业务管理,提高偿付能力,维护良好的客户关系等。     

Financial Transparency and Sources of Hidden Capital in Turkish Banks

This paper investigates how changes in regulatory and economic environments affect the transparency of banks’ financial-statements. Reregulation and a volatile economy make Turkish banks the ideal sample. I disaggregate sources of both hidden and booked capital in Turkish banks traded on the Istanbul Stock Exchange between 1988 and 2006. Hidden capital account for the difference between the accounting and opportunity-cost measures of a firm’s net worth. Increases in hidden capital in crisis periods indicate a greater reliance on government-contributed safety-net capital. The increase in hidden capital is more pronounced for large banks. Too-Big-To-Fail policies may explain why large banks are the beneficiaries of government-contributed capital.