Welfare effects of quality change and new products in the Japanese mobile telecommunications market: 1995–2001

This paper presents a simple framework based on a discrete choice model to assess the welfare effects of quality change and new products. Such a framework is shown to be useful where the hedonic approach is impracticable. This framework is applied to the Japanese mobile telecommunications market during the period 1995–2001. The estimated qualities for mobile telecommunications services in Japan are shown to have improved rapidly during this period, indicating the importance of quality change in the welfare gains of consumers relative to price change, and the need to adjust quality change in the construction of price indexes. However, it is also proven, at least in the earliest stages, that the effect of new services on consumer welfare was limited.     

Green certification,heterogeneous producers,and green consumers: a welfare analysis of environmental regulations

We develop a vertical differentiation model to analyze welfare implications of environmental policies in a competitive market with production and consumption heterogeneity. Consumers with heterogeneous preferences choose between non-green and certified green products, while producers with heterogeneous production costs decide whether to engage in green production. In order for green products to be recognized by consumers, producers must join a green club. Key findings are summarized as follows. (i) The number of green producers, environmental standard, and overall welfare under the market solution are all socially sub-optimal. (ii) The introduction of a subsidy policy for greener production and standards is shown to increase social welfare, but is not Pareto optimal. (iii) A dual policy, which combines abatement subsidizes for a greener production standard and a tax charge for green certification, is shown to be the Pareto-optimal outcome.     

Guaranteed Manufactured without Child Labor: The Economics of Consumer Boycotts, Social Labeling and Trade Sanctions

Does labeling products “Child‐Labor Free” provide a market‐based solution to the pervasive employment of child labor? This paper explores the promise of social labeling in the context of its four oft‐noted objectives: child labor employment, consumer information, welfare, and trade linkages, when competition between the North and South is based both on comparative cost advantage, and the use of child labor as a hidden product attribute. We show that (i) social labeling benefits consumers and Southern producers, whereas children and Northern producers are worse off; (ii) trade sanctions on unlabeled products deteriorates Southern terms of trade, but leaves the incidence of child labor strictly unaffected; and (iii) a threat to sanction imports of unlabeled Southern products discourages the South from maintaining a credible social labeling program. We also explore the question of whether social labeling should be viewed as a transitory or a permanent institution in developing economies.     

Graded eco-labels: A demand-oriented approach to reduce pollution

Supplied oriented environmental policies are generally used in order to limit production related pollution. This fact is based on the hypothesis that consumers are not willing to sacrifice personal utility for a wider social gain. We suggest that widespread environmental concerns of consumers can be exploited to push producers along cleaner technological patterns. Our core assumption is that consumers would be ready to purchase cleaner products if the products' characteristics are not ‘too dissimilar’ to those of more polluting alternatives. However, due to a lack of information about non-observable product characteristics, this assumption on its own is not sufficient for ‘environmental friendly’ producers to become competitive. We show - by means of a simulation model - that only if consumers are provided with appropriate information on the greenness of products through adequate eco-labels (graded eco-labels), then producers will be pressed to implement innovations aimed at reducing the environmental impact of their products. Under two test settings - one without any certification and another with binary eco-labels - the model shows markets characterised by highly polluting technological patterns. Only in the presence of graded eco-labels, competition drives the market toward cleaner technological patterns.     

Market Size and Firm Location in a Service Industry

This paper investigates the welfare effects of firm location in a service industry. We consider the situation where firms determine their locations in either of two regions with a difference in market size. From the viewpoint of the consumers' welfare, there are too few firms in the large market and too many in the small market. However, from the viewpoint of the producers' and social welfare, the opposite is true. Further, an increase in the difference in market size is unambiguously unfavorable for the producers. On the other hand, such an increase is favorable for the consumers and the economy as a whole.     

我国玉米产业技术进步的福利效应分析

在分别构建供给和需求模型对我国玉米生产消费状况进行分析的前提下,运用福利效应模型测算了技术进步对玉米生产者和消费者的福利效应,基本结论为:玉米具有较低的供给弹性和需求弹性,玉米技术进步的福利效应表现为消费者福利增加和生产者福利减少,但消费者福利的增加值大于生产者福利的减少值,使得整个社会的经济福利处于上升趋势。     

Consumer misperception of eco-labels,green market structure and welfare

Eco-labels are essential for informing consumers about products’ environmental characteristics. However, the many different labels consumers encounter can be confusing, which makes assessing environmental quality associated with each label difficult. How does consumer misperception of competing eco-labels affect market structure and welfare? This article provides theoretical insight into this issue by using a double-differentiation model in which three products compete: an unlabeled product and two distinctly eco-labeled products, one with a medium and one with a high level of environmental quality. The study investigates the effects of consumers’ imperfect information when they perceive all eco-labels as a sign of the same high environmental quality and consider each label as a unique product. This misperception can weaken the firm that provides the greenest product, though paradoxically this situation is not always detrimental to social welfare. However, depending on the certifying organizations, consumer misperception can induce firms to use a greenwashing strategy and encourage nongovernmental organizations and regulators to introduce less stringent standards.     

SEQUESTERING CARBON ON AGRICULTURAL LAND: SOCIAL COST AND IMPACTS ON TIMBER MARKETS

Planting trees to sequester carbon has broad political appeal. However, effects of a major tree planting program on the agricultural sector and on timber markets are unclear. This paper examines social costs of sequestering carbon in tree plantations on U.S. agricultural land and investigates harvesting's effects on timber prices and on private timber producers' welfare. The analysis links a model of the U.S. agricultural sector that includes the land base in major production areas with a model of the U.S. softwood economy. Using current data on planting, maintenance, and harvesting costs for tree plantations and carbon sequestration rates, the models estimate the price and welfare effects of alternative carbon sequestration goals. Results indicate a range of outcomes. Consumers pay higher prices for food as farmers divert land from crops to trees. However, wood products consumers gain from falling timber prices if the trees enter commercial markets. Agricultural producers and landowners gain from higher commodity prices, but private forest owners lose. Large tree planting programs imply that policymakers must compensate private commercial tree planting to prevent farmers from displacing present tree plantations.     

A Theoretical Reexamination of Privatization: Assessing its Welfare Impacts

Privatization has been one of the significant public policies adopted in the last two decades. Previous studies have focussed on efficacy gains at the firm and industry levels. This paper intends to reconsider the distributive impacts of privatization on the economy as a whole from a theoretical perspective. Specifically, it supposes an economy with two goods, two producers and two consumers, in which it is assumed that one of the consumers is not able to obtain one good that is regarded as a necessity. Since one basis of government intervention is to provide necessity to people who would not otherwise be able to obtain it, government intervention into production is assumed to satisfy this purpose. Using comparative statics, the paper analyzes how the welfare of two consumers is affected by this intervention, and shows that intervention can increase the welfare of some consumers and social welfare in general.     

INTER-MARKET COMPETITION THROUGH BUNDLING IN THE PRESENCE OF COST ADVANTAGE

This paper presents a model of inter-market competition through bundling wherein each firm has a cost advantage in a different market and competes against fringe firms. Without cost saving through bundling, there is no equilibrium in which the bundled good is provided. However, with cost saving through bundling, there exist equilibria in which one firm provides bundling and the other does not. In this case, bundling can be used as a device for entry deterrence. Finally, we illustrate that bundling can reduce social welfare by discouraging the efficient entrant from entering the market.     

Bundling, product choice, and efficiency: Should cable television networks be offered à la carte?

We conduct a numerical analysis of bundling’s impact on a monopolist’s pricing and product choices and assess the implications for consumer welfare in cable television markets. Existing theory is ambiguous: for a given set of products, bundling likely transfers surplus from consumers to firms but also encourages products to be offered that might not be under à la carte pricing. Simulation of “Full À La Carte” for an economic environment calibrated to an average cable television system suggests that consumers would likely benefit from à la carte sales. If all networks continued to be offered, the average household’s surplus is predicted to increase by $6.80 (65.6%) under à la carte sales (despite a total bundle price that almost doubles) and reduced network profits would have to be such that 41 of 50 offered cable networks have to exit the market to make her indifferent. Simulation of a “Theme Tier” scenario provides intermediate benefits. The incremental marginal costs to cable systems of à la carte sales and its impact in the advertising market and on competition are important factors in determining consumer benefits.     

A Case for Bundling Public Goods Contributions

We extend the model of voluntary contributions to multiple public goods by allowing for bundling of the public goods. Specifically, we study the case where agents contribute into a common pool which is then allocated toward the financing of two pure public goods. We explore the welfare implications of allowing for such bundling vis‐à‐vis a separate contributions scheme. We show that for high income inequality or for identical preferences among agents bundling leads to higher joint welfare. Interestingly, a welfare improvement can in some cases occur despite a decrease in total contributions. On the contrary, when agents are heterogenous, for low income inequality bundling can lead to lower total contributions and may decrease welfare compared to a separate contribution scheme. Our findings have implications for the design of charitable institutions and international aid agencies.     

What to do in globalised economies if global governance is missing? The vicarious role of competition in social responsibility

In this article, we present a model that seeks to illustrate mechanisms that have fostered the diffusion of socially responsible corporate practices with specific reference to Fair Trade. We do so with a simple standard Hotelling approach of competition on product differentiation between a profit-maximising producer (PMP) and a “socially responsible” not for profit “fair trader” (FT) over prices and (costly) “socially and environmentally responsible” features of their products. We show that, under reasonable conditions concerning consumers’ costs of ethical distance, the fair trader’s entry into the market triggers the partial adoption of socially responsible practices by the profit-maximising competitor. We finally compare the ethical choices of the two players with the optimal ones of a domestic benevolent planner. Our findings show that competition between the fair trader and the PMP leads to a level of transfers to marginalised producers in the South, which is above the optimal level fixed by a planner maximising the welfare of the consumers in the North. This finding shows that the competition in social responsibility triggered by fair traders partially compensates for the lack of global governance and global institutions properly representing marginalised producers.     

Efficient menu structures for pricing interruptible electric power service

A menu of interruptible service offerings provides a means for matching the reliability of electric power to the preferences of consumers with diverse interruption costs. Appropriately designed pricing induces a distribution of customer service selections such that the welfare loss (i.e., total interruption cost) of all customers is minimized, when averaged over a distribution of shortfall situations. This paper derives one and two dimensional price menus that consider lost service time and interruption frequency as separate attributes. The relative efficiencies of three types of menus are compared and discussed.     

Incentive regulation in local telecommunications: The effects on price markups

The governing bodies of the telecommunications industry instituted a major shift from rate of return to price cap regulation in an effort to foster competition and improve efficiency. This paper focuses on the local exchange market and examines the price markup before and after the implementation of price cap regulation to measure the effects of the change on consumer welfare. The average price markup increased slightly after price cap regulation; however, the average price decreased, indicating that consumers benefited without firms losing from the regulatory shift.      

Corporate Social Responsibility Spillover and Competition Effects on the Food Industry

This paper examines the spillover and competition effects of corporate social responsibility (CSR) with duopoly competition. In employing the assumption that firm CSR increases consumer willingness to pay for the firm's products while consumer willingness to pay decreases for non‐CSR firm products, some interesting conclusions are achieved. First, CSR spillover effects increase CSR firm outputs and prices, while CSR spillover has the opposite effect on competitors. Second, CSR spillover decreases total outputs and total social welfare levels. Third, competition effects increase CSR expenditures, and CSR firms' CSR policies are the most robust when non‐CSR firms assume a leading position. It is found that total outputs and consumer utilities are highest when CSR firm acts as leader, while the relationships of social welfare among different cases are ambiguous depending on product substitution and spillover effects.     

On the paradoxical case of a consumer-based environmental subsidy policy

We apply an environmentally differentiated duopoly model to the analysis of environmental policy involving consumer subsidies based on the emission levels of the products consumers purchase. More specifically, we consider the environmental and welfare effects of subsidizing consumers who purchase environmentally friendly goods in the case of a partially covered market with a Cournot duopoly. We show that, paradoxically, the subsidy policy degrades the environment, and that the optimal policy depends on the degree of marginal social valuation of environmental damage. That is, if the marginal social valuation of environmental damage is larger than a certain value, a consumer-based environmental subsidy policy is not socially optimal.     

Quality certification standards in competitive markets: When consumers and producers (dis)agree

A quality certification standard in a competitive setting can improve welfare but may affect consumers and producers differently. In a competitive model with quality preferences of the vertical product differentiation type, we find that producers prefer a higher (lower) quality standard than consumers if individual demand functions are log-convex (log-concave).     

Consumer demand for local honey

How to best target and attract niche market consumers is an important marketing problem for producers of specialty agricultural products. It is particularly an issue in the honey market where consumers increasingly face media messages regarding threats to honey bee health, honey adulteration and health benefits of locally produced honey. Using auction experiments, this research evaluates consumer behaviour related to informational messages about honey that is produced locally, domestically and internationally. Results from 115 adult consumers show that consumers’ demand for honey varies significantly based on the geographic location of the honey’s production, product packaging and the information they have about the product. Consumers demonstrate greater demand for locally produced honey, especially when provided information about negative aspects of internationally produced honey that include adulteration. This shows that such negative media attention on specialty products offers small producers an opportunity to increase profitability by marketing themselves as a specialized niche alternative.     

First-best health policy in vaccine markets with health and network externalities

This paper considers an oligopolistic market for a vaccine, characterized by negative network effects, which stem from the free-riding behavior of individuals engaged in a vaccination game. Vaccine markets often suffer from three imperfections: high concentration, network effects, and a health externality (contagion). The first conclusion of the paper is that the negative network externality is important as a market distortion, as it may lead to significant welfare losses. The second and main part of the paper develops a two-part per-unit subsidy scheme that a social planner could use to target both consumers and producers of vaccines. The scope of such a subsidy scheme to induce the firms to produce the first-best output without network effects (which is the most ambitious first-best target) is investigated. In many cases, while the first-best is attainable, it requires negative prices for vaccines, which amounts to rewarding consumers to induce them to vaccinate.