TREASURY NOTE AND BANK BILL RATES, THE RISK PREMIUM AND AUSTRALIAN MONETARY POLICY*

This paper examines a link in the Australian monetary transmission mechanism based on the risk structure of certain interest rates. Monthly data on the bank-accepted bill and Treasury note rates reveal a significant reduction in both the mean and variance of the risk premium linking the two rates towards the end of 1989. The two interest rates cointegrate in each of the periods January 1984 to September 1989 and October 1989 to December 1995, though less significantly so in the earlier period, and formal tests indicate that the risk premium was stationary for each of the sub-periods. Well defined error-correction mechanisms suggest that the burden of adjustment to shocks to the money market was shared by the two interest rates. A stationary risk premium, combined with evidence that the Treasury note rate Granger-caused the bank bill rate in both sub-periods, indicates that the Reserve Bank has been able to influence the bill rate by targeting the note rate.     

LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY RISK EXPOSURE: MARKET EVIDENCE AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Life insurance company (LIC) risk exposure increased during the 1980s while capital ratios declined. State guarantee funds that exist to handle policyholder's losses in the event of LIC failure can create incentives for excessive risk taking, just as the federal deposit insurance system did for savings and loan associations. This paper examines the relationship between stock market risk and LIC risk exposure. A sample of 44 LICs revealed that stock market risk is positively related to financial leverage as well as to differences in asset mix. This finding confirms that market data can help identify LICs with greater risk exposure .     

GROWTH, R&D AND WELFARE: THE ROLE OF PUBLIC POLICY

This paper analyzes the normative side of an R&D growth model in which market structure and growth are jointly determined in the equilibrium of a one‐sector economy under monopolistic competition. We find that a distortion in the allocation of R&D, namely the presence of technological spillovers between firms, generates two market failures: insufficient growth and excessive entry of firms. We show that this result is driven by the interplay between market structure and growth. A simple tax/subsidy scheme to support the efficient solution is proposed.     

SOME WELFARE IMPLICATIONS OF OPTIMAL STABILISATION POLICY IN AN ECONOMY WITH CAPITAL AND STICKY PRICES

In this paper we review and extend some of the key lessons that seem to be emerging from the Ramsey‐inspired theory of dynamic optimal monetary and fiscal policies. We construct measures of the key distortions in our economy; we label these ‘dynamic wedges’. Inflation, actual or anticipated, distorts these wedges in the present period, shrinks the tax base and increases the deadweight loss. We show that, if possible, labour as well as capital ought to be subsidised in steady state. We point to a number of extensions to the Ramsey literature that may help in the formulation of actual policy.     

DEPRIVATION,INEQUALITY AND WELFARE*

Welfare ranking of income distributions involves a trade‐off between equity and efficiency. A person's feeling of deprivation about higher incomes may be of a relative or absolute type. We consider an intermediate notion of deprivation, a convex mix of relative and absolute deprivations. We then look at the problem of welfare ranking of income distributions when welfare increases under a globally equitable redistribution and under an income increase that keeps intermediate deprivation fixed. All deprivation indices can be regarded as inequality indices but the converse is not true. We also provide a numerical illustration of our results.     

IMMIGRANT WELFARE RECIPIENCY: RECENT TRENDS AND FUTURE IMPLICATIONS

Using microdata from the 1970 and 1980 U.S. Censuses, this article examines recent trends in immigrant welfare recipiency. Immigrant welfare use increased over the 1970s, both in absolute terms and in comparison to the welfare use of natives. A small number of source country characteristics explain over two-thirds of the large variation in welfare recipiency that exists across national origin groups. Moreover, changes in the average source country characteristics of the foreign-born population between 1970 and 1980 can account for almost all of the increase in immigrant welfare recipiency that occurred over the decade.     

MIGRATION,MEDICAL AID AND WELFARE*

This paper constructs a simple rural‐urban migration model that explicitly incorporates the interactions between the individual's migration decision, the risk of incurring an infectious disease and unemployment. We show that providing a subsidy for health investment in urban regions in the form of medical aid does not improve individual welfare. This is because it induces further urban migration, increases the risk of infection and unemployment, and offsets completely the positive cost‐reduction effect.     

PROFIT SHARING AND EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP: POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Various arguments extol public encouragement of profit sharing and Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs). Generally, advocates of public intervention cite externalities (market failure), provision of merit goods, or social transformation as bases for their arguments. To the extent that profit sharing and ESOPs increase productivity or reduce employer costs, no case exists for public intervention, since such advantages are internalized. Although Congress views retirement saving as a merit good, deferred profit sharing and ESOPs are no more deserving of public subsidy on that basis than are other forms of saving, such as pensions. Finally, the notion that ESOPs promote a social transformation by redistributing equity is untenable. One can make a case for government efforts to spread data and information about these plans. The potential macro stabilizing effects of profit sharing—but not ESOPs—provide a rationale for a tax subsidy to the former.     

LOOKING AT THE “POPULATION PROBLEM” THROUGH THE PRISM OF HETEROGENEITY: WELFARE AND POLICY ANALYSES*

Upon introducing heterogeneity and dynamics into a model of the demand for children, a problem of optimal population is defined and analyzed. It is shown that from the perspective of social welfare, better‐educated individuals produce too few children while less‐educated individuals produce too many children and all individuals invest too little in the education of their children. The impact of several policy tools geared at addressing the “population problem” is investigated, in particular how child allowances and other tax‐subsidy policies can be harnessed to enhance welfare, and how and why early childhood education programs can mitigate the “population problem.”     

INDUSTRIAL LICENSING,BRIBERY AND ALLOCATION EFFICIENCY*

In less developed countries where an industrial licensing policy governs the entry of new firms, and when government officials awarding these licenses are corrupt, an incumbent firm may deter entry by bribing the official to deny the license. The paper demonstrates that such bribery can lead to the exclusion of more efficient firms from the market. This contradicts the established result that bribery does not affect allocation efficiency.     

RISK,UNCERTAINTY AND CHINA'S EXPORTS*

Both theoretical and empirical models were developed in this paper to examine how exporters’ response to real exchange rate volatility (RERV) and real exchange rate misalignment (RERM) varies across industries in China. The theoretical model indicates that the impact of RERV depends on exporters’ attitude to risk while the effect of RERM is ambiguous. Using disaggregated industry data, Chinese exporters were found to be averse to RERV and RERM. This suggests that the negative impact on China's exports resulting from a revaluation of the RMB will be mitigated by a positive impact due to the reduction of RERM.     

CONTROL ALLOCATION,REVENUE SHARING,AND JOINT OWNERSHIP*

This article develops a two‐period double moral hazard model with incomplete contracting to explore the implication of a possible adverse effect of unilateral control on the optimal revenue sharing and control allocation in a joint venture. We identify conditions under which joint ownership and control become optimal when unilateral control gives the controlling party opportunities to inefficiently extract private benefits at the expense of the joint revenue. Moreover, this adverse consequence of control may also lead to the separation of share ownership and control, i.e., it may be optimal for the minority owner to have the control rights.