The welfare costs of union wage compression

This paper calculates the quantitative significance of the welfare costs of union wage compression. This is done in a dynamic general equilibrium model with overlapping generations where agents choose both schooling (human capital) and assets (physical capital). The labor market in this model is characterized as a right-to-manage contract, which allows unions to compress wage differentials between high- and low-skilled workers, by implementing a binding minimum wage. This paper shows that when labor markets are competitive even low levels of wage compression lead to large welfare losses, since wage compression creates costly unemployment among low-skilled workers. The effect of wage compression on the supply of skilled labor, however, is rather small, since the disincentive effect of a lower, high-skilled wage is, to a large extent, offset by a lower opportunity cost of schooling due to higher unemployment.     

Employment, wages, and the economic cycle: Differences between immigrants and natives

In this paper, we analyse differences in the cyclical pattern of employment and wages of immigrants and natives for two large immigrant receiving countries, Germany and the UK. We show that, despite large differences in their immigrant populations, there are similar and significant differences in cyclical responses between immigrants and natives in both countries, even conditional on education, age, and location. We decompose changes in outcomes into a secular trend and a business cycle component. We find significantly larger unemployment responses to economic shocks for low-skilled workers relative to high-skilled workers and for immigrants relative to natives within the same skill group. There is little evidence for differential wage responses to economic shocks. We offer three explanations for these findings: an equilibrium search model, where immigrants experience higher job separation rates, a model of dual labour markets, and differences in the complementarity of immigrants and natives to capital.     

BIASED TECHNOLOGICAL SHOCKS, RELATIVE WAGE RIGIDITIES AND LOW-SKILLED UNEMPLOYMENT

The contrast between the evolution over the last decades of the European Union (EU) and the US unemployment rates, especially for the low-skilled, is well known. A consensus view is that these different outcomes can be explained by the interactions between common shocks and specific institutional setups. In this paper, we emphasize the interactions between technological changes and wages rigidities. We construct a fully calibrated general equilibrium model with two types of jobs and two types of workers, and with search unemployment. Our simulations show that with wage rigidities, technological changes suffice to generate a continuous rise in the low-skilled unemployment rate and an almost unchanged high-skilled unemployment rate. Without wage rigidities, the unemployment rates remain unchanged but the wage dispersion widens.     

Wage bargaining and turnover costs with heterogenous labor and perfect history screening

We study effects of mobility costs in a model of (Nash) wage bargaining between workers and firms, with instantaneous matching, heterogeneous workers, identical firms and free firm entry, and where firms can screen workers perfectly according to their previous work history but not their actual productivity. We derive the employment level and the minimum worker quality standard, in the market solution, and in the efficient solution established by a social planner. When workers have positive bargaining power, there is always some inefficient unemployment among desired workers in the market solution. The lowest hiring standard chosen by firms is higher than the planner's standard when firing costs are high relative to hiring costs, but may be lower in the opposite case. We show that any higher established hiring standard corresponds to a market equilibrium. The model explains a tendency for a high initial unemployment rate to remain high, particularly for low-skilled workers.     

Minimum wage or negative income tax: why skilled workers may favor wage rigidities

In this article, we analyze the political choice of the extent and means of income redistribution between high and low-skilled workers. Redistributive tools encompass both fiscal transfers (a negative income tax) and a minimum wage requirement. We assume the use of fiscal instruments alone to be the first-best means of redistribution. We show that high-skilled workers may favor a second-best, minimum wage requirement because it increases unemployment, hence raising the marginal cost of redistribution, and creates a justification for them to moderate low-skilled workers’ claim for redistribution.      

Stick,Carrot and Skill Acquisition*

We evaluate the impact of specially designed youth unemployment programmes (YUPs), intended to provide young unemployed unskilled workers with skills. If unemployment among skilled workers is lower than among unskilled workers, YUPs imply that unemployment falls. However, YUPs potentially crowd out ordinary training. We set up an equilibrium matching model with endogenous skill choice and examine the impact of an increase in programme participation. We derive a condition for crowding out of ordinary training, as well as a condition for an increase in the skilled labour force and thereby reduced unemployment. The impact of YUPs on welfare and wage dispersion is also considered.     

Monetary regimes and the co-ordination of wage setting

A recent literature argues that a strict monetary regime may reduce equilibrium unemployment by disciplining wage setters, as wage setters abstain from raising wages to avoid a monetary contraction. However, in this literature the wage setters are assumed not to co-ordinate their wage setting. The present paper argues that precisely because a strict monetary regime may discipline the unco-ordinated wage setting, thus lowering unemployment in the unco-ordinated outcome, it also reduces wage setters’ incentives to co-ordinate. It is shown that an accommodating monetary regime may reduce equilibrium unemployment, via the strengthening of the wage setters’ incentives to co-ordinate.     

Winners and losers: a micro-level analysis of international outsourcing and wages

Abstract.  Our paper investigates the link between international outsourcing and wages utilizing a large household panel and combining it with industry-level information on industries' outsourcing activities from input-output tables. This approach avoids problems such as aggregation bias, potential endogeneity bias, and poor skill definitions that commonly hamper industry-level studies. We find that outsourcing has had a marked impact on wages. Applying two alternative skill classifications, we find evidence that a 1 percentage point increase in outsourcing reduced the wage for workers in the lowest skill categories by up to 1.5%, while it increased wages for high-skilled workers by up to 2.6%. This result is robust to a number of different specifications.     

Unemployment and the 'Labour-management Conspiracy'

We study a model in which management and a union bargain over a rule that will later determine the level of employment, and over a wage. The government then chooses an output or an employment subsidy. An exogenous natural turnover rate in the unionised sector creates unemployment whenever the union wage exceeds the competitive wage. Government intervention can increase both the equilibrium amount of unemployment and worsen the intersectoral allocation of labour, because of the induced change in the endogenous wage. Unemployment weakens but does not eliminate the possibility of a 'labour-management conspiracy'.     

Does the Choice between Wage Inequality and Unemployment Affect Productivity Growth?

Abstract. We present a non-scale continuous-time overlapping-generations growth model that provides an explanation for why economies with relative wage rigidity feature higher unemployment, but not slower productivity growth, than economies with flexible wages. The compression of the wage distribution associated with relative wage rigidity slows down human capital accumulation and growth ceteris paribus . But unemployment among the low-skilled workers strengthens the incentives to invest in human capital and, hence, growth. The two effects are offsetting, and growth is independent of the prevailing degree of relative wage rigidity. This knife-edge result is robust with respect to some modifications of the model.     

Economic migration and business cycles in a small open economy with matching frictions

With the free movement of labour in Europe, economic migration has become an important determinant of labour supply. Cyclical migration exceeds one percent of the population in many countries and affects (un)employment and wage setting. The main contribution of this paper is that it models migration as an endogenous decision in a search-and-matching framework, where labour market institutions play an important role. It shows that, contrary to typical beliefs, migration can amplify business cycles. After a positive shock to the economy, immigration increases the labour force and initially unemployment. The latter reduces a worker's outside option in wage negotiations, resulting in a lower wage increase than when there is no migration. With cheaper labour firms post more job vacancies, which increases the probability that unemployed workers find jobs and attracts new workers to immigrate. Attenuated response of wages and the stronger response of employment to shocks result in a flatter Phillips curve.     

Public finance solutions to the European unemployment problem?

Unemployment in Europe is heavily concentrated among low-skilled workers. It has therefore been suggested that structural unemployment could be reduced by shifting the tax burden away from low-skilled labour and away from the production of consumer services, which are intensive in the use of such labour. This paper finds that a tax shift away from low-paid labour may raise aggregate employment and welfare, but only if wage formation is sufficiently responsive to changing tax incentives. The analysis also suggests that non-negligible employment and welfare gains could be reaped by offering tax concessions or subsidies to those parts of the consumer service sector which compete most directly with low-productivity home production and with underground economic activity.     

Foreign capital inflow,skilled–unskilled wage inequality and unemployment of unskilled labour in a fair wage model

This paper has developed a three-sector general equilibrium framework that explains unemployment of both skilled and unskilled labour. Unemployment of unskilled labour is of the Harris–Todaro (1970) type while unemployment of skilled labour is caused due to the validity of the FWH in the high-skill sector. There are two types of capital one of which is specific to the primary export sector while the other moves freely among the different sectors. Inflows of foreign capital of either type unambiguously improve the economic conditions of the unskilled working class. However, the effects on the skilled–unskilled wage inequality and the extent of unemployment of both types of labour crucially hinge on the properties implied by the efficiency function of the skilled workers.     

The Impact of Social Segregation on the Labor Market Outcomes of Low-Skilled Workers*

We study the impact of network homophily on labor market outcomes in a search-and-matching model with two job search channels: the formal market and social contacts. There are two worker types: low-skilled and high-skilled workers. The homophily level determines whether the referral networks of the two types are mixed or segregated from each other. We show that there exists an intermediate homophily level that minimizes the unemployment rate and maximizes the wages of low-skilled workers. Complete integration does not maximize the welfare of low-skilled workers, unless it improves their productivity. We argue that our model can explain the empirical findings on the labor market effects of the Moving-to-Opportunity experiment and the integration of immigrants.     

Prices,Productivity and Wage Bargaining in Open Economies*

According to the standard union bargaining model, unemployment benefits should have big effects on wages, but product‐market prices and productivity should play no role in the wage bargain. We formulate an alternative strategic bargaining model, where labour and product‐market conditions together determine wages. A wage equation is derived and estimated on aggregate data for four Nordic countries. Wages are found to depend not only on unemployment and the replacement ratio, but also on productivity, international prices and exchange rates. There is evidence of considerable nominal wage rigidity. Exchange rate changes have large and persistent effects on competitiveness.     

International fragmentation: Boon or bane for domestic employment?

In this paper, we introduce the fairness approach to efficiency wages into a standard model of international fragmentation. This gives us a theoretical framework in which wage inequality and unemployment rates are co-determined and therefore the public concern can be addressed that international fragmentation and outsourcing to low wage countries lead to domestic job-losses. We develop a novel diagrammatic tool to illustrate the main labour market effects of international fragmentation. We also explore how preferences for fair wages and the size of unemployment benefits govern the employment effects of outsourcing and critically assess the role of political intervention that aims to reduce unemployment benefits under internationally fragmented production.     

Unions and wage inequality: The roles of gender,skill and public sector employment

We examine the changing relationship between unionization and wage inequality in Canada and the United States. Our study is motivated by profound recent changes in the composition of the unionized workforce. Historically, union jobs were concentrated among low-skilled men in private sector industries. With the steady decline in private sector unionization and rising influence in the public sector, half of unionized workers are now in the public sector. Accompanying these changes was a remarkable rise in the share of women among unionized workers. Currently, approximately half of unionized employees in North America are women. While early studies of unions and inequality focused on males, recent studies find that unions reduce wage inequality among men but not among women. In both countries, we find striking differences between the private and public sectors in the effects of unionization on wage inequality. At present, unions reduce economy-wide wage inequality by less than 10%. However, union impacts on wage inequality are much larger in the public sector. Once we disaggregate by sector, the effects of unions on male and female wage inequality no longer differ. The key differences in union impacts are between the public and private sectors—not between males and females.     

Reforming Social Welfare in Germany: An Applied General Equilibrium Analysis

Abstract. In this paper, the effects of social assistance reform proposals are discussed for the case of Germany using a computable general equilibrium model that incorporates a discrete choice model of labour supply. This allows us to identify general equilibrium effects of the reforms on wages and unemployment. The simulation results show that general equilibrium wage reactions mitigate labour supply effects and that unemployment in fact decreases. Wage reactions are thus sufficiently strong to prevent additional labour supply from translating into higher unemployment. The simulations indicate that major cuts in welfare payments are necessary to produce substantial employment effects.     

Information and communication technology diffusion and skill upgrading in Korean industries

We examine the relationship between the directly observable indicator of new technology, information and communication technology (ICT) investment intensity, and skill upgrading by analyzing changes in employment and wage structure of 25 Korean industrial sectors over the 1993–1999 period. The estimation results indicate the following implications. First, although ICT expenditure and investment have increased sharply since 1993, it appears that ICT investment has begun to be complementarily combined with skilled labor only since 1996. Second, our results support the ‘limited substitution hypothesis’. ICT has substituted low-skilled non-production workers, whereas the increased demand for high-skilled workers is driven by ICT diffusion in the second sub-period. This asymmetric trend between high-skilled and low-skilled non-production workers in Korea reveals significant differences in comparison with the experiences of other OECD countries. Third, the existence of substitutability between ICT diffusion and low-skilled non-production workers in Korea may cast doubt on the appropriateness of the non-production workers' category, a category regarded as a proxy variable of high-skilled workers in most previous studies.     

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND LABOUR MARKET IMPERFECTION

This paper will set up a general equilibrium model with a distorted labour market to explore the effects of an environmental tax and union bargaining power on formal employment and the informal competitive wage. We find that when the government raises the environmental tax, both formal employment and informal competitive wage would fall. In addition, we confirm that a policy of labour market reform would increase both formal employment and the informal competitive wage.