如何打破国际商务谈判的僵局

在国际商务谈判中经常会遇到这样一种情况 :谈判双方似乎已经退到不能再退让的地步 ,谈判已无法进行下去了 ,即人们通常所说的谈判僵局。在谈判进行的过程中 ,僵局无论何时都有可能发生 ,任何主题都有可能形成分歧与对立。出现僵局不等于谈判破裂 ,但它严重影响谈判的进程 ,如不能很好地解决 ,就可能导致谈判的破裂。应该说 ,在国际商务谈判中 ,来自不同国度的谈判双方既然能坐在一起 ,就说明双方都是经过认真准备且怀有合作诚意的。双方从各自所寻求的利益出发 ,都希望能够打破僵局 ,求大同存小异以达到谈判的预期目的。随着我国对外开放和…     

基于人力资本视角的治理模式与企业所有权配置

企业所有权安排存在两种不同的理论流派:传统的物质资本股东至上理论逻辑下的单边治理模式和人力资本理论与利益相关者理论逻辑下的共同治理模式。文章基于人力资本视角论证了人力资本所有者分享企业所有权的可行性,采用谈判控制力与博弈方法研究在共同治理发展趋势下人力资本所有者分享企业剩余索取权和剩余控制权配置份额问题。     

利益相关者共同治理的发展趋势探析

利益相关者共同治理观认为企业的全体利益相关者都应该参与公司治理.但是企业的各利益相关者之间具有很大差异,不应该等同对待.本文在分析全体利益相关者共同参与公司治理的优越性和缺陷的基础上,提出了利益相关者共同治理的发展趋势应是核心利益相关者共同治理.     

复杂产品系统项目的治理结构——基于利益相关者理论的研究

回顾了项目治理理论,并根据利益相关者理论识别复杂产品系统项目的利益相关者,进而对4个典型的复杂产品系统项目的合同签订过程、团队组建、外部环境和项目效益等进行剖析,从中析出具有一般性的复杂产品系统项目的治理结构。研究结果表明:复杂产品系统项目治理模型是由内部治理、外部治理和环境治理组成的,是反映利益相关者的责权划分、参与方式及项目沟通协调的综合治理模型。提出:内部治理反映项目核心利益相关者的领导力;外部治理反映契约关系的作用;环境治理是项目各利益相关者权利的保障。     

探寻利益相关者理论的产生与发展

利益相关者理论产生于20世纪60年代,是在对以股东利益最大化为目标的“股东至上”公司治理实践的质疑中逐步发展起来的。目前,理论界一种认为股东是企业所有者,股东享有企业剩余索取权与剩余控制权,即股东中心理论;一种认为企业是利益相关者的企业,包括股东在内的所有利益相关者都应拥有企业所有权,即利益相关者理论。本文从利益相关者界定、利益相关者理论运用及发展趋势等问题对其进行综述。     

基于纳什谈判推广模型的国际气候谈判研究

多哈气候大会已经结束,此次多哈气候谈判将《京都议定书》承诺期延长到2020年,俄罗斯、日本、新西兰和加拿大退出了《京都议定书》,美国仍未加入。国际气候谈判经历了相当漫长的时间,至今仍未取得突破性进展。文章首次借助纳什谈判推广模型从谈判力、担心谈判破裂程度与谈判破裂后的效用水平三方面对国际气候谈判进行分析,并据此以气候谈判现状为例进行了说明,得出谈判方的效用水平与谈判力成正比,可以通过提高谈判力水平来提高效用水平,谈判方对谈判破裂的担心程度对谈判有很大影响,并且可以通过惩罚机制来改变其担心程度影响谈判结果。所以我国应努力提高谈判力,通过对其他国家担心谈判破裂程度的分析,预测其谈判动机及立场做出相应对策,另外指出了会议增设惩罚措施的必要性。     

浅析国际商务谈判策略的应用

在国际商务谈判乃至所有谈判中,各方的谈判者都在谋求共赢的前提下应用各种策略来达到已方乃至谈判各方的利益最大化。商务谈判策略是对谈判人员在商务谈判过程中为实现特定的谈判目标而采取的各种方式、措施、技巧、战术、手段及其反向与组合运用的总称。①策略设计和应用的好坏直接关系到谈判的进行和效果,因此,谈判就是一智力的较量,是一场关于策略的较量。于是,我们有必要对谈判的策略进行一次系统地总结分析。     

论利益相关者理论的合理性

企业是利益相关者之间相互合作的组织,由于各利益主体在企业中的利益是不同的,拥有控制权的一方就可能损害其他利益相关者的利益。因此,有效率的公司治理结构应该是利益相关者分享企业所有权的共同治理。     

失业利益与工资谈判:一个博弈模型

本文通过一个可以中途退出谈判的讨价还价模型 ,刻画了存在失业利益条件下的工人和企业之间的工资议价行为。结论是 :失业利益将加强工人的工资要价能力 ,降低工人求职的努力程度 ,过高的失业利益甚至导致工人提前结束谈判 ,而过低的失业利益导致工人在各阶段的工资要价都较低 ;由于信息不对称 ,企业可以凭借信息优势对工人的要价进行压价。理论上 ,存在最优的失业保障。     

浅析国际商务谈判策略的应用

在国际商务谈判乃至所有谈判中,各方的谈判者都在谋求共赢的前提下应用各种策略来达到己方乃至谈判各方的利益最大化.商务谈判策略是对谈判人员在商务谈判过程中为实现特定的谈判目标而采取的各种方式、措施、技巧、战术、手段及其反向与组合运用的总称.①策略设计和应用的好坏直接关系到谈判的进行和效果,因此,谈判就是一智力的较量,是一场关于策略的较量.于是,我们有必要对谈判的策略进行一次系统地总结分析.     

A bargaining model in general equilibrium

The goal of the paper is to present a simple model of rational endogenous household formation in a general equilibrium framework in which Pareto optimality at the economy level is not necessarily obtained. The simplest example of household formation is the case in which pairs of individuals engage themselves in a bargaining process on the division of some wealth: if an agreement on the distribution is (not) reached, we can say that the household is (not) formed. The vast majority of existing bargaining models predicts agreements on an efficient outcome. A seminal paper by Crawford (Econometrica 50:607–637, 1982) describes a very simple game with incomplete information in which, even with rational agents, disagreement causes welfare losses. We embed that model in a general equilibrium framework and present some results on equilibria both in the bargaining game and the associated exchange economy. Crawford’s results support Schelling’s intuition on the reasons of disagreement: it may arise if players’ commitments are reversible. Crawford shows that high probabilities of reversibility tend to favor the bargaining impasse, in fact with low probability. We prove that even if those probabilities are arbitrarily close to zero, disagreement is an equilibrium outcome, with high probability. That conclusion seems to be an even stronger support to Schelling’s original viewpoint. In the exchange economy model with that noncooperative bargaining game as a first stage, we present significant examples of economies for which equilibria exist. Because of disagreement, Pareto suboptimal exchange economy equilibria exist for all elements in the utility function and endowment spaces and they may coexist with Pareto optimal equilibria even at the same competitive prices.     

Bargaining with endogenous disagreement: The extended Kalai-Smorodinsky solution

Following Vartiainen (2007) we consider bargaining problems in which no exogenous disagreement outcome is given. A bargaining solution assigns a pair of outcomes to such a problem, namely a compromise outcome and a disagreement outcome: the disagreement outcome may serve as a reference point for the compromise outcome, but other interpretations are given as well. For this framework we propose and study an extension of the classical Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution. We identify the (large) domain on which this solution is single-valued, and present two axiomatic characterizations on subsets of this domain.     

Bargaining with Multinationals: Why State Capacity Matters

Dominant models of bargaining between states and multinational corporations (MNCs) have widely held that bargaining relations, especially in high-technology manufacturing, have changed from confrontational to cooperative. It is consequently argued that there is little formal entry bargaining among these actors. However, there are three primary weaknesses in this literature. First, the understanding of outcomes is limited to the terms of investment agreements. This static view ignores the dynamics of bargaining processes and decisions not to invest, which also deserve explanation. Second, it is MNC-centric, ignoring state's privileged role in relation to the governance of entry bargaining in domestic policy-making processes. Third, it views state as a monolithic entity, ignoring the bargaining that occurs inside states. To redress these issues, this article offers a state-centric bargaining model. It identifies administrative and institutional capacity as two critical components of state capacity. It chooses the entry bargaining from 2005, when Hyundai Motors Corporation considered establishing a USD1.5 billion car-manufacturing plant in Turkey. It shows that state capacity in the governance of a domestic policy-making process affects the outcome of entry bargaining: When state capacity is weak, an MNC's decision not to invest is a more likely outcome.     

Union–firm bargaining: Order of play and efficiency

This paper shows that a modified alternating offers Rubinstein model can provide a Pareto superior outcome in the context of the right-to-manage union–firm bargaining. Two examples of bargaining protocols that yield a superior outcome are provided. In the first example, the parties engage in a game in which the order of play is determined as part of the bargaining. We show that the game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in which the firm always moves first in the wage bargaining game. The equilibrium wage is, therefore, unique. In the second example, we examine a two-part-tariff alternating offers bargaining protocol, where the parties bargain over the wage and transfer payments. We show that this bargaining protocol has a Pareto efficient, unique subgame perfect equilibrium. Thus, although the parties do not bargain over the level of employment, the outcome under this protocol is, nevertheless, socially optimal.     

WAGE BARGAINING AND MERGER INCENTIVES WITH ASYMMETRIC COSTS

This paper examines how wage bargaining within each firm influences the relationship between an equilibrium ownership structure and the most preferred ownership structure from the viewpoint of social welfare, in a unionized oligopoly of asymmetric firms with respect to productivity of capital. We consider the merger incentive of each firm’s owner when the wage level is determined through bargaining between the firm’s owner and union. We derive a condition for both the degree of cost asymmetry among existing firms and the relative bargaining power of each firm’s owner to her/his union such that each ownership structure can be observed in equilibrium. We also show that although the two types of ownership structures with the merger involving the least efficient firm can be equilibria and socially optimal, these structures are observed only when both the degree of cost asymmetry and the relative bargaining power of each firm’s owner are moderate. Finally, we analyse the relationship among the cooperative game approach employed in this paper and two non‐cooperative merger formation approaches, and examine the robustness of the results obtained in this paper against the change in the assumption regarding each firm’s cost function.     

Investment and technological choice in a right-to-manage model

We analyze the interactions between investment and local wage bargaining in a putty-clay model where the investment decision commits the firm to a particular capital intensity. This technological precommitment is used strategically in order to manipulate the bargaining outcome. We show that this strategic behavior induces a nonmonotonic relationship between the capital and labor demands of the firm and most of its environmental parameters (e.g., the bargaining power of the union, its minimum wage requirement, the capital cost). The results we obtain in our putty-clay framework thus contradict several conclusions of the standard literature on wage bargaining and investment.     

The welfare effect of bargaining power in the licensing of a cost-reducing technology

This study considers licensing of a cost-reducing technology through bargaining between a technology-holding firm and its rival firm in a Cournot duopoly market. To consider the relative bargaining power of both firms, the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution is applied as our solution. Then, we specify the combinations of lump-sum fee and per-unit royalty that are realized through bargaining, and examine the effect on social welfare of the technology-holding firm’s bargaining power. The principal findings are as follows. Regardless of the technology-holding firm’s bargaining power, pure royalty licensing is carried out, and social welfare is non-increasing in its bargaining power. In our model, licensing through a take-it-or-leave-it offer, which is often assumed in the literature, is regarded as the case in which the technology-holding firm has full bargaining power. Thus, the result on social welfare implies that the take-it-or-leave-it offer licensing mechanism leads to the socially worst outcome.     

Bargaining over a Menu of Wage Contracts

We investigate an infinite horizon bargaining problem in which a firm and a worker bargain over two dimensions, quality and wage. The worker has private information about his type. Only the uninformed firm makes an offer and it can offer a menu of quality-wage contracts instead of single one. We show that for all discount factors, the unique sequential equilibrium outcome is separating without delay; the firm separates the types of worker with a menu of contracts in the first period. Our result shows that in multi-dimensional bargaining, the "Coase Conjecture" holds in the sense that the game ends in the first period. But it fails in the sense that the uninformed party can preserve the entire bargaining power.     

STRATEGIC DELEGATION UNDER UNIONISED DUOPOLY: WHO WILL BARGAIN WITH UNIONS?

This paper investigates the choice of a firm's delegate (either the owner or the manager) bargaining wages and employment with a union under a unionised duopoly. We show that if an owner delegates the task of bargaining to a manager, the owner always compensates the manager for profits by penalising sales, regardless of whether the rival owner delegates or not. Moreover, we show that an owner's decision to delegate the task of bargaining to a manager depends on the incremental benefit of delegating and the cost of hiring a manager. The asymmetric outcome (wherein one owner delegates but the other does not) can occur if there is a sufficiently large disparity of hiring costs between the owners. Finally, we show that the union in an owner‐managed firm always earns more than the union in a managerial firm.     

Dominance solvability of dynamic bargaining games

We formulate and study a general finite-horizon bargaining game with simultaneous moves and a disagreement outcome that need not be the worst possible result for the agents. Conditions are identified under which the game is dominance solvable in the sense that iterative deletion of weakly dominated strategies selects a unique outcome. Our analysis uses a backward induction procedure to pinpoint the latest moment at which a coalition can be found with both an incentive and the authority to force one of the available alternatives. Iterative dominance then implies that the alternative characterized in this way will be agreed upon at the outset—or, if a suitable coalition is never found, that no agreement will be reached.