Long‐term care and intrafamily moral hazard: Optimal public policy

The paper studies optimal public long‐term care (LTC) policy in the context of intrafamily moral hazard suggested by Pauly. The model considers a representative family consisting of an adult child and her elderly parent who might become dependent, in which case he places a special value on the LTC provided to him by his child. Since the child's caregiving is decreasing in the amount of insurance coverage, the parent prefers to underinsure, which is socially suboptimal. The child's choice of caregiving is also inefficient since she does not internalize its positive effect on the parent. The paper tackles these inefficiencies and shows that intrafamily moral hazard is a sufficient justification for public intervention targeted at insurance. If not necessarily for the introduction of mandatory public insurance, then at least for the taxation or subsidization of private insurance premiums.     

Disentangling managerial incentives from a dynamic perspective: The role of stock grants

We analyse the optimal contract between a risk‐averse manager and the initial shareholders in a two‐period model where the manager's investment effort, carried out in period 1, and his or her current effort, carried out in period 2, both impact the second‐period profit, so that it may be difficult to disentangle the incentives for these two types of effort. We show that stock grants play different roles according to whether the signal of investment effort is less noisy, or noisier, than that of current effort. We determine simultaneously the optimal stock grants and the optimal restrictions on sales of shares.     

Optimal annuitization, uncertain survival probabilities, and maxmin preferences

We consider a life-cycle model with bequest motives, and assume that the individual does not know his/her survival probability and has maxmin utility preferences; we show that it is optimal not to annuitize but to purchase pure life insurance policies instead.     

Estimates for the optimal control policy in the presence of regulations and heavy tails

We consider a classical heavy tailed risk model, included in a regulation mechanism. The regulator exercises a minimal cash requirement level and penalties for violating it to regulate the insurance firm. The problem of the insurance firm is to establish an investment and risk exposure policy as well as a barrier dividend strategy, which is a function of the strategy used by the regulator. For regularly varying tailed claim size distributions, we find the asymptotics of the stationary distribution of the risk model and derive fundamental asymptotic results of the insurance firm's problem. In the special case of Pareto claim size distributions, the asymptotic optimal control policy is found in closed form, as well as numerical results.     

Tax subsidies,the rational demand for insurance and the health care crisis

An individual's optimal insurance coverage depends on balancing his gain through avoiding risk against his loss through the distortion of demand. The U.S. tax system subsidizes the purchase of excessive health insurance by excluding employer premium payments from employees' taxable incomes and by permitting the deduction of a portion of individual premiums. The current operational model of demand for health insurance shows that the tax subsidy does substantially increase insurance coverage. Since much of the rise in health care costs can be attributed to the growth of insurance, the tax subsidy is responsible for much of what is widely perceived as a health care crisis.     

Optimal stopping with dynamic variational preferences

We solve optimal stopping problems in uncertain environments for agents assessing utility by virtue of dynamic variational preferences as in Maccheroni, Marinacci and Rustichini (2006) [16] or, equivalently, assessing risk in terms of dynamic convex risk measures as in Cheridito, Delbaen and Kupper (2006) [4]. The solution is achieved by generalizing the approach in Riedel (2009) [21] introducing the concept of variational supermartingales and variational Snell envelopes with an accompanying theory. To illustrate results, we consider prominent examples: dynamic multiplier preferences and a dynamic version of generalized average value at risk introduced in Cheridito and Tianhui (2009) [5].     

Insurance and the behavior of competitive firms under revenue risks: a note

This paper re-examines the model of Ford, Mpuku, and Pattanaik [“Revenue Risks, Insurance, and the Behavior of Competitive Firms”.Journal of Economics 64 (1996): 233–246] wherein a risk-averse competitive firm faces insurable revenue risk. The optimal output and insurance cover of the firm are shown to be deterministically related in that the marginal costs of self-insurance and market insurance are equated. In response to increasing risk aversion, the firm always takes a higher insurance cover. Increasing fixed costs generate an income effect which induces the firm to take a higher insurance cover should the preference of the firm satisfy decreasing absolute risk aversion. Market insurance and self-insurance can be either substitutes or complements, depending on the shape of the variable insurance-premium schedule.     

Optimal Income Taxation with Risky Earnings: A Synthesis

We study optimal nonlinear income taxation when earnings can differ because of both ability and luck, so the income tax has both a redistributive role and an insurance role. A substantial literature on optimal redistribution in the absence of risk has evolved since Mirrlees's original contribution. The literature on the income tax as a social insurance device is more limited. It has largely assumed that households are ex ante identical so unequal earnings are due to risk alone. We provide a general treatment of the optimal income tax under risk when households differ in ability. We characterize optimal marginal tax rates and interpret them in terms of redistribution, insurance, and incentive effects. The case of ex ante identical households and the no‐risk case with heterogeneous abilities come out as special cases.     

Tying the politicians’ hands: The optimal limits to representative democracy

The citizen candidate models of democracy assume that politicians have their own preferences that are not fully revealed at the time of elections. We study the optimal delegation problem which arises between the median voter (the writer of the constitution) and the (future) incumbent politician under the assumption that not only the state of the world but also the politician's type (preferred policy) are the policy‐maker's private information. We show that it is optimal to tie the hands of the politician by imposing both a policy floor and a policy cap and delegating him/her the policy choice only in between the cap and the floor. The delegation interval is shown to be the smaller the greater is the uncertainty about the politician's type. These results are also applicable to settings outside the specific problem that our model addresses.     

Robustness to strategic uncertainty

We introduce a criterion for robustness to strategic uncertainty in games with continuum strategy sets. We model a player's uncertainty about another player's strategy as an atomless probability distribution over that player's strategy set. We call a strategy profile robust to strategic uncertainty if it is the limit, as uncertainty vanishes, of some sequence of strategy profiles in which every player's strategy is optimal under his or her uncertainty about the others. When payoff functions are continuous we show that our criterion is a refinement of Nash equilibrium and we also give sufficient conditions for existence of a robust strategy profile. In addition, we apply the criterion to Bertrand games with convex costs, a class of games with discontinuous payoff functions and a continuum of Nash equilibria. We show that it then selects a unique Nash equilibrium, in agreement with some recent experimental findings.     

Cost of Road Accident Fatalities to the Economy

Road accidents have a major impact on the economy as well as society. In other words, such an event also has an impact on the affected individuals’ contribution back to society and state. The purpose of this paper is to study the effect of traffic accidents on the economy. We evaluate the value or cost of a human life in traffic accidents. To estimate the cost, we need to know the income contribution of each individual via his or her employment or other earnings, i.e. his or her income-generating capacity for the remainder of his or her life, had the incident not occurred. Then we find the “present value” of such income, adjusted for the probability of such an event (fatality) happening. This is similar to the calculation of a pure insurance premium. Assessment of the economic impact caused by human life loss is dealt with using insurance-based methods. We calculate the burning cost of an insurance policy that provides coverage for the risk under investigation. It is of interest to the state and the family of the deceased to recover as much of this lost income as possible.     

The Optimal Provision of Curative Goods

We analyze the optimal contract between a risk neutral regulator providing a curative goods and a risk averse patient who learns the realized value of his/her health status after the contracting stage. Consumption of a curative good (healthcare) reduces the disutility associated with a disease. We show that the consumption of curative goods is larger than in the complete information case, that this overprovision increases with the degree of patients’ risk‐aversion and the marginal cost of treatment. Ceilings on the amount of healthcare are part of the optimal contract when risk aversion is important.     

Stronger measures of higher-order risk attitudes

This paper aims to extend the results by Ross (1981) [15] and by Modica and Scarsini (2005) [13] to stochastic dominance of degree 4 and over. Specifically, it is shown that Ross' approach can be extended to any order of risk attitude beyond the generalization proposed by Modica and Scarsini by means of sth degree increase in risk defined by Ekern (1980) [8].     

Will Self‐Managed Superannuation Fund Investors Survive?

The relative risk aversion coefficient that characterises the representative self‐managed superannuation fund (SMSF) investor reveals not only how much that investor dislikes risk but also other information about the investor's economic characteristics, including how his or her allocations to risky assets change as his or her wealth changes. Determination of the relative risk aversion coefficient for the average SMSF investor reveals a value of 5.05. This value is too high to be consistent with logarithmic utility. This is significant because it implies that SMSF investors may be too risk averse to maximise the expected growth rate of wealth share accumulation. We are left to consider a very important question: Will SMSF investors survive?     

Natural vs. financial insurance in the management of public-good ecosystems

In the face of uncertainty, ecosystems can provide natural insurance to risk averse users of ecosystem services. We employ a conceptual ecological-economic model in which ecosystem management has a private insurance value and, through ecosystem processes at higher hierarchical levels, generates a positive externality on other ecosystem users. We analyze the allocation of (endogenous) risk and ecosystem quality by risk averse ecosystem managers who have access to financial insurance, and study the implications for individually and socially optimal ecosystem management, and policy design. We show that while an improved access to financial insurance leads to lower ecosystem quality, the effect on the extent of the public-good problem and on welfare is determined by ecosystem properties. We derive conditions on ecosystem functioning under which, if financial insurance becomes more accessible, (i) the extent of optimal regulation increases or decreases; and (ii) welfare, in the absence of environmental regulation, increases or decreases.     

Towards a More Complete Efficiency Wage Theory

The efficiency wage is an important topic in the theory of employment. In a traditional efficiency wage model, only the representative firm is optimizing against an assumed S‐shaped effort supply function. This S‐shaped supply curve is critical for the model and the absence of a derivation of the curve in the literature means that it is an incomplete theory. In the present paper, we extend the model by specifying a worker's representative utility function so that the corresponding argmax function will be the S‐shaped effort supply curve. This will make the worker's decision process endogenous and will produce a more complete model. The importance of this extension is clear. The characterization of the utility function will make explicit the necessary conditions and crucial assumptions of the traditional model. More importantly, the extension will allow researchers to introduce employment compensation factors into the worker's utility function for analysis. This has important bearings on future development in employment theory. For example, a worker's satisfaction from shirking (net of dismissal risks), or his or her willingness to search for jobs (net of search cost), can now be included in his or her utility function to form an optimal work or search strategy. Incorporating the worker's optimization behaviour into the model will also enable researchers to study policy directed not just towards firms but also towards the worker's decision process. Furthermore, this approach provides a framework for researchers to generate comparative statics. These comparative statics can lead to interesting topics for econometric models or to further research within this field.     

On the Design of Optimal Insurance Policies Under Manipulation of Audit Cost

This article characterizes optimal insurance policies under deterministic auditing in a situation where the policyholders can misrepresent their losses. Under exogenous audit cost, a straight deductible is optimal when the policyholders can inflate their claims by intentionally increasing the damages. If policyholders can manipulate the audit cost and the insurer is unable to observe the cost incurred by his or her auditor, then the auditor should receive contingent fees. When the auditor is risk-averse, the optimal insurance policy involves some degree of coinsurance. An upper limit on coverage is optimal when the auditor is infinitely risk-averse.     

THE PRICE OF SILENCE: MARKETS FOR NOISE LICENSES AND AIRPORTS*

This article presents a market design for the management of noise pollution created by aircraft traffic around airports. A local market for noise licenses allows noise generators to compensate noise victims and to meet social acceptability. We show that the market allows the market designer to implement the social planner's optimal allocation of flights as long as the latter does not put too high a weight in his/her objective function on firms' profits compared to the disutility of noise pollution. The fact that local representatives of noise victims may be strategic players does not fundamentally alter this finding. Because of the market auctioneer's information constraints, noise licenses are likely to distribute windfall gains to residents, which alters the urban structure in the long run.     

LOVE,TOIL, AND HEALTH INSURANCE: WHY AMERICAN HUSBANDS RETIRE WHEN THEY DO

The provision of health insurance has previously been shown to be an important determinant of retirement timing among older Americans, but the existing literature has largely ignored some aspects of the interspousal dependence of health insurance benefits. Specifically, the literature examines only how retirement may affect the health insurance available to the potential retiree but not how it might affect a spouse's options. Using data from the Health and Retirement Study, I find that the impact a husband's retirement might have on a wife's health insurance options has a statistically significant impact on a husband's rate of retirement that is independent of considerations of his own health insurance options. In households where the wife is the only one at risk of losing affordable health insurance if the husband retires, the husband is 30% less likely to retire than if neither spouse is at risk (a 5 percentage point decrease in the retirement rate). Based on these findings, prior research is missing one avenue that changes to the Medicare eligibility age and health insurance policy changes through the Affordable Care Act might impact the labor supply of older workers. (JEL I13, J26, J32)     

Optimal Controls for a Large Insurance Under a CEV Model: Based on the Legendre Transform-Dual Method

The purpose of this paper is to consider the optimal proportional reinsurance and investment strategies for an insurance company. The insurer’s surplus process is approximated by a Brownian motion with drift. The insurance company can purchase proportional reinsurance and invest the surplus in a financial market which includes one risk-free asset and one risky asset whose price is modeled by a CEV model. The primary problem is changed to the dual problem by implying Legendre transform. When the objective of the insurance company is to maximize the expected logarithmic utility from terminal wealth, the closed-form expressions for the optimal reinsurance-investment policy which is different to the Merton case to the primal optimal problem are obtained and numerical simulations are provided to demonstrate our results. Moreover, we find an interesting result that risk exposure is non-monotonic in the cost of reinsurance.