Donor coordination and specialization: did the Paris Declaration make a difference?

We assess whether bilateral and multilateral donors of foreign aid specialized and coordinated their activities with other donors as agreed in the Paris Declaration of 2005. We account for donor heterogeneity, varying aid priorities and recipient characteristics in order to isolate changes in donor behaviour over time. Recent shifts in aid priorities, such as the rising importance of general budget support, have reduced the fragmentation of aid. Nevertheless, our results reveal that aid fragmentation persisted after the Paris Declaration and coordination among donors has even weakened.     

Rhetoric versus Reality: The Best and Worst of Aid Agency Practices

Foreign aid critics, supporters, recipients, and donors have produced eloquent rhetoric on the need for better aid practices—has this translated into reality? This paper attempts to monitor the best and worst of aid practices among bilateral, multilateral, and UN agencies. We create aid practice measures based on aid transparency, specialization, selectivity, ineffective aid channels, and overhead costs. We rate donor agencies from best to worst on aid practices. We find that the UK does well among bilateral agencies, the US is below average, and Scandinavian donors do surprisingly poorly. The biggest difference is between the UN agencies, who mostly rank in the bottom half of donors, and everyone else. Average performance of all agencies on transparency, fragmentation, and selectivity is still very poor. The paper also assesses trends in best practices over time—we find modest improvement in transparency and more in moving away from ineffective channels. However, we find no evidence of improvements (and partial evidence of worsening) in specialization, fragmentation, and selectivity, despite escalating rhetoric to the contrary.     

The Rise (and Decline?) of Arab Aid: Generosity and Allocation in the Oil Era

Among non-DAC donors, wealthy Arab states are some of the most prolific contributors of foreign aid. Despite this, relatively little is known about Arab foreign aid. The OECD development database offers a paucity of information, aggregating data for “Arab countries” and “Arab agencies,” without identifying the constituent units of either. A further complication is that Arab donors are not uniformly transparent about their aid efforts, publicizing some of them while keeping other donations secret. In this paper, we advance the state of knowledge of Arab foreign aid in a number of ways. We use AidData to document the trends in reported donations from specific bilateral donors (Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates) and multilateral agencies (Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa, OPEC’s Fund for International Development, and the Islamic Development Bank). Notably, Arab bilateral donors have given less generously over time with aid levels remaining relatively stable despite skyrocketing national wealth. We explore reasons for this decline, including that Arab donors have: shifted their giving from bilateral to multilateral channels, given less as DAC donors have given more, and increased domestic spending at the expense of foreign aid with a view to safeguarding regime security. In addition, we look at the sectoral allocations of Arab bilateral and multilateral organizations, and compare the aid practices of Arab donors to their DAC counterparts. Finally, we suggest why an exclusive focus on aid commitments is problematic where Arab aid is concerned.     

Are ‘New’ Donors Different? Comparing the Allocation of Bilateral Aid Between nonDAC and DAC Donor Countries

Major DAC donors are widely criticized for weak targeting of aid, selfish aid motives, and insufficient coordination. The emergence of an increasing number of new donors may further complicate the coordination of international aid efforts. At the same time, it is open to question whether new donors (many of which were aid recipients until recently) are more altruistic and provide better targeted aid according to need and merit. Project-level data on aid by new donors, as collected by the AidData initiative, allow for empirical analyses comparing the allocation behavior of new versus old donors. We employ Probit and Tobit models and test for significant differences in the distribution of aid by new and old donors across recipient countries. We find that, on average, new donors care less for recipient need than old donors. New and old donors behave similarly in several respects, however. They disregard merit by not taking the level of corruption in recipient countries into account. Concerns that commercial self-interest distorts the allocation of aid seem to be overblown for both groups.     

What Determines the Size of Aid Projects?

Over the last few years, considerable attention has focused on aid fragmentation, the proliferation of donors and projects in developing countries. Aid fragmentation has continued to increase despite international efforts to foster donor coordination. One possible implication of fragmentation is smaller aid projects, potentially with the result of more administrative work for overtaxed recipient governments per dollar of aid received.This paper makes use of AidData data on bilateral aid commitments, sector, and funding agencies to explore the determinants of project size and to better understand the forces driving aid fragmentation. To the extent that project size is driven by the sectoral composition or purpose of aid, the associated administrative costs may be justified. Variations due to other factors, e.g. a donor’s administrative structure or bureaucratic interests, provide a stronger case for reforms.     

Dodging Adverse Selection: How Donor Type and Governance Condition Aid’s Effects on School Enrollment

We employ AidData to test the effects of primary-education aid on school enrollment. We argue that the problem of adverse selection complicates both the allocation and the effectiveness of aid. We hypothesize that bilateral donors ought to have greater freedom to condition aid on recipient governance quality than multilateral donors, which are often bound by institutional rules to provide aid more impartially. Compared to their multilateral counterparts, bilateral donors may have advantages in overcoming adverse selection, resulting in bilateral aid’s boosting enrollments to a greater degree. AidData’s extensive coverage of multilateral aid enables this analysis for up to 100 low- and low-middle-income countries from 1995 to 2008. Latent growth regression analysis suggests that, compared to multilateral donors, bilateral donors indeed condition their primary education aid on recipient control of corruption and that bilateral aid is significantly related to improved enrollments.     

25 Years of Aid Allocation Practice: Whither Selectivity?

The 4P framework (Poverty, Population, Policy, and Proximity) is introduced as a way of understanding a donor’s aid allocation. We use the two-part model and examine the period 1982–2006. The results indicate that recent conclusions of increasing selectivity are misplaced for the seven major donors analyzed, who together represent the majority of development aid. Indeed, the effect of each of the commonly mentioned time-trends (selectivity, the end of the Cold War, and the commencement of the Global War on Terror) is much smaller than the role of donor heterogeneity, which appears sizeable and entrenched.     

Giving and Receiving Foreign Aid: Does Conflict Count?

Of what relative importance are strategic motivators for bilateral aid donors, and how important is a recipient’s geographic proximity to conflict relative to previously examined economic and political motivators? We find that donors have historically responded to balanced incentives to reduce recipient poverty and further donor political and economic goals. Every bilateral donor conditions aid on conflict. The United States allocates large amounts of development aid to countries bordering a conflict, both pre- and post-Cold War. However, controlling for development levels and donor economic and political interest, most donors reduce aid to a recipient with an in-house or nearby intense conflict.     

Do Donors Target Aid in Line with the Millennium Development Goals? A Sector Perspective of Aid Allocation

We analyze the aid portfolio of various bilateral and multilateral donors, testing whether they have prioritized aid in line with the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Employing Tobit models that combine sectorally disaggregated aid data with various indicators reflecting the situation of recipient countries regarding the MDGs, we show that donors differ in the extent to which their sectoral aid allocation is conducive to achieving major MDGs. Some MDGs, notably the fight against HIV/AIDS, have shaped the allocation of aid. However, with respect to other MDGs such as primary education, there is a considerable gap between donor rhetoric and actual aid allocation. This invites the conclusion that the current focus on substantially increasing aid is unlikely to have the desired effects unless the targeting of aid is improved. JEL no. F35, O11, O19     

The Money Trail: Ranking Donor Transparency in Foreign Aid

Transparency of aid activity is being recognized to be one of the key areas whereby aid effectiveness can be improved. In this paper, we propose an index to measure and rank donors on the transparency of their aid activities. The Transparency Index rates 31 bilateral and multilateral donor agencies on six measures of transparency. We find that being a member of the IATI is a powerful signal of a donor being more transparent across most other dimensions as well. We find no relationship between transparency and donor aid volumes. Overall IDA and Australia are identified as the most transparent donors, while Korea and IDB Special Fund are the least transparent.     

Foreign Aid and Regime Change: A Role for Donor Intent

This paper uses data from the AidData project to analyze the association between foreign aid and the likelihood of democratization in aid recipients. Previous studies have argued that aid can entrench dictatorships, making a transition less likely. I find evidence that the relationship between aid and democratization depends on characteristics of the aid donor. During the period from 1992 to 2007, aid from democratic donors is often found to be associated with an increase in the likelihood of a democratic transition. This is consistent with a scenario in which aid promotes democratization and/or a situation in which democratic donors reward countries that take steps in a democratic direction. In either case, it suggests that democratic donors use scarce aid resources to encourage democracy. During the same period, aid from authoritarian donors exhibits a negative relationship with democratization. This suggests that the source of funding matters, with donor preferences regarding democracy helping to determine the link between aid and democratization.     

Redesigning the Aid Contract: Donors’ Use of Performance Indicators in Uganda

The perceived failure of traditional (ex ante) conditionality has led to proposals for using performance indicators as a basis for aid allocations (ex post conditionality). In this article we assess the role of performance indicators and their impact on the aid contract between donors and the government of Uganda. In Uganda the use of performance indicators has radically changed donor–recipient relations, by improving both program monitoring and donor coordination. It has, however, not yet fundamentally changed the incentive structure in the aid “contract.” To improve the incentive structure we propose a distinction between indicators used for monitoring and those designed to guide aid allocations.     

Business Cycle Fluctuations,Large Macroeconomic Shocks,and Development Aid

We examine the cyclical properties of development aid using bilateral data for 22 donors and 113 recipients during 1970–2005. We find that bilateral aid flows are on average procyclical with respect to the business cycle in both donor and recipient countries. While aid outlays contract sharply during severe downturns in donor countries, they rise steeply when aid-receiving countries experience large adverse shocks. Our findings suggest that development aid may play an important cushioning role in developing countries, but only during times of severe macroeconomic stress. Our results are robust to alternate definitions of aid flows, specifications, and estimation techniques.     

Does Korea follow Japan in foreign aid? Relationships between aid and foreign investment

Korea, an emerging donor country, largely considers its economic relations to recipients when allocating its aid. Such practices were preceded by Japan before the 1990s. We expect those similar practices between the two countries will make resemblance in aid outcomes. On a macro-level, we show similarities in aid allocations by type, region, income, and sector. The similarities are ascertained also at a micro-level by our statistical analysis on the relationships between aid and FDI. The analysis based on the FDI gravity model and panel dynamic system GMM estimation shows that only aids from Korea and Japan create more inflow of FDI into their respective recipient developing countries. Those are contrasted with other donors’ aids, which are not related to FDI or the substitute for FDI.     

The Localized Geography of Foreign Aid: A New Dataset and Application to Violent Armed Conflict

Existing foreign aid databases – the OECD’s CRS data and now AidData – are project-based. And yet nearly all empirical analyses using these data aggregate to the country-year level, thereby losing project-specific information. In this paper, we introduce new data on the geographic location of aid projects that have been committed to many African countries between 1989 and 2008. The data enable an examination of project-level information in a wider variety of systematic research contexts. To demonstrate the utility of the new data, we discuss how geographically disaggregated foreign aid and armed conflict data are needed to capture the theoretical mechanisms in the aid-conflict literature. We then map the disaggregated aid and conflict data in Sierra Leone, Angola, and Mozambique as specific examples of how these data could help disentangle competing causal mechanisms linking aid to conflict onset and dynamics. The research provides an important new perspective on the connections between aid and conflict. More generally, it is a crucial first step in geo-referencing and comparing foreign aid projects to various localized development outcomes.     

Aid and trade

This paper surveys the recent theoretical and empirical literaturethat explores the relations between aid and trade and asks aboutthe complementarity or substitution effects at work. We distinguishbetween the effects of aid on trade flows and on trade policies,of the donor as well as the recipient countries. Special focusis given on trade facilitation, or ‘aid for trade’.     

Determinants of China's and Japan's Foreign Aid Allocations in Africa

Foreign aid plays an important role in promoting economic development in Africa. Recently, several countries, most notably China, have emerged as alternative sources of foreign aid. However, their motives for providing foreign aid have been questioned. The present study examines and compares determinants of China's and Japan's foreign aid allocations in Africa. It assumes that the distribution of foreign aid was determined by the aid donors’ self‐interest and also by the aid recipients’ needs. Three panel model methods, namely, the pooled OLS method, the one‐way fixed effects method and the two‐way fixed effects methods, were employed to examine and compare the patterns of China's and Japan's foreign aid allocation in Africa. The main finding was that the provision of foreign aid by China and Japan was primarily driven by the aid donors’ self‐interest. Additionally, the size of population in a recipient country was an important element to determine China's and Japan's aid allocations. The findings also suggest that Japan tended to pay more attention to the aid recipient countries’ needs as well as to the quality of governance and institutions in these countries. Overall, the findings indicate that there was no considerable difference in the motives for the provision of aid between the two aid donor countries.     

The Millennium Development Goals, How Realistic Are They?

Summary In its Millennium Declaration of September 2000, the United Nations adopted the Millennium Development Goals (MDG), to be reached in 2015 through concerted efforts worldwide. According to UN-calculations, the estimated costs in terms of additional development aid of meeting the MDGs in all countries vary from 121 billion US dollars in 2006 to 189 billion US dollars in 2015. The present communication reviews the figures reported. It appears that while Asia is well on track to achieve the goals, essentially through efforts of its own, Africa is lagging behind, albeit that according to detailed survey data on weight-for-length among adults collected in Africa for the US aid agency, rates of undernutrition are about 58 percent of the levels used as a reference by the UN, which are based on assessment of food production. Yet, child undernutrition comes out higher in these surveys. Besides mentioning reservations about the adequacy of these MDG-yardsticks, we consider the cost estimates for Africa as presented in the UN-reports and subsequently assessed in the literature. It appears that these estimates are too low, even if all MDG-funds were concentrated on this continent, essentially because they are set up as shopping lists that are necessarily incomplete and, among others, disregard many of the indirect cost of delivering the goods to the target beneficiaries, including the cost of providing adequate security and avoiding corruption. Nonetheless, recalling how hopeless the situation looked some 30 years ago for China, India, and Bangladesh, where unprecedented numbers have now escaped extreme poverty during the past decade and a half, we submit that over a time horizon of about twice the 15 years of the MDG’s and with adequate international support, realization of the MDG-targets should be possible for Africa too. An erratum to this article can be found at