Legal Remedies for Breach of the Regulatory “Contract”

We present a model of the regulatory contract that focuses on the mutual investment of buyer and seller and recognizes the cost of contractual renegotiation and the importance of breach remedies when contracts are incomplete. We model renegotiation as a litigation game played before a quasi-judicial administrative court. We find that the standard contractual remedy of expectations damages cannot implement first-best levels of investment for both buyer and seller. If the seller fully recovers its sunk investment upon buyer breach, however, then first-best levels of investment by both buyer and seller can be supported provided litigation costs are small enough.     

On rational belief equilibria

Summary We study equilibria in which agent's belief are rational in the sense of Kurz [1994]. The market is formulated by specifying a stochastic demand function and a continuum of producers, each with a quadratic cost function who must select their output before knowing prices. Holding Rational Beliefs about future prices, producers maximize expected profits. In a Rational Belief Equilibrium (RBE) agents select diverse forecast functions but each one is rational in the sense that it is based on a theory which cannot be rejected by the data. It is shown that there exists a continuum of RBE's and they could entail very different patterns of time series for the economy and consequently different aggregate levels of longterm volatility. Since the model contains exogenously specified random variables, the difference in the level of long-term volatility of prices among the different RBE's arises endogenously as an amplification of the volatility of exogenous variables. The paper derives exact bounds on the possible levels of such amplification.This research was supported by NSF Grant IRI-8814954 to Stanford University. The author is thankful to Steven N. Durlauf and Carsten K. Nielsen for useful comments on an earlier draft.     

Wholesale Spot Price Pass-Through

It has been proposed that, when electricity markets open to retail competition, incumbent distribution utilities should be required to sell to residential customers at wholesale spot market prices. It is argued here that this overestimates the value of spot-price sales to customers, and underestimates the costs and disadvantages of the proposed policy. Experience in San Diego illustrates the problems. But other policies such as shopping credits have deficiencies too. An alternative approach, based on transitional maximum price caps, has facilitated the development of a competitive and fully deregulated residential retail market in the United Kingdom.     

Constitutions for Local Collective Action and Institutional Interdependence

Collective action can take place at a plurality of levels. It has to be based on a constitution which defines the basic rules of interaction. Here, we are concerned with the problem of the constitutional setting of bottom-up formal institutions with a club nature. The pressure to improve the efficiency of services pushes local administrations to co-ordinate to produce public goods. This process has stimulated the birth of different forms of agencies or private companies with a club nature. The aim of this paper is to discuss the effects of institutional interdependence on the efficiency of this kind of collective action. In order to shed some light on this problem, the paper first discusses the problem of the relativity of efficiency to the institutional setting. A framework of analysis is then discussed to identify the main factors affecting collective action. Finally some evidence will be provided by a comparative institutional analysis performed on some case studies concerning local associational forms among communes in north-eastern Italy.     

Full-cost pricing in the classical competitive process: A model of convergence to long-run equilibrium

In the last 10–15 years a lot of attempts has been devoted to study the calssical process of convergence of market prices toward natural prices. The two forces that one has thought could achieve this target were capital mobility, that determines the dynamics of output, and demand-supply forces, that determine the dynamics of prices. In this article a model of classical competition is proposed in which a full-cost pricing mechanism is adopted in the rule of evolution of market prices. An asymptotical stability result of long-run equilibrium is proved for a two-commodity model with and without a final demand.     

Exchange rates and perfect competition

The purpose of this note is to demonstrate that the commonly held belief that incomplete and perverse pass-through are incompatible with perfect competition is wrong! To this end, we consider two types of firms both operating in two countries. The demand sides of the markets of the two countries are separated and each type of firm produces its good in one of these countries. We study the effect of an exchange-rate change on the competitive equilibrium prices in each country. When producing for the foreign market causes the same costs as producing for the home market then the law of one price holds and an exchange-rate change is completely offset by price changes. Furthermore, when cost functions neither exhibit economies nor diseconomies of scope between producing for the home and producing for the foreign market then prices move in the right directions in response to an exchange-rate change. However, with general cost structures, even in this simple perfectly competitive model, perverse directions of price changes can result from an exchange-rate change.     

Discriminatory Price Auctions in Electricity Markets: Low Volatility at the Expense of High Price Levels

A pay-as-offered or discriminatory price auction (DPA) has been proposed to solve the problem of inflated and volatile wholesale electricity prices. Using the experimental method we compare the DPA with a uniform price auction (UPA), strictly controlling for unilateral market power. We find that a DPA indeed substantially reduces price volatility. However, in a no market power design, prices in a DPA converge to the high prices of a uniform price auction with structural market power. That is, the DPA in a no market power environment is as anti-competitive as a UPA with structurally introduced market power.     

On the Impact of “Callback” Competition on International Telephony

In this paper we build a simple three-country model to evaluate the impact of callback on international telephony. The effects on both accounting rates and collection prices are studied. Callback firms exploit arbitrage opportunities in collection prices among countries, rerouting calls that originate in countries with high prices for international phone calls via countries with low prices. Contrary to what is commonly perceived, we show that callback tends to magnify the distortions associated with the current accounting rate regime. In particular, callback puts upward pressure on low price countries accounting rates and on collection charges. Callback companies are assumed to enjoy a volume price discount on each rerouted call; we show that the larger the price discount offered to callback companies, the higher the prices for international calls in the country hosting callback.     

A note on repeated-offers bargaining with one-sided incomplete information

Summary This note analyzes a modified version of the standard repeated-offers bargaining game with one-sided incomplete information studied in Fudenberg, Levine and Tirole (1985), Gul, Sonnenschein and Wilson (1986) and Ausubel and Deneckere (1989). The modification, which is introduced in the extensive form, is that the (uninformed) seller can choose to withdraw her offer immediately after the (informed) buyer accepts it. This modification is important because it removes the (implicit) commitment assumption built into the standard model that the seller is committed not to withdraw her price offer. A main result obtained is, that whether or not there is a gap between the seller's valuation and the lowest possible buyer's valuation, any seller payoff between zero and the static monopoly profit can be supported by sequential equilibria. Thus, even in the gap case there exist equilibria that completely reverse the Coase conjecture.I thank Ian Jewitt and an anonymous referee for their helpful advice and comments.     

Endogenous Entry and Exit in Common Value Auctions

We develop and experimentally test a model of endogenous entry, exit, and bidding in common value auctions. The model and experimental design include an alternative profitable activity (a safe haven) that provides agentspecific opportunity costs of bidding in the auction. Each agent chooses whether to accept the safe haven income or forgo it in order to bid in the auction. Agents that enter the auction receive independently-drawn private signals that provide unbiased estimates of the common value. The auctioned item is allocated to the high bidder at a price that is equal to the high bid. Thus the market is a first-price sealed-bid common value auction with endogenous determination of market size.     

Marktstruktur und Preisverhalten in der österreichischen Industrie

Summary Being part of a larger investigation concerning forms and intensity of competition in the Austrian economy this paper deals with the characteristics of market structure and pricing behaviour in the industrial sector. Mainly based on a detailed questionnaire this study is representative for the group of larger Austrian industrial enterprises (sales of more than 100 Mill. AS) which produced more than two thirds of total industrial ouput. According to this study the dominant market structure of the Austrian industry is that of a close oligopoly. The subjective estimation of the price elasticity of demand by the firms participating in our survey was generally very pessimistic, being the lower the larger the market share of the respective firm.The most common principle of price formation for new products in the Austrian industry is a system of flexible full cost pricing, meaning cost orientation plus variable profit margins. Our study also shows that a large majority (60% resp. 80%) of the enterprises under investgation use discount, i.e. price differentiation in their pricing policies. These aspects indicate that-in line with marginalistic theories — demand situations obviously exercise a substantial influence on pricing behaviour. Considering the causes for price changes, however, cost oriented influences were clearly dominating. This stresses the great importance of the Austrian pricecontrol mechanism, the Paritätische Kommission, the institutionalized form of incomes policy in Austria.An econometric analysis of the process of price formation in the Austrian industry showed that the main factors of price changes were changes in labour costs and in international price levels, especially in the level of export prices. Our investigation also dealt with the question, whether differences in market-structure result in different, responses to demand fluctuations. Considering both the concepts of actual and potential competition it can be shown that enerprises in a more competitive situation react towards changes in demand conditions in a more stabilizing way that monopolistic firms: The reduce prices earlier in recession and they react to boom periods by expanding their capacities rather than by raising prices. Market structure and the intensity of competition thus seem to influence the position of the Phillips-curve in an economy.     

The Impact of Discounting on an Auction with a Buyout Option: a Theoretical Analysis Motivated by eBay’s Buy-It-Now Feature

An auction with a buyout option occurring over continuous time with rules similar to eBays buy it now option is analyzed. When auction participants make no distinction as to when a transaction occurs, the seller optimally chooses a buyout option price so high that bidders never exercise the option. However, time impatience on either side of the transaction can motivate the seller to offer an option price low enough so that the option is exercised with positive probability. Further, allowing a time impatient seller to offer such an option results in an ex ante Pareto improvement when bidders do not discount future transactions.     

Bidders' and Sellers' Strategies in Sequential Auctions. New Evidence about the Afternoon Effect

Using dynamic panel data econometric techniques, we analyzethe price structure of sequential auctions of modern and contemporary art that took place inItaly during the period 1983–1996. Contrary to previous empirical studies, we do not find anyafternoon effect, or decline of auction prices relative to estimated values. Taking intoconsideration the structure of the auctions and the dynamic nature of price determination, we proposean interpretation of the empirical results that encompasses previous contributions.     

Exchange rates and bertrand oligopoly

The impact of exchange-rate changes on industrial prices seems ambiguous. Incomplete and even perverse pass-through has been observed: the import prices in the depreciating country decrease while those in the appreciating country increase. To explain these counterintuitive price reactions we consider a situation of international Bertrand competition: two firms, based in different countries, are selling in both countries simultaneously. The profit-maximizing duopolists set the prices for their products in each of the two markets which are segmented on the demand side. We then study the qualitative effect of an exogenous exchange-rate change on the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium. Under the strong assumption of linear demand and cost functions we have normal exchange-rate pass-through. However, allowing for more general cost structures in this simple static model enables us to show that the import prices in both countries might move in counterintuitive directions.     

Learning in a Laboratory Market with Random Supply and Demand

We propose a simple adaptive learning model to study behavior in the call market. The laboratory environment features buyers and sellers who receive a new random value or cost in each period, so they must learn a strategy that maps these random draws into bids or asks. We focus on buyers' adjustment of the mark-down ratio of bids relative to private value and sellers' adjustment of the corresponding mark-up ratio of asks relative to private cost. The learning model involves partial adjustment of these ratios towards the ex post optimum each period. The model explains a substantial proportion of the variation in traders' strategies. Parameter estimates indicate strong recency effects and negligible autonomous trend, but strongly asymmetric response to different kinds of ex post error. The asymmetry is only slightly attenuated in observational learning from other traders' ex post errors. Simulations show that the model can account for the main systematic deviations from equilibrium predictions observed in this market institution and environment.     

Convention, Social Order, and the Two Coordinations

The word coordination has two meanings, and thesemeanings are often conflated. One meaning, associated with ThomasSchelling, is seen in situations like choosing whether to driveon the left or the right; the drivers must coordinate to eachother's behavior. The other meaning, associated with FriedrichHayek, means that a concatenation of activities is arranged soas to produce good results. Along with the Schelling sense ofcoordination comes the notion of convention, such as drivingon the right. Some conventions are consciously designed; othersemerge without design (or are emergent). Along with the Hayeksense of coordination comes the notion of social order. Somesocial orders, such as the skeleton of activities within thefirm or within the hypothetical socialist economy, are consciouslyplanned. Other social orders, such as the catallaxy of the freesociety, function without central planning (or are spontaneous).Distinguishing between the two coordinations (and, in parallelfashion, between convention and social order) clarifies thinkingand resolves some confusions that have arisen in discussionsof coordination and spontaneous order. The key distinctionsare discussed in the context of the thought of, on the one hand,Menger, Schelling, David Lewis, and the recent path-dependencetheorists, and, on the other hand, Smith, Hayek, Polanyi, Coase,and the modern Austrian economists. The paper concludes witha typology that encompasses the several distinctions.     

Market games with differential information and infinite dimensional commodity spaces: The core

Summary We provide an alternative proof of the existence of core allocations in exchange economies with differential information and infinite dimensional commodity spaces. We also identify a critical feature of information sharing rules that ensures nonemptiness of the core. In essence, the only condition we require on the sharing rules is that profitable insider trading be prohibited. In the absence of insider trading, balancedness is guaranteed and core nonemptiness follows.I thank Dan Arce, Erik Balder, Myrna Wooders, and Nicholas Yannelis for helpful comments. This paper is a greatly revised version of my paper entitled. A Variational Problem Arising in Market Games with Differential Information, written in August of 1991.     

Klassische Nationalökonomie gestern und heute

Ohne ZusammenfassungDieser Artikel ist dieungekürzte Fassung des Beitrages Klassische Nationalökonomie des Verfassers zum Staatslexikon (Band IV).     

Finance,investment and innovation: A theoretical and empirical comparative analysis

The paper compares the relative efficiency of country models in the relationship between finance and investments. Results, confirmed under three different panel data estimates (Arellano-Bond GMM method, random and fixed effect estimates) suggest that: i) the UK thick market reduces informational asymmetries for large firms and for those firms providing good signals to shareholders; ii) the Japanese vertical (between firms and banks) integration and horizontal (among firms) integration almost eliminates financial constraints (the horizontal integration effect) and equates agency costs across firms (the vertical integration effect). These results are consistent with the short-termist hypothesis which assumes that the Japanese economic system can process information more efficiently reducing managerial myopic behaviour and thereby determining positive effects on long term growth.     

Implementation of college admission rules

Summary We consider both Nash and strong Nash implementation of various matching rules for college admissions problems. We show that all such rules are supersolutions of the stable rule. Among these rules the lower bound stable rule is implementable in both senses. The upper bound Pareto and individually rational rule is strong Nash implementable yet it is not Nash implementable. Two corollaries of interest are the stable rule is the minimal (Nash or strong Nash) implementable solution that is Pareto optimal and individually rational, and the stable rule is the minimal (Nash or strong Nash) implementable extension of any of its subsolutions.We wish to thank Professor William Thomson for his efforts in supervision as well as his useful suggestions. We are grateful to the participants in his reading class, workshops at Bilkent University, University of Rochester, and in particular Jeffrey Banks, Stephen Ching, Bhaskar Dutta, Rangarajan Sundaram and an anonymous referee for their helpful comments.