Political economy of commuting subsidies

We study the political economy of commuting subsidies in a model of a monocentric city with two income classes. Depending on housing demand and transport costs, either the rich or the poor live in the central city and the other group in the suburbs. Commuting subsidies increase the net income of those with long commutes or high transport costs. They also affect land rents and therefore the income of landowners. The paper studies how the locational pattern of the two income classes and the incidence of landownership affects the support for commuting subsidies.     

Government Subsidies

This paper addresses the problems of defining and measuring government subsidies, examines why and how government subsidies are used as a fiscal policy tool, discusses their general economic effects in terms of real welfare costs and distributional implications, appraises international empirical evidence on government subsidies, and offers options for their reform. Recent international trends in government subsidy expenditure are analyzed for the 16‐year period from 1975 to 1990, using general government subsidy data for 60 countries from the United Nations' System of National Accounts (SNA). The paper reviews major policy options for subsidy reform, focusing on ways to improve the cost‐effectiveness of subsidy programs.     

基于社会、经济可持续发展的城镇廉租住房租金定价及补贴模型研究——以广州市为例

利用可持续发展理论,从社会、经济可持续发展视角对廉租住房租金与补贴方案的制定进行理论分析。从廉租户的房租负担能力、政府财政负担能力、建造运营成本、区域因素与个别因素等方面分析影响廉租住房租金和补贴的因素。结合广州现行的廉租住房租金政策,逐步建立符合可持续、可负担原则和具备动态调整性的廉租住房实物配租租金定价模型与货币配租补贴模型,并利用案例对其检验,最后得出结论。     

Plant Closings and the Community

A bstract . Over the last 10 years, 10 million jobs have been lost and millions of dollars in capital rendered unproductive from plant closings in New England and the Upper Midwest. Some were weeded out by the discipline of the market but most were moving to cut labor costs and claim subsidies from governments seeking to expand local job opportunities. And some were using the threat of closing to exact concessions from labor and government. In some cases it is possible for municipal governments to buy or condemn the plant and operate it as a public enterprise ; municipal operation is often more efficient and productive. Municipally owned and operated public enterprise should command serious consideration, as an option like cooperative ownership.     

Capacity sharing with different oligopolistic competition and government regulation in a supply chain

This paper constructs a capacity sharing model in a supply chain to reveal the factors affecting equilibrium outcomes. The results show that improving the technical level lowers capacity charge and increases seller profits in any case. Product differentiation has uncertain impacts on equilibrium outcomes, which depend on government regulations and oligopolistic competition models. The improvement of supplier's fixed component of marginal costs improves capacity sharing charge and reduces profits and consumer surplus. The government regulations and oligopolistic competition model directly affect equilibrium outcomes and welfare distribution. Government capacity control helps improve social welfare, but the effect of government subsidies is uncertain.     

经济适用房不同补贴方式的效果

通过数学模型,分析政府对经济适用房生产商或购买者实施补贴对购买者的效用影响、对生产商行为的影响、对政府补贴成本的影响,及至对经济适用房成交量、成交价格和净社会福利的影响。研究结果表明：对经济适用房生产商采用降低土地价格的补贴方式不如对其按单位价格补贴或按成交价的一定比例补贴,这后两种方式都更有效率,能够降低政府补贴成本,减少政府腐败行为,促进房地产商开发适合低收入者所需要的住房并提高销售效率。     

Technology transfer, licensing and the speed of endogenous technological change

As licensing contracts usually require the licensee firm to purchase tied inputs from the seller of the technology, the licensee firm has an incentive to embark on an R&D program for development of substitutes for the tied inputs. This paper characterizes the licensee firm's optimal speed of R&D and the optimal expected date of switch-over to the substitute inputs in an infinite-horizon model under uncertainty about the timing of success of the R&D program. The effects of different government subsidies or taxes, changes in input prices and other parameters on the optimal speed of R&D and on the expected date of switchover to the substitute are also investigated. It is also shown that strategic behavior by the seller of the technology may delay the development of the substitute by the licensee firm.     

政府补贴促进制造业企业研发投入了吗?——基于资本结构的门槛效应研究

本文以2016~2018年沪深股市的制造业上市公司为研究样本,通过建立门槛效应模型,验证了政府补贴与企业研发投入的作用关系会随着资本结构的变化而变化。研究发现,政府补贴能够促进企业研发投入,并且在资本结构的调节作用下呈现三重门槛效应。进一步研究还发现,政府补贴对非国有企业研发投入的影响系数更高。因此,政府研发补贴政策需要综合考虑企业资金状况、企业性质,建立有效甄别机制,实施差异化补贴策略,加大对非国企补贴力度,拓宽中小企业融资渠道。     

Optimal plant location and air quality management under indivisibilities and economies of scale

The implications of indivisibilities and economies of scale on the optimal location of industrial plants and on the optimal choice of their pollution abatement technologies under given air quality standards are examined. Various optimization models, accounting for abatement, land development and plant relocation costs, as well as for locational economies of scale, are developed, using the integer and mixed-integer linear programming framework. A method for computing taxes and subsidies leading the system to the optimal pattern of decisions under decentralized decision-making is proposed. Finally, an application of the approach with real data of the Haifa region is implemented, illustrating the utility of the approach for environmental management.     

A Real Options Approach to Economic Exposure Management

Exchange rate volatility is not only a source of concern for firms but also of profit opportunities. If adjustment costs and lags are low, managers can adjust their input or output decisions to raise the firm's expected profits. Notwithstanding the resulting higher profit variability, the actual risk perceived by the managers may fall as they are probably more averse to downside risk—such as financial distress—than to risk in general. Hence, this paper argues that optimal economic exposure management consists of exploiting the upward profit potential of real exchange rate volatility, while keeping downside risk under control. It is shown that option theory provides useful new principles for economic exposure management by bringing out the crucial role of adjustment costs.     

Dynamic control of rural–urban migration

This study investigates the optimal urbanization control of an underdeveloped economy by specifying a simple dynamic rural–urban model in which the urban sector bears both an intertemporal positive externality and a simultaneous negative externality. The dynamic optimization problem is solved for the political intervention of the central government in an intersectoral population distribution with taxes and subsidies. Our analysis provides the following results: (i) a big-push policy that leads an economy to a higher-income steady state with urbanization is not necessarily desirable if the government cannot borrow money at a sufficiently low interest rate; (ii) in order to sustain an appropriate urbanization speed, urbanization control policy should have a switch: the urban sector should be subsidized in order to accelerate rural–urban migration in early stages of development, and taxed to decelerate and eventually cease the migration in later stages.     

Dynamic control of rural–urban migration

This study investigates the optimal urbanization control of an underdeveloped economy by specifying a simple dynamic rural–urban model in which the urban sector bears both an intertemporal positive externality and a simultaneous negative externality. The dynamic optimization problem is solved for the political intervention of the central government in an intersectoral population distribution with taxes and subsidies. Our analysis provides the following results: (i) a big-push policy that leads an economy to a higher-income steady state with urbanization is not necessarily desirable if the government cannot borrow money at a sufficiently low interest rate; (ii) in order to sustain an appropriate urbanization speed, urbanization control policy should have a switch: the urban sector should be subsidized in order to accelerate rural–urban migration in early stages of development, and taxed to decelerate and eventually cease the migration in later stages.     

Spatial competition with free entry, Chamberlinian tangencies, and social efficiency

Free entry in Löschian spatial competition leads to a tangency between each firm's negatively sloped average revenue and the downsloping portion of average costs—as in Chamberlin's monopolistic competition. It is generally concluded that this equilibrium involves too many inefficiently small firms. However, this conclusion is incorrect. The difference between price and firm marginal production costs in spatial equilibrium is just sufficient to cover the additional marginal cost of output resulting from availability of multiple locations. This Chamberlinian tangency does not imply inefficiency, because it does not include all the social costs and benefits resulting from spatial competition.     

政府监管对食品企业实施质量保证项目的影响分析

食品质量保证项目的实施对于维护消费者利益,提升产品质量具有重要意义。文章分析了政府监管下企业质量保证体系的现状,企业实施质量保障项目的动因及障碍,指出政府监管对影响企业实施食品质量保证项目具有关键作用,然后根据成本收益理论,从政府监管和企业效用方面分别进行分析,分析发现政府采取有效监管并对企业实施质量保证项目产生影响,需建立在一定条件之下,即政府监管的成本应接近于实施质量保证项目的效益水平与实际效益水平的差距;企业实施质量保证项目的净收益加上政府提供的补贴超过执行成本与补偿成本之差。此时,政府监管能促使企业实施质量保证项目。     

Locational concentration and institutional diversification: Evidence from foreign direct investments in the banking industry

We study locational concentration and institutional diversification strategies in the context of foreign direct investment based on Dunning’s eclectic paradigm in the banking industry. We report that locational concentration and institutional diversification strategies can enhance multinational bank return independently and simultaneously. Further, we document that locational concentration increases operational risk, while an institutional diversification strategy reduces this risk for a multinational bank. Our findings suggest that even when concentrating in a limited number of geographic locations, it is preferable to select more institutionally dissimilar countries. Overall, we conclude that multinational banks can achieve better performance by focusing on either locational concentration or institutional diversification, or a combination of both.     

Are China's subsidies for electric vehicles effective?

China has implemented high subsidy schemes to promote the adoption of electric vehicles. This study constructs an industrial organization model to theoretically analyze and numerically simulate the subsidy efficacy of battery electric vehicles in China. We find that subsidies for battery manufacturers and those for electric vehicle manufacturers are equivalent. Fixed subsidies are better for social welfare maximization than linear subsidies are. Simulation based on Chinese empirical data shows that China's subsidies for electric vehicles are effective but not optimal. It could be a better option overall to enable the vertical integration of the supply chain.     

基于更新理论的产品保修策略模型

产品价格的确定不仅取决于生产成本 ,还应包涵服务成本。非价格竞争下 ,产品保修是售后服务的主要内容。本文运用更新报酬理论 ,建立了产品保修策略模型。模型表明 :在消费转型时代 ,只有引入产品的差异性、降低生产成本、提高产品质量、延长产品寿命、制订合适的保修策略 ,才能保障合理的厂商利润 ,有效刺激需求。     

上市企业政府补贴决定中的博弈效应估算研究

政府补贴决定问题是学界长期关注的热点问题,补贴规模和强度不仅受政府和企业个体特征因素的影响,还受政府和企业间博弈行为的影响。采用双边随机边界模型,使用2007—2018年沪深两市A股上市企业样本数据,实证研究了政府和企业间博弈行为对补贴决定的影响,研究结果表明：政府和企业间博弈行为对补贴决定具有重要影响;平均水平上,政府剩余显著高于企业剩余,即综合博弈效应表现为政府方获得净剩余,政府和企业最终达成的补贴水平因此被压低;博弈行为对补贴决定的影响于政企双方个体特征维度上呈现出显著异质性。     

Locational efficiency in a federal system

A number of recent studies have concluded that differing local government tax and expenditure packages necessarily create incentives for households to locate in a non-optimal fashion. This paper shows, on the contrary, that the locational equilibrium may be optimal. For example, if migration produces no congestion costs, then as long as localities tax the locationally-fixed commodity, land, the equilibrium will be optimal. In fact, there are only two reasons why non-optimality may result: local taxes may be distortionary (by taxing the mobile rather than immobile factor), or there may be non-internalized externalities.     

城市生活垃圾资源化政府最优补贴博弈分析

城市生活垃圾资源化能够带来巨大的经济效益、环境效益与社会效益,是贯彻国家绿色发展理念的必经之路。城市生活垃圾资源化体系的持续发展需要政府补贴作为保障,减少资源化产品与同类非资源化产品的价格差异,弥补相关企业投入产出不匹配的矛盾。本文基于社会福利最大化理论,将政府补贴作为决策变量,构建各利益主体之间的价格博弈模型,确定政府最优补贴额度和其他主体的最优决策,并根据结论提出相关建议。研究表明:要实现整体效益最大化,政府需要在不同环节采取不同的补贴方式与补贴额度。