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我国股权大都集中在大股东的手中,终极控制股东普遍采用金字塔股权结构的方式对底层公司实施控制并影响会计稳健性。基于Basu模型,采用2012-2017年深沪两市A股上市公司数据,对终极控制股东产权性质、金字塔股权结构对上市公司会计稳健性进行研究。结果表明:与终极控制股东为非国有的上市公司相比,终极控制股东为国有的上市公司会计稳健性更高;金字塔层级增加导致会计稳健性降低;金字塔层级的增加对于国有控股企业和非国有控股企业会计稳健性的影响存在差异,国有终极控制上市公司的会计稳健性更高。 相似文献
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上市公司终极股东行为深受金字塔股权结构形态和内部权力配置及结构的影响。我国上市公司的经验数据表明上市公司终极股东侵占行为选择与金字塔股权结构形态特征正相关,与两权分离程度负相关。金字塔股权结构的内部制衡机制不仅直接影响股东侵占行为,并能够强化金字塔基本形态的影响作用。为保护中小股东的权益不受侵占,应完善公司治理结构,规范信息披露制度,并加强对上市公司大股东的监管。 相似文献
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股权质押增强了控股股东对上市公司进行策略性"市值管理"的动机,增大了上市公司与外部资金提供者之间的信息不对称,从而可能加剧公司融资约束。本文以2004-2015年间上市公司为样本,对以上假说进行了实证检验。结果表明,控股股东股权质押提高了公司的融资约束水平。同时,在国有企业、国际"四大"审计以及股票流动性较高时,控股股东股权质押的融资约束效应较弱。本文在丰富了控股股东股权质押经济后果以及融资约束等相关领域文献的同时,还具有较为重要的政策含义,上市公司的利益相关者应该关注到控股股东股权质押所产生的"负外部性"。 相似文献
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诉讼是中小股东维护自身合法权益的重要手段,研究中小股东诉讼的影响对推动资本市场高质量发展具有重要意义。本文以2017—2022年中国A股上市公司为研究对象,从融资约束角度考察中小股东诉讼对同行业公司的影响。研究发现,中小股东诉讼加剧了同行业公司的融资约束程度,呈现溢出效应,且该效应初步表现为传染效应。异质性检验发现,在低会计信息透明度、高行业风险、新《证券法》适用后,中小股东诉讼的传染效应更显著,但被诉公司与同行业公司的距离会削弱中小股东诉讼的传染效应。机制检验发现,股价崩盘风险是中小股东诉讼影响同行业公司融资约束的途径之一。本文不仅丰富了中小股东诉讼溢出效应方面的研究,而且为上市公司关注同行业公司外溢风险提供了直接证据。 相似文献
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已有研究指出,控股股东的关系股东加剧了控股股东与中小股东间的利益冲突.关系股东是否具有积极的一面,研究中尚缺乏关注.本文以2003-2017年间附属于系族集团的A股上市公司作为研究样本,实证检验了系族成员关系股东是否以及如何影响融资约束.研究发现,相对于没有关系股东的系族成员,有关系股东的成员企业面临的融资约束更低,在考虑内生性问题后结论依然稳健.进一步研究表明,关系股东通过降低实际控制人与成员企业的信息不对称、促进内部资本市场资源优化配置,以及降低管理层代理成本从而缓解所在成员企业的融资约束.本文揭示了关系股东对融资约束的影响及作用机理,丰富了关系股东与内部资本市场经济后果方面的研究. 相似文献
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公司治理就其实质是指公司是由谁控制,并为谁的利益服务。在Berle和Means1930年的经典著作《现代公司与私有财产》中,第一次提到在美国的公司中普遍存在着大量所有权分散的股东,由于经理有着自 相似文献
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本文运用2000-2013年中国A股上市公司年数据,研究了资本市场错误定价对不同融资约束水平公司融资方式选择的影响。研究发现,对于股权融资,无论融资约束水平高低,错误定价对公司股权融资均具有显著的正向影响;对于债务融资,股价高估会显著促进高融资约束公司的债务融资,包括长期债务融资和短期债务融资,而对低融资约束公司则不存在显著影响。同时还发现,错误定价对高融资约束公司短期债务融资的正向影响要远高于长期债务融资。这表明,在中国资本市场,资本市场错误定价对不同融资约束水平公司融资方式选择的影响存在显著差异,对高融资约束公司的影响表现为股权融资、短期债务融资、长期债务融资的融资优序现象,而对低融资约束公司则不存在这一现象。 相似文献
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以我国 A 股非金融类上市公司为样本,就商业信用变动对公司价值的影响进行分析,并以投资效率损失作为融资约束程度分类标准,对融资约束程度不同公司的商业信用变动的边际价值进行对比分析。研究发现:商业信用有利于提高公司价值;融资约束公司的商业信用变动的边际价值小于非融资约束公司;对于融资约束类公司,商业信用变动的边际价值会随着商业信用存量的增加而增加;而对于非融资约束类公司,商业信用变动的边际价值会随着商业信用存量的增加而减小。 相似文献
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Huajie Liang 《新兴市场金融与贸易》2017,53(6):1405-1424
We employ a sample of 12,200 observations from 2,321 companies listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges in China between 2005 and 2013 to test five hypotheses. The empirical results show that the cost of tunneling and ownership structure play important roles in restraining incentives to expropriate firms. Financial crisis will reinforce the incentive to propping rather than tunneling with higher ownership concentration. Moreover, controlling shareholders of state-owned enterprises show a stronger motivation to prop up during crisis periods than do those of non-state-owned enterprises. The results indicate that both an entrenchment effect and a convergence-of-interest effect actually exist and vary according to ownership structure and macroeconomic circumstances. 相似文献
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Ting Zhou 《新兴市场金融与贸易》2016,52(8):1956-1965
We investigate whether ultimate ownership affects firms’ adjustment speed toward target capital structures for Chinese publicly listed companies over the period 1999–2009. We divide our sample into state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and non-SOEs according to their ultimate ownership. We find that SOEs have higher leverage ratios and slower adjustment speeds toward target capital structures. Our results are consistent with the trade-off theory, implying that the political resources of SOEs can lead to a higher persistence and slower leverage adjustment speeds in comparison to non-SOEs. Finally, our results also raise a question: Why do Chinese companies adjust their capital structure so fast? 相似文献
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TIAGO PINHEIRO FRANCISCO RIVADENEYRA MARC TEIGNIER 《Journal of Money, Credit and Banking》2017,49(7):1653-1665
How does financial development affect the magnitude of the business cycles fluctuations? We examine this question in a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents and endogenous credit constraints based on Kiyotaki (1998). We show that there is a hump‐shaped relationship between the degree of financial frictions and the amplification of unexpected productivity shocks. This nonmonotonic relation is due to the fall in financial frictions having two opposite effects on the response of output. One effect is the reallocation of productive inputs between agent types, which, while active, increases with the fall in financial frictions. The other effect is the change in the demand of inputs, which decreases with the fall in financial frictions. At low levels of financial development, the reallocation effect dominates and a fall in financial frictions increases the amplification of productivity shocks. In contrast, at higher levels of financial development, a fall in financial frictions decreases the shock amplification because the reallocation effect disappears while the effect on the demand of inputs is still present. 相似文献
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以2003~2009年沪深两市仅发行了A股的上市公司为样本,使用高频交易数据构造相对有效价差和相对报价价差以衡量股票流动性,同时采用价差分解的方法构造逆向选择指标以衡量信息不对称程度,对这一问题进行了考察。研究结果表明:两权分离度越高,则股票流动性越低,信息不对称程度越高;和国有企业相比,这一关系在民营企业中表现得更加的明显。 相似文献
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从本次金融危机对国际金融监管体系提出的新挑战出发,本文探讨了金融国际化与金融监管体系改革的关系,以及金融危机对金融监管体系改革的影响。未来,金融监管将日趋国际化,更加注重风险性监管和对创新业务的监管,重视金融机构的内部控制制度和同业自律机制,而统一监管将成为监管体系发展的趋势。在此基础上,本文提出中国金融监管体系改革应走综合监管、统一监管之路,以适应混业经营发展和金融创新的需要;要加强宏观金融审慎监管,保证整个金融系统的稳定;注重保护投资者的合法权益;并不断完善与金融监管体系改革相配套的其他制度与措施。 相似文献
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Piman Limpaphayom Sirapat Polwitoon 《Journal of Business Finance & Accounting》2004,31(9-10):1577-1600
Abstract: This study examines the relation between bank relations and market performance in Thailand, an economy in which commercial banks play a crucial role through lending relationship and, for a number of companies, equity ownership. Overall, bank relationships, both equity‐based and debt‐based, positively affect capital investment. However, there is a negative relation between lending relationships, both short‐term and long‐term, and market performance indicating that bank lending may not always be consistent with value maximization. There is also evidence of a positive marginal effect of bank monitoring through equity ownership on market performance. Further, the relation between bank equity ownership and market performance appears to be non‐linear with a concave function. Ownership by corporate insiders is also negatively related to bank equity ownership. Overall, the findings highlight the detrimental effects of excessive short‐term debt usage, one of the factors believed to contribute to the financial crisis in Thailand, and the marginal benefit of the equity‐based relationship on firm value. 相似文献
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FDI、金融结构与福利分析 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
通过构建一个古诺竞争的扩展模型,分析FDI对国内金融结构的反射作用机制,并运用动态GMM估计方法实证检验了FDI作用于国内金融结构对社会福利的影响。结果表明,FDI对金融结构存在弥补作用,但不存在优化作用;FDI作用于金融结构对社会福利的影响是不确定的,此取决于国内金融融资和FDI两种手段的融资成本等多种外部因素。 相似文献
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Innovation in financial markets, spurred to a significant extentby developments in finance theory and financial econometrics,has played a critical role in spurring economic growth. However,the current turmoil in financial markets raises fundamentalquestions about the nature of financial innovation and the roleof policymakers in maintaining financial stability. This paperexplores these questions, focusing on the complexities of modelingfinancial risk and the potential trade-off between policiesaimed at combating short-run financial instability on the onehand and the potential financial market distortions and moralhazard that can result from such policies on the other. 相似文献
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金融创新、金融风险与中国金融监管模式 总被引:5,自引:1,他引:5
高山 《广东金融学院学报》2009,24(2):50-58
金融创新对宏观政策的制定、金融市场运行、商业银行透明度均有影响,它能够管理和控制金融风险,也能增大金融风险,还将对金融稳定性产生很大的负面影响。中国的金融监管应建立健全银行、证券、保险监管机构间以及与宏观调控部门的协调机制,通过中国金融监督管理委员会与国际性金融监管组织的合作,积极参与国际金融监管准则的制定,借鉴国外金融监管经验,不断提高金融监管的专业化水平。 相似文献
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This paper studies the reasons and the costs of separating ownership from control by analysing the decision of German dual class firms to consolidate their share structure from dual to single class equity between 1990 and 2001. We find that the firm value increases significantly by an average 4% on the announcement day. A significant part of the variation in abnormal returns can be explained by the ownership structure and by changes in liquidity. A logit analysis of the unification decision yields that firms are more likely to unify if their controlling shareholder loses only little voting power in a stock unification. Also, firms that are financially constrained are more likely to abolish dual class shares; these firms often issue additional shares after the stock unification. 相似文献