论适度保护关税税率

面对日益加速的经济全球化进程,各国仍然在普遍使用关税措施来保护本国产业的发展.在这方面,发展中国家需要解决的问题是设定一个适度的保护关税税率,以让国内产业既有生存和发展的空间,同时又有足够的竞争压力来提高效率.根据国内与国际平均生产成本的差异来确定保护关税的税率是一个可行的办法.进一步削减关税是我国加入WTO后需要承担的义务,应当按照适度保护关税的原则把平均关税的税率稳定在一个合理的水平上,并根据国内不同产业的发展状况,提供必要而有效的保护.     

Infant industry protection with oligopoly and learning-by-doing

I use a simple two-period learning-by-doing model to examine optimal home country protection policy. In some cases, as in Dasgupta and Stiglitz (Oxford Economic Papers 40 (1988), 246–68), the home government will impose an import ban to protect the home firm from foreign competition. On the other hand, a protective tariff often provides greater welfare than when an import ban is imposed. In these cases, the first-period dynamic tariff is greater than the static Brander and Spencer ‘profit shifting tariff’. Protection in the form either of a tariff or an import ban encourages the home firm to invest in current output which reduces future costs. In addition to dynamic profit shifting, protection can bc valuable because the home firm does not consider the effect of its current learning on future consumer surplus. Tariffs can thus encourage the growth of infant industries while benefiting consumers in the future. Furthermore, the home firm can have an incentive to price below cost if the potential cost savings are sufficiently valuable.     

FTA背景下市场规模、产品差异与关税保护——基于空间经济学模型的解析

在缔结自由贸易协定(FTA)时,大多数缔约方对本方竞争力弱的产业往往采取关税保护措施。在确定需要保护的本方产业时大多数缔约方往往采用贸易竞争度等方法而忽略考虑了缔约双方的市场规模和产品特性。这往往会造成保护失当或达不到预期的保护效果。本文采用空间经济学模型,对市场规模、产品差异化程度与关税保护的效果之间进行模拟分析。通过分析得出:虽然关税能够防止本方产业的流出,但是对市场规模小的缔约方来说效果有限;市场规模小的缔约方无需对产品差异化程度小的产品采取高关税保护措施而只需对产品差异化程度大的产品采取高关税保护措施。     

Factor tariffs and income

This article examines a tariff on an imported factor of production in a small, open economy with two domestic factors. Suppose the imported factor is intensive in export production, and labor in import competing production. The factor tariff would reduce export production and trade, but raise the wage. The flexibility afforded by the three factors raises the possibility that import spending might fall more than the decrease in output. That is, the factor tariff could raise income. Inelastic demand for the imported factor and a high labor share of income favor increased income.     

进口需求、市场准入与我国农产品的贸易逆差

我国加入世贸组织以来,于2003-2004年间出现了农产品的贸易逆差,本文分析了农产品贸易逆差的构成及其产生原因。大豆、棉花、食用油等是我国农产品贸易逆差的主要构成产品,这些农产品进口价格和进口数量都出现了增长,而相关产业的发展导致这些农产品进口需求猛增,致使农产品贸易逆差不断扩大。另外,我国农产品关税的大幅削减以及配额管制农产品市场准入机会的扩大,也是农产品贸易逆差进一步拉大的一个重要原因。     

关税减让对我国农产品进口的影响分析

本文运用理论和实证的分析方法,研究了关税减让对我国农产品进口的实际影响。研究结果表明,关税减让与我国农产品的进口之间存在着高度的负相关关系,在影响我国农产品进口行为的诸多因素中,关税起到了主要的作用,但并非唯一因素。同时,关税减让与农产品的进口额、进口结构之间存在密切的关系,最后,还提出几点政策性意见。     

我国农产品进口保护的经济学分析

目前我国农产品保护的主要措施是关税及关税配额。本文运用图形对这两种进口保护措施进行了经济学分析,指出在国内需求增长的情况下,配额比关税更具贸易保护作用,而且,与绝对配额相比,关税配额更能以较低的社会福利代价获取保护效应。尽管关税配额不失为一种较好的保护手段,但统计结果显示,关税配额并没有起到有效的保护作用。最后分析了在目前条件下我国对农产品进行有效保护的可行途径。     

WTO"绿箱"政策与我国农业基础设施建设

根据乌拉圭回合达成的<农业协议>对进口农产品的关税进行了大幅度的削减,以至以往各国利用关税措施对本国农业进行保护失去了效果.而利用如进口数量限制、技术壁垒等非关税措施对本国农业进行保护容易引起贸易争端.所以只有在WTO框架下加强农业基础设施建设,才是符合农业发展的长久之计.     

The NAFTA Preference and US‐Mexico Trade: Aggregate‐Level Analysis

This paper focuses on the US tariff preference afforded to Mexico relative to non‐NAFTA trading partners and evaluates the trade effects of NAFTA in a manner consistent with the idea behind a preferential trading agreement. The estimation technique exploits the time‐varying dimension of the tariff preference over 1989 to 2001. This is important because the tariff preference for Mexico into the United States market existed prior to NAFTA. Further, the NAFTA preference was phased in over time. We find that a higher US tariff preference for Mexico corresponds to increased US import demand for Mexican goods, and that a higher Mexican tariff preference for the United States corresponds to increased Mexican demand for US exports. Interestingly, import demand was more responsive to changes in the tariff preference once NAFTA was in place than it was on average.     

What does the Chinese market need? An empirical study of the determinants of Chinese imports, 1996–2008

This study provides an in-depth analysis of the determinants of import demand in China through a multilevel approach. Using disaggregated data over 1996–2008 and a dynamic panel model, we find that the Chinese import market is predominantly characterized by quality competition. However, the nature of the competition varies across different industries. In line with theory, quality plays an important role in industries that are characterized by the potential for quality improvement and product differentiation, whereas price is key in industries in which quality and product differences are rather small. Moreover, private consumption expenditure is more influential than other categories of expenditures. Additionally, variables that can influence the relative price of import products, such as the exchange rate, tariffs and the domestic price index, also have an impact on import demand.     

Differentiated products and evasion of import tariffs

An emerging literature has demonstrated some unique characteristics of trade in differentiated products. This paper contributes to the literature by postulating that differentiated products may be subject to greater tariff evasion due to the difficulties associated with assessing their quality and price. Using product-level data on trade between Germany and 10 Eastern European countries during 1992-2003, we find empirical support for this hypothesis. We show that the trade gap, defined as the discrepancy between the value of exports reported by Germany and the value of imports from Germany reported by the importing country, is positively related to the level of tariff in 8 out of 10 countries. Further, we show that the responsiveness of the trade gap to the tariff level is greater for differentiated products than for homogeneous goods. A one-percentage-point increase in the tariff rate is associated with a 0.4% increase in the trade gap in the case of homogeneous products and a 1.7% increase in the case of differentiated products. Finally, the data indicate that tariff evasion takes place through misrepresentation of the import prices rather than underreporting of quantities or product misclassification.     

Differentiated products and evasion of import tariffs

An emerging literature has demonstrated some unique characteristics of trade in differentiated products. This paper contributes to the literature by postulating that differentiated products may be subject to greater tariff evasion due to the difficulties associated with assessing their quality and price. Using product-level data on trade between Germany and 10 Eastern European countries during 1992–2003, we find empirical support for this hypothesis. We show that the trade gap, defined as the discrepancy between the value of exports reported by Germany and the value of imports from Germany reported by the importing country, is positively related to the level of tariff in 8 out of 10 countries. Further, we show that the responsiveness of the trade gap to the tariff level is greater for differentiated products than for homogeneous goods. A one-percentage-point increase in the tariff rate is associated with a 0.4% increase in the trade gap in the case of homogeneous products and a 1.7% increase in the case of differentiated products. Finally, the data indicate that tariff evasion takes place through misrepresentation of the import prices rather than underreporting of quantities or product misclassification.     

Tariff wars in the Ricardian Model with a continuum of goods

This paper describes strategic tariff choices within the Ricardian framework of Dornbusch, Fischer, and Samuelson (1977) using CES preferences. The optimum tariff schedule is uniform across goods and inversely related to the import demand elasticity of the other country. In the Nash equilibrium of tariffs, larger economies apply higher tariff rates. Productivity adjusted relative size (≈ GDP ratio) is a sufficient statistic for absolute productivity advantage and the size of the labor force. Both countries apply higher tariff rates if specialization gains from comparative advantage are high and transportation cost is low. A sufficiently large economy prefers the inefficient Nash equilibrium in tariffs over free trade due to its quasi-monopolistic power on world markets. The required threshold size is increasing in comparative advantage and decreasing in transportation cost. I discuss the implications of the static Nash-equilibrium analysis for the sustainability and structure of trade agreements.     

Trade policy, trade volumes and plant-level productivity in Colombian manufacturing industries

This paper explores a period of substantial variation in trade policy across industries in Colombia (1977-1991) to examine whether increased exposure to foreign competition generates productivity gains for manufacturing plants. Using an estimation methodology that addresses the shortcomings of previous studies, we find a strong positive impact of tariff liberalization on plant productivity, even after controlling for plant and industry heterogeneity, real exchange rates, and cyclical effects. The impact of liberalization is stronger for larger plants and plants in less competitive industries. Our findings are not driven by the endogeneity of protection. Similar results are obtained when using effective rates of protection and import penetration ratios as measures of protection. Productivity gains under trade liberalization are linked to increases in intermediate inputs' imports, skill intensity, and machinery investments, and to output reallocations from less to more productive plants.     

Trade policy under firm-level heterogeneity in a small economy

We explore the effect of trade policy on productivity and welfare in the now standard model of firm-level heterogeneity and product differentiation with monopolistic competition. To obtain sharp results, we restrict attention to an economy that takes as given the price of imports and the demand schedules for its exports (a “small economy”). We first establish that welfare can be decomposed into four terms: productivity, terms of trade, variety and curvature, where the last is a term that captures heterogeneity across varieties. We then show how a consumption subsidy, an export tax, or an import tariff allows our small economy to deal with two distortions that we identify and thereby reach its first-best allocation. We also show that an export subsidy generates an increase in productivity, but given the negative joint effect on the other three terms (terms of trade, variety, and curvature), welfare falls. In contrast, an import tariff improves welfare in spite of the fact that productivity falls.     

贸易措施的效果分析与政策取向——以关税、配额与补贴为例

关税、配额与补贴是一个国家用来保护国内市场、帮助国内厂商抵御国外对手竞争的常用措施。由于保护机制不同 ,关税、配额与补贴对不同利益主体的利益再分配会产生不同的影响 :关税措施有利于生产者和政府 ,不利于消费者 ;配额措施有利于生产者 ,不利于消费者 ,政府利益不受影响 ;补贴措施有利于生产者和消费者 ,不利于政府。一个国家可以根据其要保护的利益主体不同采取相应的保护措施     

The biggest losers (and winners) from US trade liberalization

Many development experts worry that continuing reductions of tariff levels in high-income countries will limit trade flows from developing countries that benefit from preferential trade programs because of ‘preference erosion.’ Using a panel of US import data between the years of 1997 and 2005, I find that reductions in preference margins will significantly diminish imports of some products, particularly from lower-middle and low income countries; for example, a 1% reduction in the US tariff on a product that is currently imported duty-free from developing countries will decrease imports of that product from lower-middle income countries by an average of 2.6%. However, many products produced by developing countries fail to qualify for preferential tariffs, thus a gradual reduction in all US tariff rates is expected to have only a modest impact on trade flows from developing countries.     

Quotas versus tariffs

This paper examines the nonequivalence of tariffs and quotas under uncertainty, when the expected level of imports is constrained for noneconomic reasons. Tariffs and quotas are ranked according to their effect on expected social welfare. In the case of a stochastic foreign supply curve, the ranking will depend upon the height of the tariff. In the case of a stochastic import demand curve, a tariff will always yield greater social welfare than a quota.     

Trade Creation and Diversion Effects of Regional Trade Agreements: A Product‐level Analysis

This paper examines the impacts of regional trade agreements (RTAs) on trade flows at product level, with a particular focus on trade creation and diversion. Based on estimation of the gravity equation, dealing with the zero trade flows and endogeneity bias problems, we analyse the impacts of various types of RTAs involving 67 countries for 20 products during the 1980–2006 period. We find that RTAs among developing countries tend to cause trade diversion compared with RTAs among developed countries. Taking the higher external tariff rates of developing countries compared with developed countries into consideration, our results suggest trade diversion is likely to be caused by remaining high tariffs on imports from non‐members. In addition, we find the trade creation effect for many products in the cases of Customs Unions and plurilateral RTAs. These results imply that trade creation would be caused by various factors besides the reduction in tariff rates. Based on these results, we draw a policy implication that external tariff rate reduction is an important factor in avoiding trade diversion in the formation of RTAs, in particular for RTAs among developing countries, while a large number of members and the common external tariff appear to be important for generating the trade creation effect.     

Ranking optimal tariffs and quotas for a large country under uncertainty

Optimal tariffs and quotas are compared for a large country under uncertainty. If the import supply schedule has constant elasticity and is subject to multiplicative uncertainty and domestic demand is random then the optimal policy is a fixed ad valorem tariff. If the supply schedule has constant elasticity but this elasticity is random then the optimal tariff is superior to the optimal quota. If the demand and supply schedules are linear then the optimal quota is superior to the optimal tariff if and only if the supply schedule is inelastic and the degree of uncertainty in the demand and supply schedules is small.