The Role of the Business Press in Creating and Disseminating Information around Earnings Announcements

This paper investigates the role of the business press in creating and disseminating information around earnings announcements by examining different motivations of trading volume. We find that press coverage is positively associated with trading activity motivated by differential interpretation and by differential belief revision, consistent with the press playing both an information creation and information dissemination role around earnings announcements. When we divide press coverage into full articles with additional editorial content and news flashes merely repeating verbatim of firm-disclosed press releases, we find that trading volume motivated by both differential interpretation and differential belief revision increases as coverage by full articles increases, and trading volume motivated by differential belief revision increases as coverage by news flashes increases. We also report that the differential interpretation effect of full articles is more pronounced when information users’ sophistication is high. Overall, we provide new evidence to the literature by showing that each type of press coverage plays an informational role in different motivations of trading activity.     

Securities Regulation, the Timing of Annual Report Release, and Market Implications: Evidence from China

Using a sample of earnings announcements of Chinese firms in the fiscal years 1994–1999, covering the periods before and after the introduction of a regulation to stagger the release of annual reports, we reassess the relation between earnings news and the timing of earnings announcements. We find that even though the reporting lag has significantly shortened as a result of the regulation, the pattern whereby good news is announced earlier than bad news persists. We then examine the behavior of stock prices before earnings announcements and find some indication of information leakage. These findings suggest that the regulation had the expected effect of reducing reporting delay and earnings release clustering. Yet, it did not appear to reduce the extent of the pre‐announcement leakage of information.     

业绩预告下的股份减持与内幕交易——会计稳健性是遏制还是助力？

选取2010—2018年沪深A股上市公司为样本,考察业绩预告发布前后大股东是否存在以及如何利用自身信息优势进行股份减持交易,会计稳健性是否以及如何对该内幕交易产生影响。研究结果表明:与强制性业绩预告相比,自愿性业绩预告披露前后发生大股东减持的概率更高,并且会计稳健性会显著抑制自愿性业绩预告披露前后的大股东减持行为。进一步将业绩预告消息区分为好消息和坏消息之后研究发现:坏消息的利空程度越高,大股东在业绩预告之前进行股份减持的规模越大;或者好消息的利好程度越高,大股东在业绩预告之后减持的规模也越大;稳健的财务信息能够抑制公司在隐匿坏消息方面进行的内幕交易,但会加剧公司在隐匿好消息方面进行的内幕交易。     

How Important are Earnings Announcements as an Information Source?

In a competitive information market, a single information source can only dominate other sources individually, not collectively. We explore whether earnings announcements constitute such a dominant source using Ball and Shivakumar's (2008) [How much new information is there in earnings?, Journal of Accounting Research, 2008, 46(5), pp. 975–1016] R ² metric: the proportion of the variation in annual returns explained by the four quarterly earnings announcement returns. We find that the earnings announcement days' R ² is 11% – higher than the corresponding R ² of days with dividend announcements, management forecasts, preannouncements, and 10-K and 10-Q filings and their amendments, and comparable to that of the four days with the largest realised absolute returns in a year. Additional analysis reveals that earnings announcements convey extreme bad news as often as management forecasts and preannouncements; for any other type of news, earnings announcements are much more frequent. We conclude that earnings announcements are an important source of new information in the equity market.     

A Hidden Markov Model Approach to Information‐Based Trading: Theory and Applications

This paper develops a novel approach to information‐based securities trading by characterizing the hidden state of the market, which varies following a Markov process. Extensive simulation demonstrates that the approach can successfully identify market states and generate dynamic measures of information‐based trading that outperform prevailing models. A sample of 120 NYSE stocks further verifies that it can better depict trading dynamics. With this sample, we characterize the features of information asymmetry and belief dispersion around earnings announcements. The sample is also applied to the study of the co‐movements of trading activities due to private information or disputable public information. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

定期报告预约披露日期的信息含量

沪深两交易所从2002年初开始对外公布上市公司向其预约的定期报告披露日期,本文研究了这一日期是否包含对投资者有用的信息。我们发现,在交易所公布预约日期时,公司的预约披露日期越早,则其异常回报越高,反之则低。市场的这种反应可以用随后公布的实际会计业绩好坏加以解释。我们还考察了市场的这种反应在横截面上的差异,对发布过”好消息”的预警公告及规模较大的公司,市场的反应程度较低;同时还发现预约披露日期的信息含量并未被”坏消息”的业绩预警公告所取代,这说明预约披露日期对“坏消息”的预警公司起到了进一步的证实作用。     

Timeliness of Annual Report Releases and Market Reaction to Earnings Announcements in an Emerging Capital Market: The Case of China

This paper examines the relation between firm performance and the timing of annual report releases in an emerging capital market. Based on the population of listed Chinese firms with A-shares for 1994-1997, we find that good news firms release their annual reports earlier than bad news firms, and loss firms release their annual reports the latest. Moreover, consistent with Chambers and Penman (1984) and Begley and Fischer (1998), these firms unexpectedly accelerate the release of good news and delay the disclosure of bad news relative to their previous reporting pattern. We also observe a significant price reaction to the annual earnings announcements for both early (good news) and late (bad news) reporting firms. Similar results are found for those A-share firms which have also issued B- or H-shares to foreign investors. Our study documents a systematic timing pattern of annual report disclosures, which is useful for investors to predict future earnings, especially in anticipating bad news in China's emerging market where information about future earnings is very limited.     

The Effects of Conservative Reporting on Investor Disagreement

We examine whether the level of a firm's conditional conservatism affects investor disagreement around earnings announcement dates. Investor disagreement is relevant for its repercussions on stock market efficiency. However, the literature related to the effect of firms’ reporting policies on disagreement is scant. Prior research suggests that conservatism, by requiring higher verifiability of profits, constrains earnings overstatements and encourages more complete revelations of losses, thus improving the information environment. In this paper, we further hypothesize that these effects of conservatism enhance news credibility and decrease information asymmetry, particularly for bad news announcements. This results in a lower disagreement and improved interpretation of earnings news. We consistently find that conservatism measures are negatively associated with proxies of announcement-time investor disagreement and that this effect is stronger when the firm is reporting bad news. Additional analyses indicate that the impact of conservatism is stronger when market surprise to the announcement is greater, while it is weaker in the presence of frequent and precise voluntary disclosure that preempts the earnings announcement. Finally, we show that a higher percentage of institutional investors’ ownership and a higher level of commitment to conservatism reinforce the impact of the latter.     

Voluntary Disclosure and Analyst Forecast

Empiricists document that firms more often voluntarily disclose bad news than good news and link this pessimism to managers’ increased incentives not to fall short of earnings expectations. This paper analyzes the voluntary disclosure of a manager’s private information by explicitly considering her incentives to meet or beat an analyst’s earnings forecast. The model predicts that managers who face strong incentives to meet or beat these forecasts more frequently disclose bad news than good news in order to guide analysts’ expectations about future earnings downward. This pessimism is higher in markets with less informed managers and may hold even if the manager has strong incentives for high stock prices and meet-or-beat incentives are comparably low.     

The Information Content of Guidance and Earnings

I compare the information content of quarterly earnings guidance and quarterly earnings by examining their associations with current and future stock returns when the two signals are bundled at earnings announcements. At the bundled announcement, I find a significantly stronger association between announcement returns and guidance news. From the day after the bundled announcement through the next earnings announcement, both signals generate abnormal return drifts of about 200 basis points. However, the timing of the post-announcement returns differs considerably. For guidance, about 50% of the post-announcement drift occurs at the next earnings announcement. In contrast, for earnings, about 20% of the preceding drift reverses at the next earnings announcement. Investor ignorance of the drift following guidance news coupled with a fixation on post-earnings announcement drift potentially explains this surprising difference in the timing of the post-announcement returns. Overall, this study indicates that bundled quarterly earnings guidance contains more information than quarterly earnings and that investors incorrectly overweight the earnings news and underweight the guidance news during the post-announcement period until the next earnings announcement.     

Do voluntary disclosures of bad news improve liquidity?

Can managers improve market liquidity and lower the cost of capital by providing voluntary earnings guidance? This study examines the impact of profit warnings on market liquidity and finds that voluntary disclosure of bad news actually improves market liquidity. By conducting an empirical study over the period 1995–2010 on NYSE, NASDAQ and AMEX listed firms, we find that firms that issue profit warnings show enhanced market liquidity during the post-announcement period. We show that profit warnings reduce information asymmetry and lower bid-ask spreads and increase trading volumes. These results are invariant to daily (short run) and monthly (long run) data after controlling for firm specific attributes. The results have major corporate policy implications. By voluntarily disclosing negative earnings guidance by managers, firms will experience significant improvement in market liquidity, thereby lowering the cost of capital. Our results are even more profound for firms that release bad news with extremely negative stock market impact. In other words, voluntary disclosure of bad news is good for market liquidity.     

年报预约披露日变更、时机选择与会计稳健性——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

上市公司年度报告普遍存在"好消息早,坏消息晚"的披露现象,但会计准则中稳健性原则对"好消息"、"坏消息"的确认具有非对称性。本文从会计稳健性的视角探讨了盈余稳健性与年报预约披露日变更、时机选择的关系,经验证据表明:相比延迟发布年报,提前披露的年报的会计稳健性更高;而相比非周末披露年报,在周末披露的年报的会计稳健性更低;上市公司年报的会计稳健性与其披露及时性显著正相关,会计稳健性越高,披露越及时。     

News and intraday jumps: Evidence from regularization and class imbalance

We study how information provokes intraday price jumps taking into account, besides news timing, the sentiment of news stories and other high-frequency indicators. By applying penalized logistic regression and addressing the rare nature of jumps, in addition to the previous evidence showing that causes of jumps are rate decisions and earnings announcements, we find that news provoking jumps is often followed by other news about the same company, that news stories sentiment and macro-surprises sign help to predict the jump sign, and, finally, that market players sometimes anticipate company-specific news.     

The Impact of Accounting Conservatism on the Compensation Relevance of UK Earnings

Abstract

It has long been established that because of accounting conservatism, the contemporaneous correlation between returns and earnings is lower (higher) for good (bad) news firm-years. Meanwhile, prior analytical agency work suggests that the compensation role of accounting earnings is potentially greater (for tasks such as noise filtering and incentive balancing) when the contemporaneous correlation between earnings and returns is lower. Hence, since accounting conservatism implies that earnings have a lower correlation with returns in good news firm-years, the present paper hypothesises that UK CEO cash compensation exhibits a stronger (weaker) sensitivity to accounting earnings in good (bad) news firm-years. The empirical findings offer substantial support for this hypothesis and are robust to alternative estimation methodologies. In addition, the results appear not to be attributable to the well-established impact of earnings persistence on the compensation–earnings association. Overall, the findings are consistent with the notion that UK compensation committees appear to take cognisance of the impact of accounting conservatism when awarding earnings-based compensation. In addition, the present work offers additional insights into the nature of the interaction between the contracting and valuation roles of accounting numbers.     

Dissemination of Accruals Information,Role of Semi‐Annual Reporting,and Analysts' Earnings Forecasts: Evidence from Japan

Our study investigates the effects of dissemination of accounting accruals information on stock prices using Japanese annual reports as our sample. We conduct month‐by‐month detailed analyses of price adjustment behavior with a particular focus on revisions of analysts' earnings forecasts and changes in trading volume around the period of upcoming semi‐annual reports. We find that analysts' forecasts are often revised around this time, and analysts use this as auxiliary information. In addition, an accompanying re‐adjustment of abnormal returns and an increase in trading volume are observed. Our findings demonstrate that informational uncertainty initially triggered by the announcement of annual reports decreases as semi‐annual reports are disclosed and analysts change their earnings forecasts, and confirms the importance of semi‐annual reporting.     

Implications of limited investor attention to customer–supplier information transfers

This study focuses on the market reaction to information transfers from economically linked customers. I examine whether investors have limited attention with respect to the information contained in customer earnings announcements for suppliers. Using 1083 unique customer–supplier relationships for the period 1983–2011, I find that the cumulative abnormal returns of a supplier surrounding and following linked customers’ earnings announcements are positively related to the earnings information of the customers, suggesting that customer earnings announcements convey information to suppliers. I also find that the post-earnings announcement drift in customers contributes to the cross-firm reaction, and the predictability of customer earnings surprises for suppliers’ future returns is not entirely due to limited investor attention.     

The Role of Institutional and Economic Factors in the Strategic Use of Non-GAAP Disclosures to Beat Earnings Benchmarks

Abstract

We use hand-collected data for a sample of large European firms to investigate the influence of countries’ institutional and economic factors on managers’ non-generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) disclosures. We find that managers are more likely to use non-GAAP measures to meet or beat earnings benchmarks that GAAP earnings would miss in countries with efficient law and enforcement, strong investor protection, developed financial markets, and good communication and dissemination of information. We also find that managers in countries with developed institutional and economic conditions are more likely to adjust non-GAAP earnings for recurring expenses such as R&D, depreciation, and stock-based compensation expenses. Our findings suggest that in environments in which there is more pressure to achieve earnings benchmarks and less opportunity to manipulate GAAP earnings, managers use more non-GAAP earnings disclosures to meet the benchmarks.     

Developing a Reputation for Reticence

A sender who has disclosable information with probability less than one may partially conceal bad news by choosing to withhold information and pooling with uninformed types. The success of this strategy depends on receivers' beliefs about the probability that the sender has disclosable news. In a dynamic context, informed senders try to cultivate a reputation for reticence either by concealing good news along with the bad, or by concealing some good news and disclosing some bad news. A reputation for reticence is valuable because it makes receivers less skeptical of past or future nondisclosures. The model provides insight into the choice by firms such as Google not to disclose quarterly earnings guidance to analysts, as well as Tony Blair's reticence over his son's vaccine record during the measles–mumps–rubella scare in the United Kingdom.     

An Investigation of Stock Price Declines Following Corporate Financing Events: Further Evidence

Prior research documents a large downward drift in stock prices following issuances of debt and equity by US firms. We conduct tests based on both stock price and trading volume to provide evidence on the reasons for this apparent market anomaly. We document evidence of earnings management through accruals prior to external financing and lower operating performance afterward that is associated with the amount of capital raised. The earnings management that precedes external financing and the amount of capital raised are associated with both the post-financing decline in stock price and trading volume around earnings announcements that follow for a period of three years. This evidence is consistent with the proposition that firms raise external capital prior to predictable declines in their operating performance and they release upward biased earnings before these events to manage investor expectations. The failure of many investors to incorporate this information into their trading decisions in a timely manner consistent with limited attention and over-confidence appears to drive stock mispricing. Our evidence does not support the conjecture that the financing anomaly is primarily a statistical artifact or that it is a manifestation of the accrual anomaly.     

International Differences in Conditional Conservatism – The Role of Unconditional Conservatism and Income Smoothing

Abstract

Prior research documents that conditional conservatism, measured as the asymmetric timeliness of earnings reflecting bad vs. good news, varies with cross-country differences in institutional regimes. In this paper, we examine the determinants of conditional conservatism and related earnings attributes internationally. First, using panel data, we investigate whether competing earnings attributes such as unconditional conservatism and income smoothing affect conditional conservatism and its international differences. We find that these attributes are predictably correlated with conditional conservatism. Second, we address the question whether income smoothing and conditional conservatism are two fundamentally different earnings attributes. We show theoretically that both attributes yield different earnings distributions and that the motivations for producing earnings which possess these attributes differ. To test these predictions empirically, we calculate firm-specific time-series measures of asymmetric timeliness, using a novel trigonometric measure based on the standard Basu (1997)-type regression. Using this cross-sectional data, we test whether conditional conservatism and income smoothing are different and find them to be only weakly correlated for a broad international sample. Also, we demonstrate that income smoothing explains international differences in conditional conservatism. Finally, we estimate simple determinant models of conditional conservatism and income smoothing, showing that both earnings attributes are driven by different explanatory firm-level factors: Conditional conservatism increases with the importance of debt financing, while income smoothing increases with the importance of dividends. Despite some important limitations, we believe our results to be meaningful because they show that cross-country differences in conditional conservatism are influenced by the effects of other accounting properties, predominantly income smoothing. Especially, legal regime appears to drive income smoothing while losing its explanatory power for conditional conservatism when firm-specific factors are controlled for.