缓解通货膨胀预期的策略思考

通货膨胀的发生会对国民经济发展产生各种不良影响,导致产业和经济结构的畸形变化.通货膨胀预期作为通货膨胀的心理延续对通货膨胀的再现起着举足轻重的作用,所以采取何种措施缓解通货膨胀预期成为中国政策运行的重点.当前通货膨胀预期是需求拉动型、成本推进型和预期型三种类型交叉,金融预期和金融作用紧密结合、投资过热、原材料成本价格上升及市场预期的影响成为通货膨胀预期动因.准确分解通货膨胀预期的成因,采取有针对性的调控政策,落实科学发展观,进行增长模式的改革以及明确宏观经济政策目标,通过合理预期应对通货膨胀预期等措施,成为缓解通货膨胀预期的必经之路.     

Time-varying U.S. inflation dynamics and the New Keynesian Phillips curve

This paper introduces a form of boundedly-rational inflation expectations in the New Keynesian Phillips curve. The representative agent is assumed to behave as an econometrician, employing a time series model for inflation that allows for both permanent and temporary shocks. The near-unity coefficient on expected inflation in the Phillips curve causes the agent's perception of a unit root in inflation to become close to self-fulfilling. In a “consistent expectations equilibrium,” the value of the Kalman gain parameter in the agent's forecast rule is pinned down using the observed autocorrelation of inflation changes. The forecast errors observed by the agent are close to white noise, making it difficult for the agent to detect a misspecification of the forecast rule. I show that this simple model of inflation expectations can generate time-varying persistence and volatility that is broadly similar to that observed in long-run U.S. data. Model-based values for expected inflation track well with movements in survey-based measures of U.S. expected inflation. In numerical simulations, the model can generate pronounced low-frequency swings in the level of inflation that are driven solely by expectational feedback, not by changes in monetary policy.     

Is the slope of the Phillips curve time-varying? Evidence from unobserved components models

This paper formally tests for time variation in the slope of the Phillips curve using a variety of measures of inflation expectations and real economic slack. We find that time variation in the slope of the Phillips curve depends on the measure of inflation expectations rather than the measure of real economic slack. We find strong evidence in support of the time-varying slopes of the Phillips curve with different measures of inflation expectations. Thus, we conclude that the slope of the Phillips curve is time-varying.     

The New Keynesian Phillips curve and the role of expectations: Evidence from the CESifo World Economic Survey

We provide evidence on the fit of the hybrid New Keynesian Phillips curve for selected Euro zone countries, the US and the UK. Instead of imposing rational expectations and estimating the Phillips curve by the Generalized Method of Moments, we use direct measures of inflation expectations from the CESifo World Economic Survey. Our main findings are as follows: (i) The use of survey data gives empirical results, which are more reliable than those obtained from the GMM approach. (ii) The purely forward-looking Phillips curve can be rejected in favor of the hybrid New Keynesian Phillips curve. (iii) The estimated coefficients on past inflation are higher when using survey expectations than when using the rational expectations GMM approach. (iv) It remains unclear whether real unit labor costs or a measure of the output gap should be used as a proxy for real marginal costs. (v) Theory-based restrictions lead to an improvement of the empirical results.     

Inflation literacy and inflation expectations: Evidence from Austrian household survey data

Inflation expectations are known to be quite heterogeneous across agents. We investigate whether this heterogeneity is primarily due to differences in people’s understanding of the inflation process and of the goals and intentions of the central bank. Using micro data from a survey conducted among 2000 Austrian households, we construct an indicator of “inflation literacy” from several questions on people’s knowledge about different aspects of inflation. We find that this indicator helps explain both the level and the uncertainty of inflation expectations: Households with relatively higher levels of inflation literacy tend to have lower and more accurate short-term and long-term inflation expectations. Interestingly, however, they are less certain about their inflation expectations than people with lower levels of inflation literacy. We also find that people’s trust in the central bank and in its ability to maintain price stability significantly dampens their inflation expectations.     

The information content of market-based measures for the long-term inflation expectations of professionals: evidence from a midas analysis

Long-term inflation expectations taken from the Survey of Professional Forecasters are a major source of information for monetary policy. Unfortunately, they are published only on a quarterly basis. This article investigates the daily information content of market-based measures, such as inflation-linked swaps and breakeven inflation rates, for the next survey outcome. Using a mixed data sampling approach, we find that professionals account for the daily dynamics of market-based measures when they submit their long-term inflation expectations. We propose a daily indicator of professionals’ inflation expectations that outperforms alternative indicators that ignore the high-frequency dynamics of market-based measures. To illustrate the usefulness of the new indicator, we provide new evidence on the (re-)anchoring of U.S. inflation expectations.     

Regime Switches, Biased Expectations, and the Brazilian Inflationary Experience

The paper analyzes how an error in inflation expectations helped maintain high interest rates in the wake of the major stabilization plans launched in Brazil over the past 18 years. Newly implemented low-inflation measures lacked credibility and forced agents to expect a higher inflation rate than the one effectively observed, creating a wedge between ex-post and ex-ante real interest rates. The results also indicate that past failures have helped undermined the credibility of new measures.     

Inflation Dynamics in the Euro Area and the Role of Expectations

This paper examines the empirical performance of the New Keynesian Phillips curve and its hybrid specification in the euro area. Instead of imposing rational expectations, direct measures, i.e. OECD forecasts, are used as empirical proxies for economic agents’ inflation expectations. Real marginal costs are proxied by three alternative measures. The results suggest that once the rational expectations hypothesis is relaxed and directly measured expectations are used, the European inflation process can be modeled using the forward-looking New Keynesian Phillips curve. However, when allowing for possible non-rationalities in expectations, inflation can be modeled more accurately by the hybrid Phillips curve with the additional lagged inflation term. In this approach, output gap turns out to be at least as good as labor income share as a proxy for real marginal cost. Moreover, the inflation process seems to have become more forward-looking in the recent years of low and stable inflation.The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Bank of Finland. Special thanks are due to the editor, two anonymous referees, Juha Tarkka, Jouko Vilmunen and Matti Virén for useful comments. I am also grateful to David Mayes and Geoffrey Wood for helpful suggestions and to Heli Tikkunen for excellent research assistance. For their constructive comments, I would also thank participants in the conference on the Eurosystem Inflation Persistence Network at the ECB, which was held in Frankfurt in December 2003.     

Central bank forecasts and private expectations: An empirical assessment from three emerging economies

As part of their monetary policy strategy, many central banks are attempting to manage private sector expectations about key macroeconomic variables. In this article, we investigate whether forecasts provided by central banks in three inflation targeting emerging economies (Brazil, Mexico, and Poland) affect the expectations of private forecasters. In particular, we analyze whether the disagreement between the central bank and private sector forecasts applies to explain changes in private sector expectations regarding inflation and economic growth. The findings show that while central bank forecasts are higher than those made by private sector forecasters, the result is an update upwards of private forecasts and that this effect is stronger for GDP growth forecasts than for inflation forecasts.     

Competing macro-hypotheses in the United States: A Kalman filtering approach

The empirical validity of alternative views about the short-run determinants of real output growth in the United States is investigated. A nested framework is used to test the macro rational expectations (MRE) hypothesis directly against two competing hypotheses - the neo-Keynesian view that anticipated and unanticpated monetary policy both matter,and Friedman's (1977) proposition that increased inflation uncertainty reduces real output at least temporarily. The unobservable explanatory variables are obtained from time-varying-parameter models of inflation and money growth, which generate forecast errors and their conditional variances consistent with rational expectations under a continuously chaning policy regime. The empirical results strongly support Friedman's view. The MRE hypothesis must be rejected since both anticipated and unanticipated monetary changes matter. The results prove robust across different model specifications and estimation techniques.     

Dynamic asset allocation and consumption under inflation inequality: The impacts of inflation experiences and expectations

Differences in spending patterns and in price increases across goods and services lead to the unequal inflation experiences of households (called inflation inequality). These differences then cause disagreements in inflation expectations and eventually have a significant effect on households’ asset allocation and consumption decisions. The asset allocation model in this paper explains how inflation experiences affect household investment and consumption through corresponding inflation expectations, which are characterized by long-term expected inflation, the impact coefficient of the expected inflation and the correlation between expected inflation and the risky return. Using China's economic data, the empirical results show that significant differences in inflation expectation arise from income gap, regional inequality, different inflation measures and economic sector spending differences. Using the estimated coefficients, the calibration results have policy implications that households need more financing channels to resist inflation, especially in rural areas and in the raw material sector.     

Targets and lags in a two-equation model of US stabilization

A simple model of activist macroeconomic policy derives a reaction function by assuming that rational governments have performance objectives, but are constrained by the Phillips curve. Although not formally modeled, governments apply a variety of instruments to influence inflation and output, in addition to monetary policy these include fiscal policy, bailouts and exchange rates. Our econometric results are generally consistent with US economic history. One qualification is that governments appear more likely to target growth rates than output gaps. Another inference is that inflation expectations are more likely to be backward than forward looking; a variety of rational expectation models fit the data less well than do simple inertial expectations. We also find that annual data series are more appropriate than quarterly ones for studying these issues.     

Inflation surprises and inflation expectations in the Euro area

In the second half of 2012, euro area inflation started declining and reached historical lows at the end of 2014. Market-based measures of inflation expectations also declined to unprecedented levels. During this disinflationary period, inflation releases have often surprised analysts on the downside. We provide evidence that inflation ‘surprises’ have significant effects on inflation expectations. The sensitivity of inflation expectations to the surprises, which has varied over time, disappeared after the introduction of the Asset Purchase Programme by the European Central Bank.     

The reaction of disagreements in inflation expectations to fiscal sentiment obtained from information in official communiqués

Using official communiqués about fiscal policy, we develop a fiscal sentiment indicator, and we verify the reaction of disagreements in inflation expectations to fiscal sentiment. This analysis is relevant to inflation targeting (IT) countries because transparency and communication can influence expectations. The results suggest that a more optimistic fiscal sentiment reduces disagreements in inflation expectations. Estimates show that, for higher disagreements in inflation expectations at 12-month maturity, an optimistic fiscal sentiment can reduce the disagreement more sharply. In turn, the fiscal sentiment effect on the disagreement for the 48-month maturity is stronger the smaller the disagreement is. The results allow us to outline the following policy recommendations. First, an optimistic fiscal environment is important in the task of guiding inflation expectations and reducing inflation uncertainty. Second, fiscal communication is an important tool for the expectations formation process, and therefore it must be carefully managed to help in the task of forward guidance of inflation expectations, being important for the IT regime. Third, both fiscal credibility and monetary policy credibility are important for the expectations formation process, particularly for the reduction of inflation uncertainty, representing aspects that must be preserved in countries that adopt the IT regime.     

Rationalizing the Political Business Cycle: A Workhorse Model

An incumbent policymaker has incentives to expand the money supply prior to elections to stimulate the economy and thereby further her chances of re-election. In its original formulation, the Nordhaus political business cycle hypothesis relies on adaptive inflation expectations and naive retrospective voting.
This article develops a simple model of a political cycle in inflation and output growth, assuming rational inflation expectations and rational retrospective voting. Voter scrutiny of the incumbent's economic performance has policy and selection effects, with ambiguous consequences for welfare: the policymaker manipulates the money supply for electoral purposes, but an incumbent of above average quality is more likely to remain in office.     

Modifying Taylor reaction functions in the presence of the zero‐lower‐bound — Evidence for the ECB and the Fed

We propose an alternative way of estimating Taylor reaction functions if the zero‐lower bound on nominal interest rates is binding. This approach relies on tackling the real rather than the nominal interest rate. So if the nominal rate is (close to) zero central banks can influence the inflation expectations via quantitative easing. The unobservable inflation expectations are estimated with a state‐space model that additionally generates a time varying series for the equilibrium real interest rate and the potential output — both needed for estimations of Taylor reaction functions. We test our approach for the ECB and the Fed within the recent crisis. We add other explanatory variables to this modified Taylor reaction function and show that there are substantial differences between the estimated reaction coefficients in the pre‐ and crisis era for both central banks. While the central banks on both sides of the Atlantic act less inertially, put a smaller weight on the inflation gap, money growth and the risk spread, the response to asset price inflation becomes more pronounced during the crisis. However, the central banks diverge in their response to the output gap and credit growth.     

CONSUMERS' INFLATION EXPECTATIONS AND MONETARY POLICY IN EUROPE

This article analyses the effects of monetary policy decisions on inflation expectations of European consumers. Using a novel approach, I convert qualitative survey responses of consumers in various European countries into a quantitative time series of inflation expectations. I investigate the effects of unanticipated movements in interest rates and inflation on inflation expectations across European countries. I inter alia seek to explore whether the reaction differs of consumers in countries with more credible central banks than those in less credible countries.     

Anchoring of inflation expectations in the euro area: Recent evidence based on survey data

This article analyses the anchoring of inflation expectations of professional forecasters and consumers in the euro area. We study anchoring, defined as the central bank's ability to manage expectations, by paying special attention to the impact of the ECB inflation target and ECB inflation projections on inflation expectations. Our analysis indicates that in the post-crisis period longer-term inflation expectations have become somewhat more sensitive to shorter-term ones and to actual HICP inflation. We also find that the ECB inflation projections have recently become more important for short- and medium-term expectations of professional forecasters and at the same time the role of the ECB inflation target for those expectations has diminished. Overall, our analysis suggests that in recent years inflation expectations in the euro area have shown some signs of de-anchoring.