Taxation,redistribution, and observability in social dilemmas

In the presence of social dilemmas, cooperation is more difficult to achieve when populations are heterogeneous because of conflicting interests within groups. We examine cooperation in the context of a nonlinear common pool resource game, in which individuals have unequal extraction capacities and have to decide on their extraction of resources from the common pool. We introduce monetary and nonmonetary mechanisms in this environment. The two monetary mechanisms are tax extraction and redistribution of the tax revenue. These include a Pigovian per‐unit tax mechanism and an increasing block tax that only taxes units extracted above the social optimum. Another mechanism varies the observability of individual decisions. We find that the two tax and redistribution mechanisms reduce extraction, increase efficiency, and decrease inequality within groups. In contrast, observability impacts only the baseline condition by encouraging free‐riding instead of creating moral pressure to cooperate.     

Do binding agreements solve the social dilemma?

We investigate experimentally whether “binding agreements” can provide a solution to the social dilemma that arises in the presence of pure public goods. Signing a binding agreement can prevent players from free riding on the contributions to the public good. However, a well known theoretical result is that the outcome of the endogenous formation of agreements is not necessarily efficient. Our setting is a bargaining game in which agreements form sequentially. The individual level of contribution to the public good increases with the size of the coalition reaching an agreement and the global agreement is always the socially optimal structure. There are two equilibrium outcomes, the global agreement and an asymmetric structure, which consists of two coalitions of different sizes, the small one free riding on the contributions of the larger one. We run an experiment which lends force to the theoretical result that outcomes may be inefficient. However, subjects do not play Nash and the experimental outcome is, on average, even more inefficient than the theory predicts. Our analysis leads to the conclusion that different types of behaviour co-exist.     

Anti-poverty competences in a multilevel government: an empirical analysis of citizens’ preferences in Europe

This article aims to investigate individuals’ perceptions about institutions that should be primarily responsible for reducing or preventing poverty, which is a dramatic phenomenon that became a crucial issue in European countries over recent years. We propose an empirical analysis based on European survey data and investigate some citizens’-level and country-level variables that potentially affect individuals’ attitudes. Our results suggest that country-level economic and institutional characteristics do significantly affect individual preferences for the governance of anti-poverty policies.     

Crowdfunding and social influence: an empirical investigation

The literature so far provides no in-depth investigation of the determinants of decisions to contribute to crowdfunding platforms. The present article draws on work measuring the decisions and prosocial behaviours of individuals in relation to public goods, and uses survey data on crowdfunding behaviour. We surveyed an original sample of individuals in France to explore individual decisions and amounts of funding chosen to support a creative project. We show that in non-equity crowdfunding contributing money is associated with altruism. Our findings suggest that the ‘warm glow’ effect influences the level of the contribution; we show also those monetary incentives could ‘crowd out’ the decisions to contribute of crowdfunders. Our study has some implications for business strategy since understanding why people contribute adds to our knowledge about the incentives that might encourage them to increase their contributions, and allows predictions about how changes to how crowdfunding platforms are managed might affect individual incentives to give.     

POLITICAL INEQUALITY,CENTRALIZED SANCTIONING INSTITUTIONS,AND THE MAINTENANCE OF PUBLIC GOODS

Centralized sanctioning institutions cultivate cooperation by eradicating the gains from free‐riding. Studies show that electing a community member to operate a centralized sanctioning institution further increases support for the public good. These studies have overlooked an all‐too‐common attribute of non‐laboratory elections: political inequality. In this paper, we replicate those studies and, then, introduce novel experimental treatments that examine how political inequality influences the cooperation‐enhancing effect of a democratic election to centralized sanctioning institutions. In our novel treatment conditions, participants receive either a random allotment of votes that they can use to elect a centralized sanctioning authority or an allocation of votes proportional to their earnings in a previously‐executed public goods game. We find that political inequalities created via the random allocation of votes do not hinder cooperation, whereas political inequalities created via past game play undermine elected authorities and diminish contributions to the public good from individuals advantaged by political inequality.     

Revisiting strategic versus non-strategic cooperation

We propose a novel experimental method that disentangles strategically- and non-strategically-motivated behavior. We apply it to an indefinitely-repeated prisoner’s dilemma game to observe simultaneously how the same individual behaves in situations with future interaction and in situations with no future interaction, while controlling for expectations. This method allows us to determine the extent to which strategically-cooperating individuals are responsible for the observed pattern of cooperation in experiments with repeated interaction, including the so-called endgame effect. Our results indicate that the most common motive for cooperation in repeated games is strategic.     

Cooperation in collective action*

The ability to cooperate in collective action problems – such as those relating to the use of common property resources or the provision of local public goods – is a key determinant of economic performance. In this paper we discuss two aspects of collective action problems in developing countries. First, which institutions discourage opportunistic behaviour and promote cooperation? Second, what are the characteristics of the individuals involved that determine the degree to which they cooperate? We first review the evidence from field studies, laboratory experiments, and cross community studies. We then present new results from an individual level panel dataset of rural workers.     

SOCIAL NORMS,LOCAL INTERACTION,AND NEIGHBORHOOD PLANNING*

This article examines optimal social linkage when each individual's repeated interaction with each of his neighbors creates spillovers. Each individual's discount factor is randomly determined. A planner chooses a local interaction network or neighborhood design before the discount factors are realized. Each individual then plays a repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game with his neighbors. A local trigger strategy equilibrium (LTSE) describes an equilibrium in which each individual conditions his cooperation on the cooperation of at least one “acceptable” group of neighbors. Our main results demonstrate a basic trade‐off in the design problem between suboptimal punishment and social conflict. Potentially suboptimal punishment arises in designs with local interactions since in this case monitoring is imperfect. Owing to the heterogeneity of discount factors, however, greater social conflict may arise in more connected networks. When individuals' discount factors are known to the planner, the optimal design exhibits a cooperative “core” and an uncooperative “fringe.”“Uncooperative” (impatient) types are connected to cooperative ones who tolerate their free riding so that social conflict is kept to a minimum. By contrast, when the planner knows only the ex ante distribution over individual discount factors, then in some cases the optimal design partitions individuals into maximally connected cliques (e.g., cul‐de‐sacs), whereas in other cases incomplete graphs with small overlap (e.g., grids) are possible.     

Comparing alleged incommensurables: Institutional and Austrian economics as rivals and possible complements? ∗

The purpose of this article is to explore the changing relationship between Austrian and Institutional economics and the common ground that they appear increasingly to share. It is maintained that both parties have something to learn from each other - there are gains to be made from intellectual trade and inter-research tradition discourse. Neither Austrian economics nor institutional economics presently provides a sufficiently robust or sophisticated approach to individual and group problem-solving activity within institutional-knowledge constraints and historical time dynamics, yet they are both beginning to seriously grapple with such issues. The gulf between the Austrian and Institutional research traditions is narrowing given that there is some convergence toward a middle ground where it is recognized that individuals do not exist in a vacuum and that institutions both constrain and enable purposeful behaviour. Through increased interaction Austrians may learn to take ‘institutional’ frameworks even more seriously whilst Institutionalists may learn to be even more earnest in their treatment of ‘individual’ action within a historical time continuum.     

Darlings and Orphans: Interactions across Donors in International Aid

We examine how the bilateral aid flows from an individual donor to a recipient depend on the aid flows from all other bilateral and multilateral donors to that recipient. Thereby, we assess to what extent issues including donor coordination, free‐riding, selectivity, specialization, and common donor interests drive bilateral aid allocations. We find that others’ bilateral flows lead to a significant increase in aid flows from a particular donor, but primarily within a given year. The effects are particularly pronounced for large donors and so‐called “darling” recipients. Overall, the results suggest that herding is a dominant feature of aid inter‐relationships.     

Institutions and Values: A Methodological Inquiry

Economics entails a study of institutions regardless of the school of thought, and it is inherently an analysis of institutional transformation with a vision toward creating positive social change through economic arrangements. However, the conceptions of institutions, identity of individuals, human nature as it pertains to economics, identification of the economic sphere, its concerns, and studying its evolution, all vary substantively across schools of thought. We examine the following issues: (i) the differences in the ontological identity of the individual between heterodox approaches, new institutional economics (NIE), and the neoclassical school; (ii) the central point of divergence between original institutional economics (OIE) and NIE, despite both schools being committed to the project of an “institutionally” centered approach to economics; and (iii) the absence of a cohesive project to explore foundational theoretical congruencies among those heterodox approaches that have a shared vision, values, and a common ontological identity of socially embedded people.     

Flexible Integration? Mandatory and Minimum Participation Rules

For a club such as the European Union, an important question is whether a subset of the members should be allowed to form “inner clubs” and enhance cooperation. Flexible cooperation allows members to participate if and only if they benefit, but it leads to free‐riding when externalities are positive. I show that flexible cooperation is better if the heterogeneity is large and the externality small, but that rigid cooperation is the political equilibrium too often. Both regimes, however, are extreme variants of a more general system combining mandatory and minimum participation rules. For each rule, I characterize the optimum and the equilibrium.     

Cooperation,Trust and Economic Development: An Experimental Study in China

Many previous empirical studies have suggested that cooperation and trust affect economic growth. However, the precise relationship between trust and cooperation (i.e. whether trust leads to cooperation or cooperation leads to trust) remains unclear and it is not known how the level of economic development affects the level of cooperation and trust. Using a combination of public goods, gambling game and trust game experiments, we investigate the links among cooperation, trust and economic development in four regions of China. Our results suggest that, first, there is a U‐shaped or V‐shaped relationship between cooperation and economic development. Second, on the one hand, cooperation leads to trust, and on the other hand, more cooperative behaviour may be created by rewarding trusting behaviour. Third, men are more cooperative and trusting than women. Furthermore, we find that the widely used ‘GSS trust’ question from the General Social Survey (GSS) does not predict either cooperation or trust, whereas the questions ‘GSS fair’ and ‘GSS help’ have weak predictive power for trusting behaviour but not for cooperative behaviour.     

Externalities in appropriation: responses to probabilistic losses

Using an appropriation game setting, we examine individual responses to changes in a groups’ vulnerability to a probabilistic loss (L) of a public good. The probabilistic loss parameter entails losing 10, 50 or 90% of the value of the public good that is maintained through cooperation, where the likelihood of the loss decreases in total group cooperation. By design, the expected marginal net benefits to an individual and the expected harm to others depends endogenously on the individuals’ expectations of group cooperation and exogenously on the magnitude of the loss parameter. We find that individual cooperation is greater when forecasts of total group cooperation are greater and where the magnitude of the probabilistic loss is larger. There is, however, an interesting asymmetry in responses by two subgroups. Subjects who are pessimistic regarding total group cooperation decrease cooperation the higher the magnitude of the probabilistic loss and their decisions are tied systematically to changes in their expectations of other’s cooperation. On the other hand, subjects who are optimistic regarding total group cooperation are found to be more cooperative, but their decisions are not systematically tied to changes in expectations of others’ cooperation.     

Social norms and individual savings in the context of informal insurance

This paper develops a theory of informal insurance in the presence of an intertemporal technology. It is shown that when an insurance agreement suffers from enforcement problems, constraints on individual savings behaviour can enable the group to sustain greater cooperation. This result provides a motivation for a variety of social norms observed in traditional societies which discourage ‘excessive’ accumulation of wealth by individuals. The paper also shows that social norms that discourage savings are more likely to benefit poorer communities and thus, paradoxically, cause them to fall further behind even as it serves a useful purpose.     

Can immigrants insure against shocks as well as the native-born?

We examine the impact of job displacement and serious health problems on multiple measures of individual and household well-being using longitudinal data. We extend the previous literature by examining whether these shocks have differential effects for the native-born and immigrants and whether shock mitigation strategies and their effectiveness differ by immigration status. Our results suggest that both immigrants and native-born individuals have access to similar institutional and other formal and informal risk-sharing arrangements such that they are able to mitigate shocks against job loss or illness almost equally.     

Institutional framework and economic development: international evidence

This paper examines the effect of ‘quality’ of the institutional framework on economic development. Our empirical results support the hypothesis that ‘good’ institutions improve efficiency and accelerate growth. The positive effect of institutional ‘quality’ is more pronounced with mutually reinforcing support of economic freedom. Our results also indicate that ‘good’ institutions help developing countries grow faster to achieve conditional convergence. We infer from the results that economic development requires not only physical and human capital formation, but also freedom to choose and institutional support.     

Do we lie in groups? An experimental evidence

We study whether there is a difference between individual and group unethical behaviour in an experimental study among adolescents. We find that on average, groups cheat more than individuals, but there are important differences across age. Younger groups cheat more than younger individuals but there is no difference between older individuals and groups. The way in which groups are formed and friendship ties among group members do not seem to matter.     

The Evolutionary Stability of Moral Objections to Free Riding

In this study we explore the endogenous determination of moral objections to free riding. We first derive the individually rational behavior for given preferences. The motivational structure is allowed to evolve evolutionarily based on the comparison of the relative reproductive success of all possible preference types. The tastes that emerge are not necessarily those assumed in models resorting to altruism or moral obligations. In general, an effective social conscience preventing free riding need not be evolutionarily stable. In the first model that we explore, moral objections to free riding and, in turn, voluntary contributions to the provision of public goods are not to be expected with one notable exception, namely unanimity games. In the second model that we explore, the evolutionarily stable probability that an individual develops social conscience is positive.     

Lab and framed lab versus natural experiments: Evidence from a risky choice experiment

Some recent papers have studied data from TV game shows to examine the behaviour of individuals towards risk. It is generally agreed that data from these shows are useful in detecting individual risk aversion in the field, with both “real life” subjects and incentives. Field experiments also include some interesting reality features that could affect individuals’ behaviour and possibly lead to different findings. This paper aims at investigating lab versus field evidence in risk taking attitudes, especially controlling for framing effects. To assess whether the behaviour of subjects in the field is consistent with that of experimental subjects, we designed an experiment to mimic (with experimental rewards and subjects) the rules of a well-known Italian TV game show, Affari Tuoi, in two different settings: a traditional lab setting, where the game was played individually (109 subjects) (Treatment 1); and a framed lab, in which the experiment was replicated in the Italian public television (RAI) studio where the show was actually recorded, with a smaller sample of undergraduate students (33) and in the presence of an audience (Treatment 2). Our comparison between the two different settings aims at establishing whether the presence of an audience, or of a situation that reproduces the stress that contestants must experience in the TV studio, can affect experimental subjects’ choices. We did not find any significant evidence of framing effects: students behave in a similar way in the two lab settings, responding essentially to incentives. Comparing the risk attitudes shown by experimental subjects in the two lab treatments with those exhibited by the contestants in the field, we found that contestants in the TV show are generally more risk averse than students in the lab.