The welfare effect of a free trade agreement in the presence of foreign direct investment and rules of origin

This paper investigates the welfare effect of forming a free trade agreement (FTA). To receive tariff‐free treatment, firms must comply with the rules of origin (ROO). Outside firms could undertake either market‐oriented or export‐platform foreign direct investments (FDIs). ROO have the following effects: (i) An infeasible FTA may become feasible by deterring outside firms' FDIs, (ii) an FDI of a less efficient firm could replace that of an efficient firm, or (iii) FDIs made before the FTA is concluded might be eliminated. These potential effects complicate the welfare effect of the FTA and could decrease the consumer surplus.     

FREE TRADE AREAS AND RULES OF ORIGIN: ECONOMICS AND POLITICS

Incorporating an intermediate input into a simple small-union general-equilibrium model, this paper first develops the welfare economics of preferential trading under the rules of origin (ROO) and then demonstrates that ROOs can improve the political viability of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). Two interesting outcomes are derived. First, a welfare-reducing FTA that was rejected in the absence of ROOs can become feasible in the presence of these rules. Second, a welfare- improving FTA that was rejected in the absence of ROOs can be endorsed in their presence, but upon endorsement it can become welfare inferior relative to the status quo.     

Market size and entry in international trade: Product versus firm fixed costs

This paper develops a theoretical framework to infer the nature of fixed costs from the relationship between entry patterns in international markets and destination market size. If fixed costs are at the firm level, firms take advantage of an intrafirm spillover by expanding firm‐level product range (scope). Few firms enter with many products and dominate international trade. If fixed costs are at the product level, an interfirm spillover reduces the fixed costs to export for all firms producing the product. The resulting entry pattern consists of many firms exporting different varieties of the same product. Using cross‐country data on firm and product entry, I find empirical evidence consistent with product‐level costs. More firms than products enter in larger markets offering their consumers lower prices and a greater variety of goods within the product category.     

Why does China protect its labour‐intensive industries more?*

China's tariff structure favours labour‐intensive sectors, and this is at odds with traditional theory of comparative advantage. The paper argues that tariffs in China are a mechanism for protecting technology‐backward domestic – especially state‐owned enterprises (SOEs) from competition technology‐advanced foreign enterprises producing in China. With relatively integrated labour markets and cross‐firm technology differences, SOEs’ subsistence is supported by subsidized credit and limited access of foreign firms’ local production to tariff‐protected domestic markets. Labour market integration and capital subsidies increase the relative cost of labour in SOEs compared to their foreign competitors, hurting more domestic firms in industries that use labour more intensively. Restrictions to FIEs’ (foreign‐invested enterprises) access to tariff‐protected product markets, which protect more labour‐intensive industries, compensate for the greater cost disadvantage of SOEs in labour‐intensive sectors.     

DECISION TO INVEST ABROAD: THE CASE OF SOUTH KOREAN MULTINATIONALS

Recent firm‐based empirical studies examine whether firms serving foreign markets either through exports or foreign direct investment (FDI) are more efficient than their domestically‐oriented counterparts. The purpose of the present paper is to study the link between performance of multinational firms and the choice to participate in foreign investment. In so doing, this paper explicitly differentiates exports and FDI decisions. Using firm‐level data for large South Korean manufacturing firms, I provide evidence that the premium for FDI is huge compared to exports, and that good firms undertake FDI. Studying performance across firms, I find that firms that engage in FDI outperform other firms in the future in all possible dimensions; they are larger, pay higher wages, and are also more productive. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that good firms self‐select to engage in FDI. I also find clear evidence that past FDI experience has a strong positive effect on the probability of current investment abroad. This implies that the sunk cost involved in FDI plays a role in current decisions to undertake FDI.     

HORIZONTAL MERGERS IN A DIFFERENTIATED COURNOT OLIGOPOLY

Using a standard differentiated goods quantity competition setting, we show three facts about horizontal two‐firm mergers that are not true for a homogeneous goods Cournot market. First, merger of two firms is profitable for the merging firms provided that goods are sufficiently distant substitutes. Second, merging of two firms can lead to more two‐firm mergers. Third, an initially non‐profitable two‐firm merger can occur in anticipation of subsequent mergers. These facts imply that mergers are more likely to occur in differentiated goods markets than in homogeneous goods markets.     

Multinational Enterprises,Absorptive Capacity and Export Spillovers: Evidence from Polish Firm‐level Data

An important benefit attributed to the activity of multinational enterprises (MNEs) in developing and transition countries is its effect on international market access. Through a variety of channels the presence of MNEs is expected to reduce the costs faced by indigenous firms in breaking into international markets and in turn boost their export prospects. In this paper we use an extensive Polish firm‐level dataset for the period 2000–2008 to verify whether MNEs have positively contributed to the export performance of indigenous firms. We track not only sectoral and geographical spillovers stemming from the activity of MNEs but also control for firm‐specific characteristics that affect indigenous firms' decisions to export including their absorptive capacity. Our empirical results support the existence of positive spillovers (related to MNE export activity) at the sectoral level but not at the regional level. Finally, we find that individual absorptive capacity determines the size of export spillovers.     

On Assisting Domestic Industries under Bertrand Competition

In a homogeneous‐good duopoly game with a home and a foreign firm, which compete on prices, it has been shown that the optimal way to assist the domestic industry is by a production subsidy. The argument here is that the subsidy is used to keep potential competitive pressure on the foreign firm. This paper analyzes under which conditions this threat of entry of a subsidized home firm is credible. It is shown that in markets where the firms move before the government, a subsidy is not credible and dominated by a tariff in terms of welfare.     

On intrabrand and interbrand competition: The strategic role of fees and royalties

We examine oligopolistic markets with both intrabrand and interbrand competition. We characterize equilibrium contracts involving a royalty (or wholesale price) and a fee when each upstream firm contracts with multiple downstream firms. Royalties control competition between own downstream firms at the expense of making them passive against rivals. When the number of downstream firms is endogenous, each upstream firm chooses to have only one downstream firm. This result is in sharp contrast to previous literature where competitors benefit by having a larger number of independent downstream firms under only fixed fee payments. We discuss why allowing upstream firms to charge per-unit payments in addition to fixed fees dramatically alters their strategic incentives.     

Collective Choice and Control Rights in Firms

Recent writers have asserted that firms controlled by workers are rare because workers have diverse preferences over firm policies, while investors all support wealth maximization. However, the source of the asymmetry between capital and labor remains unclear. We resolve this puzzle by arguing that because financial capital is exceptionally mobile, capital markets induce unanimity. The lower mobility of human capital implies that labor markets are monopolistically competitive and hence that unanimity cannot be expected in labor‐managed firms. Moreover, such firms are vulnerable to takeover by investors, while capital‐managed firms are substantially less vulnerable to takeover by workers.     

Exchange Rate Exposure of Chinese Firms at the Industry and Firm Level

This study investigates the exchange rate exposure of Chinese firms at the industry and firm level based on the conventional capital asset pricing model (CAPM) framework. At the industry level, the dynamic conditional correlation MGARCH (DCC MGARCH) estimates demonstrate that the market model and three‐factor model are appropriate for exposure measurements, and industry returns are more likely to be exposed to unanticipated changes in the real exchange rate and the trade‐weighted effective exchange rate, particularly for manufacturing industries. At the firm level, although the seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) estimates vary across markets, it is apparent that there is a relationship between firm size and exposure effects, which also show that lagged exchange rate changes have significant exposure effects on firm returns. This study finally suggests that non‐financial firms should set up special commissions to hedge currency risks of their future cash flows.     

Does Exporting Increase Productivity? A Microeconometric Analysis of Matched Firms

Exporting involves sunk costs, so some firms export whilst others do not. This proposition derives from a number of models of firm behavior and has been exposed to microeconometric analysis. Evidence from the latter suggests that exporting firms are generally more productive than nonexporters. They self‐select, in that they are more productive before they enter export markets, but the evidence suggests that entry does not make them any more productive. This paper investigates exporting and firm performance for a large panel of UK manufacturing firms, applying matching techniques. The authors find that exporters are more productive and they do self‐select. In contrast to other evidence, however, exporting further increases firm productivity.     

TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND FIRM PERFORMANCE: THE CASE OF THAILAND

After the Asian Financial Crisis, Thailand's trade policy has been driven by the proliferation of free trade agreements (FTAs). We use firm‐level data to estimate the effects of reductions in tariffs applied to Thai imports on Thai firms. Reductions in Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) tariffs were associated with increasing firm employment and exports, lower ASEAN‐China import tariffs were associated with increasing firm employment, while lower tariffs from the Japan‐Thailand FTA were associated with reductions in firm employment and increasing likelihood of International Organization for Standardization (ISO) certifications. FTAs were associated with a decrease in firm R&D spending. (JEL F1, F2, F6)     

Sunk Costs,Firm Heterogeneity,Export Market Entry and Exit: Evidence from India

This paper analyses the role of sunk costs and firm heterogeneity in firm decision to enter and exit export markets. Employing rich firm-level data on Indian manufacturing firms, the study points out that sunk costs in terms of previous export experience significantly explain entry and exit decisions of firms in the export market. The first set of analysis involves estimation of dynamic discrete choice model using random effects probit correcting for initial conditions problem. We find evidence that previous export experience (sunk costs) matters for export decision. However, importance of sunk costs is found to depreciate rapidly. Further, analysis across sub-sample of firms accounting for firm heterogeneity factors like size and product level information supports the hypothesis of sunk costs. Second set of analysis involving firm survival in export markets using discrete-time hazard models shows evidence of negative duration dependence. We observe that those firms which continue to export for few years are less likely to exit from export markets.

     

Horizontal Mergers Under Asymmetric Information About Synergies

This paper analyses a situation in which there are three quantity‐setting firms, two of which are considering whether or not to merge. When these two firms have private information about the potential cost‐saving synergies of the merger, they may have an incentive to overstate them. This is because if they succeed in making the non‐merging rival firm believe that the synergies are high, the rival firm reduces output and the merger becomes more profitable. Under some conditions, anticipating that the rival will form such a belief, low‐synergy firms that would never merge under complete information will mimic high‐synergy firms by merging. Such pooling behaviour by the merging firms can have a negative impact on social welfare.     

Shrouding Add‐On Information: An Experimental Study*

We explore how increased competition affects firms’ obfuscation strategies in a laboratory experiment. Firms sell a base good and an add‐on product. Besides choosing the base‐good price, sellers take an action that mimics the effects of shrouding the add‐on product. Shrouding is an equilibrium but an unshrouding equilibrium coexists. In our experiment, more competition matters, in that only duopolistic markets are frequently shrouded whereas four‐firm markets are not. With repeated interaction, shrouding rates do not increase. However, the opportunities to shroud facilitate tacit collusion on the base‐good price for the duopolies: the unshrouding equilibrium serves as a credible punishment if deviations occur.     

Learning to Export and the Timing of Entry to Export Markets

Exporters normally enter their first foreign markets some time after beginning to sell locally, then enter subsequent markets progressively. Standard trade models are essentially static and do not explain these elementary facts about exporting, which can bias the estimation of trade patterns. This paper proposes a model that endogenously generates the timing of entry to new export markets. The timing results from a learning mechanism. More productive firms are less sensitive to the learning effect and therefore (1) enter markets more quickly and (2) enter larger markets earlier and smaller markets later. These predictions are confirmed using Swedish firm‐level data.     

Perfectly competitive markets as the limits of cournot markets

A perfectly competitive, partial equilibrium market for a single homogeneous good with a (bounded) continuum of infinitesimal firms is considered. Cost functions are essentially unrestricted and are allowed to vary smoothly across firms. A sequence (net) of Cournot markets (each with a finite number of firms) which converge smoothly to the perfectly competitive limit in terms of both the inverse demand functions and the distributioon of firm technologies is introduced and it is shown that all markets sufficiently far along the sequence have a Cournot equilibrium and all the Cournot equilibria converge to the perfectly competitive equilibrium of the limit market.     

Do good governance provisions shelter investors from contagion?Evidence from the Russian crisis1

This paper studies how the Russian crisis of 1998 affected listed firms in transition economies. The data cover 394 companies that were listed before the Russian crisis, and include financial, industry, ownership and stock market information. Results show that in the short term (within one month of the crisis) good governance did not shelter investors from contagion. On the contrary, stock returns during the crisis period were lower for the largest and most liquid stocks and markets in the region irrespective of their direct exposure to Russia. The paper also documents that in the longer term (one year after the crisis) recovery was faster in firms without direct trade exposure to Russia, as well as in firms with better firm‐level governance as proxied by the presence of a foreign blockholder. The paper presents evidence that both firm‐ and country‐level characteristics are important in overcoming the effects of a crisis. Firm‐specific characteristics, however, play a bigger role for companies operating in countries with weaker corporate governance.     

Globalization,Worker Mobility and Wage Inequality

In the present paper, I integrate frictional labor markets with on‐the‐job search into an otherwise standard heterogeneous firm model of intra‐industry trade. Most importantly, I show that the returns to workers' inter‐firm mobility are higher in a trade equilibrium than in autarky. Intuitively, by favoring large and productive firms, international trade amplifies the disparities in profitability between small and large firms. Hence, the returns to labor reallocation across firms rise. In view of the empirically observed higher inter‐firm mobility among high‐skill workers, this suggests a skill‐biased impact of trade liberalization.