现阶段银行理财子公司面临的挑战及发展对策

随着我国居民财富增长,资管行业中理财业务规模快速扩大。“资管新规”发布后,银行理财子公司作为独立的法人机构进入市场,必将深刻改变我国理财市场格局。本文阐述了银行设立理财子公司的意义,分析了现阶段银行理财子公司所面临的挑战,建议银行理财子公司应完善公司治理,重塑业务模式,充分发挥其优势,提高投研能力和金融科技应用,在与母行其他资管子公司及外部其他资管机构合作共赢的基础上,实现差异化发展。     

银行理财转型之路

资管新规发布已有两年时间,按照理财新规的规定,理财业务整改时间进度过半,银行理财业务进入整改转型深水区。2019年,监管部门有序引导理财子公司成立开业,截至2020年2月末,共有30余家银行宣布设立或已经设立理财子公司,其中,工银理财公司等11家已正式开业。随着理财子公司悉数落地,银行理财业务机构转型将基本完成,但如何有效实现监管新规下的经营转型,不仅是理财子公司未来成长发展关键所在,也事关我国资管行业转型发展。     

理财子公司的高质量发展之路

2021年是"十四五"规划的开局之年,也是资管新规过渡期的收官之年.自2019年5月第一家银行理财子公司成立至今,三年多的时间内,银行理财子公司产品存续规模不断增长,产品类型日益丰富,逐渐发展成为理财市场的主力军. 银行理财子公司的设立开启了银行理财新时代,推动了银行理财业务回归本源,也促进了资管行业的高质量发展.在当前承上启下的关键时间节点,银行理财子公司未来的高质量发展之路,既面临着难得的历史机遇,也将迎来前所未有的挑战.     

银行理财变局之下谁主“沉浮”?

<正>去年4月,央行、银保监会、证监会、外汇局联合发布了《关于规范金融机构资产管理业务的指导意见》(简称"资管新规"),对资产管理市场的发展带来了深远影响。如今,"资管新规"落地已有一年多时间,银行理财产品平均预期收益率跌至4.31%,为近两年最低值。银行理财收益率缘何会创新低随着"资管新规""理财新规"和《商业银行理财子公司管理办法》等监管文件接连出台,2018年又被业内称为"资管元年"。有业内专家表示,资管业务转型对银行相关业     

浅议结构性存款风险及其发展展望

《商业银行理财业务监督管理办法》的出台,进一步规范了理财、资管市场发展秩序。随着金融去杠杆化的成效日趋深化,理财业务市场已初步形成了由资管新规、理财新规、理财子公司管理办法共同构建的管理框架。结构性存款产品应运而生,其特征、风险值得我们关注及分析。     

银行备战理财子公司时代

<正>2018年12月26日,中国建设银行、中国银行正式获批设立理财子公司;2019年1月4日,中国农业银行和交通银行设立理财子公司计划也随后获批。在业内看来,四家理财子公司获批,是银行业对"资管新规"和"理财新规"相关监管要求的进一步落实。另据不完全统计,目前已有28家银行公告或披露了设立理财子公司的计划。     

2020银行理财市场谋变求新

2020年,银行理财市场出现了一系列的新变化和新趋势。这一年,伴随着资管新规过渡期延长一年、理财子公司有序设立,监管层对银行理财市场发展的“严管之心”有之、“呵护之情”亦有之;伴随着银行理财子公司加速布局、线上理财快速发展,金融机构在危机中转型谋变的动能不断积蓄;伴随着部分银行理财产品跌破净值、净值型产品占比越来越高,投资者们切身感受到了沉甸甸的“买者自负”压力。这一年,银行理财市场在谋变求新中前行。     

监管新规下中小银行资管业务发展探析

近年来银行理财业务在快速发展中出现了业务运作不够规范、投资者适当性管理不到位、信息披露不够充分等问题。随着银保监会持续加大监管力度,银行理财业务已在按照监管导向有序调整,表外资产负债收缩,短期险产品份额下降,同业存单配置比例提升。本文探讨了资管行业细则发布后的资管理财市场变化趋势,预计银行成立资管子公司进程将加快,理财产品将向非标倾斜,分析了过渡期内新老划断的执行问题和结构化平层拆除后的增信措施落实问题,并就设立资管子公司、增强投研能力、提高客户覆盖率、开展财富管理业务、资管业务智能化转型等方面对中小银行资管业务提出了具体建议。     

商业银行理财子公司转型路径探索——基于资管行业竞争格局的视角

自2018年资管新规落地以来,银行理财在去通道、去嵌套、去池化、去刚兑的要求下不断向净值化、标准化的方向摸索前行.监管对于资管业务的规范管理催生了理财子公司,未来,理财子公司也必然承接银行理财业务的转型重任.从2019年建信理财正式成立发展至今,包括两家外资控股的合资理财公司在内,已经有21家理财公司正式营业,产品规模...     

银行理财业务转型与发展

资管新规、理财新规等政策的出台,对银行理财业务发展具有重要影响。本文针对理财业务净值化转型、加快理财行业对外开放等问题进行探究,通过总结我国银行麵业务在转型发展过程中面临的诸多挑战,提出我国未来银行理财业务转型的六条路径。理财业务转型是一项系统工程,需要市场投资者和监管者在符合相关法律法规的前提下,相互配合’共同发力,推进理财业务顺利转型。     

行业变革下理财子公司的机遇和挑战

随着资管新规、理财新规和理财子公司管理办法的相继颁布,我国资产管理行业迎来了重大的变革。2019年,理财子公司陆续成立,作为一种全新的资产管理机构,因为体量大、背景深,对整个资管行业将产生重大影响。理财子公司成立于行业发生重大变革的背景下,面临着经营模式转型、关系重新定位、人才系统欠缺、能力亟待提升等方面的挑战,但同时也有市场机遇、政策机遇和转型机遇等方面的有利条件。面对行业变革带来的机遇和挑战,理财子公司要通过做好自身定位、打造合作共赢生态圈、建设三大体系、构筑四大基础,为客户和企业提供一站式金融服务。     

Determinants of the capital adequacy ratio of foreign banks’ subsidiaries: The role of interbank market and regulation

This paper examines the factors influencing the capital adequacy ratio (CAR) of foreign banks. We test whether the CAR of subsidiaries and branches in developed and developing countries depends on the same factors. We use data from 310 subsidiaries and 265 branches to test the impact of the parent banks’ fundamentals on subsidiaries’ and branches’ capital ratios. We also study how the economic condition and regulatory environment in a bank's home country determine foreign banks’ CAR. Our results provide strong evidence that the CAR of subsidiaries and branches operating in developing and developed countries do not depend on the same set of explanatory factors. We also find that the regulatory framework of a parent bank's home country affects the capitalization of its foreign subsidiaries in the host countries. Finally, we show that specific variables of the parent bank have a stronger effect for foreign banks highly related to the interbank market.     

地方政府债券置换对银行信贷及货币供给的影响

通过构建基于商业银行资产负债结构的地方债置换分析框架,研究表明,地方债置换将通过商业银行资产结构在贷款与债券之间的配置调整影响货币供给,它将使银行可贷资金增加,并导致贷款规模的变化,在贷款创造存款的信用放大机制下,引起货币供应量的变化,进而造成货币政策的扩张(收缩).贷款市场的供求弹性将决定地方债置换的扩张效应或收缩效应.在经济增长放缓、银行为弥补持有地方债收益下降、地方债纳入货币政策工具的抵押品和质押品范围的情况下,地方债置换具有货币政策扩张效应.为减少地方债对金融市场的冲击,央行需密切监测商业银行资金运用情况,提高货币政策操作的针对性,并加强同财政政策的协同配合.     

资产管理业务的国际比较研究

资产管理业务连接着融资方和投资者,兼具融资属性和投资功能,是金融市场的 重要组成部分。2012年之后,我国资管业务迎来一波快速增长浪潮。但与欧美国家相对成熟的 资产管理业务体系相比,我国的资产管理业务起步较晚,在驱动因素、主要产品、业务模式、 行业监管等方面均具有较为明显的本土特征。本文通过对中外资管业务的系统梳理和横向比 较,以期在借鉴国际经验的基础上,得出有助于完善我国资管业务规制、促进行业健康可持续 发展的建议。     

RAROC AT BANK OF AMERICA: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE

In 1993, Bank of America's Risk and Capital Analysis Group was charged with the task of developing and instituting a single corporate-wide system to allocate capital to all the bank's activities. Since 1994, that system has been providing quarterly reports of risk-adjusted returns on capital (RAROC) for each of the bank's 37 major business units. By 1995, B of A had also developed the capability to calculate RAROC down to the level of individual products, transactions, and customer relationships. RAROC systems allocate capital for two basic reasons: (1) risk management and (2) performance evaluation. For risk management purposes, the overriding goal of allocating capital to individual business units is to determine the bank's optimal capital structure–the proportion of equity to assets that minimizes the bank's overall cost of funding. This process involves estimating how much the risk (or volatility) of each business unit contributes to the total risk of the bank, and hence to the bank's overall capital requirements. For performance evaluation purposes, RAROC systems assign capital to business units as part of a process of determining the risk-adjusted rate of return and, ultimately, the “economic profit” of each business unit. The objective in this case is to measure a business unit's contribution to shareholder value, and thus to provide a basis for effective planning, capital budgeting, and incentive compensation at the business unit level. Concerns about capital adequacy, along with the Basel risk-based capital requirements, have played some role in the growth of RAROC among commercial banks. But the most powerful impetus to bankers' use of more systematic risk measures is coming from increasingly activist institutional investors. Besides giving senior management an economic basis for evaluating the bank as a portfolio of businesses and for making resource allocation decisions that improve the bank's risk/reward profile, RAROC systems are also expected to produce better performance by holding managers accountable for the amount of investor capital they are putting at risk.     

Actuarial pricing of deposit insurance

Using a pricing formula for options on coupon bonds (Jamshidian [1989], El Karoui and Rochet [1990]) we are able to compute the actuarial pricing of deposit insurance for a commercial bank. Our formula takes into account the maturity structure of the bank's balance sheet, as well as market parameters such as the term structure of interest rates and the volatilities of zero coupon bonds. The relation with asset liability management methods is explored.     

Optimal design of derivatives in illiquid markets*

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to determine the optimal structure of derivatives written on an illiquid asset, such as a catastrophic or a weather event. This transaction involves two agents: a bank which wants to hedge its initial exposure towards this illiquid asset and an investor which may buy the contract. Both agents also have the opportunity to invest their residual wealth on a financial market.

Based on a utility maximization point of view, we determine an optimal profile (and its value) such that it maximizes the bank's utility given that the investor decides to make the deal only if it increases its utility. In the case of exponential utility, we show that the pricing rule is a non-linear function of the structure and that the bank always transfers the same proportion of its initial exposure. In the general case, an additional term appears, depending only on the relative log-likelihood of the two agents' views of the distribution of the illiquid asset.     

BANK REGULATIONS,CAPITAL STRUCTURE,AND RISK

The joint influence of the Federal Reserve's (Fed) discount window credit and reserve requirements and FDIC's deposit insurance on a bank's optimal capital structure and asset risk choices is analyzed. The specific seniority of such regulatory claims, and potentially strong negative correlation between bank asset classes, significantly alters our traditional view of such regulatory influences on bank behavior. I find that the discount window's presence does not always prompt bank risk taking and leverage, but it does partially offset such incentives under certain conditions. In addition to its cost, a reserve requirement provides the bank with an indirect subsidy that may encourage deposit funding. Thus, regulatory reforms, such as the FDIC Improvement Act of 1991, which curtail banks' access to the discount window, may not always be appropriate to resolve a bank's incentive for moral hazard behavior. The Fed's presence needs to be more comprehensively examined to design effective regulatory policy.     

Limited liability and bank safety net procedures ∗

A model is presented of bank behaviour which identifies the factors determining a bank's optimal capital/asset ratio, its optimal liquidity ratio, the expected value of non-performing loans and the probability of bank failure. We propose that this last variable can act as an index of bank credit-worthiness. The main factors determining this index are (i) the risk associated with bank asset returns, (ii) the variability of bank deposits, (iii) the costs associated with bank failure and (iv) the implicit or explicit government subsidy involved in depositor protection schemes. The principal general conclusion of the paper is that regulations governing capital requirements, liquidity requirements and depositor protection should be (a) risk related and (b) integrated. Depositor protection can be improved through relatively high capital requirements. However, the optimal strategy is for all bank safety net procedures and incentive mechanisms to be related to the riskiness of individual bank portfolios.     

Bank governance,regulation and risk taking

This paper conducts the first empirical assessment of theories concerning risk taking by banks, their ownership structures, and national bank regulations. We focus on conflicts between bank managers and owners over risk, and we show that bank risk taking varies positively with the comparative power of shareholders within the corporate governance structure of each bank. Moreover, we show that the relation between bank risk and capital regulations, deposit insurance policies, and restrictions on bank activities depends critically on each bank's ownership structure, such that the actual sign of the marginal effect of regulation on risk varies with ownership concentration. These findings show that the same regulation has different effects on bank risk taking depending on the bank's corporate governance structure.