DISCOUNT RATE FOR PUBLIC INVESTMENT IN A MONETARY DISEQUILIBRIUM ECONOMY*

In this paper, we explore the social rate of discount for public investment in a monetary overlapping generations model which allows for market disequilibria arising from price and wage rigidities. Financing public investment with a lump-sum tax on the younger generation, borrowing and money supply, the government maximizes the sum of generational utilities discounted by a social rate of time preference. For the social welfare optimum, it is required to take the boundary-maintaining policy by making demand for output equal to supply. In a stationary state, we show that (i) the social rate of discount on the Keynesian-repressed inflation boundary should be the weighted average of the social rate of time preference and the market rate of interest, the weights depending on the amount of private investment crowded out by public investment, and (ii) on the Keynesian-classical boundary it should be a modified version of the weighted average rule, containing an extra term which represents the marginal opportunity cost of public investment through its impact on labour employment.     

基于公共财政构架下财政支出结构的优化

现阶段我国要建立与市场机制相适应的公共财政，就必须科学界定公共财政支出范围，优化财政支出结构，这样才能提高财政支出效率，降低政府运作成本，减少对竞争性领域的财政投资，强化公益性事业支出，最终实现支出结构的优化调整.     

Now or later? The political economy of public investment in democracies

This paper explores the impact of elections on public investment. Working with a sample of 67 presidential and parliamentary democracies between 1975 and 2012, we find that the growth rate of nominal public investment is higher at the beginning of electoral cycles and decelerates thereafter. The peak in public investment growth occurs 28 months before elections, and each month closer to the next election the growth rate of public investment declines by 0.7 percentage points. Other political variables, such as cabinet ideology and government fragmentation have less influence on short-term public investment dynamics. Fiscal rules and stronger institutions seem to attenuate the impact of elections on investment, but available information is insufficient to draw definitive conclusions. These results are robust to a number of controls, including for fixed elections.     

The Marglin-McFadden-Mishan debate on public investment criteria: Some Clarifications

This paper reviews the post 1963 debate on public investment criteria stemming largely from Marglin's work. At issue here, are the two main propositions of Marglin, namely, that the social marginal rate of time preference is the appropriate social rate of discount (SRD) for public projects, and that the social opportunity cost (SOC) of capital raised to facilitate public investment is, in general, in excess of the money cost of such investment. Both supported and challenged by different writers, this debate does not provide any clear consensus as to the current status of these propositions. The central purpose of this paper is to put the series of apparent claims and counterclaims found in the literature to an analytical test, and draw the appropriate conclusions. This we do by explicitly considering the technology, fiscal policy and savings reinvestment behavior in a simple model of maximizing the present discounted value of the marginal net consumption stream generated by the public project. We argue that given Marglin's assumptions, the criterion that the marginal social rate of time preference be the SRD is valid as has already been demonstrated by Diamond (1968) and McFadden (1972). His other conclusion that the SOC should generally exceed unit v is seen to be correct only in special cases.     

Investment scaling up and the role of government

This article studies the fiscal and welfare implications of a scaling up of public investment when the government is subject to inefficiencies on the spending and on the tax collection side. In our simulations, the scaling up of public investments results in higher long-run output and consumption levels but requires a fiscal stabilization package in order to preserve fiscal sustainability. The effects on consumers’ welfare after the fiscal adjustment are nontrivial. Our welfare analysis shows that consumers’ welfare is increased when the government smooths the fiscal adjustment via higher borrowing and not through an increase in taxation. Moreover, the comparison between several stabilization packages via tax adjustment shows that higher welfare is achieved when the government relies mostly on taxation of capital as this allows higher levels of consumption. Lower fiscal costs that do not undermine fiscal sustainability can however be achieved if the government manages to reduce inefficiency in tax collection. Finally, we consider a change in the trade regime that causes a decline in revenues. We find that the higher fiscal burden required to preserve fiscal sustainability would completely wipe out the welfare gain of higher public investments.     

Financing government investment and its implications for public capital: A small open economy perspective

Expenditure reductions played a key role in many small open economies during fiscal consolidation, with large declines in public investment. This led to a reduction in public capital stock and affected the competitiveness of these economies. After the sovereign debt crisis, the governments that consider increasing investment to replenish the public capital stock have limited fiscal space and have to avoid external imbalances. We show that using budget-neutral investment spending can generate long-term benefits of higher public capital stock while at the same time limiting negative consequences for the public finances and the trade balance. The best way of financing government investment, which preserves fiscal and trade balances, and increases welfare, is by reducing other government spending. The second-best is financing investment with value-added tax. Financing with debt worsens fiscal and trade balances, while using distortionary labour taxes reduces labour supply, increases wage costs and worsens the trade deficit in the short run.     

A note on public debt, tax-exempt bonds, and Ponzi games

By issuing tax-exempt bonds, the government can incur debt and never pay back any principal or interest, even if the economy without public debt evolves on a dynamically efficient growth path. The welfare effects of such a Ponzi type borrowing scheme are mixed. The current young will unambiguously benefit. Depending on preferences and the aggregate technology, a finite number of subsequent generations may also benefit. However, the welfare of all generations thereafter will be lower than in the economy without public debt.     

Factor-biased public capital and private capital crowding out

This paper studies the dynamic effects of public investment on private capital accumulation in a general equilibrium macroeconomic model of a small open economy with factor-biased public capital. I show that public investment induces rather complex private capital dynamics—falling in the short and in the long run, but potentially increasing along transition—if public capital augments private capital and private inputs are gross complements in production. Whether private investment is crowded in or out during transition critically depends on parameters that are empirically hard to measure, such as the labor supply elasticity and the elasticity of substitution between private inputs—a small increase in the latter from 0.5 to 0.6, for instance, turns a totally negative transitional effect into a predominantly positive one. These results help rationalize the lack of empirical consensus on the relationship between public and private investment.     

财政政策的供给效应与经济发展

本文分析了发展中国家公共投资对私人资本积累的动态响应。针对公共资本的拥挤性特征 ,同时考虑财政投资可能引起的风险。在不考虑公共投资风险的分权经济中 ,由于公共资本和私人资本都处于短缺状态 ,企业争夺拥挤性公共资本而扩张私人资本的投资行为虽然使经济超常增长 ,但是存在过度投资和过度拥挤。在集中优化模型中 ,如果考虑到公共投资的风险 ,政府通过税收方式弥补公共投资风险 ,同时将企业投资产生的拥挤效应内部化 ,就能消除企业的过度投资和过度拥挤现象 ,使经济保持合理持续的增长。对中国这样的发展中国家 ,需要重视财政的供给效应 ,在经济起飞初期保证一定数量的政府资本性支出是必要的 ,但随着经济的不断发展和政府资本性支出累积的风险增加 ,财政转型十分必要。     

Optimal taxation and discount rate for public investment in a growth setting

This paper studies the optimal policy of a government which maximizes intertemporal social welfare using such instruments as taxes on interest income and wages, and debt in conjunction with public investment. In doing so, it has to face a decentralized economy where in each generation individuals and firms are free to maximize their own objectives subject to their own private constraints. The welfare function is a sum of discounted generational utilities and its maximization is handled by using dynamic programming. From the first order conditions so derived, it appears that an optimal policy of taxation and public capital accumulation is that which sets the tax rates according to Ramsey's optimal taxation structure and which equates the rate of return on public investment to the rate of social time preference.     

Why is the public sector more labor-intensive? A distortionary tax argument

Government-run entities are often more labor-intensive than private companies, even with identical production technologies. This need not imply slack in the public sector, but may reflect a wage tax advantage, stemming from the fact that government entities (partly) pay their taxes to themselves. A tax-induced cost advantage of public production precludes production efficiency and reduces welfare when labor supply is inelastic. With an elastic labor supply, a wage tax advantage of the public sector may improve welfare if it allows for a higher net wage.      

Chasing votes with the public budget

This paper examines the distribution of public resources by an incumbent seeking re-election. I present a model to explain the behavior of an incumbent redistributing public goods and cash transfers. According to the model, politicians use the government budget as a portfolio for electoral investment and diversify expenditure in order to target different groups of voters at the same time. I construct a unique data set of the promises made by the president of Colombia from 2002 to 2010 to municipalities throughout the country's various regions. The empirical results show some evidence that promises of cash transfers targeted swing voters, promises of public goods simultaneously targeted both core and swing municipalities, while opposition municipalities received few promises of cash transfers and public goods, which is consistent with the prediction of the model.     

Local governance and public goods provision in rural China

In developing countries, identifying the most effective community-level governance mode is a key issue in rural development; therefore, empirical evaluation of these different modes is desperately needed. Since the 1980s, tens of thousands of villages in rural China have held local government elections, providing a good opportunity to investigate the effect of democratization on the level of public goods provision. Using a recent village survey conducted over a significant period of time, this article compares two different governance modes. It finds that elections affect little on the size of revenue but significantly shift the distribution of taxation from individuals to enterprises if possible. However, privatization has made taxation or levies on rural enterprises more difficult. It also shows that elections and power sharing are conducive to improve the allocation of public expenditures.     

A dynamic general equilibrium model for public R&D investment in Taiwan

In terms of economic development policies, public research and development (R&D) investment may be one of the most critical and useful tools in Taiwan, having frequently played a role in leading related overall investment in Taiwan. Although the impact channels of R&D investment are varied and complex, its benefits in terms of the development of human capital, industrial productivity, and basic research are clear. With the rapid growth of the private sector in the Taiwan economy, it is, however, debatable whether the government should continue to use the public financial budget to invest in R&D. By using a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model to simulate the impact of public R&D investment on the economy in Taiwan, the empirical evidence of the present paper is that public R&D investment gives rise to different short-term and medium-term impacts on real GDP that are mostly felt in the third or fourth years of their implementation among different industries. These impacts then gradually converge back to equilibrium in the long run. Public R&D investment boosts the technology of high-tech industries and increases exports, but it also crowds out the output of primary industries. Although the public R&D investment has a positive effect on the real wage, its effect on inflation should not be overlooked. Because of the pros and cons surrounding the impact of public R&D investment on industries and the economy, the study provided by the present paper can serve as valuable reference not only to decision-makers in government agencies but also to academic researchers.     

Fiscal rules and the intergenerational welfare effects of public investment

A common argument against balanced-budget fiscal rules has it that the costs of durable public capital fall entirely on current generations while its benefits also accrue to future generations. This paper proposes an additional argument whereby balanced-budget rules imply uneven welfare effects of public investment across generations. Using an overlapping generations model of a small open economy, I show that, when subject to a balanced-budget constraint, public investment causes a negative financial wealth effect on current generations. Numerical simulations of the model show that, in terms of welfare, this negative financial wealth effect more than offsets the productivity gains of higher public investment spending, leaving current generations worse-off. A golden rule exempting net public investment from the balanced-budget requirement overturns this effect and allows for welfare gains to both current and future generations. Allowing for debt-financing may thus be necessary to ensure public support for efficient increases in public investment spending.     

Corruption governance and its dynamic stability based on a three-party evolutionary game with the government,the public,and public officials

The current state of corruption in China is still worrisome. Corruption among public officials depends not only on their subjective will, but also on the success rate of government investigations and public whistleblowing. Based on the evolutionary game theory, this study constructs an evolutionary game model with the government, the people, and public officials and solves the dynamic model. The authors also provide a numerical simulation of the proposed model to confirm theoretical predictions. The results reveal that when the government’s success rate reaches a certain threshold, public officials will trend to a strategy of no bribery, and at this threshold, raising the cost of bribing public officials can quickly prevent them from corruption. At the equilibrium, the public will trend toward a strategy of no whistleblowing. The findings of this study are of great significance to the current anti-corruption debate in China.     

Private finance for public goods: social impact bonds

Social impact bonds (SIBs) attract private investment to social programs by paying a market rate of return if predefined outcome targets are met. SIBs monetize benefits of social interventions and tie pay to performance, limiting governmental control once the contract is designed. Despite policy enthusiasm across the globe, SIBs have failed to attract private market investors without substantial additional guarantees. SIBs raise questions about government’s ability to ensure broader public values. Using literature on contracting, performance management, and public private partnerships, this exploratory analysis focuses on institutional design, transaction costs, and performance measurement, outlining the opportunities and concerns SIBs present.     

Government size,composition of public spending and economic growth in Brazil

The performance of the fiscal policy is largely affected by the relationship between government size, composition of public spending and economic growth. We use a theoretical framework to find optimal relations among these variables and confront them with a panel data for the Brazilian states. Private capital and government spending are substitute inputs in production as the Brazilian states require provision of public spending to fill gaps in the underdeveloped private sector. Public investment and current government expenditures are combined in fixed ratios in the overall government spending due to strong rigidity of the public budget. The optimal share of public investment is considerably lower than current expenditures, as occurs in developing countries characterized by low economic dynamism. Finally, the average tax burden from the data is below the estimated optimal level, meaning that there is space for increasing tax rate without harming economic growth for some Brazilian states.     

地方政府性债务治理与上市企业投融资*——基于我国247座城市的初步证据

本文利用中国社科院披露的我国247座城市地方政府性债务对金融稳定影响的评价指数,分析了地方政府性债务治理对上市企业债务融资与资本性投资效率的影响及其传导机理。研究发现,与地方政府性债务治理较好地区相比,处于地方政府性债务治理较差地区的地方政府控股国企,其杠杆率均显著较高,但企业资本性投资效率却显著较低,企业产能过剩的财务特征十分明显。这表明,地方政府性债务治理会显著影响微观企业的投融资,并且地方政府性债务治理越差,透过政府对经济活动的控制或干预,通过预算外举债,政府“杠杆”有转化为企业“杠杆”的风险。本文明确了“去杠杆”究竟应去谁的“杠杆”问题,对理解地方政府性债务治理转变为“内涵型”经济增长的微观基础具有重要的理论和现实意义。     

长期经济增长中的公共投资政策--包含一般拥挤性公共基础设施资本存量的动态经济增长模型

本文通过建立理论模型 ,系统分析了公共基础设施资本促进长期经济增长的动力机制 ,揭示了公共投资政策与经济增长的关系。第一个模型是包含外生公共基础设施资本的动态模型。所得结果是 ,无论是纯公共性还是拥挤性的外生公共基础设施资本 ,都能够提高长期经济增长率。第二个模型是包含由公共投资形成的内生公共基础设施资本的动态模型。此模型假定公共基础设施资本由政府通过征税而进行公共投资形成 ,所得结果是 ,如果基础设施资本为纯公共性质 ,就能产生恒定的内生增长 ;如果基础设施资本为拥挤性质 ,则虽然不能产生恒定的内生增长 ,但能减缓增长率的递减 ,从而提高长期经济增长率。模型的结论表明 ,公共投资政策的研究重点不应当是政策的短期逆周期调节的效果 ,而应当是其推进长期经济增长的作用。本文的结论不仅能够解释经济增长的典型事实 ,而且可以为研究我国公共投资、积极财政、城市化战略、支持不发达地区发展以及环境保护等重大政策提供理论依据和分析方法