Demand for area crop insurance among litchi producers in northern Vietnam

This study examines the need for crop insurance for litchi production in northern Vietnam and how farmers might participate in such a program. Hypothetical insurance programs were developed which proposed all‐risk coverage based on area yields. This coverage was offered to farmers to determine both their interest in the program and how insurance features and farmer characteristics affected their decision to buy insurance. Farmers were also surveyed regarding their production practices, price and yield expectations, and financial and personal characteristics. Even before considering other program costs and government budget constraints, there is not a strong case for establishing a crop insurance program here. Results indicate that while farmer participation would be significant, crop insurance is not needed to achieve policy goals like raising farmer income or guaranteeing subsistence levels of income. Crop insurance is not needed to promote litchi production, which is already expanding rapidly due to its high profitability relative to other farm enterprises. In their choice of coverages, farmers preferred higher yield guarantee levels and lower indemnity prices. Estimated premiums were quite low when expressed as a percent of expected revenue, and farmers were not responsive to changes in premiums. Econometric analysis indicated that high income farmers were more likely to participate, but other farmer characteristics seemed to matter little. Anecdotal evidence suggested that farmers believed the expected area yields used to set insurance coverage levels were too low. Because litchi productivity varies significantly by tree age and the litchi planted area is expanding rapidly, determining appropriate values for expected area yields and insurance coverage levels appeared to be the biggest challenge in program design. It is hypothesized that additional farmer education about the relationship between area and farm yields and other aspects of area insurance could improve such a program's operation. Published by Elsevier Science B.V.     

A Comparative Evaluation of Yield Risk Reductions with Alternative Crop Insurance Programs in Manitoba

Three crop insurance programs are evaluated in terms of their effectiveness of yield risk reductions for 371 Manitoba farms. The examination is first conducted with a proposed index method, with which the relative yield risk reduction magnitude is calculated and compared for each farm under each alternative program. The generalized stochastic dominance (GSD) methodology is also used to provide an alternative analytical framework in analyzing producers’relative preferences among those alternatives by comparing the net yield distributions generated by each program for each farm. The results suggest that, given an actuarially sound basis, the filly individualized crop insurance (FI) program is the most favorable choice for risk-averse producers. The area coverage and individual indemnity program (IA) is generally the second best option. The full area crop insurance program (FA) is least preferred by risk-averse farmers.     

Constrained Efficient Contracts for Area Yield Crop Insurance

With area yield crop insurance, indemnification occurs when area yield falls below a yield trigger that is chosen by the producer. The maximum value for this yield trigger is generally restricted (e.g., 80% of the long term area average yield). The impact of this trigger constraint on the optimal design of an area yield insurance contract is examined. Within the constrained efficient contract, indemnities consist of both a lump sum payment and a payment that is proportional to the yield shortfall. Because lump sum payments may not be feasible to implement, efficiency-enhancing modifications to standard contracts are also proposed.     

DISTRIBUTIONS OF INDEMNITIES FOR CROP-INSURANCE PLANS: WITH APPLICATION TO GRAIN CROPS IN NEW SOUTH WALES

A review of crop-insurance schemes is followed by a discussion of a guaranteed-yield, crop-insurance plan. General formulae for the distribution function and mathematical expectation of indemnities for the insurance plan are presented in terms of the distribution of crop yields. Three special cases are considered in which the original yields, the square root of yields, and the logarithm of yields are normally distributed. The insurance plan is applied on a regional basis for wheat and sorghum production in N.S.W. Given distributional information on the crops obtained from a simulation model, expected indemnities are calculated for four different insurance plans.     

PREMIUM RATEMAKING IN AN ALL RISK CROP INSURANCE PROGRAM1

Fluctuation in farm incomes resulting from variation in crop yield is one of the most significant features in agriculture. Crop insurance is a feasible method by which the farmer can protect his income and his investment from the disastrous effects of crop losses due to natural hazards. This study has attempted to cover two parts. First, it has examined the most important-factors influencing crop yields in connection with the premium rate scheme (i.e. the long-run average yield and the level of coverage). These factors include resource inputs, technology, weather, and stochastic variable. Second, it has developed a refined method of approximating the premium rate. The data used in testing normality were based on the Manitoba Crop Insurance Corporation's annual yield survey covering the years 1916 to 1964. The test shows that none of the annual yield distributions within the area surveyed was normally distributed, revealing that a cartful and exact delineation of a crop risk area is necessary. The findings also show that the cyclical pattern of weather and the upward trend in crop production due to technology were evidently important for the adjustment of the level of coverage and premium rate over time. Additional research relating the effects of weather and technology on crop yields would help to establish a more realistic insurance program. Other aspects should not be overlooked. These include (a) other possible levels besides the existing level of coverage and (b) a livestock or a combined crop-livestock insurance program along with the crop insurance program. The purpose of these additional aspects is to provide farmers with a fuller measure of protection.     

An Evaluation of the Actuarial structure of manitoba crop Insurance Program and its Implications

Very little research has been done in evaluating the basic principles and assumptions of the actuarial structure for premium ratemaking in crop insurance programs. Therefore, the objectives of this study are: (a) to examine the Pearson probability distribution of actual crop yields as compared with an application of normal-curve theory to crop yields as compared with an application of normal-curve theory to crop yield distributions and in turn to crop insurance ratemaking which was suggested by Botts and Boles in 1958 [1]; (b) to evaluate the pure premium rates derived from estimated Pearson probability distributions for wheat yields in 14 crop districts of the province of Manitoba; and to establish an experience rating system for the crop insurance program based upon the estimated Pearson distribution of actual crop yields on the individual farm.     

Climate and agricultural risk: measuring the effect of ENSO on U.S. crop insurance

Predictive models of climatic phenomena can aid in insurance program design and decision making. Extreme weather outcomes have been linked to the El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO), which globally impacts agricultural production. This study demonstrates that extreme ENSO events alter cotton yield distributions in the Southeastern United States. These impacts translate into economically meaningful effects on crop insurance premium rates. Commercial insurers can use publicly available information to determine if government‐set premium rates are mispriced, and in turn extract economic rents via the federally mandated Standard Reinsurance Agreement. By ceding underpriced policies in El Niño and La Niña years, we find that private insurance companies can reduce paid indemnities by 10–15% on average.     

Belief in Disaster Relief and the Demand for a Public–Private Insurance Program

Producers' demand for a public–private crop insurance program in the Netherlands is surveyed. A novel aspect was the inclusion of the producer's belief in disaster relief. Despite emphatic assertions that future governmental involvement would only be directed at a hypothetical insurance program, the participation decision was negatively and significantly associated with the producer's belief about the availability of disaster relief in the future. So, if governments continue to provide (free) ad hoc disaster relief, an important incentive to participate would be severely undermined. However, the conditional decision about the amount was not affected.     

Managing basis risk with multiscale index insurance

Agricultural index insurance indemnifies a farmer against losses based on an index that is correlated with, but not identical to, her or his individual outcomes. In practice, the level of correlation may be modest, exposing insured farmers to residual, basis risk. In this article, we study the impact of basis risk on the demand for index insurance under risk and compound risk aversion. We simulate the impact of basis risk on the demand for index insurance by Malian cotton farmers using data from field experiments that reveal the distributions of risk and compound risk aversion. The analysis shows that compound risk aversion depresses demand for a conventional index insurance contract some 13 percentage points below what would be predicted based on risk aversion alone. We then analyze an innovative multiscale index insurance contract that reduces basis risk relative to conventional, single‐scale index insurance contract. Simulations indicate that demand for this multiscale contract would be some 40% higher than the demand for an equivalently priced conventional contract in the population of Malian cotton farmers. Finally, we report and discuss the actual uptake of a multiscale contract introduced in Mali.     

THE ECONOMICS OF INSURING CROPS AGAINST DROUGHT

The necessary conditions for the existence of a financially viable crop insurance scheme against drought are examined. A supply and demand model for crop insurance is developed which identifies the parameters that are critical to the efficiency of such a scheme. The values of these parameters are estimated by using data from the Australian wheat industry. It is found that crop insurance against drought would appear to be unattractive from an efficiency point of view.     

Effects of subsidized crop insurance on crop choices

This study focuses on how subsidized crop insurance affects crop choices. Crop insurance may change farm investments by reducing risks and providing subsidies. First, actuarially fair insurance reduces risks in crop production and marketing, holding the expected return constant. Second, insurance subsidies encourage farms to purchase crop insurance, which increases the expected return to insured risky crops. Farms also have many self‐insurance mechanisms such as crop diversification or working off the farm. We derive conditions under which (1) unsubsidized and actuarially fair crop insurance or (2) insurance premium subsidies lead to more investment in a risky higher return crop. We then examine the role of self‐insurance for these conditions. The impact of premium subsidies is decomposed into a direct profit effect and an indirect coverage effect. These effects are explained by substitutions between market insurance and self‐insurance and between a risky crop and a safe crop. We discuss each effect as a combination of subsidy and risk effects. Numerical illustrations show that an insurance subsidy has a larger impact on risky crop investments compared to that of an input subsidy when farms are more risk‐averse and have high costs of self‐insurance. The framework provides a novel way to evaluate subsidized crop insurance programs.     

Estimating the Prevalence and Cost of Yield-Switching Fraud in the Federal Crop Insurance Program

Producers who manipulate and switch their reported crop-yields between separately insured units can increase their insurance indemnities substantially. A statistical model that identifies potential yield switching is developed. The unrestricted statistical model is singular and is identified by imposing a mixture of system-estimable and system-nonestimable restrictions. Lower bound estimates of yield-switching fraud incidence and costs are obtained by applying the model to 207,067 multiple unit producers who purchased crop insurance in 1998.     

U.S. Farm Safety Nets and the 2000 Agricultural Risk Protection Act

Although crop insurance programs have been an important part of U.S. agricultural policy since the 1930s, the "safety net" matra has taken on new relevance and importance in recent policy deliberations and rhetoric. This paper contains a non technical review of issues underlying the safety net concept in U.S. agricultural policy. We outline recent changes in U.S. crop insurance programs and review provisions of the 2000 Agricultural Risk Protection Act (ARPA), which had a significant impact on U.S. risk management programs by expanding crop and revenue insurance subsidies and stimulating new product development. A simple empirical analysis of how these changes may have affected program participation is considered. We then outline points relevant to 2002 Farm Bill deliberations. As is pointed out, the safety net concept seems pervasive to all policy discussions. Countercylical payments, even when provided on an ad hoc basis, may distort production and trade conditions.     

Warming temperatures will likely induce higher premium rates and government outlays for the U.S. crop insurance program

Likely climate change impacts include damages to agricultural production resulting from increased exposure to extreme heat. Considerable uncertainty remains regarding impacts on crop insurance programs. We utilize a panel of U.S. corn yield data to predict the effect of warming temperatures on the mean and variance of yields, as well as crop insurance premium rates and producer subsidies. While we focus on corn, we demonstrate that the subsidy impacts are likely to carry over to other major program crops. We find that warming decreases mean yields and increases yield risk on average, which results in higher premium rates. Under a 1°C warming scenario, we find that premium rates at the 90% coverage level will increase by 39% on average; however, there is considerable statistical uncertainty around this average as the 95% confidence interval spans from 22% to 61%. We also find evidence of extensive cross‐sectional differences as the county‐level rate impacts range from a 10% reduction to a 63% increase. Results indicate that exposure to extreme heat and changes in the coefficient of variation are large drivers of the impacts. Under the 1°C warming scenario, we find that annual subsidy payments for the crop insurance program could increase by as much as $1.5 billion, representing a 22% increase relative to current levels. This estimate increases to 3.7 billion (57%) under a 2°C warming scenario. Our results correspond to a very specific counterfactual: the marginal effect of warming temperatures under current technology, production, and crop insurance enrollments. These impacts are shown to be smaller than the forecasted impacts under a commonly used end‐of‐century general circulation model for even the most optimistic CO₂ emissions projection.     

Coping with systemic risk in index‐based crop insurance

The implementation of index‐based crop insurance is often impeded by the existence of systemic risk of insured losses. We assess the effectiveness of two strategies for coping with systemic risk: regional diversification and securitization with catastrophe (CAT) bonds. The analysis is conducted in an equilibrium pricing framework which allows the optimal price of the insurance and the number of traded contracts to be determined. We also explore the role of basis risk and risk aversion of market agents. The model is applied to a hypothetical area yield insurance for rice producers in northeast China. If yields in two regions are positively correlated, we find that enlarging the insured area leads to higher insurance premiums. Unless capital market investors are very risk averse, a CAT bond written on an area yield index outperforms regional diversification in terms of certainty equivalents of both farmers and insurers.     

Demand for Crop Insurance in Developing Countries: New Evidence from India

Determining farmers’ real demand for crop insurance is difficult, especially in developing countries, where there is a lack of formal financial sector integration and a high reliance on informal risk mitigation options. We provide some new estimates of farmers’ willingness‐to‐pay for insurance in the context of a large‐scale subsidised programme in India. We conducted a discrete choice experiment with agricultural households across four states in India, enabling us to estimate preferences for specific insurance policy attributes such as coverage period, method of loss assessment, timing of indemnity payments and the cost of insurance. Our results suggest that farmers do value crop insurance under certain conditions and some are willing to pay a premium for such coverage in excess of the subsidised rates they are currently required to pay under this programme. In particular, farmers value the assurances that they will receive timely payouts when they incur losses, and may not have a strong preference for the method with which losses are assessed. On the other hand, farmers are quite sensitive to coverage periods. Our baseline assessment shows that when optimised to farmer requirements, there can be a sizeable demand for crop insurance by developing country farmers.     

Crop Insurance Under Catastrophic Risk

We develop a new insurance model that shows how catastrophic risk affects the nature and existence of a crop insurance market equilibrium. A reservation preference level is used to characterize long-run equilibrium when catastrophic risk makes insurance companies risk responsive. Catastrophic risk is shown to increase premiums, reduce farmer coverage levels and, under some conditions, lead to a complete breakdown of the crop insurance market. Reinsurance can help facilitate an equilibrium and/or increase participation, particularly if the reinsurance is subsidized. The analysis has important implications for the design and management of crop insurance and reinsurance programs.     

Productivity,credit, risk,and the demand for weather index insurance in smallholder agriculture in Ethiopia

The article explores the relationship between fertilizer use and the demand for weather index insurance (WII) among smallholder farmers in Ethiopia. We examine whether fertilizer use is profitable under current smallholder production conditions, whether risk‐related factors affect fertilizer use, and we estimate the returns to inputs in the agricultural production function in the absence of insurance. We then study how these primitives of agricultural production functions relate to insurance demand. The study compares a survey‐based estimate of willingness to pay with actual uptake for the weather insurance, finding the stated and actual demand to be almost completely uncorrelated. While those with high marginal returns to inputs say they would purchase insurance, only those with low marginal returns actually do, consistent with the stated purpose of the product as input insurance. Insurance demand proves to be highly responsive to the existence and amount of randomly allocated insurance vouchers.     

Demand for temperature and rainfall index insurance in India

Weather index insurance has been attracting considerable attention from academics and policymakers. This study investigates the demand for two types of index insurance sold in India: temperature index insurance for dry season and rainfall index insurance for subsequent monsoon season. Using data from randomized subsidy experiments, we separate purchase and quantity decisions and investigate how demand for rainfall insurance is correlated with demand for temperature insurance sold in the previous season. We find that the price (premium) does not influence purchase decisions per se but does significantly influence quantity decisions. The quantity demanded is less price‐sensitive for subsequent rainfall insurance than it is for temperature insurance. We also find that purchasers of temperature insurance tend to buy rainfall insurance more often than nonpurchasers do. However, a one‐time subsidy does not influence on subsequent demand, suggesting no price‐anchoring effect.     

Evaluating the Potential of Index Insurance Schemes to Reduce Crop Yield Risk in an Arid Region

We evaluate yield risk reduction through weather index, area yield index and farm yield insurance contracts for wheat farms in Kazakhstan by employing data from 1980 to 2002. We use the usual mean variance (MV) approach and also a second‐degree stochastic dominance (SSD) criterion. While MV is not necessarily consistent with the expected utility (EU) theory, SSD results only in a minimum but EU‐consistent benefit from insuring. Differences in the estimation results for both approaches underline the advantage of applying both criteria to analyse the risk‐reducing potential of crop insurance. Bootstrapping results show that none of the analysed insurance schemes provides statistically significant risk reduction for every single farm. In addition, weather‐based index insurance is found to provide less risk reduction than area yield insurance based on the rayon (county) yield. Moreover, rayon yield index insurance can reduce yield risk more effectively for Kazakhstan's wheat producers than farm yield insurance with a low strike yield.