WHY FOREIGN OWNERSHIP MAY BE GOOD FOR YOU*

We develop a two‐country model with heterogeneous producers and rent‐sharing at the firm level. We identify two sources of a multinational wage premium: A composition effect because multinational firms are more productive, make higher profits, and pay higher wages, and a firm‐level wage effect, because a firm makes higher global profits and thus pays higher wages in its home market when becoming multinational. With two identical countries, the wage premium is fully explained by firm characteristics. Allowing for technology differences between countries, a residual wage premium exists in the technologically backward country but not in the advanced country.     

TRAINING, JOB SECURITY AND INCENTIVE WAGES

This paper considers the optimal level of firm‐specific training by taking into account the positive effect of training on the expected duration of workers' current employment. In the framework of an efficiency wage model, a short expected job tenure represents a disamenity that reduces the penalty from shirking. As this disamenity increases, workers have an incentive to continue providing a positive level of effort only if they are compensated by a higher wage. We endogenize the employment separation rate by introducing firm‐specific training. Firm‐specific training creates a rent that is lost if the worker is separated from the firm. As a result, the firm will be more reluctant to fire its trained workforce in a recession. This implies that firm‐specific training can decrease current wages because it represents a commitment to lower future labour turnover.     

A Union-bashing Model of Inflation Targeting

This paper shows that in an open two‐sector economy, centralization of wage setting may be important in determining the employment (and welfare) effects of different monetary targets. By disciplining unions in the sectors open to international trade, exchange rate targeting yields higher employment than inflation targeting when wage‐setting is more centralized in the open sector than in the shielded sector. When wage‐setting centralization is higher in the shielded sector, we show that general price‐level inflation targeting, while better than exchange rate targeting, is inferior to an inflation target that focuses more heavily on shielded sector prices.     

The Macroeconomic Consequences of Reciprocity in Labor Relations*

We develop and analyze a structural model of efficiency wages founded on reciprocity. Workers are assumed to face an explicit trade‐off between the disutility of providing effort and the psychological benefit of reciprocating the gift of a wage offer above some reference level. The model provides a rationale for rent sharing—a feature that is very much present in the data but absent from previous formulations of the efficiency wage hypothesis. This firm‐internal perspective on efficiency wages has potentially important macroeconomic consequences: rent‐sharing considerations promote wage rigidity, internal amplification and differential responses to technology and demand shocks.     

Profit Sharing and Outsourcing under Labor Market Imperfection

When the wage rate is set by the labor union, profit sharing and outsourcing is combined in this paper to analyze how the implementation of profit sharing affects individual effort and wage and thus outsourcing. The findings show that profit sharing and wage have an individual effort‐augmenting effect and therefore increase productivity. It is also found that the wage effect of profit sharing in general is ambiguous. There is a wage decreasing substitution effect, but in contrast, there is a wage increasing effect via labor demand elasticity and effort so that outsourcing and employment effects are also ambiguous. Furthermore, it is shown under which condition a firm will implement a profit sharing scheme.     

Employment and Wages in the Private and Local Government Sectors in a Centralized Fiscal System

This paper discusses the interaction between the local government and private sector in an institutional context consistent with a centralized fiscal system. Under decentralized wage setting in the private sector, the effects of shocks in the two sectors depend on whether private and local public goods are substitutes or complements in the union utility function. Higher wage markup in the local government sector unambiguously decreases government output while the effect on private sector employment is ambiguous. Higher income taxes have ambiguous effects on local government output. Shocks in the private sector can be reinforced through feedback effects from the local government sector. A shift from decentralized to centralized wage setting in the private sector reduces wages and increases employment in both sectors.     

Public firms' merger,employment, and welfare in developing countries: A general equilibrium analysis

This paper examines the effect of a merger of state‐owned firms on wage gap, employment, and social welfare in a general equilibrium setting. For a developing economy with state‐owned firms in the urban sector, a merger via a reduction in the number of the urban state‐owned firms can reduce the cost of capital. It then lowers the skilled wage rate through the factor‐substitution effect, while it raises the unskilled wage by the inflow of capital to the rural sector and hence lowers urban unemployment. In addition, the reduction in the number of the urban state‐owned firms can yield a scale effect to the firms. The beneficial effects on higher urban output and less urban unemployment can improve social welfare of the developing economy.     

Unfair incentives: A behavioural note on sharecropping

We conducted a laboratory‐in‐the‐field experiment with real‐life tenants in Ethiopia to test the incentive effects of fixed wage, sharecropping, fixed rent, and ownership contracts. The experimental task resembles a common process in agricultural production. The sharecropping contract is a piece rate scheme framed as a profit‐sharing agreement. Sharecropping output was about 12 percent smaller than the fixed rent output. Surprisingly, it is statistically indistinguishable from the fixed wage output, despite substantial piece rates. This effect is driven by real‐life sharecroppers. Their sharecropping output was smaller than that of non‐sharecroppers, especially in a region where a controversial land reform took place. We argue that our subjects dislike sharecropping contracts because of the unfair profit sharing and the disputed allocation of land. Fairness concerns, therefore, may be another impediment to efficiency under the sharecropping contract.     

Entry Threats and Inefficiency in ‘Efficient Bargaining’

We study limit pricing in a model of entry with asymmetric information, where the incumbent firm's wage is endogenously determined through ‘efficient bargaining’ with its union. In the presence of entry threat, the incumbent firm‐union pair may face a conflict between rent sharing and transmitting its cost information. When the wage is not observable to outsiders and employment is the only signalling instrument, over‐employment features in all entry deterring contracts. When the wage is also observable, information transmission becomes easier. Most of the time, then, but not always, the efficient contract deters (induces) entry against the low (high) cost incumbent.     

Analyzing the effect of advanced agriculture development policy

This paper broadens the scope of current theoretical studies, divides rural agriculture into two sectors—advanced and traditional, and takes into consideration the land factor and the urban informal sector. Under the assumption that wages in the advanced agricultural sector are higher than in the traditional agricultural sector, this paper analyzes the effect of policies to promote advanced agricultural development with the comparative static method. The main conclusions of this paper are: wage subsidization of the advanced agricultural sector, in addition to having the same economic impact as interest subsidies on the advanced agricultural sector, could also increase the land employment in the advanced agricultural sector and reduce that in the traditional agricultural sector. Therefore, the effect of wage subsidizing policies is stronger than that of interest subsidies, while land rent subsidies for the advanced agricultural sector have the same economic effect as wage subsidies.     

FDI,Industry Heterogeneity and Employment Elasticity in China

We investigate the different impacts of foreign direct investment (FDI) on employment elasticity with China's firm level data from 1998 to 2007. Our analysis shows that the inclusion of FDI does significantly affect firms' employment elasticity when facing wage, capital and output shocks. These effects vary dramatically across industries with different factor intensities and export status. Specifically, we find that non‐exporters with FDI tend to increase employment elasticity more than exporters when wage, capital input or output changes. However, FDI firms that are engaging in labor‐intensive production tend to have larger output and capital input elasticity of employment while smaller wage elasticity of employment. Our findings help to explain the contradicting results in existing literature and provide important references for China's policy makers to design proper industry policies towards FDI.     

Flexible and Committed Profit Sharing with Wage Bargaining: Implications for Equilibrium Unemployment

We analyze the relationship between profit sharing, employee effort, wage formation and unemployment under different relative timings of the wage and profit sharing decisions. The optimal profit share under commitment exceeds that under flexibility, because through a profit share commitment the firm can induce wage moderation. The negotiated profit sharing depends positively on the bargaining power of trade union and it has both effort-enhancing and wage-moderating effects. Higher profit sharing is shown to reduce equilibrium unemployment under ``sufficiently rigid' labor market institutions, but it can harm employment when labor market ``rigidities' are ``small enough'.     

Restructuring in privatised firms: A Statis approach

We analyse the dynamics and evolution of the corporate restructuring process in the Portuguese banking sector, where 10 banks were privatised during the period 1989–1996. We apply a novel methodological approach in this context, using a multidimensional measure of restructuring that links product and labour market variables. We find evidence of considerable heterogeneity in the restructuring process, where firms adjust at different speeds and intensities. We also find that the wage level is by far the firm attribute that changed more, which is shown to reflect substantial changes in terms of composition, and not size, of the workforce. Our empirical evidence also suggests that privatisation is associated with a higher level of rent sharing.     

A contribution to the public–private wage inequality debate

This paper studies the public–private wage inequality in Romania. Although public sector employment is perceived as safer and offering more benefits, we find that in Romania it also offers higher wages, after controlling for experience, education and gender. This result is at odds with the negative premium uncovered in other transition economies. The public–private wage premium is increasing across the wage distribution, leading to more inequality in the public sector. Decomposing the wage premium into the effect of personal characteristics, coefficients and residuals, we show that only about half of this premium can be attributed to personal characteristics, especially in the top half of the wage distribution. We also find that the number of other public sector employees in the family is a significant driver of public sector employment, facilitating access to jobs. However, the effects of self‐selection are negligible, the premium being still positive and significant after controlling for this.     

Unionization,international integration,and selection

Abstract We study how unionization affects competitive selection between heterogeneous firms when wage negotiations can occur at the firm or at the profit‐centre level. With productivity specific wages, an increase in union power has: (i) a selection‐softening; (ii) a counter‐competitive; (iii) a wage‐inequality; and (iv) a variety effect. In a two‐country asymmetric setting, stronger unions soften competition for domestic firms and toughen it for exporters. With profit‐centre bargaining, we show how trade liberalization can affect wage inequality among identical workers both across firms (via its effects on competitive selection) and within firms (via wage discrimination across destination markets).     

Wage Inequality and Returns to Education in Turkey: A Quantile Regression Analysis

This paper investigates the male wage inequality and its evolution over the 1994–2002 period in Turkey by estimating Mincerian wage equations using ordinary least squares and quantile regression techniques. Male wage inequality is high in Turkey. While it declined at the lower end of the wage distribution it increased at the top end of wage distribution. Education contributed to higher wage inequality through both within and between dimensions. The within‐groups inequality increased and between‐groups inequality decreased over the study period. The latter factor may have dominated the former contributing to the observed decline in the male wage inequality over the 1994–2002. Further results are provided for the wage effects of experience, public sector employment, geographic location, firm size, industry of employment and their contribution to wage inequality. Recent increases in foreign direct investiment inflows, openness to trade and global technological developments are discussed as contributing factors to the recent rising within‐groups wage inequality.     

效率工资、租金分享与企业工资收入差距——基于第一次全国经济普查工业企业数据的实证研究

企业利润对工资差距的影响究竟来自效率工资还是来自租金分享,这是理论界和政策制定者共同关心的问题。文章利用2004年第一次全国经济普查数据实证分析发现:(1)企业利润是解释我国企业工资差距的重要因素,这主要由效率工资导致。(2)国有企业存在租金共享,但它不是通过企业利润实现的,而是利用行业垄断地位直接将职工高工资转化为企业成本实现的。(3)集体企业存在着租金共享。(4)外资企业也存在租金共享,但存在租金共享的外资企业同时具有更高的效率。(5)私营企业存在效率工资。与其他所有制企业不同的是,对私营企业而言,行业垄断不但不能提高反而会降低职工工资水平,或反过来说,产品市场竞争有利于提高职工工资水平。最后,文章针对性地给出了一些缩小企业工资差距的政策建议。     

A DYNAMIC MODEL OF TOURISM, EMPLOYMENT AND WELFARE: THE CASE OF HONG KONG

Abstract.  The present paper uses a dynamic open-economy model with wage indexation to examine the impact of tourism on employment and welfare. Both short-run and long-run situations are analysed. It is well known that tourism converts non-traded goods into tradable goods. An increase in the demand for a non-traded good raises its relative price, which results in an expansion of the non-traded sector at the expense of the traded goods sector. This output shift raises labour employment in the short run. However, in the long run, the higher relative price leads to higher wages, resulting in a negative impact on labour employment. If the output effect is dominant, the expansion in tourism raises employment and welfare. However, under realistic conditions tourism may lower both labour employment and welfare due to rising costs. These results are demonstrated by simulating a dynamic model for the case of Hong Kong.     

Wage and employment effects of a wage norm

Most transition countries used tax‐supported wage norms in the early 1990s, as a part of their market liberalization programmes. This article analyses how a firm‐level tax (or subsidy) on deviations from a pre‐set wage norm may promote employment by rotating the labour demand curve perceived by the workers’ union around the value of the norm. We derive the conditions under which it yields a positive employment effect. We test the effect of the norm on the wages on a sample of Polish firms in 1990 and 1991. The data support the role of the wage norm on the position of the perceived labour demand curve and the role of the tax rate on its slope.     

Operating efficiency and output insensitive employment contracts for capital management

Summary This paper considers a problem in which an agent is hired to manage a capital investment and subsequently receives private information regarding the productivity of the capital investment. The capital manager must decide whether to invest capital supplied by the firm (the principal), or to divert these investment funds to perquisite consumption. If the manager decides to invest, the manager must then select the level of operating efficiency (productivity) of the capital investment, this latter choice being unobservable and constrained by the (maximal) productivity of the investment. In this setting we demonstrate that the optimal employment contract, from the perspective of the firm hiring the manager, is the contract whichminimizes the dependence of the manager's compensation on firm output. This contract pays the manager a fixed wage whenever output from the investment exceeds the wage and provides the manager with all of the projects rents whenever output falls below this level. Thus, we provide a setting in which fixed wage contracts are the optimal incentive contract even when agents are risk neutral and contracts can be costlessly written on future output.We would like to thank the participants in the Princeton Economics and Finance Workshop and the Ohio State University Finance Workshop for their comments on an earlier draft of this paper. The second author gratefully acknowledges the research support of the Georgia State College of Business Administration Research Council.