Brotherhood of competition: Foreign Direct Investment and domestic mergers

We examine the effects of mergers on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), and on shaping national policies regarding FDI. In this work we develop a partial equilibrium model of an oligopolistic industry in which a number of domestic and foreign firms compete in the market for a homogeneous good in a host country. It is assumed that the number of foreign firms is endogenous and can be affected by the government policy in the host country. The government sets the policy (subsidies) to maximise social welfare. We allow domestic mergers. Our main results suggest that when the host country government imposes discriminatory lump-sum subsidy in favor of foreign firms, a merger of domestic firms will increase the number of FDI if the subsidy level is exogenous. With an endogenous level of subsidy, a merger of domestic firms will decrease (increase) the welfare if the domestic firms are more (less) efficient.     

Restrictions on Foreign Investments and the Relocation of Firms

We analyse why the Chinese government sets restrictions on foreign direct investment (FDI). We focus our analysis on the percentage of shares in relocated firms that the government allows to be foreign‐owned. The government's decision on this percentage depends on the entry cost, the number of firms that relocate and the weight of the consumer surplus in the objective function of the government. We show that by its choice of this percentage, the Chinese government may restrict or encourage FDI to its country. We also find that if the government may subsidise the fixed entry cost, it provides a subsidy only when the producer surplus has a greater weight than the consumer surplus in weighted welfare. In that case, the subsidy encourages relocation by both firms and permits the government to allow a lower percentage of shares to be foreign‐owned in relocated firms.     

A welfare analysis of unilateral trade and FDI liberalization

This paper uses a heterogeneous‐firms model to examine the pro‐competitive channel through which FDI affects national welfare. The model shows that the country from which FDI originates experiences a welfare gain following liberalization. However, a counterintuitive finding is that the welfare of the host country deteriorates. This is explained by the production relocation process that leads to an increase in the mass of domestic firms in the source country and a decrease in the host country. The model also confirms that unilateral trade liberalization brings a similar result even in the presence of bilateral FDI flows.     

TARIFF JUMPING FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT DECISION IN A QUALITY‐DIFFERENTIATED MARKET

Using a product differentiation model, this paper discusses the issue of transnational firms evading tariffs and investing directly in a host country (through foreign direct investment (FDI)). Where product quality is differentiated between foreign and host country firms and assuming a firm's quality requirement is a long‐term strategy and is not affected by a foreign firm's trade decision, we obtain the following findings. First, whether or not a host country firm produces high or low quality products, raising the quality requirement for foreign products will increase the possibility of a foreign firm choosing FDI instead of exporting a product to the host country. Second, raising the quality requirement for domestic products will lower the possibility of foreign firms choosing FDI without regard to the product's quality. Finally, given a competitor in the host country, in FDI, a foreign high‐quality product‐producing firm has an advantage over a low‐quality product‐producing firm. We also find that even when firms' quality decisions are affected by a foreign firm's trade decision, most of the above results will still hold.     

The Impact of Foreign Direct Investment on Home and Host Countries with Endogenous R&D

The paper analyzes the impact of FDI on home and host countries, when firms compete both in the choice of international strategy and in R&D. A two-country, two-firm model is used. The problem is structured as a three-stage game in which firms must decide: the mode of foreign expansion; how much to invest in R&D; how much to sell in each market. It is shown that in high-technology sectors a policy of attracting inward FDI may increase welfare in both the home and host countries. The effect on host-country welfare is found to be more beneficial if technological spillovers are national, instead of international, in scope.     

FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN A TWO‐TIER OLIGOPOLY: COORDINATION,VERTICAL INTEGRATION,AND WELFARE*

We study foreign direct investment (FDI) by two independent investors/entrants into a two‐tiered oligopolistic industry. An FDI subsidy at a single stage of production can be sufficient to resolve the coordination problem facing investors thereby inducing entry at both stages. However, due to linkage offsetting, FDI at both stages may yield lower domestic welfare than FDI at a single stage. Vertical integration not only solves the coordination problem, it also eliminates double marginalization. But since the integrated multinational does not sell the intermediate to local firms, its entry generates no vertical linkages and can yield lower welfare than FDI by independent firms.     

Competing for Foreign Direct Investment

The paper analyzes 'subsidy games' between countries in order to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) from a third country. The winner of this game results from the interaction of two factors, relative country size and employment gains from FDI: a large (or 'central') country is more likely to attract FDI, and so is a country with high unemployment. The subsidy equilibrium is compared with two alternative solutions: zero subsidies and first-best subsidies. It is shown that total welfare may be greater under subsidy competition than under zero subsidies: the gains from efficient location implied by subsidy competition may more than outweigh the losses from higher subsidies. Moreover, departing from subsidy competition to zero subsidies or to first-best subsidies (without side payments) implies a gain to one country and a loss to the other. This suggests that it may be difficult to reach a consensus to move away from the status quo of subsidy competition.     

Foreign direct investment and its impact on real wages: evidence from Turkish micro-level data

This paper analyzes the role of foreign direct investment (FDI) on wages, using Turkish firm-level data from 2003 to 2010, a period which coincides with significant FDI inflows both in manufacturing and service sector firms in the region. We explore the possibility of increased foreign presence translating into shifts in either labor demand or supply curves thereby resulting in changing the total wage bill or wage per worker in the host country. To empirically test this relationship we employ a dynamic specification of the wage equation. After addressing endogeneity concerns, the results reveal that foreign presence measured in terms of intra- and inter-sectoral linkages is related to higher wage bills in the host economy, hence strengthening the argument for attracting greater foreign investment to enhance labor welfare.     

INTERNATIONALIZATION STRATEGIES IN OLIGOPOLY WITH HETEROGENEOUS FIRMS

This paper examines the foreign direct investment (FDI) versus exports decision of foreign oligopolistic firms under cost heterogeneity. An additional motivation for firms to invest abroad is the technological sourcing via spillovers, which flow from the host more efficient firm to foreign less advantaged firms. For intermediate values of the set‐up costs associated with FDI entry, it is shown that foreign firms choose opposite entry strategies. An equilibrium where the less efficient foreign firm exports whereas the more efficient invests is more likely to happen when foreign firms become more heterogeneous, the larger the trade costs and not too big oligopolistic profitability. Interestingly, the opposite may also be an equilibrium thus finding that the more efficient firm does not choose to invest, a result that emphasizes the relevance of the strategic setting under consideration. The latter result identifies a market failure since welfare in the host market is higher when both firms undertake FDI; a finding that calls attention to how appropriate are host government policies towards internationalization strategies.     

Tax competition for foreign direct investments and the nature of the incumbent firm

We investigate tax/subsidy competition for foreign direct investments (FDI) between countries of different size when a domestic firm is the incumbent in the largest market and we study how the nature (public or private) of the incumbent firm affects policy competition. We show that, differently from the case of a private firm, the country hosting the incumbent always benefits from FDI if the domestic firm is a public welfare‐maximizing firm. We also show that the public firm acts as a disciplinary device for the foreign multinational that will always choose the efficient welfare‐maximizing location. An efficiency‐enhancing role of policy competition may then arise only when the domestic incumbent is a private firm, whereas tax competition is always wasteful in the presence of a public firm.     

Foreign direct investment,international trade,and firm heterogeneity

We present an asymmetric model with firm heterogeneity and foreign direct investment (FDI) from a developed country to a developing country. We found that the successful entry firms could be sorted from highest to lowest according to productivity as reimport firms, FDI firms, export firms, and domestic firms. We also found that FDI decreases (increases) the gross national income of the developed (developing) country, but it can either increase or decrease the world income according to the level of the relative propensity to spend. In addition, we demonstrated that FDI influences welfare through variations in average price, national income, and the number of types of goods.     

Foreign Direct Investment, Local Content Requirement, and Profit Taxation

We develop a partial equilibrium model of foreign direct investment (FDI) in which identical foreign firms locate themselves in a host country to compete in an oligopolistic market for a non-tradeable commodity. The host country, assumed to be small in the market for FDI, makes use of two instruments, viz., a profit tax and a local content requirement, to compete for FDI in the international market. We assume the existence of unemployment in the host country. The structure of optimal instruments and their relationship to the number, and the relative efficiency levels, of the domestic firms, are established     

外商技术转移、创新激励与东道国引资政策——走自主创新道路,我们能依靠外国技术吗？

文章在累积创新框架下建立一个附加拍卖的动态博弈模型,研究东道国企业利用外商技术转移实现技术升级的微观机制,以及东道国政府旨在改善社会福利的引资政策。研究后发现:对于核心技术,外商总有激励进行技术封锁;对于一般技术,外商愿意将其技术许可给东道国以赚取垄断利润;东道国企业只有坚持自主创新才能获得技术模仿的机会并最终突破外商对核心技术的封锁;若东道国政府能使外商将核心技术授权给本国企业,本国企业将绕过自主创新从而直接进行模仿创新,若不能有效控制外商技术转移方式但可对仅转移设备等"硬"核心技术的方式采取有效限制,可降低潜在技术模仿成本从而减少东道国激励本国厂商进行创新的补贴成本。最后,文章讨论了我国利用外资推动技术升级的方式。     

Welfare effects of competition for FDI between technologically asymmetric countries with varying trade costs

Given the traditional argument that host countries' excessive competition for FDI (foreign direct investment) deteriorates the host countries' welfare, this paper examines the impact of policy competition for FDI on social welfare considering varying trade costs. Based on a model where two technologically asymmetric countries compete for FDI, we determine an equilibrium where a multinational firm relocates to a less efficient country. Moreover, we demonstrate that the policy competition for FDI between less integrated economies might improve social welfare when the multinational firm relocates to a country with a lower technology and a less competitive market. Nonetheless, we show that the traditional argument can be true when the policy competition for FDI between highly integrated economies deteriorates host countries' welfare, as supported by the empirical evidences of moderated competition for FDI within EU member countries.     

Pollution Haven with Technological Externalities Arising from Foreign Direct Investment

This paper presents a two-stage game, in which in the first stage two multinational firms (MNFs) seeking pollution havens choose a location, that is, whether to export to or undertake FDI in the host country, and in the second stage, these two MNFs and a firm in the host country play a Cournot game. The MNFs’ location decisions are influenced by the fixed cost of FDI, the spillover of technologies to a foreign firm, and pollution emission standards in the host and home countries. There exist multiple equilibria in the location pattern because of the technology spillover accompanied by FDI. In addition, the analysis leads to the possibility of an equilibrium based on the Prisoners’ Dilemma. When the host country relaxes emission standards, the MNFs choose FDI, although their profits are higher if both choose to export instead. This provides a rationale for the FDI source country’s intervention to restrict the MNFs’ FDI according to the level of environmental regulation in the host country.     

Entry into a Foreign Market: Foreign Direct Investment versus Licensing

We compare foreign direct investment (FDI) and technology licensing as two modes of entry into a foreign market. While direct entry via FDI dissipates rents in the host country, opportunistic competition from a licensee may erode rents in the entrant's other markets. Since FDI increases competition in the host country while licensing stifles it. welfare is higher under FDI than under licensing.     

Vertical foreign direct investment: Make,buy, and sell

According to conventional wisdom, multinational enterprises (MNEs) undertake vertical FDI to take advantage of cross‐border factor cost differences and source inputs from abroad at better terms. However, recent empirical studies document many instances in which intrafirm trade between parent firms and their vertically related foreign affiliates is absent. We provide theoretical support for these findings, demonstrating that a firm can engage in vertical FDI to exploit its intangible assets in another country and improve its input sourcing terms domestically by enhancing its cross‐threat. Furthermore, we show that the welfare implications of vertical FDI on the home and host country are neither always positive nor aligned.     

Location choice,competition, and welfare in non-tradable service FDI

We investigate whether non-tradable service FDI is efficient from a welfare point of view. A fixed number of firms strategically decide which markets to locate in and then compete in quasi-Cournot fashion. Considering firm location in two symmetric markets, non-tradable service FDI may or may not be efficient for the source country, depending on the total number of firms, competition in markets and the curvature of the demand function. In contrast, non-tradable service FDI is always efficient for the host country and the overall economy. This implies that any policy that affects firm location between two symmetric markets will not be beneficial from a welfare viewpoint.     

Should Governments Subsidise Inward Foreign Direct Investment?

What happens when a government has incentives to subsidise inward FDI when labour markets are imperfectly competitive? Contrary to the traditional assumption in the literature, we allow the production in the multinational firm to either complement or substitute for local production. A new result is that the wage in the host country may decrease when production is moved to this country. The reason is that the union in the host country internalises product market externalities between the firms. Furthermore, it is shown that when a single country subsidises inward FDI, total world welfare might increase.     

Foreign Direct Investment and Environmental Taxes

Abstract. This paper studies the effect of foreign direct investment (FDI) on environmental policy stringency in a two-country model with trade costs, where FDI could be unilateral and bilateral and both governments address local pollution through environmental taxes. We show that FDI does not give rise to ecological dumping because the host country has an incentive to shift rents away from the source country toward the host country. Environmental policy strategies and welfare effects are studied under the assumption that parameter values support FDI to be profitable.