To dissent or not to dissent? Informative dissent and parliamentary governance

Legislative dissent has detrimental effects for both party and legislator, i.e., legislators depend on their party label for re-election, which value in turn depends in part on the party’s reputation of cohesiveness. Commonly dissent has been attributed to “extreme” preferences. I provide an informational rationale for dissent. Costly dissent allows the legislator to credibly signal information about his constituency’s preferences to the Cabinet. As a result the Cabinet can better calibrate its policies with the electorate’s preferences. Dissent is shown to depend on policy preferences as well a the legislators’ electoral strength, electoral volatility, and the cost of dissent. Finally, the results suggests that parties may sometimes benefit from tolerating some level of dissent. I am grateful to Christopher Kam, Randall Calvert, John Duggan, Mark Fey, Eduardo Leoni, Sona Golder, and the anonymous referees for their helpful comments and suggestions. I also wish to thank the Political Institutions and Public Choice Program at Michigan State University for its support. All remaining errors are mine.     

Pay,productivity and aging in Major League Baseball

Using panels of player pay and performance from Major League Baseball (MLB), we examine trends in player productivity and salaries as players age. Pooling players of all ability levels leads to a systematic bias in regression coefficients. After addressing this problem by dividing players into talent quintiles, we find that the best players peak about 2 years later than marginal players, and development and depreciation of performance appear to be more pronounced for players with the highest ability levels. Within-career variation, however, is less pronounced than between-player variation, and the performance level of players within a given quintile will typically remain lower than the talent level for rookies in the next higher quintile. We also find preliminary evidence that free agents are paid proportionately to their production at all ability levels, whereas young players’ salaries are suppressed by similar amounts.     

Modeling collective adaptive agent design and its analysis in Barnga game

This paper explores the collective adaptive agent that adapts to a group in contrast with the individual adaptive agent that adapts to a single user. For this purpose, this paper starts by defining the collective adaptive situation through an analysis of the subject experiments in the playing card game, Barnga, and investigates the factors that lead the group to the collective adaptive situation. Intensive simulations using Barnga agents have revealed the following implications: (1) the leader who takes account of other players’ opinions contributes to guide players to the collective adaptation situation, and (2) an appropriate role balance among players (i.e., the leader, the claiming and quiet players, which make the most and least number of corrections of the leader’s decision) is required to derive the collective adaptive situation.     

Schumpeter and new technology based firms: Towards a framework for how NTBFs cause creative destruction

Although Schumpeter’s “creative destruction” has become something of a buzzword, the theoretical underpinnings of his theory are largely missing from the recent literature on technological change. This paper explores the link between technological change and creative destruction, with particular attention being paid to the role of new technology-based firms in bringing this about. Recurring themes in the technological change literature are examined. These show that the phenomenon of dominant firms failing due to the introduction of a new (disruptive) technology is creative destruction in action. NTBFs are the most common introducers of disruptive technologies and a leading driver of creative destruction.     

Mechanisms that efficiently verify the optimality of a proposed action

The best known achievement of the literature on resource-allocating mechanisms and their message spaces is the first rigorous proof of the competitive mechanism's informational efficiency. In an exchange economy withN persons andK+1 commodities (including a numeraire), that mechanism announcesK prices as well as aK-compenent trade vector for each ofN−1 persons, making a total ofNK message variables. Trial messages are successively announced and after each announcement each personprivately determines, usingprivate information, whether she finds the proposed trades acceptable at the announced prices. When a message is reached with which all are content, then the trades specified in that message take place, and they satisfy Pareto optimality and individual rationality. The literature shows that no (suitably regular) mechanism can achieve the same thing with fewer thanNK message variables. In the classic proof, all the candidate mechanisms have the privacy property, and the proof uses that property in a crucial way. ‘Non-private’ mechanisms are, however, well-defined. We present a proof that forN>K,NK remains a lower bound even when we permit ‘non-private’ mechanisms. Our new proof does not use privacy at all. But in a non-private mechanism, minimality of the number of message variables can hardly be defended as the hallmark of informational efficiency, since a non-private mechanism requires some persons to know something about the private information of othersin addition to the information contained in the messages. The new proof of the lower boundNK invites a new interpretation of the competitive mechanism's informational efficiency. We provide a new concept of efficiency which the competitive mechanism exhibits and which does rest on privacy even whenN>K. To do so, we first define a class ofprojection mechanisms, wherein some of the message variables are proposed values of the action to be taken, and the rest are auxiliary variables. The competitive mechanism has the projection property, with a trade vector as its action and prices as the auxiliary variables. A projection mechanism proposes an action; for each proposal, the agents then use the auxiliary variables, together with their private information, to verify that the proposed action meets the mechanism's goal (Pareto optimality and individual rationality for the competitive mechanism) if, indeed, it does meet that goal. For a given goal, we seek projection mechanisms for which theverification effort (suitably measured) is not greater than that of any other projection mechanism that achieves the goal. We show the competitive mechanism to be verification-minimal within the class of private projection mechanisms that achieve Pareto optimality and individual rationality; that proofdoes use the privacy of the candidate mechanisms. We also show, under certain conditions, that a verification-minimal projection mechanism achieving a given goal has smallest ‘total communication effort’ (which is locally equivalent to the classic ‘message-space size’) among all private mechanisms that achieve the goal, whether or not they have the projection property.     

The generalized Stackelberg equilibrium of the all-pay auction with complete information

We characterize the equilibrium of the all-pay auction with general convex cost of effort and sequential effort choices. We consider a set of n players who are arbitrarily partitioned into a group of players who choose their efforts ‘early’ and a group of players who choose ‘late’. Only the player with the lowest cost of effort has a positive payoff in any equilibrium. This payoff depends on his own timing vis-a-vis the timing of others. We also show that the choice of timing can be endogenized, in which case the strongest player typically chooses ‘late’, whereas all other players are indifferent with respect to their choice of timing. In the most prominent equilibrium the player with the lowest cost of effort wins the auction at zero aggregate cost. We thank Dan Kovenock and Luis C. Corchón for discussion and helpful comments. The usual caveat applies. Wolfgang Leininger likes to express his gratitude to Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB) for its generous hospitality and financial support.     

The effectiveness of entrepreneurial firm’s knowledge acquisition from a business incubator

This cross-cultural research project, involving the United States and Finland, explored how the entrepreneurial firm’s acquisition of business processes’ knowledge from interaction with incubator management positively impacts on new product development, increased technical competence, enhanced reputation and lower costs of sales to customers. In a sample of 52 firms, the study’s methodology depended on single response, self-reported data. The findings suggest that the sole knowledge benefits gained by the firm, from the incubator relationship, is a perception of enhanced reputation. Also, incubator managers should focus more on assisting new technology based firms with growing the venture in the marketplace. Funding for this project was provided by The National Science Foundation, and The National Technology Agency of Finland.     

Measuring opinion distributions

In this study it will be argued that the perceived distribution of opinions among others is important for opinion research. Three different ways of measuring the perception of opinion distributions in survey research are compared: (a) by means of a questionwhat most people think about an issue, (b) by means of a questionhow many people are perceived to agree with an issue-statement, (c) by means of ‘line-production-boxes’, a special version ofmagnitude estimation. The results indicate that ‘line-production-boxes’ can improve data quality, but have also some drawbacks which will have to be dealt with. ‘Line-production-boxes’ give a wealth of information about individual differences in the forms of perceived opinion distributions. Although the normal distribution is used often, many other distribution forms are also used. The method of ‘line-production-boxes’ is compared with the method of estimating percentage points. Although high correlations suggest a good concurrent validity, some systematic differences do exist. New research directions are suggested.     

Electoral control over policy-motivated candidates and their policy biases

We present an election model employing candidates with policy preferences, and show how re-election pressure induces candidates to keep their campaign promises in finitely repeated competitions. The game consists of two periods, each of which comprises an election followed by the winner’s policy implementation. Following the first election, the incumbent may signal his dishonesty by implementing a policy different from his campaign promise. If the citizens care about political honesty, this choice reduces the incumbent’s probability of re-election. An equilibrium is derived which demonstrates that even with term limits, an elected candidate’s deviation from his campaign promise is controlled by the citizens’ monitoring of his performance. Strong public response to the dishonesty of politicians thus serves as a commitment device. The author is grateful to anonymous referees and to the editor of the journal for many valuable comments and suggestions. The author also thanks Masaki Aoyagi, Motonari Kurasawa, Yukihiro Nishimura, Shigehiro Serizawa, Takashi Ui, and participants in the seminars held by the Institute of Statistical Research, Meikai University, Osaka University, University of California, Irvine, and Yokohama National University for their insightful comments.     

On the distribution of Harter

In his seminal paper, Harter (1951) derived the exact distribution of Wald’s classification statistic. In this note, we consider the more general problem of deriving the exact distribution of the product XY when X and Y are independent student’s t random variables with any degrees of freedom. Our results are simpler and more general than those presented by Harter (1951).     

Self-organized criticality in a herd behavior model of financial markets

This paper explains the fat-tail distribution of asset transaction volumes and prices by a model of rational herd behavior of traders. Each trader decides whether to buy an asset by observing private information and other traders’ actions. A trader’s buying action reveals his positive private information and affects the other traders’ beliefs in favor of buying, leading to strategic complementarity. A power-law distribution emerges for the number of buying actions in a static Nash equilibrium. This model provides an economic reason as to why the stock market has to exhibit a criticality in the connectivity of the traders’ actions. I am benefited by comments from the seminar participants at University of Tokyo and the Econophysics Colloquium 2006 at International Christian University, the editors of the special issue, and particularly an anonymous referee.     

Developing a Reputation for Reticence

A sender who has disclosable information with probability less than one may partially conceal bad news by choosing to withhold information and pooling with uninformed types. The success of this strategy depends on receivers' beliefs about the probability that the sender has disclosable news. In a dynamic context, informed senders try to cultivate a reputation for reticence either by concealing good news along with the bad, or by concealing some good news and disclosing some bad news. A reputation for reticence is valuable because it makes receivers less skeptical of past or future nondisclosures. The model provides insight into the choice by firms such as Google not to disclose quarterly earnings guidance to analysts, as well as Tony Blair's reticence over his son's vaccine record during the measles–mumps–rubella scare in the United Kingdom.     

The impact of signal dependence and own ability awareness on herding behaviour: a tale of two managers

This model examines the case of managers whose signals, when informative, are perfectly correlated as in the Scharfstein and Stein model [1990. The American Economic Review 80(3): 465–479]. This has a herd increasing impact as it introduces a positive reputation externality. On the other hand, it is also assumed that managers have perfect knowledge of their own ability, an assumption with herd reducing implications. Combining these two offsetting, in terms of herding, assumptions, it is found that a smart manager who plays first will sometimes, but not always, truthfully announce his/her private information. On the other hand, a smart manager who plays second will always report his/her true signal, while a dumb manager who plays second may herd, either on the first manager's action and/or on the prior. It is also found that the more likely a dumb manager who plays second is to herd on the first manager's action, the less likely is a smart manager who plays first to herd on the prior. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Measurement of power,probabilities, and alternative models of man

Starting from Max Weber’s definitions of power we discuss the meaning of his concept Chance and its relationships to the probabilistic notions that play a central role in definitions of indices of measuring voting power. Using Martin Hollis’s distinction between two models of man—plastic and autonomous—we argue that the common measures of voting power when interpreted in terms of probabilities seem to be in better conformity with the model of plastic man than with the model of autonomous man. The paper elaborates on the probability interpretation with applications to the modelling of power measures with a priori unions and to the concept of “real voting power” based on relative frequencies of historical events. Power as potential—which in our view is what Weber very likely meant—remains an elusive concept, but one that should be amenable to game-theoretic analysis.     

“Trilemmas”: Characterising the Japanese Concept of “amae” with a Three-Way Forced-Ranking Technique

A ‘trilemma’ procedure is introduced for collecting ‘dominance data’ (i.e. rankings of a set of items along a scale of relevance, preference, etc.). Trilemmas are three-way forced choices where the three items comprising each trilemma are selected on the basis of a multidimensional scaling solution (MDS) for the item set, ensuring that each choice is as stark and informative as possible. A questionnaire designed on this principle is easily understood and rapidly administered. The data are convenient to record and show less fluctuation among informants than existing techniques. We demonstrate the procedure with a set of 45 short generalisations about behaviour, designed for assessing child attachment. A three-dimensional ‘map’ of these items was obtained by applying MDS to multiple sets of similarity data. The same structure emerged from English-language and Japanese translations of the items. Thirty trilemmas based on this map were used to rank the items by degree of association with the Japanese concept of amae, characterising the concept in terms of its behavioural correlates.     

Agreement and consensus in a Q-mode research design: an empirical comparison of measures,and an application

Subject of this paper is the analysis of consensus within small groups of respondents, based on a proportionally large number of variables. The target group is researchers who are interested in Q-mode research. Measures of agreement are compared, and an application from a recent project is presented. Cohen’s κ is the preferable measure, Krippendorff’s α is an alternative, which is based on a different concept of expected disagreement. At group level, along with κ and α for multiple raters, additional measures are r _wg, intraclass correlation, and κ _SC. Predictions about level differences between groups can be assessed by a t-test and θ     

Can Findings of Qualitative Research in Education be Generalized?

Most qualitative researchers do not recommend generalization from qualitative studies, as this research is not based on random samples and statistical controls. The objective of this study is to explore the degree to which in-service teachers understand the controversial aspects of generalization in both qualitative and quantitative educational research and as to how this can facilitate problems faced by the teachers in the classroom. The study is based on 83 participants who had registered for a 10-week course on ‘Methodology of Investigation in Education’ as part of their Master’s degree program. The course is based on 11 readings drawing on a philosophy of science perspective (positivism, constructivism, Popper, Kuhn, Lakatos). Course activities included written reports, class room discussions based on participants’ presentations, and written exams. Based on the results obtained it is concluded: (1) almost 91% of the teachers agreed that external generalization in a different social context is feasible; (2) almost 63% of the participants used a fairly inconsistent approach, that is in a theoretical context agreed that qualitative research cannot be generalized and still when asked with respect to the experience of two particular teachers, agreed that generalization was possible; (3) almost 28% of the participants used a consistent approach. Some of the reasons provided by the participants as to why generalization was feasible are discussed. An analogy is drawn with respect to Piaget’s methodology, viz., it was not based on random samples or statistical treatments and still his oeuvre has been generalized (criticisms not withstanding) in both the psychology and educational literature.     

Assessment of Interjudge Reliability in the Open-Ended Questions Coding Process

In the process of coding open-ended questions, the evaluation of interjudge reliability is a critical issue. In this paper, using real data, the behavior of three coefficients of reliability among coders, Cohen’s K, Krippendorff’s α and Perreault and Leigh’s I _r are patterned, in terms of the number of judges involved and the categories of answer defined. The outcome underlines the importance of both variables in the valuations of interjudge reliability, as well as the higher adequacy of Perreault and Leigh’s I _r and Krippendorff’s α for marketing and opinion research.     

Keeping Work in Perspective: Work–Nonwork Considerations and Applicant Decision Making

The work–nonwork supportiveness of an organization may influence applicant decision making among young applicants. This possibility was tested using a phased narrowing decision making task and three organizational attributes (salary, number of work–nonwork supportive policies/benefits and their related culture supportiveness). Data gathered from a sample of 110 graduating college business majors partially supported the hypotheses (p < 0.05), revealing a dynamic influence of the organizational attributes across decision making stages and a differential impact of the attributes depending on their framing as family-friendly or life-friendly. Salary was especially important in initial screening of organizational options, and the organizational culture support of work–nonwork challenges was increasingly influential as the final choice was formed. Implications for young applicant attraction are discussed. The research presented here (a portion of the author’s master’s thesis at Bowling Green State University) was presented at the 2006 Annual Conference of the Society for Industrial and Organizational Psychology in Dallas, TX. Thanks go to Dr. Steve M. Jex, Dr. Scott Highhouse, and Dr. Cathy Stein for their assistance in the development of this study. Thanks are also owed to Dr. Michael Doherty for his thoughtful comments on an earlier draft.     

Hypothesis testing and parameter estimation based onM-statistics ink samples with unequal variances

Summary Ink samples with unequal variances,M-tests for homogeneity ofk location parameters are proposed. The asymptoticχ ²-distributions of the test statistics and the robustness of the tests are investigated. NextM-estimators (ME’s) of parameters are discussed. Furthermore positive-part shrinkage versions (PSME’s) of theM-estimators for the location parameters are considered along with modified James-Stein estimation rule. In asymptotic distributional risks based on a special feasible loss, it is shown that the PSME’s dominate the ME’s, and preliminary test and shrinkageM-versions fork≧4.