Can rating agencies look through the cycle?

Rating agencies claim to look through the cycle when assigning corporate credit ratings, which entails that they are able to separate trend components of default risk from transitory ones. To test whether agencies possess this competence, I take market-based estimates of 1-year default probabilities of corporate bond issuers and estimate their long-run trend using the Hodrick-Prescott filter, local regression, or centered moving averages. I find that ratings help identify the current split into trend and cycle. In addition, rating stability is similar to the one of hypothetical ratings based on long-term trends. The results are robust to the use of different filter techniques. They are confirmed by a model-free analysis, which shows that ratings predict future changes in market-based default probability estimates. Since the examined trends are forward-looking in the sense that the trend filtering algorithms use future data, agency ratings exhibit important characteristics one would expect from ratings that see through the cycle.     

Rating the rating agencies: Anticipating currency crises or debt crises?

We revisit the question whether sovereign ratings predict financial crises. In line with previous studies, we find that ratings do not predict currency crises and are instead downgraded ex-post. However, the likelihood of currency crisis and the implied probability of sovereign default are not closely linked in emerging markets post-1994. When debt crises are defined as sovereign distress – when spreads are higher than 1000 basis points or 10 percentage points – we find that access to international capital markets is reduced by half. In addition, although sovereign distress events last for typically 5.2 consecutive months, they can persist for longer periods up to nine quarters. Finally, lagged ratings and ratings changes, including negative outlooks and credit watches, are useful in anticipating sovereign distress.     

Rating the raters: Are reputation concerns powerful enough to discipline rating agencies?

Credit rating agencies (CRAs) are accused of bearing a strong responsibility for contributing to the subprime crisis by having been deliberately too lax in the ratings of some structured products. In response to this accusation, CRAs argue that such an attitude would be too dangerous for them, since their reputation is at stake. The objective of this article is to examine the validity of this argument within a formal model: Are reputation concerns sufficient to discipline rating agencies?We show that the reputation argument only works when a sufficiency large fraction of the CRA income comes from other sources than rating complex products. By contrast when rating complex products becomes a major source of income for the CRA, we show that it is always too lax with a positive probability and inflates ratings with probability one when its reputation is good enough.We provide some empirical support for this prediction, by showing that ceteris paribus, the proportion of subprime residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) that were rated AAA by the three main CRAs indeed increased over the last eight years.We analyze the policy implications of our findings and advocate for a new business model of CRAs that we call the platform-pays model.     

The economic function of credit rating agencies – What does the watchlist tell us?

Credit rating agencies do not only disclose simple ratings but announce watchlists (rating reviews) and outlooks as well. This paper analyzes the economic function underlying the review procedure. Using Moody’s rating data between 1982 and 2004, we find that for borrowers of high creditworthiness, rating agencies employ watchlists primarily in order to improve the delivery of information. For low-quality borrowers, in contrast, the review procedure seems to have developed into an implicit contract á la Boot et al. (2006), inducing the companies “on watch” to abstain from risk-augmenting actions. The agencies’ economic role hence appears to have been enhanced from a pure information certification towards an active monitoring function.     

Mergers in the bond rating industry: does rating provider matter?

I examine whether investors favour bond ratings from established global agencies by analyzing the market response to Standard and Poor’s (S&P) acquisition of the Canadian Bond Rating Service (CBRS). As a result of the acquisition, CBRS ratings were completely eliminated and replaced with ratings from S&P. While little reaction was apparent for bonds, the stocks of firms with CBRS ratings responded positively to the acquisition announcement. Small firms and those with little institutional ownership experienced the greatest benefit. The findings suggest that ratings from S&P may increase the exposure of foreign firms to international investors.     

Do sovereign rating changes trigger spillover effects?

This paper examines whether changes in a particular country's sovereign ratings provided by Standard and Poor's and Moody's trigger a spillover effect on other countries. The analysis focuses on two sets of countries namely where there are trade links between the countries and where there are links between the financial markets of each country. The findings indicate that there are more significant results when the links in financial markets are analysed compared to trade links. Moreover, the results are dependent on which rating is under analysis, that is, Standard and Poor's Local Currency, Standard and Poor's Foreign Currency, Moody's Bank Deposit or Moody's bonds and notes. Finally, there does appear to be a contamination effect for both upgrades and downgrades among the countries.     

Should more local governments purchase a bond rating?

We investigate whether issuers that choose to forgo a bond rating suffer an interest cost penalty greater than the cost of the rating. We use estimated ratings provided by Moody’s Investor Service to proxy for what the rating would have been if it had been purchased. We find that the primary factors associated with an issuer’s decision to purchase a rating are the rating expected by the issuer and the extent to which an issue is marketed locally. After controlling for self-selection bias, we find that the issuers that forgo a rating do not suffer an interest cost penalty.

When do stock analysts find bond rating changes informative?

Credit rating agencies (CRAs) have considerable privileged access to corporate management and are therefore a potentially important source of information to the equity market. We study how stock analysts incorporate bond ratings in their earnings forecasts. We develop an economic framework to explain why equity analysts might look to CRAs as an information source, especially after Regulation Fair Disclosure. Using this framework, we characterize the association between ratings changes and earnings forecast revisions surrounding these changes. We examine whether the extent to which equity analysts glean information from ratings changes is related to the extent and importance of information conveyed in the ratings change and analysts’ information uncertainty. We find that characteristics we examine are strongly related to stock analysts’ use of information in rating downgrades.     

Accruals and ‘accounting numbers management’ in UK executive agencies

Public sector reforms have implemented business techniques, including management by results, cost management and accrual accounting, to make public entities more efficient and accountable. As a consequence, ‘accounting numbers management’ has become a way for managers in the public sector to adapt accounting figures to their interests. This study focuses on ‘earnings management’ (manipulation of earnings) in government agencies. The authors provide evidence of earnings management in which agencies try to keep net operating costs to around zero. The authors' findings question the effectiveness of financial targets associated with accrual-based measures.     

Do bond rating changes affect the information asymmetry of stock trading?

Using a sample of 279 upgrades and 310 downgrades from 1996 to 2004, we find that bond rating changes affect the information asymmetry of stock trading and other measures of information risk. Specifically, when a firm's bond rating is upgraded, its stock information asymmetry and its analysts' earnings forecast dispersion are significantly reduced, while the institutional equity holdings of its shares are significantly increased. The reverse is true for a downgrade. In addition, the degree of change in stock information asymmetry is positively associated with the magnitude of the bond rating changes.     

Predicting rating changes for banks: how accurate are accounting and stock market indicators?

We aim to assess how accurately accounting and stock market indicators predict rating changes for Asian banks. We conduct a stepwise process to determine the optimal set of early indicators by tracing upgrades and downgrades from rating agencies, as well as other relevant factors. Our results indicate that both accounting and market indicators are useful leading indicators but are more effective in predicting upgrades than downgrades, especially for large banks. Moreover, early indicators are only significant in predicting rating changes for banks that are more focused on traditional banking activities such as deposit and loan activities. Finally, a higher reliance of banks on subordinated debt is associated with better accuracy of early indicators.     

Rating or no rating? That is the question: an empirical examination of UK companies

The aim of this paper is to examine the main determinants of the rating likelihood of UK companies. We use a binary probit specification to model the main drivers of a firm's propensity to be rated. Using a sample of 245 non-financial UK companies over the period 1995–2006, representing up to 2872 firm years, the study establishes important differences in the financial profiles of rated and non-rated firms. The results of the rating likelihood models indicate that the decision to obtain a rating is driven by a company's financial risk, solvency, default risk, public debt issuance, R&D, and institutional ownership, thus identifying a wider range of determinants and extending the current literature. The study also finds that the rating decision can be modelled by means of a contemporaneous or predictive specification without any loss of efficiency or classification accuracy. This offers support to the argument that the rating process is fundamentally forward-looking.     

Governance or reputation? Flexible tax enforcement and excess goodwill: Evidence from the taxpaying credit rating system in China

This study investigates the effect of flexible tax enforcement on firms’ excess goodwill using unique manually collected data on taxpaying credit rating in China from 2014 to 2021. We document that A-rated taxpayer firms have less excess goodwill; A-rated firms reduce excess goodwill by 0.005 vis-a-vis non-A-rated firms, which accounts for 100% of the mean value of excess goodwill. This finding holds after multiple robustness tests and an endogeneity analysis. Moreover, this negative effect is more pronounced in firms with low information transparency, that are non-state-owned and that are located in regions with low tax enforcement intensity. The channel test results suggest that taxpaying credit rating system as flexible tax enforcement reduces firms’ excess goodwill through a reputation-based effect and not a governance-based effect. This study reveals that the taxpaying credit rating system in China as flexible tax enforcement can bring halo effect to A rating firms, thereby limiting irrational M&As and breaking goodwill bubble.