A market mechanism for electric power transmission

As competition is introduced into the electric power industry, access and pricing policy for transmission will play a pivotal role in shaping future market structure and performance. The externalities associated with the loop flow phenomenon in an electric power network constitute a significant barrier to the formation of efficient markets for electricity and transmission services. In this paper, we present a new approach to the design of an efficient market mechanism for transmission access that resolves these externalities. Under a trading rule that combines the Coasian and the Pigouvian principles to resolution of externalities, property rights are defined so that a competitive market could be established for transmission services and electricity to achieve a social optimum within a power pool. We characterize a dynamic trading process which is Lyapunov stable and always converges to a competitive equilibrium. Finally, we discuss some practical applicability and long-term investment issues.The authors are indebted to Charles Clark, Shmuel Oren, Pravin Varaiya, Robert Wilson, Felix Wu, and two referees for helpful comments and suggestions and particularly to William Hogan for many incisive comments and constructive suggestions. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Annual Meeting of International Association of Energy Economists in Washington D.C., June 20, 1995, and at the Joint LBS/IFORS International Symposium on Energy Models for Policy and Planning in London on July 18–20, 1995. This paper does not represent the views of EPRI or its members. The authors remain solely responsible for the errors in this paper.     

Contract networks for electric power transmission

A contract network extends the concept of a contract path to address the problem of loop flow and congestion in electric power transmission systems. A contract network option provides an internally consistent framework for assigning long-term capacity rights to a complicated electric transmission network. The contract network respects the special conditions induced by Kirchoff's Laws; accommodates thermal, voltage, and contingency constraints on transmission capacity; and can be adopted without disturbing existing methods for achieving an economic power dispatch subject to these constraints. By design, a contract network would maintain short-run efficiency through optimal spot-price determination of transmission prices. Through payment of congestion rentals, the contract network makes a long-term capacity-right holder indifferent between delivery of the power or receipt of payments in a settlement system. to]Everybody talks about the weather, but nobody does anything about it.Often attributed to Groucho Marx, but earlier from Charles Dudley Warner, Hartford Courant, Editorial, August 24, 1897.     

Proactive planning and valuation of transmission investments in restructured electricity markets

Traditional methods of evaluating transmission expansions focus on the social impact of the investments based on the current generation stock which may include firm generation expansion plans. In this paper, we evaluate the social welfare implications of transmission investments based on equilibrium models characterizing the competitive interaction among generation firms whose decisions in generation capacity investments and production are affected by both the transmission investments and the congestion management protocols of the transmission system operator. Our analysis shows that both the magnitude of the welfare gains associated with transmission investments and the location of the best transmission expansions may change when the generation expansion response is taken into consideration. We illustrate our results using a 30-bus network example. An erratum to this article can be found at     

Decentralization with externalities

In this paper, we examine in a systematic way the problem of decentralization in an economy with all types of externalities. We show that decentralization with artificial markets requires strong convexity assumptions which are typically not fulfilled for negative externalities on producers. A milder form of decentralization with taxation is shown to obtain under weaker convexity assumptions. A new example is given to explain the role of a non-interiority assumption. Finally, new types of non-convexities are described and the problem of rights to externalities is clearly defined in the framework of this general theory.     

Regulation and grid expansion investment with increased penetration of renewable generation

The recent trend toward decarbonization led to crucial challenges for network operators and regulators in terms of network reliability and optimal grid expansion. In order to analyze the effects of rising shares of renewable energy sources on investment decisions in both, the generation and the transmission sector, the following article brings together the two sectors in a single real options framework. This allows us to derive the optimal timing of the production capacity expansion and the optimal transmission price which assures its connection. We find that an increasing penetration through renewables leads to investment postponement in both sectors, which goes along with increased systematic risk. However, we show that the negative effects on the transmission firm can be overcome by choosing an appropriate incentive system.     

Let's Get Physical! Or Financial? A Study of Electricity Transmission Rights

I test experimentally the predictions of neoclassical theory for a radial electricity market without rights to the transmission line, with rights that give the owner a financial right to a share of the transmission congestion charges collected by a network operator, and with physical rights which give the owner the exclusive right to utilize a portion of the transmission line. I find that physical rights lead to more right market signals, diminish some market-power, and remove an uncertainty about electricity transmission congestion better than financial rights or the absence of rights.     

A note on dynamic monopoly pricing under consumption externalities

We analyze dynamic monopoly pricing under consumption externalities, focusing on pricing under negative externalities. We also attempt to generalize models in the previous literature, which encompass both negative and positive externalities, by incorporating a consumer’s discount factor for past sales as a parameter. Analyzing our model reveals oscillation as the optimal price path in the presence of negative externalities.     

CAPACITY EXPANSION IN MARKETS WITH INTER‐TEMPORAL CONSUMPTION EXTERNALITIES

This paper analyses market capacity expansion in the presence of inter‐temporal consumption externalities such as consumer learning, networks and bandwagon effects. An externality leads to an endogenous shift of market demand that responds to past market capacity. Whereas market capacity grows in waves, its magnitude depends on the degree of market concentration. The competitive environment contributes to S‐shaped time patterns of market capacity expansion. On the other hand, using a low introductory price, a monopolist plans an initially larger amount of market cultivation than a competitive market capacity expansion.     

Two-part tariffs in the online gaming industry: The role of creative destruction and network externalities

Playing computer games online is a fast growing, billion dollar industry which has received little academic attention. The industry exhibits a number of interesting economic features. The industry structure is determined by creative destruction as in Aghion and Howitt (1992) [Aghion, P., Howitt, P. 1992. A model of growth through creative destruction, Econometrica, 60(2), 323–351], with game makers experiencing market power within a genre until the game is superceded. Furthermore, the attractiveness of playing a game online depends on the existence of opponents (positive network externalities) while technical and reputational problems eventually arise (negative network externalities). We model the choice of two-part tariffs by a monopolist under creative destruction and network externalities and derive conditions for the multiple equilibria which currently exist in the industry.     

Economic Competition,Policy Interdependence,and Labour Rights

Extant scholarship treats national policies concerning labour rights as a function of economic factors and yet neglects influences of policies among economically competing states. Relying on the policy interdependence theory, this study argues that labour rights policy in a state is dependent on its economic competitors’ labour policy decisions. It specifically maintains that the intensifying competition for foreign direct investment and exports as well as against imports channels negative externalities of deteriorating labour protection in competing states which drives expansive downward policy mimicking and leads to a global decline in labour rights – a race to the bottom. Utilising spatial econometric technique to analyse a new data on labour rights for the period 1994–2009, it finds that labour rights practices are interdependent among economic competitors and experience global deteriorations; whereas labour rights laws remain largely independent due to high policy and reputational costs of lowering them and show more fluctuations.     

Toward a combined merchant-regulatory mechanism for electricity transmission expansion

Electricity transmission pricing and transmission grid expansion have received increasing attention in recent years. There are two disparate approaches to transmission investment: one employs the theory based on long-run financial rights (LTFTR) to transmission (merchant approach), while the other is based on the incentive-regulation hypothesis (regulatory approach). In this paper we consider the elements that could combine the merchant and regulatory approaches in a setting with price-taking electricity generators and loads. The monopoly transmission firm (Transco) is regulated through benchmark or price regulation to provide long-term investment incentives. The two-part tariff approach used can be analyzed analytically only for well-behaved cost and demand functions. We explore a series of simplified transmission grids to argue that in a variety of circumstances those functions could have reasonable economic properties. The results suggest directions for further research to explore the properties of the cost functions and implications for design of practical incentive mechanisms and the integration with merchant investment in organized markets with LTFTRs.     

The political economy of post-crisis international standards for resolving financial institutions

The development of post-crisis international standards for resolving financial institutions highlights an intriguing puzzle: the European Union (EU), which is often considered as a ‘great financial power’, had a marginal influence in the standard-setting process, which was led by the United States (US) and the United Kingdom (UK). Why? This paper brings together and further develops the concepts of cross-border externalities derived from the hierarchical network structure of the international financial system and domestic regulatory capacity. The US and the UK had the incentives (externalities) to promote and the domestic capacity to shape international standards. By contrast, the EU was mainly exposed to regional (intra-EU) cross-border externalities and lacked regulatory capacity on the matter. Paradoxically, international standards contributed to developing EU resolution capacity by facilitating an agreement on EU (and later on, euro area) rules.     

COPYRIGHT AND BRANDS IN THE DIGITAL AGE: INTERNALIZING THE EXTERNALITIES OF MEANING

The adoption of binary code as the universal standard for globalized communications generates highly positive externalities of the kind often referred to as “network effects.” But what about meaning? What are the externalities associated with the formatting and circulation of meaning, and are they all positive? Within the digital paradigm, is it really possible to separate the notion of expression—covered by copyright—from the meanings conveyed? Isn't meaning closely related to the concept of brand? And on that assumption, how do copyright and trademark institutions work together to stimulate and promote the generation of meaningful information? To answer these questions, we will look at how the meaningful forms of expression—the “works”—that have historically been covered by copyright generate specific types of externality, both positive and negative, giving rise to both incentive and censorship mechanisms. We will then show how the institutions of copyright and author's rights that allow the appropriation of a meaning‐dependent good also confer a brand on it by identifying its sources. This leads to cross‐externalities between works of expression and publishing brands, with the result that copyright and trademark institutions cannot be completely separated from each other. (JEL K11, L5, L82, B25)     

Thematic Clubs and the Supremacy of Network Externalities

We explore the issue of minorities' survival in the presence of positive network externalities. We rely on a simple example of thematic clubs to illustrate why and how such survival problems might appear, first considering the case of simple‐network effects (fully anonymous externalities) and then the case of cross‐network effects (type‐dependent externalities). In both cases, the analysis is framed as a simple noncooperative game with a continuum of players and binary action sets. There is a unique and interior Nash equilibrium under mild network effects and two corner equilibria under strong network effects, with one club driven out. A utilitarian planner would accentuate the clustering effects of network externalities, and call for the disappearance of the minority club more often than the noncooperative solution. A simple myopic learning algorithm capturing the progression of network lock‐in effects is studied.     

Choosing between imperfect proxies for a corrective tax

Choices are sometimes distorted by internalities or externalities. This paper considers a setting in which the distortion cannot be taxed directly, and asks how a policymaker should choose a proxy variable to tax instead. We derive a criterion for when one proxy should be preferred to another, and consider a range of factors with implications for this criterion. These factors are (i) sensitivity to the tax rate, (ii) how accurately the taxed variable approximates the distorted variable, (iii) susceptibility to offsetting behavior, and (iv) consumer heterogeneity. Our analysis is illustrated with a comparison between ad valorem and volumetric taxes on sugar-sweetened beverages.     

Fair,reasonable, and non-discriminatory terms and technology adoption: standard setting vs. incompatible technologies

The present paper shows that in the absence of fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND) licensing terms, the adoption of a standard depends on the degree of network effects. If the degree of network externalities is low, patent holders may opt for developing incompatible technologies in order to avoid the entry deterrence in the downstream market and the resulting decrease in the royalty income. If the degree of network externalities is sufficiently high, patent holders may prefer developing a common standard even though it has a negative impact on the market entry in the downstream market. Generated network externalities are then sufficiently high to create additional demand compensating the losses from the entry deterrence. The application of FRAND terms eliminates the entry deterrence problem and by consequence stimulates the standard adoption. The use of the FRAND commitment has beneficial effects for consumer surplus and total welfare.     

Congestion management in power systems

In liberalized power systems, generation and transmission services are unbundled, but remain tightly interlinked. Congestion management in the transmission network is of crucial importance for the efficiency of these inter-linkages. Different regulatory designs have been suggested, analyzed and followed, such as uniform zonal pricing with redispatch or nodal pricing. However, the literature has either focused on the short-term efficiency of congestion management or specific issues of timing investments. In contrast, this paper presents a generalized and flexible economic modeling framework based on a decomposed inter-temporal equilibrium model including generation, transmission, as well as their inter-linkages. The model covers short-run operation and long-run investments and hence, allows to analyze short and long-term efficiency of different congestion management designs that vary with respect to the definition of market areas, the regulation and organization of TSOs, the way of managing congestion besides grid expansion, and the type of cross-border capacity allocation. We are able to identify and isolate implicit frictions and sources of inefficiencies in the different regulatory designs, and to provide a comparative analysis including a benchmark against a first-best welfare-optimal result. To demonstrate the applicability of our framework, we calibrate and numerically solve our model for a detailed representation of the Central Western European (CWE) region, consisting of 70 nodes and 174 power lines. Analyzing six different congestion management designs until 2030, we show that compared to the first-best benchmark, i.e., nodal pricing, inefficiencies of up to 4.6% arise. Inefficiencies are mainly driven by the approach of determining cross-border capacities as well as the coordination of transmission system operators’ activities.     

Sovereign Risk, FDI Spillovers, and Growth

This paper studies the effect of sovereign risk on capital flows from rich to poor nations in the context of a two-country model, where Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) creates positive externalities in domestic production. We show that if externalities are large, a developing country never expropriates foreign assets, and behaves as under perfect enforcement of foreigners' property rights, jumping to the steady state in one period. If externalities are absent, a developing country always expropriates foreign assets and, then, there are no capital flows in equilibrium, as occurs in autarky. If externalities are of a medium size, our model can account for scarce capital flows from rich to poor nations, as well as other key features of the data, such as rising-over-time patterns of foreign capital and FDI in developing countries. In addition, the model offers an economic rationale for the FDI restrictions observed across nations.     

Optimal renewable-energy promotion: Capacity subsidies vs. generation subsidies

We derive optimal subsidization of renewable energies in electricity markets. The analysis takes into account that capacity investment must be chosen under uncertainty about demand conditions and capacity availability, and that capacity as well as electricity generation may be sources of externalities. The main result is that generation subsidies should correspond to externalities of electricity generation (e.g., greenhouse gas reductions), and investment subsidies should correspond to externalities of capacity (e.g., learning spillovers). If only capacity externalities exist, then electricity generation should not be subsidized at all. Our results suggest that some of the most popular promotion instruments cause welfare losses. We demonstrate such welfare losses with data from the German electricity market.     

Does immigration crowd out foreign direct investment inflows? Tradeoff between contemporaneous FDI-immigration substitution and ethnic network externalities

This study examines the dynamic interactions between immigration and inward foreign direct investment (FDI) using bilateral data on these indicators between Japan and each of the 29 countries/economies of origin for both FDI and immigrants into Japan during 1996–2011. Although literature shows a positive FDI–migration relationship, I distinguish between short- and long-term effects of immigration, and show a contemporaneous negative relationship between FDI and immigration. The results show that immigration flows discourage FDI inflows (FDI–migration substitution), although larger immigration stocks induce FDI inflows (ethnic network externalities). Therefore, total effects need to be evaluated considering a tradeoff between contemporaneous substitution and the longer-term complementarity from network effects. While inward FDI promotion and immigration enhancement are often suggested as solutions to resolving shortages in domestic savings and labor, our results have implications for addressing the increasingly daunting policy issue of population aging.