ILLEGAL DISPOSAL AND WASTE COLLECTION FREQUENCY

A model of household refuse production is presented in which the implications of the presence of dumping incentives for the public choice of garbage collection frequency under a user fee system are analysed. Insofar as governments wishing to balance their waste collection service budgets can set the marginal benefit of collecting garbage equal to its marginal cost, no externality arises through pick‐up frequency. However, when the expected punishment for dumping is zero or independent of its extent, the public provision of refuse collection frequency turns out to be negatively affected by the amount of garbage that individuals dump and, therefore, intervention in the management of household waste is required. The optimal policy is found to consist of taxes on consumption goods and subsidies for curbside (or legal) disposal and recycling that are directly linked to collection costs.     

An economic analysis of mixing wastes

Using a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous waste, this paper studies optimal waste policy when households have to exert separation effort to produce homogeneous waste streams suitable for recycling. Our model explicitly allows for changes in the composition (quality) of waste streams depending on how much effort households are willing to spend on separating different types of waste. Accordingly, we are able to generalize some earlier contributions to the waste management literature and demonstrate that with both mixing and effort included, a first-best optimum is feasible under reasonable conditions. In particular, we find that a (modified) deposit-refund system still provides the optimal incentives to guide recycling as well as legal disposal (landfilling) and illegal dumping. Both the number and level of taxes and subsidies needed to reach the first-best depend crucially on the socially optimal level of dumping as well as the socially optimal composition of the mix. We are grateful to two anonymous referees, Leon Bettendorf, Elbert Dijkgraaf, Don Fullerton and Matthieu Glachant for constructive comments and useful discussions on an earlier version of this paper.     

Wasting Time? Recycling Incentives in Urban Taiwan and Japan

What makes recycling work? We study the factors driving household waste disposal and recycling in 18 cities in Taiwan and Japan in order to understand the impact of alternative waste management incentives. We show that this depends on the effect of distinct policies on the relative costs of the main alternative disposal methods: recycling, disposal to landfill and illegal dumping. The willingness both to recycle and to dispose to landfill depends on the relative costs of the waste collection regime, and these are dominated by the time cost of alternative disposal methods. The higher the frequency of waste collection, the less recycling and the more disposal to landfill there will be. This is because frequent collection reduces the marginal time-cost of disposal to landfill. Curbside collection of recyclable material, and the frequency of that collection, has a similar effect on the recycling rate. Although direct incentives, such as unit pricing are important in the waste disposal decision, recycling depends primarily on management of the time-costs it involves.     

The effect of experience and quantity-based pricing on the valuation of a curbside recycling program

Quantity-based pricing for garbage collection services and recycling programs are becoming increasingly popular methods of meeting municipal solid waste diversion objectives. This article investigates household willingness to pay (WTP) for a pilot curbside recycling program (CRP) in the presence of a quantity-based pricing scheme for garbage collection services, which allows a household to alter their garbage container size at a reduced price. Unlike previous studies that have modeled the simultaneity of these household decisions as a two-step process, we jointly estimate the household's intentions using a full-information maximum-likelihood (FIML) approach. Our results show a strong positive correlation between a household's WTP for a CRP and its stated intention to reduce its garbage container size when a CRP is offered. The positive correlation suggests that WTP will be higher for households which are more likely to reduce their garbage container size. Thus, in the presence of quantity-based pricing, a household's WTP for recycling more fully reflects the marginal social costs of garbage disposal.     

On the Flexibility of Optimal Policies for Green Design

Several recent papers show that different combinations of taxes and subsidies can achieve the social optimum for green design and household waste management when there are various market failures. This note shows that such policy flexibility exists only if all relevant actions by individual agents can be properly targeted by economic instruments. If the household can make a private effort to reduce waste, then an optimal policy is shown to be a unique combination of given economic instruments.     

Advance disposal fee vs. disposal fee: A monopolistic producer’s durability choice model

This study examines how the timing of waste disposal fee collection affects the producer’s choice of built-in product durability and social welfare in a durable-goods monopoly model. We categorize the waste disposal fee policies into two: advance disposal fee (ADF) policy and disposal fee (DF) policy. We show that a DF policy has two opposing effects on durability. Firstly, a DF policy gives the producer an incentive to increase durability in order to delay the households’ waste disposal and to discount future payments of the disposal fee (the payment-discounting effect). Secondly, a DF policy creates an incentive for consumers to dump waste illegally in order to mitigate the payment of the disposal fee, and gives the producer an incentive to reduce durability in order to avoid market saturation and the associated future price cuts (the illegal-dumping effect). When the disposal fee is low, the payment-discounting effect dominates the illegal-dumping effect under a DF policy, leading to the enhancement of durability. In this case, from a social welfare viewpoint, a DF policy may be more desirable than an ADF policy if the environmental damage associated with illegal dumping is not serious. However, when the disposal fee is high, a DF policy induces more illegal dumping, reduces durability, and inflicts more environmental damage. Therefore, an ADF policy is more socially desirable than a DF policy when the disposal fee is high. Moreover, we consider an oligopoly case and find that an ADF policy is more socially desirable in an industry with smaller market power.     

Optimizing production technology choices: conventional production vs. recycling

The present study examines the optimal use of renewable resources and how optimality is linked to the accumulation of waste stock. Production technology choices are based on a maximization of a discounted stream of net utility over time with respect to constancy of environmental services. When adopting a socially optimal tax-subsidy scheme to price produced goods, the ultimate utility level is determined by how tax revenues and subsidies compensate each other in monetary terms. Therefore, the constraints imposed on the optimal use of economic instruments in promoting recycling when a government budget is balanced are also studied. The materials balance structure of the model yields steady-state comparative statics and dynamic envelope results with interesting policy implications.     

Does garbage pricing increase the immoral disposal of household waste?

Some empirical studies have attempted to clarify the mechanism of illegal dumping by examining the degree to which per-bag pricing plays a role. However, previous research on the behaviour of avoiding paying a charge for waste collection has tended to neglect so-called ‘immoral disposal,’ which is less risky than illegal dumping because there is no legal penalty. In this study, we define immoral disposal as the dumping of waste in a manner that is immoral but not illegal. To detect the existence of immoral disposal, we apply a spatial econometric approach, namely an extended panel spatial Durbin model, to identify the actual spillover effect of garbage pricing in neighbouring municipalities on immoral disposal from the total waste. A major finding of this study is that immoral disposal exists in unit-based pricing, two-tiered pricing, and fixed pricing.     

A Comparison of Household Recycling Behaviors in Norway and the United States

This paper investigates empirically the determinants of household recycling in Norway and compares the results with a similar, recently published, study of households in the United States. The comparison focuses on the relative importance of user fees on waste disposal, community recycling programs, and socioeconomic factors. Both data sources are nationwide, material-specific, and at the household level. One major finding is that a disposal fee provides a significant economic incentive to Norwegian households, whereas its effectiveness in the United States is still up for debate. Providing households with convenient recycling options, such as curbside and drop-off recycling, appears generally effective, but less so in Norway than in the United States. Socioeconomic characteristics are less important predictors of behavior in Norway than in the United States. Qualifications on the comparison are provided throughout and two extensions for future research are suggested at the end.     

Economic instruments and the environmental accounts

The Nordic countries have now had experience with environmental taxes and subsidies as a major component of their environmental policy over an extensive period of time. The Swedish System of Environmental and Economic Accounts (SEEA) include environmental taxes and subsidies as part of the official statistics. This article presents the accounts for taxes and subsidies, linked to the accounts for emissions data by industry. It demonstrates disparities between emissions and environmental taxes, as well as where industries or environmental problems are not regulated. The data show that in Sweden economic instruments are always aimed at particular actors or areas, and are never quite as comprehensive as recommended by economic theory. The environmental taxes are primarily aimed at fossil fuel use and related emissions, and have been mostly applied to the household sector and services sector, while industry often has been given exemptions due to concerns about international competition. The environmentally motivated subsidies are mainly directed to agriculture, fishing and research on renewable resources. A fully developed international data set on taxes and subsidies would provide a sound base for comparing the impact on international competitiveness. Eurostat is promoting the use of environmental accounts data for its member countries by harmonizing methods and engaging in publication of international comparisons.     

Household Waste Management in a Swedish Municipality: Determinants of Waste Disposal, Recycling and Composting

This paper analyzes waste disposal, recycling and composting in a municipality in southwest Sweden. In 1994, Varberg introduced a weight-based billing system for household waste charging 1 kr/kg of waste and at the same time recycling centers were set up and a green shopping campaign was launched. This led to a significant reduction in waste collected and increased recycling. This study had access to actual measured data on waste disposal at the household level for a residential area called Tvååker, in addition to survey data for the same households. This makes it possible to carry out a more reliable and more detailed analysis than has been previously possible, particularly with respect to attitudinal variables. The most important determinants of each individual household's waste were composting of kitchen waste, living area, age and attitudes concerning the difficulty of recycling various materials. Separate sections look at composting behaviour, at willingness to pay for sound waste management and for the sake of comparison three other municipalities are also studied. The main finding is that economic incentives, although important, are not the only driving force behind the observed reduction in municipal waste: Given the proper infrastructure that facilitates recycling, people are willing to invest more time than can be motivated purely by savings on their waste management bill.     

Recycling and Waste Diversion Effectiveness: Evidence from Canada

In this paper, we investigate the relationship between recycling policy options and recycling behavior to study the most effective methods of diverting post-consumer waste from landfills. We employ data from a unique, micro-data set collected from households in communities across Ontario, Canada. We estimate the relationships between several commonly recycled materials (newsprint, glass, plastics, aluminum cans, tin cans, cardboard, and toxic chemicals) and individual household characteristics, recycling program attributes, and garbage collection financing methods. We find that user fees on garbage collection have significant impacts on recycling levels for all materials except toxic chemicals, and mandatory recycling programs on particular items have significant effects on recycling for almost all materials. Limits on the amount of garbage that can be placed at the curb, and providing free units under user fee systems, however, generally have a negligible or detrimental impact on recycling.JEL classification: D10, H23, Q28     

A social accounting matrix for Egypt, 1976

A 1976 Social Accounting Matrix for Egypt is presented and the methods of estimation used are described briefly. Some of the implications of the accounting are discussed. The information on the distribution of taxes and subsidies indicates that the latter are the major source of progressiveness in the fiscal system. In relation to their incomes, rural households are also shown to pay less in taxes and receive less in subsidies than urban households.     

Optimal Taxation of Risky Human Capital*

In a two‐period life‐cycle model with ex ante homogeneous households, earnings risk, and a general earnings function, we derive the optimal linear labor tax rate and optimal linear education subsidies. The optimal income tax trades off social insurance against incentives to work. Education subsidies are not used for social insurance, but they are only targeted at offsetting the distortions of the labor tax and internalizing a fiscal externality. Both optimal education subsidies and tax rates increase if labor and education are more complementary, because education subsidies indirectly lower labor tax distortions by stimulating labor supply. Optimal education subsidies (taxes) also correct non‐tax distortions arising from missing insurance markets. Education subsidies internalize a positive (negative) fiscal externality if there is underinvestment (overinvestment) in education because of risk. Education policy unambiguously allows for more social insurance if education is a risky activity. However, if education hedges against labor‐market risk, optimal tax rates could be lower than in the case without education subsidies.     

Environmental Taxation,Inequality and Engel’s Law: The Double Dividend of Redistribution

Empirical evidence shows that low-income households spend a high share of their income on pollution-intensive goods. This fuels the concern that an environmental tax reform could be regressive. We employ a framework which accounts for the distributional effect of environmental taxes and the recycling of the revenues on both households and firms to quantify changes in the optimal tax structure and the equity impacts of an environmental tax reform. We characterize when an optimal environmental tax reform does not increase inequality, even if the tax system before the reform is optimal from a non-environmental point of view. If the tax system before the reform is calibrated to stylized data—and is thus non-optimal—we find that there is a large scope for inequality reduction, even if the government is restricted in its recycling options.     

Indirect Taxation and Gender Equity: Evidence from South Africa

Abstract

This study adds to the growing literature on the distributional effects of indirect or consumption taxes in developing countries by exploring whether these taxes have differential gender outcomes. Using data from Statistics South Africa's 2000 Income and Expenditure Survey, the study investigates differences in tax incidence between “female-type” and “male-type” households, classified according to their demographic and economic attributes. The results suggest that zero-rating a well-targeted selection of basic foodstuffs and fuel for household use is important in protecting female-type households, especially those in the lowest quintiles and with children, from bearing an otherwise disproportionate share of the tax burden. In contrast, high taxes on alcohol, tobacco, and fuel for private transport result in a larger incidence on male-type households. The study also suggests ways in which the indirect tax structure could be refined to further reduce the large gender (and income) inequities that exist in South Africa.     

Consumption externalities and direct versus indirect corrective pricing

In a competitive economy with consumption externalities arising only if some commodities are put to particular uses and where individual marginal contributions to the level of the externality may differ among individuals, a first best Pareto-optimum can be attained through a set of Pigouvian taxes discriminating between users and uses of the externality-generating commodities. In the present paper we shall discuss the optimal structure of commodity taxes in the case that policy discrimination is not possible or feasible. If policy discrimination between users or uses is not possible, we show that apart from taxing or subsidizing the direct sources of externalities, it may be optimal to impose taxes or subsidies on related goods, i.e., indirect corrective pricing.     

On the Second-best Policy of Household's Waste Recycling

This study analyzes the second-best household's waste recycling policy. If we assume the first-best economy with no illegal disposal or transaction costs, then unit pricing, an advance disposal fee and a recycling subsidy are required in order to achieve the social optimum such that both the sum of unit pricing and an advance disposal fee and the sum of unit pricing and a recycling subsidy are equal to the marginal disposal cost. Furthermore, the first-best outcome can also be obtained by a producer take-back requirement system.In the real economy, however, various factors prevent the first-best optimal outcome. In this study we consider two factors, one being the transaction cost associated with a recycling subsidy (or refund) and the other being illegal disposal by the consumer. If a recycling subsidy (or a deposit-refund system) is adopted, a transaction cost associated with it will be generated. Alternatively, if unit pricing is adopted, some of the consumed goods may be disposed of illegally. We show the complete trade-off between unit pricing and a recycling subsidy. In other words, we can not adopt unit pricing and a recycling subsidy simultaneously. As a result, there are three candidates for the second-best policy: unit pricing with an advance disposal fee, a deposit-refund system, and a producer take-back requirement system.Which of these three policies is the second-best policy will depend on the relative magnitude of the price of a recycled good and the marginal transaction cost associated with a recycling subsidy (or the refund in a deposit-refund system). Generally, if the price of a recycled good is positive and the marginal transaction cost is relatively high, unit pricing with an advance disposal fee is the second-best policy. However, where the price of a recycled good is negative and the marginal transaction cost is relatively high, a producer take-back requirement system is the second-best policy. Further, where the marginal transaction cost is relatively low, a deposit-refund system is the second-best policy, regardless of whether the price of a recycled good is positive or negative.     

Recycling under a material balance constraint

In this paper we analyze the dynamic implications of recycling for resource use, the level of economic activity and the long-run development of the economy. In contrast to former approaches, we take explicit account of the circulation of matter in the economy. We consider virgin resources and recycled wastes as essential inputs to production. These material inputs either end up as waste after consumption or are bound in the capital stock—depending on the utilization of the produced output. As accumulating wastes can be recycled and again be employed in production, the waste stock serves as a source of valuable inputs in our model. We focus on the implications of recycling-related market failures and the integration of material balances on the dynamics of the economy. It is shown that a market for waste and subsidies to resource extractors and recycling firms can restore optimality in the decentralized economy.     

Consumption adaptation,anticipation‐bias,and optimal income taxation

Adaptation is omnipresent but people systematically fail to correctly anticipate the degree to which they adapt, leading them to make irrational intertemporal decisions. This paper concerns optimal income taxation to correct for such anticipation‐biases in a framework where consumers adapt to earlier consumption levels. The analysis is based on a general equilibrium OLG model with endogenous labor supply and savings where each consumer lives for three periods. The results show how a paternalistic government may correct for the effects of anticipation‐bias through a combination of time‐variant marginal labor income taxes and savings subsidies/taxes. The optimal policy mix remains the same, irrespective of whether consumers commit to their original life time plan for work hours and consumption or reoptimize later on when realizing that they have already adapted more than expected.