An elementary model of export tax war

In this paper, the author uses a generalized version of Kennan and Riezman (Int Econ Rev 29(1):81–85, 1988) trade war model with Stone–Geary preferences, where countries can choose between a Nash tariff or an export tax. Three scenarios emerge from this setting, namely: the standard tariff war, the export tax war and a mixed scenario—“the tariff-export tax war”—where one country applies a Nash tariff, while the other imposes an export tax. In this setting, countries derive their market power not only from their relative endowment size, but also from their subsistence consumptions. As a consequence, a large country does not necessarily win a trade war if it has a substantially higher consumption requirement than the small country. This finding explains why large economies sign trade agreements with small counterparts that prohibit the use of tariffs and export taxes.     

Uniform versus Discriminatory Tariffs: When Will Export Taxes Be Used?

This paper examines the noncooperative interactions between two exporting countries and one importing country when all of them are seeking the optimal policies to improve their welfare. Whereas the importing country has the incentive to impose tariffs on the goods coming from the two exporting countries, the export policies chosen by the exporting countries depend on the tariff regime, whether uniform or discriminatory tariffs are used. It is argued that export taxes are chosen by both exporting countries in some cases, and that whereas the importing country prefers a uniform tariff regime, the exporting countries find a discriminatory tariff regime preferable.     

On the comparison of tariffs and quotas in oligopolistic intermediate goods markets

This paper examines and compares the effects of tariffs and quotas imposed on oligopolistic intermediate input markets. We introduce tariff and quota revenues and the substitutability of all inputs including two intermediate inputs. We focus on Cournot–Nash equilibrium and show that if the price elasticity of demand for the final good is smaller (respectively greater) than the elasticity of substitution between the intermediate inputs, the output of the duopolist in the protected country is smaller (respectively greater) under a quota than under a tariff.     

MFN Status and the Choice of Tariff Regime

The gradualist approach to trade liberalization views the uniform tariffs implied by MFN status as an important step on the path to free trade. We investigate whether a regime of uniform tariffs will be preferable to discriminatory tariffs when countries engage in non-cooperative interaction in multilateral trade. The analysis includes product differentiation and asymmetric costs. We show that with the cost asymmetry the countries will disagree on the choice of tariff regime. When the choice of import tariffs and export subsidies is made sequentially the uniform tariff regime may not be sustainable, because of an incentive to deviate to a discriminatory regime. Hence, an international body is needed to ensure compliance with tariff agreement.     

The impact of international agreements on domestic policy: An analysis of tariff policy in African countries

This paper estimates a fixed effects tariff model to study the impact of the tariff reform provisions of international agreements on domestic tariffs, using a sample of eight Sub-Saharan African countries. The structure of the model explaining domestic tariff changed from the preagreement period to the postagreement period. However, the results indicate that for the most part, efforts by governments to adhere to tariff agreements failed in all but a few countries. Even for the countries in which the agreements appeared to be successful, the significance of the results is relatively weak.     

Measuring the usage of preferential tariffs in the world

The preference utilization ratio, i.e., the share of preferential imports out of total imports, has been a popular indicator for measuring the usage of preferential tariffs vis-à-vis tariffs on a most-favored-nation basis. A crucial shortcoming of this measure is the data requirements, particularly for data on imports classified by tariff schemes, which are not available in most countries. This study proposes another measure for preference utilization, termed the “tariff exemption ratio.” This measure is a good proxy for the value of offered preferences by each importing country to the rest of the world. Importantly, it can be computed by employing only publicly available data, such as those provided by the World Development Indicators, for its computations. We can thus calculate this measure for many countries for an international comparison. Our finding is that tariff exemption ratios differ widely across countries.     

碳关税对我国外贸产生的影响及应对策略

气候大会的相继召开说明各国越来越重视气候变化,发展低碳经济已经成为世界共识。发达国家提出碳关税的概念,以求减少全球二氧化碳排放,引起了以中国为首的发展中国家强烈的反对。主要介绍碳关税的含义、由来以及目前实施的现状,分析征收碳关税将对我国外贸产生的巨大影响,最后从国内和国际两个层面提出应对碳关税的措施。     

How Will the Implementation of Zero Tariffs Affect Employment in China?

This paper studies the employment effect of China's possible implementation of zero tariffs by comparing China's most‐favored‐nation tariffs and the tariff schedules of China's signed free trade agreements (FTAs) with the tariff concessions in a typical high‐standard FTA. It finds that there is a large gap between China's current tariff status and a high‐standard FTA, and the implementation of zero tariffs in China would have a significant negative impact on employment in some industries. However, the employment effect of implementing zero tariffs is heterogeneous. Analysis at the industrial level shows that, although employment would drop in a few industries as a result of the implementation of zero tariffs, more jobs would be created in most industries. The overall employment effect of a zero tariff policy would be positive, creating an estimated 8.05 million jobs in China. Therefore, China should consider the adjustment costs brought by the labor movement in different industries and introduce relevant policies to deal with the employment shocks caused by zero tariffs.     

Revenue enhancing tariff reform

Revenue Enhancing Tariff Reform. - Programmes of gradual trade policy reform have been included in most of the structural adjustment packages adopted by developing countries. So far the literature on piecemeal trade policy reform has concentrated on finding reform programmes that improve the welfare of a representative individual. Yet trade taxes are an important source of government revenue in many developing countries. This paper therefore examines tariff reform programmes that are both welfare improving and revenue enhancing. It first determines general conditions under which such a reform will exist and then considers specific reforms of both single tariffs and groups of tariffs. The standard welfare improving reform programmes — proportional and concertina reforms - are also discussed.     

中国—俄罗斯FTA的贸易、关税及福利效应——基于WITS-SMART的模拟分析

当前,中国与俄罗斯亟需通过FTA夯实双方战略伙伴关系的经贸基础。文章利用WITS-SMART模型估算了中俄FTA的贸易、关税以及福利效应,结果显示:随着FTA框架下关税不断削减,中俄两国大多数产品部门都将从贸易规模扩张中受益,尽管两国的关税收入会出现下降,但是整体的经济福利都将获得提升。如果两国能够尽快实现零关税,那么两国之间的贸易往来会获得快速增长。因此,中俄两国需要从战略层面把握中俄FTA建设的重要意义,尽快推动中俄FTA谈判与建设。     

The First 100 Years of Tariffs in Australia: the Colonies

This paper reviews the history of tariffs imposed by the six Australian colonies during the nineteenth century. In each of the colonies, we identify the starting dates for the first tariffs, first preferences, and other features, and the turning points in the levels of tariffs. We then construct a time series of the average tariff levels in the individual colonies and an average for all six colonies combined. The conclusion notes general features of the pattern of tariffs and how the main features of colonial tariffs, such as the favourable treatment of intermediate inputs, the complex differentiation of tariff rates within industries, and the protection implicit in the excise tax system all carried over to the Commonwealth Customs Tariff in the twentieth century.     

资本积累下的动态关税模型——基于互补品贸易的分析

本文是对Calzolari and Lambertini(2007)的模型的一个拓展,尝试性地对在考虑到资本积累下的互补产品进行了动态关税分析。该模型建立在Bertrand-Ramsey竞争的微分对策之上(differential game)。分析表明,该模型同样存在两种稳态:"需求驱动"的稳态和Ramsey的"黄金律"稳态。在"需求驱动"的稳态下,如果只考虑本国厂商的利益且税率足够高,政府就会征税,但降低了本国的总福利;在Ramsey的"黄金律"稳态下,征税提高本国总福利,政府也会征税,前提是对方不征收关税。     

“碳关税”与中国外贸政策之应对

二氧化碳等温室气体排放导致气候变化问题日益受到人们关注。而美国为了在经济危机中寻找新的增长点,意图在新的节能经济中继续处于有利地位,也迫于其国内贸易保护主义的压力,于2009年6月22日通过《清洁能源安全法》。该法以限制温室气体排放、减缓全球变暖为由正式提出了对进口的高耗能产品征收"碳关税"。西方征收"碳关税"一旦成为现实,不仅会使西方国家在短期内达到贸易保护的目的,也会使其在节能环保的"低碳经济"时代保持经济和技术上的优势。本文首先对"碳关税"的由来以及西方国家的意图进行分析阐述,进而讨论其对中国外贸的不利影响,最后,从外贸政策的角度提出应对之策。     

India and the Tokyo round

The paper attempts to quantify the gains and the losses for India from the changes in import tariffs decided during the Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. The study focuses on exports to the ECCC, Japan, and the US. It is conducted at the tariff line level and uses the actual tariffs resulting from the Tokyo Round. The evaluation is in terms of the static effect of the tariff changes. The results indicate that the gains for India from most-favoured nation tariff cuts far outweigh her losses due to the erosion of preference margins acquired under the Generalized System of Preferences.     

DID GOOD INSTITUTIONS PRODUCE GOOD TARIFFS? EVIDENCE FROM TARIFF PROTECTION IN COLONIAL VICTORIA

Were tariff rates in the Australian colony of Victoria directed towards growth‐enhancing industries or rent seekers? Recent research suggests tariffs may be welfare enhancing if they are directed at industries with positive externalities; something more likely when institutions are strong. Using disaggregated tariff data for the years 1872, 1880, and 1890, we analyse the relationship between industry characteristics and tariffs, finding little evidence that Victorian industries with positive externalities received tariff protection. Our results throw doubt on good institutions necessarily producing good tariff outcomes and suggest the relationship between tariffs and growth is more complex than current studies assume.     

双寡头竞争下最优进口贸易政策选择

文章在水平差别产品的伯川德模型中对从量和从价关税进行了分析比较。研究发现,效用函数必须满足一些严格的假设,才能保证征收关税将改善本国社会福利。从量关税的进口限制效果明显强于从价关税。但对于均衡从量关税,总存在一个对能给本国带来更高社会福利的从价关税。两者的差距取决于均衡点本国市场对外国产品的需求弹性,需求弹性越小,社会福利差距越大。     

Do oil tariffs lower wages?

An oil tariff has potential to alter the pattern of production and income distribution across productive factors. This paper use a general equilibrium model of production and trade with inputs of capital, labor, and international energy to examine the effects of an oil tariff. Under a range of conditions, higher energy prices created by oil tariffs would lower the ratio of wages to capital rents, and production of labor intensive goods would fall. This paper concentrates on the potential of oil tariffs to alter patterns of production and income distribution.     

Tariff valuation,transport cost and the establishment of trade preferences among developing countries

While there are various reasons for believing that the establishment of trade preferences among developing countries would convey important benefits, previous efforts along these lines have produced few concrete accomplishments. The preference-creating system proposed in this paper is based on the proposition that developing countries are often at a transport cost disadvantage in intra-trade and the following observations: (1) almost all developing countries employ a cost-insurance-freight (c.i.f.) valuation base for tariff assessment, and (2) tariffs in the developing countries are generally much higher than in developed countries and may range from 20 to 200% or more. From this, it is demonstrated that a situation exists in which the normal c.i.f. tariff base often has a potentially important discriminatory effect on intra-trade. Specifically, if customs duties are applied to an unfavourable transport margin, the tariff system will result in a higher duty collected on intra-trade than on shipments from a developed country. However, by shifting to a two-tier valuation base, the present system's discriminatory effects can be neutralized and preferences generated for developing countries. Simulations with international trade data support the proposition that the two-tier system has these desired effects.     

Trade creation,trade diversion,and the general equilibrium effects of regional trade agreements: a study of the European Community–Turkey customs union

This paper presents an industry-level analysis of trade flows in order to estimate the trade effects of Turkey’s customs union with the European Community (EC). The paper is able to distinguish between trade creation and trade diversion by employing tariff data on each good to measure the impact of not only the tariff level but also the difference between tariffs applied to imports from Europe and the most-favored nation tariffs applied to imports from other non-preferential trading partners. The paper estimates the general equilibrium effects of the customs union in addition to the effects of eliminating tariffs on the EC’s exports to Turkey. It concludes that the customs union has generated more than twice as much trade creation as trade diversion but that the overall impact of the customs union has been relatively small.     

Trade Liberalization and Industry Dynamics

This paper uses a large data set for 28 industries in 40 countries to examine the effects of trade liberalization on the number of firms, the average size of surviving firms, and markups. We extend previous studies by examining not only tariff changes in the liberalizing country but also trade reforms in the rest of the world. In addition, we look at whether these effects differ across industries depending on their degree of comparative advantage. The results show that a reduction in home tariffs decreases the number of establishments, firms average size, and markups. All of these three effects are found to be of lower magnitude for comparative advantage industries. In the case of foreign tariffs, our results show that a reduction in protection in the rest of the world is associated with an increase in the number of establishments (which is likely to be reflecting an increase in export profitability), a decrease in average size, while markups are mostly unaffected. As with home tariffs, these effects tend to be less pronounced in comparative advantage industries.