经营现金流透明度、市场关注度与股价崩盘风险

选取2008—2015年A股上市公司数据,实证分析经营现金流透明度与公司股价崩盘风险之间的关系,结果表明,相比于应计会计盈余,经营现金流具有更多的信息含量,对股价崩盘风险具有更强的解释力。进一步,考察市场关注度对经营现金流透明度与公司股价崩盘风险关系的调节效应,发现市场关注度对股价崩盘风险存在双重影响,主要表现为:一方面,市场关注度的提高增大了企业管理层的经营压力,使其更倾向于操纵现金流信息,进而导致现金流透明度降低,股价崩盘风险升高;另一方面,随着市场关注度的逐步提高,投资者消化、吸收与理解信息的能力也在不断提升,企业隐藏坏消息的能力受到限制,从而降低了经营现金流透明度对股价崩盘风险的影响,即表现为市场关注度越高,经营现金流透明度对股价崩盘风险的影响越弱。     

有效激励还是以权谋私:超额高管薪酬与股价崩盘风险——基于不同产权性质的实证研究

近年来中国上市公司的高管高薪引起社会的广泛关注.本文搜集了2010~2014年中国A股上市公司前三名高管的薪酬水平,考察高管的超额薪酬与股价崩盘风险的相关关系,分析不同产权性质下高管高薪的激励效果.研究发现:国有上市公司的高管超额薪酬与股价崩盘风险正相关,证明国企中高管高薪的自利性,但该现象仅在地方国企显著;民营上市公司的高管薪酬相对国企而言更具激励性,但激励效果十分有限;超额高管薪酬与股价崩盘风险的关系受产权性质的影响,证明不同产权性质的企业在高管激励方面存在明显差异.本文为不同产权性质上市公司的高管薪酬制度建设提供了理论依据,并同时反映了基于激励动机的股价崩盘效应.     

信息披露对企业风险的影响——以KH药业为例

本文先通过对KH药业的案例分析得出,其企业社会责任信息披露会增加企业的股价崩盘风险,之后又利用回归实证分析了众多上市企业社会责任信息披露对股价崩盘风险的影响。研究显示,在强制披露的前提下,企业社会责任与股价崩盘风险之间呈显著正向关系,表明中国上市公司推行社会责任的同时加剧了股价的崩盘风险,"社会责任的崩盘效应"不是个别现象。     

企业内部监督与股价崩盘风险——基于代理成本和信息透明度的中介效应检验

文章以2007—2017年我国沪深A股上市公司为样本,探究了企业内部监督对股价崩盘风险的影响及其作用机制。研究结果显示,企业的内部监督程度越高,股价崩盘风险越低;企业的内部监督通过降低代理成本和提高信息透明度来降低股价崩盘风险,即代理成本和信息透明度是内部监督与股价崩盘风险之间的两个中介变量。进一步研究表明,企业内部监督对股价崩盘风险的降低作用在两职分离时更为显著。文章从企业内部监督的角度对股价崩盘风险进行研究,具有一定的理论价值和实践意义。     

投资者保护与股价崩盘风险

股价崩盘严重损害投资者利益,阻碍资本市场健康有序发展,因此探究股价崩盘风险的影响因素,已成为当前公司财务和资产定价领域研究的热点话题。本文以2001-2012年A股上市公司为样本,研究了地区投资者保护与股价崩盘风险之间的内在关系。研究发现:随着地区投资者保护水平的提高,公司股价崩盘风险显著下降;在业绩差、成长性低的公司中上述负相关关系更加显著。在进行了一系列稳健性检验后,这一结论依然成立。进一步分析表明,地区投资者保护对未来股价崩盘风险的抑制作用可以通过降低公司正向盈余管理的路径实现。本研究不但将股价崩盘风险的研究视角拓展到了宏观领域,深化了股价崩盘风险的研究,也为监管部门加强投资者保护建设提供了决策依据。     

数字化转型程度、投资者情绪与股价崩盘风险——基于制造业市场的影响研究

数字化时代,制造业作为经济的重要支柱,不仅面临着数字化转型的挑战,还有着巨大的转型发展机遇。本文选取2010—2020年全部A股制造业上市公司数据作为研究样本,旨在探究企业数字化转型如何在投资者情绪与股价崩盘风险路径中发挥作用。研究表明：当投资者情绪高涨时,股价崩盘风险会相应增加。数字化转型对整个路径有负向调节作用;企业数字化转型程度越高,对投资者情绪高涨带来的股价崩盘风险抑制能力越强。综合以上结论,企业应积极推进数字化转型,以减少由投资者情绪高涨带来的股价崩盘风险。本文基于数字化转型程度,验证了数字化转型对股价崩盘风险的调节效应并提出了相关发展建议,以期为制造业和企业制定数字化转型战略提供参考。     

机构投资者持股、内部控制与股价崩盘风险

为探究机构投资者持股比例与内部控制质量对于股价崩盘风险的关系,本文选取2011～2019年中国A股主板上市公司数据为样本进行实证检验分析。实证结果表明：机构投资者对上市公司持股比例越高,其个股股价崩盘风险越高。上市公司内部控制质量越高,其个股股价崩盘风险越低。高质量的内部控制能够减轻机构投资者持股对于个股股价崩盘风险带来的正向影响,起到稳定股价的作用。     

高管持股、内部控制与股价崩盘风险

文章选取2017-2021年沪深A股上市公司的数据,分析高管持股对股价崩盘风险的影响以及内部控制在其中起到的调节作用。研究结果表明：高管持股比例增加会加大上市公司股价崩盘风险,有效的内部控制则可以弱化高管持股比例增加在股价稳定性方面带来的负面影响。因此,政府监管部门要完善内部控制基本规范并对企业执行情况进行有效监督,而企业要从机制和制度两方面去降低股价崩盘风险。     

企业创新投入与资本市场反应 ——研发支出加计扣除政策效应探讨

企业创新作为具有高风险与信息不对称性的内部活动,究竟会对股价崩盘风险与股价特质性波动产生怎样的影响,已有研究并未得出一致结论。本文以2007～2017年非金融类A股上市公司为样本,探究企业创新投入对于股价崩盘风险和股价特质性波动的作用效果。OLS回归结果表明,企业创新投入显著降低了股价崩盘风险,同时提高了企业特质性波动。为解决内生性问题,本文使用双重差分模型(DID)对因果关系进行检验。研究发现,相比于不符合研发支出加计扣除政策条件的企业,符合这一政策条件的企业在政策实施后的股价崩盘风险显著下降,特质性波动显著上升,与OLS回归结果一致。上述结论在PSM-DID等多项稳健性测试中保持一致。本文研究对于上市公司加强研发信息披露,投资者优化投资决策,以及政府部门完善资本市场制度均具有重要启示。     

期望绩效反馈会影响股价崩盘风险吗?——基于中国A股上市公司的实证分析

以2003—2017年沪深两市A股上市公司为研究样本,实证检验消极绩效反馈下期望绩效差距对股价崩盘风险的影响。结果表明:当企业未实现组织期望绩效时,实际绩效低于期望绩效的程度越大,股价崩盘风险越高;较高的内部控制质量和控股股东持股比例能够弱化期望绩效差距对股价崩盘风险的正向影响。进一步分析发现,企业信息透明度在期望绩效差距与股价崩盘风险之间起部分中介作用。文章从期望绩效反馈的视角深入阐述了股价波动的成因,同时从内部监督的角度提出了平稳资本市场表现的对策。     

Ultimate government control and stock price crash risk: Evidence from China

Using data of Chinese firms over 2004–2018, we find that firms controlled by government entities, particularly central government entities, are less prone to stock price crashes, as compared with privately controlled firms. The effect is robust to alternative estimation approaches and moderated by the Split-share Structure Reform and the anti-corruption campaign. The results attest to the incentive alignment view that controlling and minority shareholders align their interests and stock prices perform well. Further, we find that government-controlled firms exhibit less financial opacity, undertake less risky investments, and appoint myopic CEOs, through which stock price crash risk is diminished.     

Corporate Philanthropy and Stock Price Crash Risk: Evidence from China

How to mitigate stock price crash risk has become a focus in the theoretical and practical fields. Building on the work of Kim et al. (J Bank Finance, 43:1–13, 2014b), this paper investigates the relation between corporate philanthropy and crash risk under the unique Chinese institutional background. The results show that both state ownership and the 2005 split share reform attenuate the mitigating effect of corporate philanthropy on crash risk. Specifically, the negative relation between corporate philanthropy and crash risk is less pronounced for state-owned enterprises than for non-state-owned enterprises, and it is also less pronounced after firms accomplish the split share reform. Further, this effect is more pronounced for firms with greater financial risks and poorer performance. Our paper contributes to the growing literature on the determinants of stock price crash risk and the economic consequences of corporate philanthropy. It also offers useful guidance to firms that are seeking to reduce stock price crash risk in emerging markets.     

Do Patented Innovations Reduce Stock Price Crash Risk?*

Using a large sample of US firms, we document a significantly negative relation between the number of patents (citations) and stock price crash risk. Our findings are consistent with the arguments that patented innovation activities send a high‐quality signal and reduces proprietary information costs, which lowers information asymmetry and enhance disclosure. Further, we find that such impact of patented innovation on stock price crash risk is more pronounced in firms with weak corporate governance and high information opacity. Our findings provide new evidence on the real effects of patented innovation on crash risk in equity market.     

环境管理体系认证能够抑制股价崩盘风险吗？

近年来，随着环境政策日趋严格，环境负面消息累积导致的股价崩盘风险不断提高。文章基于2007-2019年中国沪深两市A股重污染企业的经验数据，探讨了环境管理体系认证对股价崩盘风险的影响。研究发现，环境管理体系认证能够显著抑制股价崩盘风险，且当媒体关注越高、分析师关注越高时，环境管理体系认证对股价崩盘风险的抑制作用更强。进一步探讨影响机制发现，环境管理体系认证主要通过治理机制和信息机制来影响股价崩盘风险，换言之，环境管理体系认证能够通过提高公司环境绩效和公司信息透明度来抑制股价崩盘风险。研究结论揭示了环境管理体系认证具有资本市场有效性，丰富了股价崩盘风险的影响因素研究，对于政府完善环境管理体系认证制度以提高资本市场稳定性、企业优化战略决策以提升企业价值具有重要的借鉴意义。     

Takeover protection and stock price crash risk: Evidence from state antitakeover laws

We exploit the passage of state antitakeover laws to examine the relation between takeover protection and stock price crash risk. We find that firms incorporated in states that passed the laws are negatively associated with future stock price crash risk in the post-law periods, suggesting that takeover protection mitigates bad news hoarding activities. Further analysis shows that the mitigating effect is more pronounced when firms have severe information asymmetry or face strong product market competition. Together, our findings shed new light on the impact of takeover threats on managerial incentives to engage in bad news hoarding.     

Company visits and stock price crash risk: Evidence from China

Using a sample of Chinese listed firms, we observe that firms more visited by analysts or institutional investors exhibit lower future stock price crash risk. This effect is more pronounced for firms facing more incentives for or fewer constraints on hiding bad news. Greater mitigation of crash risk occurs if more firm-specific information is discovered during such visits and if visits are conducted by analysts instead of institutional investors. The impact of company visits is observed mostly in the first half of the subsequent year. These findings suggest that company visits mitigate crash risk by discovering and disseminating firm-specific information.     

Retail attention,retail trades,and stock price crash risk

This paper investigates the impact of retail attention on stock price crash risk in the Chinese stock market. Developing a composite measure of retail attention emphasizing its dynamic changes, we find that retail attention exacerbates future crash risk, which is robust to numerous checks that accommodate possibly omitted variables, apply the fixed effects model and instrumental variable approach, and adopt a legal interpretation as an exogenous policy shock. Extended analyses show that the impact of retail attention is more pronounced for firms with high information uncertainty under optimistic aggregate states. Moreover, using a sample of attention-grabbing stocks, we find that retail trades offer a crucial linkage from retail attention to crash risk. Overall, our findings are helpful to understand the nature of retail attention and its consequences on trading behavior as well as stock returns.     

Does share pledging affect firms' use of derivatives? Evidence from China

We investigate whether share pledging by controlling shareholders affects firms' use of derivatives. Our findings suggest that share-pledging firms are more likely to use derivatives than non-share-pledging firms. In cross-section analyses, we observe that the relationship is more pronounced when the margin call risk is higher, for example, if controlling shareholders own fewer shares, firms are located in regions with higher levels of marketization, or firms have a higher stock price crash risk. Our findings indicate that shares pledged by controlling shareholders steer firms toward the use of derivatives to hedge firm activities and alleviate the margin call risk.     

Economic policy uncertainty,non-financial enterprises' shadow banking activities and stock price crash risk

At present, the structural contradiction between Economic Financialization and the real economy's long-term weakness has become increasingly prominent. As China enters a “new normal” stage of economic growth, the real investment rate drops, non-financial enterprises continuously allocate resources to the shadow banking system. The financial economy becomes increasingly divorced from reality. This leads us to the questions: will the shadow banking behavior of non-financial companies exacerbate the risk of stock price crash risk? How does the increase in economic policy uncertainty affect the relationship between non-financial companies' shadow banking activities and stock price crash risk?This article uses non-financial listed companies' data from 2007 to 2017 and conducts empirical analysis to answer this question. The study finds that companies engaged in high-leverage, high-risk shadow banking business exacerbate stock crash risk. This effect is only pronounced in non-state-owned enterprises and low social trust regions. The increase in the degree of economic policy uncertainty positively impacts the relationship between non-financial companies' shadow banking business and stock price crash risk. The theoretical mechanism is as follows: the rise in economic policy uncertainty amplifies the positive relationship between shadow banking activities of non-financial companies and stock price crashes by increasing bank loans, investors' sensitivity to external information, risk cross-contagion, and inefficient investment mechanisms. Various robustness tests do not change the research conclusion. This paper has important theoretical and policy guidance significance for reviewing the existing diversified shadow banking system and preventing systemic risks.     

Influence of dividend tax policy tied to investment horizon on stock price stability: Evidence from the 2015 dividend tax reform in China

We examine how the dividend tax cut policy tied to the investment horizon enforced on September 8, 2015, influences stock price stability in China's A-share market. As the new dividend tax policy waives the tax on cash dividends for investors holding a stock for more than a year, it encourages long-term investment behavior. From 2013 to 2017, we find that stock turnover, return volatility, and turnover volatility decrease after the policy enforcement, especially for stocks with high dividend yields. This result shows that dividend tax reforms increase investors' stock investment horizons and help stabilize the market. However, our findings demonstrate that stock crash risk increases after policy enforcement. Further analysis shows that earnings management through real activities manipulation for stocks with a higher dividend yield contributes to an increase in stock crash risk. Therefore, one externality of the dividend tax cut policy tied to the investment horizon is that top managers of firms with a higher dividend yield may take advantage of investors' passive longer-term investment behavior and engage in more earnings management. This result suggests that regulatory agencies should pay attention to top managers' earnings management behavior after enacting policies that encourage long-term investment.