国有商业银行改革存在的问题与对策分析

我国国有商业银行改革是与改革开放同步进行的.本文针对现阶段商业银行股份制改革存在的国有商业银行的公司治理结构不健全、员工素质普遍不高、金融环境不健康三个主要不良因素进行分析并提出措施建议:建立健全有效的公司治理结构;提高基层行的素质;加大力度培养和吸收高级金融人才;加快法治社会建设,加强诚信制度建设;推动现代企业制度建设,转变政府职能;建立健全惩治和预防金融腐败体系.     

对降低金融风险之我见

国有商业银行作为我国最主要的金融力量在国民经济发展中起到了积极的作用,也作出了巨大的贡献.然而,随着市场经济体系的建立以及金融体制改革的不断深化,国有商业银行公共信用的特征正逐渐淡化,而逐步建立起现代企业制度.审计中发现一些国有商业银行(以下简称商业银行)的经营结果显露出了其原有管理方式上的一些弊端,蕴藏着风险危机.我国加入WTO后,一些国外金融机构随之可以进入中国,一系列的挑战和冲击也随之而来,进一步完善国有商业银行经营管理降低金融风险显得越来越重要.     

国有商业银行面临的形势

<正> 金融是现代经济的核心,国有商业银行是金融业的重要组成部分。到2001年底,国有商业银行的存、贷款余额分别占全部存、贷款总量的62％和59％。我国国民经济结构的战略性调整,加入WTO后中国金融市场的进一步开放,国内金融同业的不断创新,使国有商业银行面临更为复杂的发展环境,也为国有商业银行的体制和机制创新提供了巨大的推动力。进一步深化改革,已成为银行发展的潮流。国有商业银行改革的目的是提高竞争力国有商业银行改革是我国建立现代企业制度的重要组成部分,建立现代企业制度的根本的是发展生产力,对于国有商业银行来说,则是为了提高国有资本的经营效益,实现集约型的有效增长,最直接的表现是提高竞争力。商业银行的竞争力是银行业盈利性、安全性、流动性的综合反映,是对商业银行经营管     

现代金融企业制度：内涵与要求

现代金融企业制度：内涵与要求葛兆强建立现代企业制度，是我国经济体制改革的核心内容。金融企业作为经营货币这一特殊商品的企业，也必须适应市场经济发展和金融体制改革的要求，建立起现代金融企业制度，以确保金融业的良性运行和金融宏观调控作用的发挥，从而带动金融...     

试论建立现代金融企业制度

现代企业制度是一种产权明晰、权责明确、政企分开、管理科学的企业制度。建立现代金融企业制度 ,标志着银行改革转向以明晰产权关系为主要内容的金融企业制度的创新 ,这对于进一步深化金融体制改革 ,适应市场经济体制 ,具有直接的重大意义。一、建立现代金融企业制度的内容1、明确商业银行的法人产权。法人产权是现代企业制度的核心 ,明确银行法人产权主要是明确银行以国家授予的产权承担民事责任 ,以法人产权承担资产增值的经济责任。商业银行只有在拥有独立产权的基础上 ,才能承担资产经营风险 ,成为真正的货币商品经营者。2、按现代企业…     

国有银行上市的六大争议问题

随着金融改革的不断深化,国有商业银行所深藏的许多矛盾和问题却始终没有得到解决。究其原因就在于我国国有商业银行改革还未触及问题的实质——产权改革。而产权则是现代企业制度的核心,如果不能从产权入手对国有商业银行进行改革,真正意义上的商业银行就无法形成。因此,进行产权改革就成了今后我国国有商业银行进行改革的重点。对国有商业银行进行产权改革,就是解决国有商业     

加快建立现代商业银行企业制度

随着我国经济市场化步伐的加快 ,特别是加入 WTO和经济金融全球化影响的扩大 ,银行改革面临着难得的机遇、巨大的挑战 ,从当前环境来看 ,银行改革应以加快建立现代商业银行企业制度为根本 ,力争解决深层次的问题 ,建设真正意义上的现代化商业银行。一、完善法人治理结构 ,改革银行治理制度国有商业银行产权关系模糊是制约其迈向现代化商业银行的最深层次的矛盾。这势必成为国有商业银行在加入 WTO后更趋明显的竞争劣势 ,甚至成为危及其生存和发展的根本性因素。《商业银行法》规定 ,商业银行采取有限责任公司和股份有限公司两种形式。国…     

探讨建立现代金融企业制度的途径

探讨建立现代金融企业制度的途径杨明国有商业银行的制度创新，核心是确立三个基本制度：（１）建立企业法人制度。商业银行应依法独立享有民事权利，承担民事责任，拥有独立的法人财产权。（２）建立有限责任制度。商业银行以其全部法人财产为限，自主经营，自负盈亏，照...     

加快国有商业银行商业化势在必行

加快国有商业银行的商业化步伐,是深化金融体制改革和适应市场经济的重要任务。当前国有商业银行发展中存在着许多问题,商业化改革步伐不快,尤其是我国即将加入WTO,商业银行将面临国外银行的冲击,因此,加快我国商业银行商业化步伐势在必行。     

解决民营企业融资问题的对策

1·完善民营企业制度,健全治理结构。推动民营企业制度的多元化和社会化,实现治理结构合理化。对民营企业要引导资本社会化方向,改变家族式管理方式,吸收现代企业制度和管理制度的要素;应规范财务制度,增加企业财务透明度。2·深化商业银行改革,完善金融企业制度。要改变银行在民营企业贷款中的约束条件,必须深化商业银行改革,建立现代金融企业制度。要选择有条件的国有商业银行实行股份制改造,加快处置不良资产,充实资本金,创造条件上市,争取尽快实现党的十六届三中全会提出的“要把商业银行改造成资本充足、内控严密、运营安全、服务效益…     

The effects of the external debts of Mexico,Brazil, Argentina,Venezuela, and the Philippines on the United States

The external debts of developing countries have become a major issue recently, prompting debate among both academicians and policy markers. In this paper, the author describes the origins and history of debt problem, summarizes proposals for policies for creditor nations, and estimates the effects of debt-related austerity in five major debtor nations on US imports, exports, net exports, and output in 1985. He concludes that debt-related austerity was responsible for 11.0% of the US merchandise trade deficit in that year, caused decreases in US net trade in 40 to 61 non-service industries studied and decreases in output in 46 industries, and caused a decrease of 0.5% in GNP.

Neither a borrower nor a lender be;

For loan oft loses both itself and friend,

And borrowing dulls the edge of husbandry.

William Shakespeare (Hamlet, I. iii. 75)     

Specialization,product development,evolution of the institution of the firm,and economic growth

This paper considers the effects of the division of labor on economic growth and welfare in a general equilibrium environment where changes in individual specialization and product development can proceed simultaneously. The nature of the dynamic equilibrium is shown to depend on the interaction of transaction efficiency, economies of specialization, and economies of complementarity. Where the dynamic equilibrium involves evolution in the division of labor, this will be associated with increased per capita real income and hence economic growth. It is also shown that the emergence of firms is an aspect of the evolution of division of labor if transaction efficiency for a producer good is lower than that for labor used to produce this good.     

Uncertainty,trust, and the regulation of the banking industry

This paper suggests that, in presence of uncertainty, individual choices are made on the basis of subjective evaluations, and the transmission of information is too expensive, so that the decision-making process must largely be based on other agents’ knowledge. Banks operate by developing a network of personal relationships, based on trust, that allows agents to make use of the subjective knowledge of others. The deregulation process of the financial industry of the 1990s was based on the principle that information disclosure would make the market for securities more efficient, increasing risk diversification, and making the financial system safer. Many innovative financial contracts, however, were not backed by trust and reputation mechanism as traditional banking activities. The shadow banking system emerging from these market-based transactions was thus much more risky and fragile than the traditional one, based on private information and unwritten rules of conduct.     

Information, Evolution of the Institution of the Firm, and the Optimal Decision Horizon

This paper introduces an information problem into Yang and Ng's model of the firm, to study the process of social searching for the efficient structure of residual rights. The analysis adopts the concept of Walrasian sequential equilibrium developed in the literature of endogenous specialization to model this searching process. The main finding is that more organizational patterns will be experimented with, and therefore an efficient organizational pattern is more likely to be achieved as the pricing efficiency increases. The problem of determining the optimal decision horizon is solved by specifying a tradeoff between the benefits and calculation costs from longer decision horizons.     

中国的宪政、"三个代表"与法治

由于植根于本国的意识形态和宪政观念,西方的评论家常常误解中国的意识形态、宪政和法治的发展."三个代表"思想不仅能够充当中国共产党执政地位的意识形态基础,而且能够充当国家政治和意识形态权力的合法性来源.因此,它不仅仅是一种意识形态,而且能够推动中国宪政理论和实践的发展.     

Crony capitalism,the party-state,and the political boundaries of corruption

We build a model that puts together crony capitalism, the hierarchy of the Chinese communist party-state, and the decision-making process inside the Party Center. We show that inefficient economic institutions create local corruption that raises realized productivity, while generating rents that flow along the party-state hierarchy up to the provincial level, threatening the Center’s control in potential crises. Although both stronger crisis control and higher economic performance help the Center’s goal to stay in power, we show that given a general fat-tailed risk of crisis, the Center will maximize crisis control at the expense of the economy when choosing its tolerance of local corruption. Power structure and corruption within the Center and reciprocal accountability between central and provincial leaders are also analyzed. Our analysis suggests conditions under which China’s communist regime will or will not deal with the existential threat presented by corruption.     

Sraffa,Okun, and the theory of the imperfectly competitive firm

Piero Sraffa's Production of Commodities by Means of Commodities is wedded to Arthur Okun's Prices and Quantities to bring out important implications for the theory of the imperfectly competitive firm. The implications relate to firm objectives and to firm behavior in both the ‘vertical’ environment (relations with suppliers) and the ‘horizontal’ environment (relations with customers and competitors).     

Factor Endowment,the Choice of Technology,and the Volume of Trade

Abstract

This paper studies impacts of factor endowment on international trade in a general equilibrium model in which firms choose their technologies endogenously. Although countries only differ in factor endowment ex ante, countries may also differ in their chosen technologies. If industries choose different capital-labor intensities in equilibrium, the Heckscher–Ohlin theorem, factor price equalization theorem, the Rybczynski theorem, and the Stolper–Samuelson theorem hold. If industries choose the same capital-labor intensity in equilibrium, the volume of trade is zero. None of the four theorems applies.