Rethinking John R. Commons’s Theory of Collective Action: The Viewpoint of Regulation and Convention

This article examines the theoretical connection between John R. Commons, régulation theory, and convention theory. In institutional economics (Commons 1934), by applying the idea of “multiple causation,” Commons approached macro-dynamics based on the expansion of some key concepts and studies on income distribution and demand growth. It is a prototype of the growth analysis based on the cumulative causation model, with the various forms of coordination later formulated by régulation theory. The two-layered coordination in convention theory attempted to explicitly explain the individuals’ reflexive capacities to change preference endogenously and to evaluate collective and social value, which were implicitly assumed in Commons’s term “intellect.”     

John R. Commons and Government as Employer of Last Resort: Three Paths to a Progressive Right to Work

Abstract:

Today in the United States, a number of congressional Democrats endorse proposals that would establish a job guarantee for all Americans seeking work. Arguments for such a policy can be traced back at least to the work of John R. Commons, one of the first institutional economists. This article demonstrates that there are actually three arguments in Commons’s scholarship that provide a case for government to hire the unemployed by serving as employer of last resort. These arguments, each highlighted at a different point in Commons’s career, can be viewed in turn as legal, financial, and historical paths to public provision of work for the jobless—government employment that Commons considered part of “the right to work.” The article traces each path, highlighting insight that remains relevant and calling for greater attention to Common’s writings as a way to reclaim the right to work as a progressive cause.     

Toward Reasonable Capitalism: The Role of John R. Commons’s Price and Business Cycle Theories

Abstract

John R. Commons thought that prices should be stable and that the law of supply and demand should be controlled by the power of the state through patent law and by protecting bargaining equality. Commons also thought that prices should be stabilized by macro monetary policy. These means would allow the realization of a “reasonable price.” Commons called the objective and measurable value in money, which is determined by a court ruling, “reasonable value.” Analysis of Commons’s price and business cycle theories point toward the realization of both “reasonable price” and “reasonable value” and toward “reasonable capitalism” that can replace banker capitalism.     

Solving the U.S. Trade Deficit and Competitiveness Problem

We compare the analytical approach of John R. Common and Ronald H. Coase to institutional analysis and social provisioning. In particular, we examine their similarities in (i) the definition and role of institutions in the economy, (ii) the allocative (social provisioning) role of institutions in the economy, and (iii) the inescapable and unchanging role of institutions in shaping the social provisioning process. We contend that Commons and Coase had more in common than did Coase and many of his followers in the “new institutional economics.” In particular, the two had strong similarities in both (a) their insights into the nature of institutions in the legal-economic nexus that is the foundation of the economy and (b) their methods for conducting economics research. Because this role of institutional evolution is, as Warren Samuels noted, an inescapable and unchanging part of an economy’s social provisioning process, it will remain an integral part of any such work in the future, regardless of the “school of analysis” or methodological approach.     

Institutional Economics and Chock-Full Employment: Reclaiming the “Right to Work” as a Cornerstone of Progressive Capitalism

In the United States, the “right to work” originally referred to a progressive call for the right to employment. For example, from the perspective of John R. Commons, the right to work included “the right of the unemployed to have work furnished by the government.” For Commons, that right was a logical outgrowth of Americans’ constitutional rights to life and liberty, “the next great human right.” This article reviews Commons’s right-to-work stance, the history of federal efforts to establish government as employer of last resort, and some key postwar institutionalist contributions to the literature on achieving jobs for all. Then it presents the case for reclaiming the right to work as a cornerstone of progressive capitalism.     

Global Production Networks and the Private Organization of World Trade

As John R. Commons understood, the role of the firm in providing employment and income distribution is a form of public power (Munkirs and Knoedler 1987). This public power of firms is supported by the laws of the state, which protect private property and enforce market transactions. The Global Production Network (GPN) is a new form of the firm, influenced by information technology to lower “transaction costs” (Coase 1937), as well as international trade regimes, such as the Washington Consensus to improve the ease of world trade and investment. The GPN is globe-scanning, yet private and able to shape the economies and policies of countries. Under the banner of branded products, the lead firm in a supply chain exercises considerable power over subsidiaries, contractors, workers, communities, and countries. By influencing trade relations, GPNs also influence international finance, foreign currency reserves and exchange rates, as well as trade deficits and “race to the bottom” of taxes and environmental protection. Drawing on interdisciplinary research, this topic benefits from an alliance of sociology, business, history, law, and international as well as institutional economics in the AFEE tradition. I draw on the work of leading scholars in the field (Antras 2016; Baldwin 2016; Gereffi 2013; Milberg and Winkler 2013) and analyze the implications for the world trade system, as well as the ongoing political resistance to globalization. These GPNs are no longer “of” their country of origin (Tyson vs. Reich).     

Creating Legitimacy,Reciprocity, and Transfer Programs

Sustainable development prospects are not substantially visible in the comparative analysis of models of capitalism. The concept of sustainable development does not appear in the initial theoretical framework of the “variety of capitalism” approach or in the “diversity of capitalism” approach. This article aims to contribute to current thinking about the interaction between the diversity of capitalism and sustainable development, based on the concepts of institutional complementarity and hierarchy, and to question the dynamics of various forms of capitalism in this perspective. The example of economic policies aimed at tackling global warming shows how each form of capitalism adopts measures that are compatible with its own unique configuration of complementary institutions, helping to make it “greener.” However, this trend fits into a dynamic of “limited sustainability” that does not challenge the finance-dominated institutional hierarchy or the current growth regime. The non-viability of our production/consumption model on a global scale calls for a more radical change in capitalism, combined with a shift in the institutional hierarchy.     

Compound Voids and Unproductive Entrepreneurship: The Rise of the “English Fever” in China

China has emerged as an economic power due, in part, to government policies that opened China to the world and created a modern consumer culture. One of these policies is the advancement of English-language education, including private providers, which has spawned the “English Fever” phenomenon. We use the unique context of the private English-language education industry in China to illustrate the concept of “compound (institutional) voids” and their relationship to unproductive entrepreneurship. Our contribution is in untangling some of the complexities related to institutional relationships, and in describing how compound voids increase the likelihood of rent-seeking behavior.     

From Judicial Sovereignty to Collective Democracy: The Development of J.R. Commons’ Perspective on Progressive Institutional Change

Abstract:

This article clarifies the significance of “collective democracy” in the works of John R. Commons by comparing it with “judicial sovereignty” in terms of its contribution to “progress.” We can thus answer two issues that Paul D. Bush does not clearly address: (i) what setup for policy formation contributes to progress and (ii) what is the role of economists within a collective democracy? Based on the comparison, the answer to the first question is collective democracy, and regarding the second question, the roles of economists as both economists and “institutional” economists are extrapolated.     

An Alternative Post-Keynesian Framework for Understanding Capital Flows to Emerging Markets

This article contributes to the establishment of a framework for the analysis of international capital flows, with a specific focus on emerging markets. It is based on a “monetary” analysis of the economy, as well as on the works of Hyman Minsky and Jan Toporowski in particular. The key aspects of such an approach are the following. First, in a monetary economy, capital flows need to be understood as “flows of funds” that pertain to the realm of financial choices, as opposed to the traditional understanding of capital flows as based on “real” variables, such as saving and investment. A consequence of this is the need to focus on gross flows rather than capital flows. Second, liquidity preference considerations also apply at the international level, particularly in relation to the liquidity of emerging-market currencies that, in turn, depends on context-specific “Keynesian fundamentals.” Third, the rise of institutional investors is the key historical development in the financial system, shaping the current reality of cross-border capital flows, including to emerging markets. I argue that institutional investors’ liabilities, in light of the theories of Minsky and Toporowski, are one of the most important variables in determining these investors’ portfolio choices. I synthesize these elements by defining capital flows to emerging markets as the demand for emerging-market assets by institutional investors. I propose a framework to categorize the various channels that guide this demand.     

Denmark’s Agricultural Institutions: An Instrumental Evaluation

This paper begins with a tax and a specially organized commission proposed by John R. Commons. Commons made his proposal because high tariffs were not benefiting workers. The paper contends that his proposal also applies to a current problem - the failure of trade agreements to improve working conditions. The paper bases its argument on data, standard economic reasoning, and Commons’ approach in “constructive research” to wage transactions, public purpose, limiting factors, and power imbalances.

The paper argues that Commons’ proposal could improve the evolution of American labor law and that it could ameliorate power imbalances created by laws that give corporations and trade associations a bargaining advantage over nations and organizations such as the International Labor Organization (ILO). It concludes that economic discourse could benefit from consideration of the belief behind Commons’ proposal - that costs of production passed on to consumers should include the cost of good working conditions.     

Can the link between functional and personal income distribution enhance the analysis of inequality?

The aim of this paper is to present a framework which links functional and personal income distribution. In the first part of the paper, Piketty’s book “Capital in the XXI Century” is briefly reviewed. Piketty’s framework is discussed arguing that it can only partially explain levels and changes within personal income distribution. Piketty links the returns from capital r to the rate of growth of national income g in a very innovative way comparing them within a macroeconomic framework. He claims that when returns on capital rise more quickly than the overall economy and taxes on capital remain low, a vicious circle of ever-growing dynastic wealth and growing concentration of wealth takes place. However, the rise in the inequality of personal income distribution cannot only be explained by the rise of capital incomes. An analysis of the generation of personal incomes, and consequently of inequality, requires a suitable framework that links incomes at the macroeconomic level (national accounts) and incomes at the level of the individual/household. It is possible to set up this framework starting from individual endowments and their link to the productive structure: that is to what can be called the “generating function of personal income.” This function transforms personal endowments into personal earnings, given the productive structure, the technologies, and the market rules that determine the functional distribution. Personal income distribution and its inequality are linked to the functional one through the shares of capital and labor owned by each individual. The framework introduced here seems to be a suitable tool to account for the fact that personal income distribution is inextricably tied up to different sources of inequality in the distribution of national income. Sources come from institutional and productive structures (matrix Y), but also from the distribution of endowments and of individual/household entitlements (matrix S). This approach, we argue, allows for the assessment and evaluation of the effects of “ambitious new policies,” aimed at reducing poverty and inequality ex-ante, as suggested by Atkinson in his last book.     

“Business and Government” Then and Now

Socio-environmental conflicts are widespread, and global economic growth will likely increase them in the coming decades. While political ecology, the analysis of common pool resources, and ecological economics, among others, have provided praiseworthy insights into such conflicts, institutional approaches to these phenomena are still scarce. Classical institutional economics has occasionally been put to work on environmental issues, but proposed frameworks remain relatively underdeveloped. We wish to contribute to institutional research on environmental issues by building upon Bruno Théret’s interpretation of John R. Commons’s transactional model and applying the framework to a case of socio-environmental conflicts. First, we briefly sketch the landscape of institutional contributions (especially those that follow the classical institutionalist tradition) to the analysis of environmental issues. We explain why Commons has largely been ignored on these issues. Then, we analyze some of the key concepts of Commonsian economics that are of particular interest to our theoretical elaboration. Following this, we depict Commons’s transactional scheme and propose an application to a case of socioenvironmental mining conflict in Peru. Our framework could complement existing ones and shed light on the institutional dynamics of natural-resource management through conflict.     

Automation,Financialization, and Institutional Change: Challenges for Progressive Policy

Abstract:

This article argues that the issue of “technological unemployment” resulting from automation is the result of ceremonial encapsulation within the process of progressive institutional adjustment. While institutions of production have adjusted to account for new technological developments, institutions of distribution have not. As discussed here, the main cause of this lack of adjustment is a financialized economy, in which shareholder returns motivate and dominate economic decision making and activity. As a result, gains and benefits from technological advances exacerbate existing income inequality and reduces the power of labor. I discuss this issue in detail before explaining how progressive policies that divorce private wage-labor from access to the system of social provisioning may serve to smooth this process of institutional adjustment caused by the introduction of automated processes.     

Paternalistic Capitalism

Brazil’s political-economic structure has rapidly evolved over the past decade, shedding its shallow policy alignment with neoliberalism of the 1990s. Brazil’s large, diversified industrial base was painfully constructed over the course of the twentieth century. A major and sustained political realignment, which began in 2003, has resulted in two essential thrusts in development policy: (i) a “growth with equity” strategy that has dramatically reduced poverty and inequality; and (ii) a state-led “industrial policy” designed to upgrade manufacturing and direct the accumulation process toward specific sectors, highlighting and consolidating the National Innovation System (NIS). Nonetheless, as a result of the commodity boom that swept through Latin America, Brazil’s natural resource sector achieved outsized growth from 2002 to 2012. One result has been a shift toward resource intensive activities and a broad opening to low-cost Chinese manufactures. Utilizing an institutionalist framework and method, this article analyzes the cohesion of the NIS and the emergence of the “deindustrialization” debate. Also, it assesses the instrumental nature of the “growth with equity” strategy. The article hypothesizes the viability of an endogenous “neo-developmentalist” strategy, while acknowledging the emergence of fundamental exogenous forces and structural ceremonial/institutional factors that have impeded the consolidation of a Brazilian social structure of accumulation.     

评估地方政府层面的制度改革:一个有待研究的领域

在地方政府层面,对制度改革政策的评估是目前政策评估领域中很少涉及的内容。文章将相关的方法运用到制度改革政策的评估中,从而对该领域的研究做出一些探索。文章将制度方面的政策(如地域性和功能性改革)概括为一类特殊的公共政策,并从概念上和方法上将其与普通的实体政策相比较。文章探讨了评估过程中存在的诸多问题,包括交易成本的确定和找寻制度改革的度量指标等。文章最后提出了关于功能性和地域性改革评估的分析框架,以便区别制度评估和绩效评估。此外,该框架还可以应用于比较性的评估研究中。     

Dualistic Discourse and Immigration Policy

Abstract:

The central question in immigration policy is whether to support less immigration through more “restrictive” laws and procedures or whether to support more immigration through a “relaxation” of existing laws. Recently, however, a second debate has arisen on one side of this debate regarding the appropriate types of arguments that may be used to support “restrictive” immigration. Ross Douthat refers to this dispute as the “race versus economics” question: using “race-based” arguments is not legitimate; while an “economic” or a “fact-based” argument is regarded as legitimate. We argue that this distinction in anti-immigration rhetoric is more apparent than real. Using the two most common historical “tropes” in immigration policy, “criminal” and “worker,” we find that racist, anti-ethnic, and classist assumptions pervade U.S. immigration law and policy and have been far more influential in formulating actual policy than either economic or “fact-based” analysis. The central problem with restrictive immigration policy is that its primary purpose is to determine who is eligible to be an American, and who is not; in other words, immigration policy is, by its fundamental intent, invidious. The question is whether it is possible to exclude individuals on these “legitimate” grounds without relying on “illegitimate” invidious distinctions?     

Introduction: Reform in the Provision of Health Care

The term “sustainable consumption” is subject to many interpretations, from Agenda 21's hopeful assertion that governments should encourage less materialistic lifestyles based on new definitions of “wealth” and “prosperity”, to the view prevalent in international policy discourse that green and ethical consumerism will be sufficient to transform markets to produce continual and “clean” economic growth. These different perspectives are examined using a conceptual framework derived from Cultural Theory, to illustrate their fundamentally competing beliefs about the nature of the environment and society, and the meanings attached to consumption. Cultural Theory argues that societies should develop pluralistic policies to include all perspectives. Using this framework, the paper examines the UK strategy for sustainable consumption, and identifies a number of failings in current policy. These are that the UK strategy is strongly biased towards individualistic, market-based and neo-liberal policies, so it can only respond to a small part of the problem of unsustainable consumption. Policy recommendations include measures to strengthen the input from competing cultures, to realize the potential for more collective, egalitarian and significantly less materialistic consumption patterns.     

Income Tax, Property Tax, and Tariff in a Small Open Economy

Why do some countries enjoy high economic growth rates while some suffer in “low-growth traps”? Why are tax policies in different countries so different? Some suggest that it is exactly these differences in government policies which contribute to the difference in economic growth rates. This paper considers a small open economy which sustains its economic growth by adopting new technologies. When the value of initial wealth is “relatively small,” policies which promote growth most result in the highest welfare. In other cases, policies that discourage growth most may be welfare-maximizing.     

Transaction costs and environmental policy design

This article synthesizes the growing empirical literature on transaction costs to identify pragmatic design recommendations for environmental and natural resource policies. The New Institutional Economics literature recognizes that appropriate policy choice and design will be a function of the specific characteristics of the problem. The physical and institutional determinants of both transaction costs and abatement costs should be considered in the policy design process due to potential interactions between them. Analysts also need to incorporate the extent to which the technologies, institutional environment, governance structures, or policy designs can be changed; some factors can only be adjusted to or “designed around” while others can be designed differently. This framework highlights the importance of property rights since transaction costs will be incurred to obtain or retain property rights and since the rights assignment may affect both the magnitudes and distribution of costs. Another implication is that education and extension programs or use of behavioral economics concepts to affect choices can be cost-effective in some circumstances. Policy design should take advantage of economies of scale and foster technical change. Appropriate sequencing of policy instruments may decrease transaction costs, particularly if there is potential for technical change.