Income shares,secular stagnation and the long-run distribution of wealth

Four alarming stylized facts have recently emerged in the United States: (a) a decline in the labor share of income; (b) a decline in labor productivity; (c) an increase in the top 1% wealth share and (d) an increase in the capital-income ratio. In Capital in the XXI Century, Thomas Piketty's argument is that the r > g inequality determines an increase in the capital-income ratio; if the elasticity of substitution in production is above one, the profit share rises. We provide a contrasting explanation that draws from the Post Keynesian approach to differential saving propensities between classes and the Classical-Marxian theory of induced technical change. In a simple model of “capitalists” and “workers,” we show that institutional changes that lower the labor share—declining unionization, increasing monopsony power in the labor market, the global ‘race to the bottom' in unit labor costs or the exhaustion of path-breaking scientific discoveries—can reduce labor productivity growth because of the lessened incentives to innovate to save on labor costs. A falling labor share reduces workers' total savings, and wealth concentrates in the capitalists' hands. A higher profit share and wealth share both put pressure on accumulation: but the long-run growth rate, which is anchored to labor productivity growth, has fallen. To restore balanced growth, the capital-income ratio must rise, independent of the elasticity of substitution. These tendencies are not inevitable: taxation can be used to implement any wealth distribution targeted by policymakers, while worker-crushing institutional arrangements can also in principle be reversed through policy. Neither change appears likely given the current institutional and global policy climate.     

A Stochastic Model of Wealth Accumulation with Class Division

This paper is aimed at contributing to the literature on income and wealth inequality by proposing a simple stochastic model in which wealth accumulation depends on the ‘social relation’ between two classes: capitalists or workers. As a result, the society may evolve towards an unequal outcome with few rich and many poor individuals. We study the dynamic properties of the model by means of computer simulations. A maximum likelihood estimation procedure is applied to analyse the Pareto or power law tail of wealth distribution. We also provide a scenario analysis to explore the system's behaviour under alternative parameter settings.     

A STEINDLIAN MODEL OF CONCENTRATION,DEBT AND GROWTH

Income distribution plays a crucial role in the Kaleckian models of growth. The recent US experience has seemingly turned the Kaleckian argument on stagnationism on its head. Does it, therefore, render the Kaleckian growth framework redundant? We argue that while there is a tendency towards underconsumption, there could be other counteracting tendencies like the wealth effect of the capitalists or the possibility of debt for the workers. But such a growth process, which is primarily driven by the asset price markets, is, by its very nature, iniquitous and extremely volatile and the downturn is far more severe than the normal business cycles.     

CAPITALISTS,WORKERS AND SOCIAL SECURITY

This paper elaborates an exogenous growth model that nests overlapping generations of workers who save for life cycle reasons with dynastic agents who save for bequest reasons (‘capitalists’). The model overcomes Marglin's objection that the overlapping generations framework requires special assumptions about technology, and it also provides a natural environment to revisit Samuelson's analysis of lump‐sum transfers between generations. The ability of a benevolent planner to improve workers' welfare is severely restricted by the control capitalists exercise over the accumulation process. Prefunding social security assumes renewed significance because it overcomes this restriction.     

SOCIAL CONFLICT,GROWTH AND FACTOR SHARES

Standard growth theory is based on atomistic agents with no strategic interactions among them. In contrast, we model growth as resulting from a one‐off, strategic game between ‘workers’ and owners of capital (‘capitalists’) on factor shares, in an otherwise standard ‘AK’ growth model. The resulting distribution of income between factors further determines the marginal revenue product of capital and the rate of growth. We analyse the properties of four equilibria: competitive, Stackelberg equilibrium, a hybrid non‐cooperative regime and cooperative, in terms of labour shares, growth and welfare. Our model thus endogenizes key aspects of the ‘social contract’.     

ENDOGENOUS TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION,CAPITAL ACCUMULATION AND DISTRIBUTIONAL DYNAMICS

This paper develops a post‐Keynesian dynamic model of accumulation, growth and distribution in which endogenous technological innovation plays a significant role. Firms’ rate of labour‐saving technological innovation is made to depend non‐linearly on the distributive (wage and profit) shares, with the latter determining both the incentives to innovate and the availability of funding to carry it out. As it turns out, the direction and the intensity of the effect of a change in distribution on the rates of accumulation and growth depend on the prevailing distribution, with a similar dependence applying—alongside the relative bargaining power of capitalists and workers—to the dynamic stability properties of the system. Hence, the model does not rely on full capacity utilization being reached for a change in the accumulation and growth regime to take place.     

A Leibenstein–Hobbes–Walras Model of Sharecropping

Circumstances under which share tenancy may emerge as a socially viable and incentive-compatible system of land-labor exchange are explored in a model incorporating Leibenstein’s nutrition-effort hypothesis, limited substitution possibilities and endogenous distribution. The model provides a Walrasian resolution of the traditional conundrum of production control under sharecropping. It is shown that a pure sharecropp ing equilibrium with tenant control exists when land is relatively abundant though land rent is zero under either a fixed-rent or wage system. With land relatively scarce, a nearly-symmetric equilibrium with landlord control also exists provided workers share income in the presence of unemployment.     

Small and Medium Enterprises in Thailand: Recent Trends

This paper reviews the evolution of small and medium firms in Thailand in recent years. It shows that such firms did not preserve their share of total employment during the period 1987–96; indeed, their share fell from 60% to 52% over this period. Much of this decline was felt in the category of very small firms (with less than 10 workers). This aspect is explored further by looking at small firm employment shares in three sub-periods of varying overall economic growth rates. It is found that when overall economic growth is high, the share of small firms tends to contract possibly because many small firms become medium in size and others disband because their owners can find more remunerative employment in larger firms. In slower growth periods, the employment share of small firms appears to rise probably because larger firms may be taking in less new workers or even laying off workers. The paper also calculates productivity measures (technical efficiency and total factor productivity) and shows that different measures give different rankings by size of firm.     

Effort Elicitation,Wage Differentials and Income Distribution in A Wage‐Led Growth Regime

Motivated by the empirical evidence on endogenous labor effort and wage differentials, this paper explores implications for distribution and growth of firms using different strategies to elicit effort from workers. The frequency distribution of effort‐elicitation strategies across firms is governed by a replicator dynamic that generates wage differential as a long‐run equilibrium. Although firms willing to elicit more effort have to compensate workers with a higher wage rate, a larger proportion of firms adopting such strategy will not necessarily produce a higher wage share and thereby a higher growth rate. The intuition is that, depending on the accompanying rise in labor productivity, the wage share may not vary positively with the proportion of firms paying higher wages.     

Is Inequality Growing as American Workers Fall Behind?

This article looks at reasons why income inequality could rise and then explores whether, in fact, workers are losing out. It examines whether workers are falling behind relative to the wealthy and whether real wages have been falling or perhaps only manufacturing wages. It also examines whether there is a growing “wealth gap” and why it could be developing. Finally, it examines the hypothesis that relatively inexperienced or unskilled workers are falling behind. The paper concludes that there is a wealth gap, but that it is due to falling real interest rates not declining compensation. Other indicators of inequality may be growing as well, but it is not because compensation is falling short of rapid productivity growth or because workers are falling behind other income recipients.     

税负转嫁视角下商品税对居民消费影响的实证研究

本文借鉴ELES模型,利用横截面数据对我国不同收入等级的城镇居民八类消费性支出进行了微观模拟,对其需求的价格弹性进行测算。在此基础上,分析了居民在消费支出过程中承担增值税、消费税和营业税的情况,对税负转嫁的方式和力度进行了实证评估。结果发现,我国商品税不具有明显的累退性,商品税“中性”特点显著。但在不同收入阶层之间税收负担份额是不同的,居民税收负担与商品税征税范围、税率等要素高度相关。基于此,提出要逐步降低商品税比重、进一步扩大“营改增”范围、完善消费税功能、以及将价内税改为价外税等政策建议。     

A note reconsidering a post-Keynesian model of growth and distribution in the globalization context

We treat an extension of the Metcalfe and Steedman model of growth and distribution in a small open economy with government activity. We show, simultaneously, that certain kinds of taxation and government expenditures will not affect the essential nature of the “Cambridge Equation.” This is important due to the increasing process of Financial Globalization which can be responsible for changing the profit distribution between capitalists and workers. The present note aims at integrating the public sector and the foreign trade together into the model, based on previous literature that, with few exceptions, treats them separately. To do so, a new framework is proposed. Our contribution shows that workers’ income grows when the Current Account in the balance of payments is in surplus, a result not studied by Teixeira and Araújo. The discussion includes recent literature concerning with limits of applicability of such analytical model, dealing with more realistic economies including the process of globalization.     

Unionized Labour Market,Unemployment Allowances,Productive Public Expenditure And Endogenous Growth

An endogenous growth model with unionised labour market is developed to analyse the interaction between the tax financed productive public expenditure policy and the unemployment benefit policy. We consider both ‘Efficient Bargaining’ model and ‘Right to Manage’ model; and analyse properties of balanced growth rate maximising income tax policy as well as effects of unionisation. This growth rate maximising income tax rate exceeds the competitive output share of the public input in the presence of an unemployment benefit scheme. The growth effect of unionisation in the ‘Efficient Bargaining’ model and in the ‘Right to Manage’ model are different.     

增值税收入地区间转移的衡量——生产地原则与消费地原则的比较

我国增值税收入的地方政府分享部分,实际上主要是按生产者所在地在各地区间分配,我们称之为"生产地原则"。由于增值税是间接税,而且是价外税,其税负实际是由消费者最终负担的。目前的这种分配准则,事实上造成了税收收入归属与税负归属的不一致,扭曲了政府与市场参与者的行为。采用"消费地原则"分配地方级增值税能很好地避免上述扭曲的出现。文章通过一个简单的理论框架来分析,发现各地方所占商品的生产流通增值税环节以及这些环节的增值率和商品的地方销售占全国的比例是影响两种分配方式下地方实际税收收入差异的因素;同时借用现有各省消费数据具体衡量发现,采用当前生产地原则较消费地原则下的地方增值税分配存在相当程度的财富逆流。因而,改革现有增值税地方分配方法很有必要。     

AN ENVIRONMENTAL RESTRICTION AND INCOME DISTRIBUTION IN A CAPITALIST ECONOMY

Let us consider a growing economy where capitalists organize production emitting pollutants. The government is supposed to issue emission rights in order to control the amount of emitted pollutants, while capitalists must control their emission of pollutants in accordance with the amount of emission rights they buy. It is assumed that workers are also allowed to purchase emission rights. We show that the conventional inverse relationship holds between the wage rate and the profit rate, and between per capita consumption and the growth rate in this economy. We also study how economic variables such as the wage rate and per capita consumption are affected by the workers' purchase of emission rights.     

Für einen einfachen,transparenten und effizienten Finanzausgleich

Tax revenues are allocated to the “Länder”-budgets in a very complicated process which lacks any transparency and unsurprisingly has been (and is currently) the subject of numerous legal suits at the Federal Constitutional Court. But the most striking feature of the whole system is its final outcome: a nearly equal distribution (per head) of tax revenues among all 16 states. If that is the aim, the process could be achieved much more easily. The authors suggest a central tax administration, a political determination of the state’s tax share and a distribution of that share among the single states according to the population, partly weighted with the states domestic product per head. Such a system is simple and transparent and apt to fulfill distributional as well as allocational purposes.     

STEADY‐STATE GROWTH AND DISTRIBUTION WITH AN ENDOGENOUS DIRECTION OF TECHNICAL CHANGE

A model of labor‐constrained accumulation and economically directed technical progress has a stable steady state at which the class distribution of income is invariant with respect to population and saving parameters yet sensitive to workers’ stances in wage bargaining and to the tax and transfer policies of a redistributive state.     

对我国税负问题的思考

本文对我国税负轻重问题发表了看法,认为在与国外比较税负时,不应把非税收入和国有土地使用权出让收入计入在内。目前,我国宏观税率较低,老百姓感觉税负重,主要原因是我国的税负结构不合理,而且税款的使用也有不尽如人意之处。未来结构性减税,就是要在税收总规模适度增加的基础上调整税负结构,通过税制改革减轻中低收入者的税负。     

出口退税与就业增进——基于我国数据的协整研究

在一个出口决策模型的基础之上,建立了一个出口退税的就业影响模型。并采用我国1985-2009年的数据,研究了出口退税政策对我国就业水平的影响,结果显示:我国的出口退税政策显著促进了国内就业的增长。进一步把出口退税分解为增值税退还与关税退还两部分,研究了不同类别出口退税对国内就业的影响,结果仍然稳定。结果同时表明:国内投资、FDI以及汇率贬值显著促进了国内就业的增长,而技术水平的提升则抑制了国内就业的增长,这一结果说明,我国的技术发展选择的仍然是劳动节约型而非资本节约型技术进步。     

Nach der Wahl: Was sind die wichtigsten wirtschaftspolitischen Herausforderungen?

Even though Germany’s economy is currently going strong, the country still faces enormous challenges if it wants to maintain and increase this prosperity. The new government should take this opportunity to set the course for the future by encouraging the digitalisation of the economy and the society as well as by ensuring that the ongoing energy transition is sustainable and efficient. Other challenges include the adverse effects of globalisation on parts of society and the uneven distribution of income and wealth. But the actual magnitude of the government’s room to manoeuver is up for debate. The new government’s fiscal space might be more limited than it seems, since an automatic adjustment of the income tax to inflation and growth is required to end the bracket creep. Given that transfer programmes are being phased out, the federal income tax surcharge to finance German unification also needs to be abolished. Further budget pressure stems from the pension system and from demands by state and local as well as European governments. The new German government should use the next governing period to initiate fundamental reforms of economic and fiscal policy that will provide adequate answers to long-run challenges.