Attitudes Towards Paying Taxes in Austria: An Empirical Analysis

People mostly pay their taxes although there is a low probability of getting caught and being penalized. Thus, new attempts in the tax compliance literature try to go beyond standard economic theory. This paper examines citizens attitudes toward paying taxes – what is sometimes termed their tax morale, or the intrinsic motivation to pay taxes. Tax morale may be a key determinant to explain why people are honest. However, there are very few papers that explore the concept of tax morale theoretically and empirically. This study, based on the World Values Survey and the European Values Survey, therefore attempts to fill this gap in the literature, focusing on tax morale in Austria. Societal variables such as trust or pride have been identified as key determinants that shape tax morale in Austria. Furthermore, a lower perceived compliance leads to a decrease of tax morale, which indicates that social comparisons are relevant. The results also show a decrease of tax morale between 1990 and 1999, although Austrias taxpayers still have a very high tax morale compared to other European countries.     

Tax evasion and tax morale: A social network analysis

We study the effects of tax morale and social norms on tax evasion when individuals interact in a network. We present a model that incorporates incentives for tax compliance in the form of punishment and fines, tax morale, and reputation for social behaviour. We assume that individuals adjust their tax morale by observing the neighbours' tax morale. We simulate the model for different values of the parameters and show that the steady-state share of taxpayers as opposed to tax-evaders is affected by the probability of finding like-minded peers in the reference group (network integration), the weight that individuals attribute to reputation, and the share of individuals who update their tax morale. Last, we consider the possibility of a fiscal authority using the knowledge of the network structure and targeting ‘central’ individuals. We show that by positively affecting the tax morale of individuals whose influence within the network is high, a fiscal authority can increase tax compliance.     

Tax evasion,social norms,and economic growth

We propose a theoretical model to account for the negative relationship between tax evasion and economic development. More precisely, we integrate tax morale into a dynamic OLG model of tax evasion. Tax morale is modeled as a social norm for tax compliance. We show that accounting for such nonpecuniary costs of evasion may explain (a) why the share of evaded taxes over GDP decreases when countries grow and (b) that tax morale is positively correlated with the level of GDP per capita. Finally, a higher tax rate increases aggregate evasion and the number of evaders when taxpayers decisions are interdependent.     

Tax evasion in a behaviorally heterogeneous society: An evolutionary analysis

We focus on the tax evasion dynamics emerging from repeated interaction of three types of taxpayers: cheaters, honest citizens and punishers. By assuming that cultural evolution is driven by material payoffs only, we show that a long overlooked behavioral attitude towards taxation such as tax morale is important to dynamically induce higher levels of tax compliance within a large-scale population. The results of our evolutionary analysis reveal that the presence of taxpayers who both act honestly in the first place and are willing to costly sanction cheaters plays an important role for the long-run success of the social battle against tax evasion.     

Tax Morale in Transition Countries

This article tries to reduce the lack of tax compliance research analysing tax morale in transition countries. The empirical analysis using tax morale as a dependent variable working with World Values Survey data indicates that there is a significantly higher tax morale in Central and Eastern European than in former Soviet Union countries. This difference has increased during the transition process. Furthermore, the article shows that factors such as trust in the legal system and the government have a significant positive effect on tax morale in transition economies.     

Tax Morale in Spain: A Study into Some of Its Principal Determinants

In this paper, the role of certain determinant factors of tax morale in Spain will be analyzed through information provided by the Survey into Tax Morale in Spain, which had a remit that covered the entirety of the national territory. To this end, discrete choice models have been employed, and a particular relevance of a number of categorical variables, as well as some macroeconomic variables have been observed. The relevant role that socioeconomic variables play, such as the age and gender of each interviewee, is prominent and observable, as is the importance of other factors - such as that of the interviewee's having presented their income tax return or their belief that immigrants have to make contributions - in positively indicating the interviewee's level of tax morale. It is also observed that, in regions with a higher GDP per capita, a lower rate of unemployment or the greater strength of the construction sector, the level of tax morale is considerably lower than the mean.     

A tax discrepancy coefficient resulting from tax evasion or tax expenditures

Tax evasion and tax expenditures introduce discrepancies between taxpayers. In this paper, a tax discrepancy coefficient has been worked out in order to establish, given a constant tax yield, what bigger or smaller amounts taxpayers would have to pay if tax evasion or tax expenditures were completely eliminated. After the definition of the coefficients these are calculated for individual income tax returns in Belgium. Similar coefficients can be established for other types of taxation, such as inheritance tax, corporate income tax or even sales tax (e.g. V.A.T.).     

Tax enforcement,tax compliance and tax morale in transition economies: A theoretical model

The focus of this paper is the analysis of the relationship between tax enforcement, tax compliance and tax morale within countries characterised by rapid introduction of market institutions and slow evolution of political regimes, such as transition economies. The paper investigates a coordination game in which the government is ex-ante committed to tax enforcement and can observe the proportion of tax-compliant agents in the economy. In turn, two groups of agents (third-party reporting and self-reported income) are keen to evade taxes unlawfully but have limited information on how many others evade taxes; their tax morale is therefore an endogenous function of agents' perception on tax compliance. The model predicts that the lower the quality of political institutions and the weaker tax morale, the less tax compliance can be achieved. The third-party reporting group will also be bearing higher tax burden than the self-reported income group. The model entails that having political institutions of good quality is not a sufficient condition to conduce to tax enforcement or tax compliance. Due to the endogenous role of tax morale, the government could be pushed ex-post towards poor or no tax enforcement. If good political institutions are not accompanied by good information about the enforcement of tax collection, there is scope for co-existence of poor tax enforcement, low tax compliance and weak tax morale. As such, this model well describes the tax evasion behaviour observed since the outset of transition from planned to market economy.     

The effect of tax enforcement on tax morale

In this paper we argue that tax enforcement is an additional contextual factor affecting tax morale, one of the most important determinants of tax compliance. By using a unique dataset that merges a representative sample of Italian households with administrative data on tax enforcement, we first find that tax morale is positively correlated with tax enforcement. Second, to deal with possible endogeneity of tax enforcement, we show that results are confirmed in an IV specification using the change in the tax gap at the provincial level as an instrument for tax enforcement. Finally, we provide evidence that the impact of tax enforcement and social environment is stronger at low quantiles of tax morale. Our results show that besides that of lowering the expected value of tax evasion, tax enforcement has an additional and indirect effect on tax compliance through its effect on tax morale.     

Information and IRA participation: the influence of tax preparers

The steep drop-off in the number of Individual Retirement Account (IRA) contributors after 1986 has led to suggestions that taxpayers misunderstood and over-reacted to the restrictions on deductible contributions imposed by the Tax Reform Act of 1986. Tax panel data is used to investigate the role of taxpayer misunderstanding in the drop-off in IRA contributors after 1986. The hiring of a tax preparer is the transmission mechanism for knowledge of the deductibility rules after 1986. The results suggest that more information and promotion of IRAs would have increased the probability of contributing to an IRA in 1987 for high income taxpayers, but would have decreased this probability for middle-income taxpayers. Taxpayer confusion over the deductibility restrictions appears to have been resolved by 1988. Therefore, taxpayer misunderstanding did not play a major role in the steep drop-off in the number of IRA contributors after 1986.     

Do the catholic and protestant countries differ by their tax morale?

Does the tax morale differ between various countries? The paper introduces a model of tax evasion. The equilibrium shadow production is determined by consumers’ and entrepreneurs’ tax morale, affected by the inherited culture or religion. The model suggests that in the conditions of the prisoners’ dilemma, shadow economies tend to be large once a moral code is violated. The implications of the model are tested in the OECD data on groups of countries with different religious denominations in two regimes, 1979–1992 and 1992–2003. We find evidence on a link between tax morale and shadow market activities, but none to support the view that tax morale differs between the catholic south and protestant north in Europe.     

增值税两类纳税人身份选择的新思考

我国现行税收政策上的差别造成了增值税两类纳税人税收负担上的差别,也为纳税人选择税收身份进行税收筹划提供了可能性。本文对目前国内主流的税收筹划教材、书籍及相关刊物上关于增值税两类纳税人身份选择的税收筹划方案提出了质疑,站在纳税人税后利润最大化的角度对其进行了分析和总结,得出了与前者不同的结论。     

Separating small and big fish: The case of income tax evasion

This paper proposes to offer the taxpayer a choice of tax-enforcement schemes for self-selection. More specifically, the taxpayer should have the possibility of opting for the prevailing regime with a certain penalty on the evaded tax or for an alternative regime with a higher penalty on the evaded tax but a reduced tax rate. It is shown that this leads to a separation of taxpayers characterized by a relatively high degree of evasion (H-evaders) from taxpayers who evade only a relatively small amount of tax (L-evaders). Furthermore, the procedure is not self-defeating, it is effectively possible to direct the efforts of auditing towards the H-evaders. At the end of the game the L-evaders experience a welfare gain, the H-evaders are induced to reduce their evasion activities and the government can expect higher yields.We wish to thank Johann K. Brunner and two anonymous referees for many helpful comments.     

Feasible taxation in advanced democracies

One usually considers tax pressure as the result of the policymakers’ efforts to increase public expenditure, while populism is resorted to in order to alleviate tensions among the taxpayers. This paper takes a different view. It assumes that populism is exogenous in the short run and defines the tolerable degree of tax pressure required to bring about redistribution; however, taxpayers also resent disappointing economic performances and low-quality public expenditure. Within this context, therefore, policymakers try to find a compromise between their desire to engage in rent-seeking and their electoral ambitions. This paper shows under which circumstances compromise is obtained, how tensions arise, and what outcomes the taxpayers’ reactions may generate.     

How does petty corruption affect tax morale in Sub-Saharan Africa?

Revenues from taxation gain in importance to finance economic development in Sub-Saharan Africa. One obstacle to enhancing the willingness to remit taxes can be the extortion of bribes by public officials. Using micro-level data from the Afrobarometer, we show that petty corruption erodes tax morale. The effect on tax morale is more severe in countries and regions where fewer people are affected by petty corruption and becomes insignificant if extortion of bribes is particularly prevalent. Differing levels of civic participation and potential access to tax funded services are also found to induce heterogeneous reactions to corruption experience. Applying a mediation analysis, we demonstrate that petty corruption not only has a direct effect on tax morale but also diminishes confidence in tax authorities and therefore affects tax morale indirectly. The harmful effects of corruption experience, however, operate mainly through a generally lowered inclination to uphold high levels of tax morale.     

Effects of tax benefits on the price elasticity of charitable contributions in South Korea

Using South Korean panel data from 2008 to 2019 and censored quantile regression method, this study calculates the effects of different tax incentives on charitable contributions. We observe price elasticity under two different tax-benefit systems in South Korea and find that, first, taxpayers tend to be more sensitive to tax incentives under a tax deduction system than a tax credit system. The price elasticity gap between a tax deduction and tax credit is approximately −2.3 to −1.0. Second, we show the existence of heterogeneity in taxpayers’ behaviour: the price elasticity of charitable contributions exhibits a convex shape, where more significant donors have lesser reactions to tax incentives. We further show that socioeconomic contexts, such as income, gender, marital status, and education, affect people's attitudes. In sum, the results are as expected: tax deductions work more efficiently than tax credits.     

关于国内增值税改革的若干思考

增大减税力度,深化增值税转型改革对于多数企业的发展而言无疑是一良机,但转型改革本身也面临着诸多问题。应该建立增值税征收管理细则,进一步扩大增值税抵扣范围,进一步减轻小规模纳税人的税收负担,对劳动密集型企业给予适当倾斜,提高征管水平和税务人员素质,更大限度发挥改革对我国经济发展的促进作用。     

Are Tax Expenditures of Individuals Only a Tool of Tax Optimisation?

The paper focuses on tax expenditures of individuals, which are one of the fiscal tools of the state. In the Czech Republic they are primarily aimed at housing policy, pension policy, and philanthropy, and the question is the extent to which tax expenditures can influence the preferences of tax payers. The aim of this paper is to evaluate the effect of tax expenditures of individuals in the form of tax deductions for social policy, housing support and retirement savings. We also evaluate whether these tax deductions fulfill the fiscal functions for which they were introduced and the extent to which taxpayers use them. Methodically, the research is based on the analysis of secondary statistical data of the Financial Administration of the Czech Republic and results from aggregated tax returns filed for the period 2005–2015. The effect of tax deductions was decreased by abolition of the progressive rate of personal income taxes and by introduction of a uniform tax rate of 15%. Tax deductions for retirement savings do not have a sufficiently strong motivational impact and do not affect taxpayers in the context of public policy. Deductions for mortgage interest can be regarded as a form of major housing support, but are related to taxpayer income and favor those with higher incomes.     

Optimal Income Tax Enforcement under Prospect Theory

Prospect theory (PT) has become the most accepted alternative to expected utility theory (EUT) as a theory of decision under uncertainty. This paper extends the existing literature on efficient tax and audit schemes, by answering the question as to just how progressive an efficient tax system can be when assuming that taxpayers behave in line with the tenets of PT. Under reasonable assumptions regarding the reference income and the value function of taxpayers, we show that the efficient tax schedule is regressive while audit probabilities are nonincreasing in the declared income. These results are consistent with the previous literature on EUT.     

Federalism and horizontal equity across Switzerland and Germany: a new rationale for a decentralized fiscal structure

Higher wages in agglomerations often do not reflect an increase in purchasing power, because a high percentage of the wage increase has to be spend on housing. Thus, after housing is considered taxpayers may have identical disposable incomes, although gross as well as after-tax income may differ. This unequal treatment of taxpayers is due to the taxation of nominal incomes. If tax systems taxed income based on regionally adjusted purchasing power, horizontal equity would be assured. Since this is an unfeasible option, the differences could be corrected by allowing a deduction on housing costs. Given the large revenue losses, it seems unlikely that governments in OECD countries move to a system where rents are deductible in determining taxable income. Another alternative—taxation of potentially achievable income—is unfeasible due to political opposition. A final and less costly alternative is fiscal federalism. Granting autonomy to the lower levels of the government offers local governments the power to design the tax system in a way that reflects differences in living costs. Although this option does not necessarily imply that governments effectively design the tax schedule in that way, a comparison of Germany and Switzerland shows that governments are aware of these differences across regions. The paper concludes that granting tax autonomy to the lower tiers in Germany would make many citizens, especially in the Southern part, better off and would promote horizontal equity among German taxpayers.