迪拜楼市降温了

金融危机期间,随着国际投资者的撤离,迪拜一度爆发了主权债务危机,最后依靠阿布扎比酋长国超过100亿美元的援助得以摆脱危机。相比2013年迪拜楼市的疯狂,2014年,迪拜的房地产市场开始遇冷。根据地产咨询公司莱坊国际发布的莱坊环球房地产价格指数,2014第三季度迪拜房地产价格环比下跌5.2%,同比上涨12.5%,这是四年来,迪拜房价首次出现季度下跌。在世界油价下跌和投资者悲观情绪的影响下,迪拜的房地产价格是否会再次面临泡沫破灭?从阿拉伯湾南岸的一个封闭的小     

迪拜债务危机:原因、影响及启示

2009年11月25日,迪拜政府宣布将重组旗下最大的主权投资公司迪拜世界,延迟6个月偿还其即将到期的约600亿美元债务。此事引起全球金融市场对迪拜未来偿还能力的担忧,多国股市出现下跌。迪拜债务危机的爆发主要是迪拜的发展模式出现问题,导致在金融危机冲击下房地产价格大幅度下跌。欧洲银行业在此次危机中风险敞口最大。此次事件会使新兴市场资金流向和美元汇率短期受到影响,但对世界经济的长期影响有限。迪拜危机对中国影响较小,但其所暴露的问题值得我们关注。     

迪拜和希腊债务危机的对比分析

迪拜和希腊债务危机是金融危机之后,相继爆发的主权债务危机.迪拜债务危机发生的主要原因是金融危机冲击下房地产泡沫破灭,价格大幅度下降,资金链条断裂,实体经济无力支撑等多重因素.而金融危机之后,希腊政府财政状况显著恶化,全球三大信用评级机构惠誉、标准普尔和穆迪相继调低希腊主权信用评级.随着主权信用评级被降低,希腊政府的借贷成本大幅提高,陷入债务危机之中.迪拜和希腊的主权债务危机不仅在短期内冲击全球经济,而且给全球经济的长期发展以很多警示.     

欧洲主权债务危机对我国经济的影响

在美国次贷危机对全球经济的影响逐步消退之时,世界经济复苏之路又迎来新挑战,继国际评级机构下调希腊、葡萄牙、西班牙国家主权债务评级之后,近期又下调意大利国家主权债务评级,显示着欧洲主权债务危机出现进一步恶化的趋势,进一步影响着包括中国在内的世界经济的发展。本文对欧洲主权债务危机的成因做出了分析,并重点研究了对中国经济的影响和带来的启发。     

“中国经济增长与周期（2011）”国际高峰论坛邀请函

2011年是“十二五”开局之年,我国发展面临的形势依然极其复杂。世界经济复苏缓慢,发达经济体经济增长乏力,失业率居高难下,国家主权债务危机隐患未除,全球流动性继续泛滥,国际大宗商品价格和主要货币汇率加剧波动,新兴市场资产泡沫和通胀压力加大。     

迪拜经济的崛起与债务危机的形成

迪拜经济的迅速崛起与债务危机的形成密切相关。地处中东的迪拜并非依赖石油美元实现经济的迅速崛起,而是主要源于其独特而激进的经济发展模式,而这也正是导致债务危机发生的深层次原因。迪拜与中国同为新兴经济体,在分析迪拜经济迅速崛起的基础上探讨迪拜债务危机的形成机理,对中国经济的健康发展具有重要的借鉴和启示意义。     

“中国经济增长与周期(2011)”国际高峰论坛邀请函

2011年是十二五开局之年,我国发展面临的形势依然极其复杂。世界经济复苏缓慢,发达经济体经济增长乏力,失业率居高难下,国家主权债务危机隐患未除,全球流动性继续泛滥,国际大宗商品价格和主要货币汇率加剧波动,新兴市场资产泡沫和通胀压力加大。同时我国经济运行中一些长期问题和短期问题相互交织,体制性矛盾和结构性问题叠加在一起,宏观调控难度加大。复杂的形势给我们提出了严峻挑战,需     

控房价 防游资——迪拜危机的启示

在世界民众庆幸将要渡过金融危机之际，迪拜（Dubai），这个建在沙漠中的奢华之都，突然传来了债务危机，立刻在全球金融、资本市场掀起了一场飓风。虽然从目前情况看，迪拜债务危机的规模以及影响力有限，但这一债务危机给中国经济的启示却是及时而又深刻的。追溯危机的根源，揭示危机的启示，必然对中国经济的发展提供参考和借鉴。     

迪拜债务危机的原因及其对中国的启示

本文通过对迪拜债务危机原因的分析,阐明了迪拜债务危机对于高速发展的中国经济的警示作用,提出中国经济发展不能重蹈迪拜的覆辙,应在产业结构、金融政策和外汇管制上进行调整,保证经济的健康平稳发展。     

迪拜债务危机及其影响

2009年11月25日,阿联酋七个酋长国之一——迪拜酋长国宣布将重组旗下最大的主权投资公司迪拜世界,该公司负债总额高达590亿美元,拟延迟6个月偿还债务,引发迪拜债务危机。受此影响,迪拜世界下属最大上市公司迪拜世界的信用违约掉期价格迅     

An Alternative Approach to the Institutional Economics of the Eurozone Crisis

I argue that the Eurozone crisis is neither a crisis of European sovereigns in the sense of governmental over-borrowing, nor a crisis of sovereign debt market over-lending. Rather, it is a function of the “sovereign debt market” institution itself. Crisis, I argue, is not an occurrence, but an element fulfilling a precise technical function within this institution. It ensures the possibility of designating — in the market’s day-to-day mechanisms rather than analytical hindsight — normal (tranquil, undisturbed) market functioning. To show this, I propose an alternative view on the institutional economics of sovereign debt markets. First, I engage literature on the emergent qualities of the institutions “market” and “firm” in product markets, concluding that the point of coalescence for markets is the approximation of an optimal observation of consumer tastes. I then examine the specific institution “financial markets,” where the optimal observation of economic fundamentals is decisive. For the specific sub-institution “sovereign debt market,” I conclude that the fundamentals in question — country fundamentals — oscillate between a status of observable fundamentals outside of markets and operationalized fundamentals influenced by market movements. This, in turn, allows me to argue that the specific case of the Eurozone crisis is due to neither of the two causes mentioned above. Rather, the notion of “crisis” takes on a technical sense within the market structure, guaranteeing the separation of herd behavior and isomorphic behavior on European sovereign debt markets. By the same token, the so-called Eurozone crisis ceases to be a crisis in the conventional sense.     

Evaluating sovereign risk spillovers on domestic banks during the European debt crisis

Using a Markov-switching model with time-varying probabilities, spillovers from sovereign to domestic bank CDS spreads during the European debt crisis for a set of 14 European countries and 30 European banks are investigated. Our model is able to capture how the increased sovereign risk observed between 2010 and 2013 throughout Europe has impacted i) the probability that banks fall into a crisis regime and ii) the probability that banks stay in the crisis regime. The latter state is characterized by a high volatility and large positive returns of CDS spreads. Different regime-dependent indicators have been computed to assess heterogeneity within the region. The evidence indicates that the intensification of sovereign risk observed during the European debt crisis has positively and significantly driven the regime shifts in volatility of the bank CDS spreads due to increased risk aversion. The results show that the increase in sovereign credit risk seems to have generated second-round effects for some banks that have experienced a deterioration in their funding conditions due to a rise in the domestic sovereign default risk. Overall, our results suggest that sovereign CDS spreads can be considered good forewarning indicators for predicting the evolution of bank CDS spreads. We also find that the effects differ depending on the country and the financial institution. This result suggests that banks are heterogeneously exposed to sovereign credit risk within the same country. One argument relates to the size of these financial institutions and the domestic exposure to sovereign debt.     

欧洲债务危机、财政联盟与蓝色债券

自希腊发生主权债务危机以来,欧元区持续动荡。欧元区总体财政状况并不差于美国等国,但欧元区却率先陷入债务危机困局,未建立统一的财政政策是一个重要原因。在债务危机的逼迫下,欧元区针对危机采取了一系列救助措施,这事实上是某种形式的财政联盟。在对比美欧财政和公共债务状况的基础上,本文探讨了欧元区建立财政联盟的必然性,分析了欧元区财政联盟的实际进展,并进一步剖析了建立财政联盟的一种方案——"蓝色债券"的优点和障碍等。     

Fundamentals and Sovereign Risk of Emerging Markets

We empirically assess the relative importance of various economic fundamentals in accounting for the sovereign credit default swap (CDS) spreads of emerging markets during 2004–2012, which encompasses the global financial crisis of 2008–2009. Inflation, state fragility, external debt and commodity terms of trade volatility were positively associated, while trade openness and a more favourable fiscal balance/GDP ratio were negatively associated with sovereign CDS spreads. Yet the relative importance of economic fundamentals in the pricing of sovereign risk varies over time. The key factors are trade openness and state fragility in the pre‐crisis period, the external debt/GDP ratio and inflation in the crisis period, and inflation and the public debt/GDP ratio in the post‐crisis period. Asian countries enjoy lower sovereign spreads than Latin American countries, and this gap widened during and after the crisis. Trade openness was the biggest factor behind Asia's lower sovereign spreads before the crisis, and inflation during and after the crisis. The results imply that external factors were paramount in pricing sovereign risk prior to the crisis, but internal factors associated with the capacity to adjust to adverse shocks gained prominence during and after the crisis.     

Increase in home bias in the Eurozone debt crisis: The role of domestic shocks

One of the most striking consequences of the recent episode of sovereign debt market stress in the Eurozone has been the increase in the share of public debt held by the domestic sector in fragile economies. However, the causes and potential consequences of this increase were only given scarce attention in the literature on the Euro area sovereign debt crisis. In order to fill this gap, we first determine the shocks that impact the variation in the share of sovereign debt held at home in an SVAR model on a sample of Eurozone countries between 2002 and 2014, distinguishing between external and domestic shocks. Thanks to several alternative tests, we show that home bias in sovereign debt responds positively to country-specific fundamentals and expectation shocks but we find no evidence that the increase in home bias is destabilizing per se in the short-run. Second, a stylized theoretical model backed by the empirical results predicts that the consequences for sovereign debt crisis depend on the relative impact of domestic initial destabilizing shocks and increased home bias. The analysis suggests that an increase in home bias in times of sovereign debt stress, despite reflecting deteriorating fiscal conditions, may make default less likely.     

PIGS or Lambs? The European Sovereign Debt Crisis and the Role of Rating Agencies

This paper asks whether rating agencies played a passive role or were an active driving force during Europe??s sovereign debt crisis. We address this by estimating relationships between sovereign debt ratings and macroeconomic and structural variables. We then use these equations to decompose actual ratings into systematic and arbitrary components that are not explained by previously observed procedures of rating agencies. Finally, we check whether systematic, as well as arbitrary, parts of credit ratings affect credit spreads. We find that both do affect credit spreads, which opens the possibility that arbitrary rating downgrades trigger processes of self-fulfilling prophecies that may drive even relatively healthy countries towards default.     

TIME‐VARYING VOLATILITY,DEFAULT, AND THE SOVEREIGN RISK PREMIUM

This article studies how volatility changes affect sovereign spreads in strategic default models. Volatility changes affect savings and sovereign spreads. However, the impact of volatility shocks is state dependent; when the economy has a low debt, an increase in volatility is prone to generate precautionary savings. Instead, with high debt, an increase in volatility is likely to induce an even further increase in debt and spreads, both in endowment and production economies. I document a positive correlation between sovereign spreads and aggregate income volatility for a set of European economies during the debt crisis, consistent with the model's implications.     

迪拜视角下中国商业银行信用风险管理的对策研究

在对迪拜债务危机成因分析的基础上,引入信用风险的含义,结合中国商业银行信用风险管理的现状,尤其是中国步入全球经济后,发现信用风险问题尤为突出,已对中国的经济构成严重影响,商业银行经营机制不健全、内部评级机制不完善、监管的手段和方法陈旧、落后等,亟待解决。如何根据中国的基本国情加强商业银行信用风险管理问题提出了一些对策和建议。     

One crisis,two crises…the subprime crisis and the European sovereign debt problems

This article explores the link between the subprime crisis and the European sovereign debt crisis. Using a panel data approach, we estimate the impact of the different government interventions aimed at rescuing financial institutions on the significant increase of the costs of public debts as measured by the interest rate spreads with respect to Germany. We show evidence on the existence of a statistically significant link between the two crises embodied by capital injections and government guarantees. More specifically, the two types of government interventions have a negative impact on the cost of the sovereign debts under study. This empirical result can explain why the sovereign debt crisis immediately followed the subprime crisis.