The price normalization problem in imperfect competition and the objective of the firm

Summary. General equilibrium models of oligopolistic competition give rise to relative prices only without determining the price level. It is well known that the choice of a numéraire or, more generally, of a normalization rule converting relative prices into absolute prices entails drastic consequences for the resulting set of Nash equilibria when firms are assumed to maximize profits. This is due to the fact that changing the price normalization amounts to altering the objective functions of the firms. Clearly, the objective of a firm must not be based on price normalization rules void of any economic content. In this paper we propose a definition of the objective of a firm, called maximization of shareholders' real wealth, which takes shareholders' demand explicitly into account. This objective depends on relative prices only. Real wealth maxima are shown to exist under certain conditions. Moreover, we consider an oligopolistic market and prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium in which each firm maximizes the real wealth of its shareholders. Received: July 10, 1997; revised version: July 27, 1998     

Product differentiation,prices, and market structure

We examine the effect of cost reductions and advertising on equilibrium prices and the equilibrium market shares. Our equilibrium has the following characteristics; the aggregate demand is the integral of individual demand over consumers, goods are differentiated in the sense of Novshek and Sonnenschein (1979), production functions are constant returns to scale.Cost reductions of a firm, which are due to R&D activity of the firm, lead to declines of equilibrium prices. Advertising of a firm, which is supposed to influence consumers' preferences in favor of the firm, cannot necessarily cause equilibrium prices to go up; one firm can raise its prices, but the other cannot. Contrary to our intuition, cost reductions cannot always enable a firm to capture a larger share.     

Monopoly power and the firm’s valuation: a dynamic analysis of short versus long-term policies

Summary. Recent anti-trust cases exacerbated the concerns of investors regarding the effects of a firms monopoly power on its production choice, shareholder value, and the overall economy. We address this issue within a dynamic equilibrium model featuring a large monopolistic firm whose actions not only affect the price of its output, but also effectively influence the valuation of its stock. The latter renders time-inconsistency to the firms dynamic production choice. When the firm is required to pre-commit to its strategy, the ensuing equilibrium is largely in line with the predictions of the textbook monopoly model. When the firm behaves in a time-consistent manner, however, the predictions are strikingly at odds. The trade-off between current profits and the valuation of future profits induces the firm to increase production beyond the competitive benchmark and cut prices. This policy may result in destroying shareholder value, and does indeed fully wipe out the firms profit in the limit of the decision-making interval shrinking to zero, in line with the Coase conjecture.Received: 23 December 2003, Revised: 1 March 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D42, D51, D92, E20, G12.Correspondence to: Anna PavlovaWe thank Steve Spear and the anonymous referees for helpful suggestions. We are also grateful to Franklin Allen, Dave Cass, Peter DeMarzo, Bernard Dumas, Ron Giammarino, Rich Kihlstrom, Leonid Kogan, Branko Urosevic, Dimitri Vayanos, seminar participants at Boston University, University of Colorado at Boulder, Columbia University, MIT, University of Pennsylvania, Princeton University, American Finance Association Meetings, and European Finance Association Meetings for valuable comments. All errors are solely our responsibility.     

Technology Strategy And Product Diversity

This paper considers a three-stage game of a differentiated oligopoly: firms first make their entry decisions, then they choose production technologies and in the third stage of the game they decide product prices. The technology choice can be understood as selecting one from a pool of those recently available as well as developing a new technology through innovative activities. The resulting market equilibrium is then compared with the social optimum. The main conclusions are that a monopolistically competitive market will typically undersupply both product variety and production scale. R&D competition in a free entry differentiated oligopoly will lead to insufficient R&D investment at firm and industry levels.     

Allocative inefficiency properties of price-cap regulation

The paper deals with the argument that a price-cap regulated firm maximizing profits under the price-cap constraint will set prices that over time approach the Ramsey structure. My analysis explores the effects of price caps on the structure of prices. The results are in important aspects at variance with the claim of convergence to a Ramsey structure.     

How Applicable is the Dominant Firm Model of Price Leadership?

In this paper, we examine the usefulness of the dominant firm model of price leadership to serve as a benchmark for organizing behavior in laboratory markets. This well established model, whose origins can be traced back over a hundred years, has been recently applied to such landmark antitrust cases as Standard Oil and Alcoa and more recently to the analysis of deregulated markets for electric power. Our results indicate that in posted offer markets the dominant firm quite often produces more than the model's benchmark and sometimes at much greater prices. With sealed offer auction rules and a low elasticity of fringe supply, the dominant firm produces the theoretical output at a price greater than the prediction. However, with a high elasticity of fringe supply, the dominant firm produces more output over a wide range of prices that includes the predicted price.     

Join hands or walk alone? Evidence on lobbying for trade policy in India

Using primary evidence for 146 Indian manufacturing firms, I examine single and dual lobbying strategies for trade policy influence, and the factors driving firm's choice of these strategies. Firms can adopt a single strategy, by lobbying collectively as a group (Join Hands), or lobbying individually as a firm (Walk Alone). Firms can also adopt a dual strategy, that is, a combination of collective and individual lobbying. The choice of strategy is affected by sector concentration and by tradeoffs between lobbying intensity for sector‐wide and firm‐specific outcomes. The following findings are new for India: First, majority of Indian firms (more than 64% in the sample) use a dual strategy, suggesting the importance to better understand what drives dual strategies. Second, the likelihood of adopting a dual lobbying is higher in sectors that are characterized by low concentration (dispersion is higher), indicating a strong competition effect over free‐riding. Third, relative to the single strategy of collective lobbying, Indian manufacturing firms are likely to join hands while walking alone when targeting firm‐specific outcomes, but prefer to walk alone (single strategy of individual lobbying) when there are tradeoffs between different outcomes, to react quickly. Finally, the availability of resources and firm's perceived effectiveness of its lobbying are significant drivers for the strategy choice.     

Growth in economies with non convexities: sunspots and lottery equilibria

Summary. We investigate the relation between lotteries and sunspot allocations in a dynamic economy where the utility functions are not concave. In an intertemporal competitive economy, the household consumption set is identified with the set of lotteries, while in the intertemporal sunspot economy it is the set of measurable allocations in the given probability space of sunspots. Sunspot intertemporal equilibria whenever they exist are efficient, independently of the sunspot space specification. If feasibility is, at each point in time, a restriction over the average value of the lotteries, competitive equilibrium prices are linear in basic commodities and intertemporal sunspot and competitive equilibria are equivalent. Two models have this feature: Large economies and economies with semi-linear technologies. We provide examples showing that in general, intertemporal competitive equilibrium prices are non-linear in basic commodities and, hence, intertemporal sunspot equilibria do not exist. The competitive static equilibrium allocations are stationary, intertemporal equilibrium allocations, but the static sunspot equilibria need not to be stationary, intertemporal sunspot equilibria. We construct examples of non-convex economies with indeterminate and Pareto ranked static sunspot equilibrium allocations associated to distinct specifications of the sunspot probability space.Received: 25 August 2003, Revised: 16 March 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D84, D90.Correspondence to: Paolo SiconolfiWe thank Herakles Polemarchakis for helpful conversations on the topic. The research of Aldo Rustichini was supported by the NSF grant NSF/SES-0136556.     

The determinants of research and development intensity in the UK

The primary purpose of this paper is to discover whether research and development expenditures are related to firm size, market structure and technological influences in the UK. After providing a preliminary analysis of R & D activity, the paper tackles the problem of the rather limited data set. Two approaches are adopted: first, analysing part of the relationship using a broadly based sample, and second, providing data on a more narrowly based sample over three years. The results suggest that firm size and concentration have virtually no influence on R & D intensity in the UK among firms with R & D programmes.     

Economies with observable types

We study economies of asymmetric information with observable types. Trade takes place in lotteries. Individuals face a standard budget constraint, while the incentive compatibility constraints are imposed on the production set of the intermediaries. This formalization encompasses moral hazard, as in [Jerez, 2003] and [Jerez, 2005], and private information economies. Equilibrium allocations are constrained efficient, but, contrary to what stated for example in Jerez (2005), the set of equilibrium allocations may be empty and the Second Welfare Theorem may fail. This happens for two reasons. First, constrained efficient allocations may violate the necessary and sufficient conditions of price supportability for the individuals. Second, even when constrained efficient allocation are price supportable, they may fail to be a profit maximizing choice of the firm at the individual supporting prices. To restore existence of an equilibrium the firm has to be restricted to supply allocations with support in the set of incentive compatible contracts.     

Procedural choice

Summary. In this paper, we attempt to combine the concept of a choice function with a procedural aspect. We examine an individuals choices over alternatives when the available options are linked either to the procedure by which these alternatives came into existence or to the degree of availability of other options. The procedural aspect behind availability may prompt an individual to refuse to choose so that the choice set becomes empty. This particular aspect is used to study different cases that are characterized axiomatically. We relate our conditions to well-known consistency conditions from standard choice theory.Received: 2 December 2002, Revised: 18 August 2003JEL Classification Numbers: D62, D63, D71.Correspondence to: Wulf GaertnerThe first author would like to thank Volkswagen-Stiftung for generous financial support. For helpful comments and suggestions we are grateful to Fuad Aleskerov, Nick Baigent, Nancy Cartwright, Kotaro Suzumura as well as to seminar participants at various universities and audiences at several conferences.     

The Size of Firms and R&D Investment

We construct an industry-equilibrium model in which it is costly for consumers who have previously purchased from one firm to switch to competitors. This gives firms a certain degree of market power over their established customers. The equilibria we identify under these conditions have the following properties: (1) there is a nontrivial size distribution of firms, although firms are intrinsically identical, (2) larger firms make higher profits, (3) larger firms spend more on R&D, (4) larger firms charge (on average) lower prices, and (5) profits are positively correlated over time. These properties match empirical regularities concerning the manufacturing and retail sectors in the U.S. economy.     

Incentive Regulation of Prices When Costs are Sunk

We present a model featuring irreversible investment, economies of scale, uncertain future demand and capital prices, and a regulator who sets the firm’s output price according to the cost structure of a hypothetical replacement firm. We show that a replacement firm has a fundamental cost advantage over the regulated firm: it can better exploit the economies of scale because it has not had to confront the historical uncertainties faced by the regulated firm. We show that setting prices so low that a replacement firm is just willing to participate is insufficient to allow the regulated firm to expect to break even whenever it has to invest. Thus, unless the regulator is willing to incur costly monitoring to ensure the firm invests, revenue must be allowed in excess of that required for a replacement firm to participate. This contrasts with much of the existing literature, which argues that the market value of a regulated firm should equal the cost of replacing its existing assets. We also obtain a closed-form solution for the regulated firm’s output price when this price is set at discrete intervals. In contrast to rate of return regulation, we find that resetting the regulated price more frequently can increase the risk faced by the firm’s owners, and that this is reflected in a higher output price and a higher weighted-average cost of capital.     

欧美跨国公司在华离岸研发的空间区位战略比较研究*——基于城市层面集群网络的视角

本文基于研发子公司空间分布的城市集群网络特征,构建了跨国公司离岸研发“集群寻求型”战略框架,并采用离散选择模型对这一理论视角进行实证检验。样本包含了1992-2012年期间在华275家美国研发子公司和207家欧洲研发子公司跨越27个城市的区位战略。实证结果揭示了欧美在华离岸研发的差异化空间区位战略：美国公司采用“知识集群寻求型”战略,即一个城市的知识资源和技术基础设施是重要的区位因素;欧洲公司则采用“工业集群寻求型”战略,例如,一个城市的制造业基础、产业专业化以及公司内部的前向关联显著地影响其区位选择。此外,母国公司规模和欧洲公司母国的异质性的影响也得到证实。     

Are economists amoral? Contemporary economic thought and the distinction between values and prices

Underlying the “clash of cultures” between economists and the rest of the citizenry is a way of thinking about rationality, consumer choice and policy that periodically reveals a confusion between values and prices on the side of economists. Lawrence Summers' famous memo on the underpollution of the Third World was a case in point. Sadly, this was not an isolated incident. On the contrary, mainstream economists are conditioned, by the categories they employ, to regularly conflate value with price. This is particularly the case when it comes to theorizing about consumer choice and the meaning(s) to be ascribed to the set of market prices that emerge from the aggregate of these choices. This paper explores the dimensions of the problem and suggests other frameworks of choice that can enrich our understanding of consumer behavior and the significance of the set of prices that emerge in the market. Thanks go to Falguni A. Sheth, Kevin McCarron and the audience at the Association for Social Economics Annual Meetings, Washington, D.C., 2003 where an earlier version of this paper was presented.     

Scale economies and existence of sustainable monopoly prices

The size of the firm relative to market demand is crucial to a determination of whether there exist sustainable monopoly prices. In the one product case the size of the firm is its minimum efficient scale. In the multiproduct case size is defined by a set of outputs at which cost complementarities are present. The analysis shows that when the size of the firm is sufficiently large, there exist anonymously equitable Aumann-Shapley prices. Further, at these prices natural monopoly is sustainable against rival entry. The Aumann-Shapley price are also shown to be quantity sustainable in the sense of Brock and Scheinkman.     

Preference for flexibility in infinite horizon problems

Summary. We consider the extension of the classical problem of preference for flexibility to many periods. Preferences are defined over sets of infinite paths of choices. The main result provides a set of axioms on preferences that yield an additive representation over a subjective state space. This space is the set of preferences over choice today and feasible set tomorrow. The main new axiom, stochastic dominance, is a stronger form of the assumption of monotonicity. Received: September 11 2000; revised version: December 18, 2001     

A new model of equilibrium involuntary unemployment

Summary. We show that equilibrium involuntary unemployment emerges in a multi-stage game model where all market power resides with firms, on both the labour and the output market. Firms decide wages, employment, output and prices, and under constant returns there exists a continuum of subgame perfect Nash equilibria involving unemployment and positive profits. A firm does not undercut the equilibrium wage since then high wage firms would attract its workers, thus forcing the undercutting firm out of both markets. Full employment equilibria are payoff dominated by unemployment equilibria, and the arguments are robust to decreasing returns.Received: 21 May 2001, Revised: 15 April 2003, JEL Classification Numbers: D43, E24.Correspondence to: Leo KaasWe thank an anonymous referee, Woojin Lee, Klaus Ritzberger and seminar participants in Konstanz, Manchester, Milan, Prague, Vienna, and Warwick for helpful comments. Financial support from the Economic and Social Research Council (UK) under grant L138251030 and from the Manchester School Visiting Fellowship Scheme is gratefully acknowledged.     

INNOVATION ACTIVITIES EXPLAINED BY FIRM ATTRIBUTES AND LOCATION

In this paper, innovation activities of a firm are observed as its R&D spending and participation in three categories of innovation systems. The various factors that can influence a firm's innovation efforts are divided into, (i) firm location reflecting the regional milieu and (ii) firm attributes such as corporate structure, nature of the knowledge production, type of industry and a set of specific firm characteristics. The study is based on information about 2094 individual firms, which may be non-affiliated or belong to a group (multi-firm enterprise). The empirical analysis applies a novel data set to examine the influence of location versus a vector of firm attributes. Among innovative firms, the location of a firm does not influence neither the R&D intensity nor the frequency of interaction in horizontal and vertical innovation systems, when controlling the skill composition, physical capital intensity, industry, firm size and market extension. The paper contributes to the literature by observing that innovative firms have similar characteristics irrespective of where they are located, although the share of innovative firms differs between regions.     

Extensive Form Implementation in Incomplete Information Environments

We study the implementation of social choice rules in incomplete information environments. A sufficiency condition calledposterior reversalis given for extensive form implementation. The condition has a natural interpretation in signaling terms: Consistent posterior distributions under truth-telling are different from consistent posteriors under deception. This variation in the distribution over player types leads to variation in the distribution over actions and outcomes (comparing truth-telling and deception). We exploit this feature to implement social choice rules.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: D78, D82.