The optimal export tax for a primary commodity in a vertical market

The conventional formula for the optimal export tax (derived from a partial equilibrium model that ignores importers’ welfare) is extended to include the deadweight loss to the domestic economy associated with the tax. Applying the extended formula to the tax Russia imposes on its exports of logs, results suggest ignoring the marketing channel causes the optimal export tax for a primary commodity to be understated. The degree of understatement increases as the supply of logs and processing/marketing inputs become less price elastic, and as buyer and seller power in the downstream (lumber) industry increases. For plausible values of model parameters, however, the degree of understatement is modest, less than 19%.     

Welfare Impacts of the Canada-U.S. Softwood Lumber Trade Dispute: Beggar Thy Consumer Trade Policy

The welfare impacts of the 1987–91 Canadian "voluntary" 15% lumber export tax and the current 6.51 % U. S. import duty are analyzed using a simultaneous equations model of the softwood lumber market. The results show that U.S. consumers suffer losses 35% to 45% of those endured by Canadian producers. Canadian national welfare was much higher under the voluntary export tax, indicating the Canadian government erred in unilaterally terminating the agreement. In both instances, the U.S. government pursued policies that benefited domestic producers at the expense of U.S. lumber consumers, with no attempt or discussion of compensation. Thus, this appears to be a case of "beggar thy consumer" trade policy.     

Incidence of the 1996 Canada–U.S. Softwood Lumber Agreement and the Optimal Export Tax

Our partial-equilibrium analysis suggests 63% of the Canada-U.S. Softwood Lumber Agreement's export tax is absorbed by Canadian consumers. Still, sufficient surplus was extracted from U.S. consumers for the agreement to be in Canada's national interest. In fact, the agreement was suboptimal from a Canadian perspective in that a higher tax rate would have raised national welfare, at least in the short run. Although the agreement decreased U.S. welfare, the net loss for the combined U.S. and Canadian economies is modest, about 5% of the bilateral softwood lumber trade value according to our baseline estimates. This suggests the agreement's tariff rate quota scheme is a reasonably efficient mechanism for redistributing economic surplus from U.S. consumers to producers. Still, a better policy may be to enlarge the softwood lumber market via a research and promotion program funded by a modest (say, 5%) tax on Canadian exports.     

Benefits and costs of impeding free trade: Revisiting British Columbia's restrictions on log exports

The government of British Columbia (BC) imposes restrictions on the export of logs from public and private forestlands, primarily to promote local processing and associated employment benefits. Most economists wholeheartedly oppose BC's export restrictions, arguing that BC's citizens are worse off as a result of the government's measures. In this paper, it is shown that, while free trade in logs might well maximise global wellbeing, it might not necessarily result in the greatest benefit to BC. Indeed, both economic theory and a follow-up numerical analysis indicate that some restrictions on the export of logs can lead to higher welfare for BC than free trade. Thus, log export restrictions could be economically efficient from a local perspective, but only if the transaction costs of obtaining necessary permits are not excessive.     

中国木材进口的可替代性和进口来源安全性分析

基于2008—2017年中国与常年贸易伙伴国的数据样本,运用面板数据估计方法分别测算了国产原木、锯材与进口原木、锯材之间的Armington替代弹性,并分三阶段分组检验,还测算了中国原木、锯材主要进口来源国的出口产出弹性。结果显示:国产原木、锯材与进口原木、锯材之间具有较低的可替代性,且可替代性均呈下降趋势;内外材差异化程度较大,对国外进口木材具有长期的进口依赖性;原木进口市场供给风险较大,新西兰、澳大利亚供给安全性强,美国、巴布亚新几内亚、俄罗斯进口风险大;锯材进口市场的供给较稳定,泰国、巴西和马来西亚等国供给潜力大。因此,中国应大力发展培育国内优质大径材和珍贵树材,建设培育基地,提高优质木材供给能力;寻找珍贵木材的替代材料,通过技术开发生产替代产品;加强境外森林资源的开发利用,调整木材进口来源,减少对高风险国家的进口依赖。     

Optimal Production Tax and Quota under Time Consistent Trade Policies

This article investigates the policy active importers' incentives and welfare implications of using production and trade policies in a dynamic framework where production decisions occur before consumption decisions. We show that the equilibrium for production taxes and quotas are not equivalent, and that each equilibrium depends on whether the trade policy instruments are tariffs or quotas. Under import quotas, the equilibrium policy is to tax domestic production, whereas under a tariff either a production tax or subsidy may be optimal. We also show that a collective agreement to ban production policies is likely to be welfare-improving in many circumstances.     

Who gains from Australian generic wine promotion and R&D?

The present paper estimates the distributions of aggregate returns from different types of research and promotion investments by the Australian grape and wine industry among grapegrowers, winemakers, domestic and foreign consumers, and the tax office. The results show that most of the gains from cost-reducing R&D in grape and wine production go to producers and that producers get a far larger share of the benefit from export promotion than that from domestic promotion. Foreign consumers of Australian wine also enjoy a significant share of the benefits from Australian R&D. Sensitivity analysis shows that the key results hold for a wide range of parameter values.     

Welfare Effects of an Export Tax: Thailand's Rice Premium

An empirically based, applied general equilibrium model is used to study the welfare and distributional effects of an export tax when the implementing country possesses some monopoly power in the world market. A method is demonstrated through which a general equilibrium model can be used to find the optimal value of a tax or subsidy. The approach makes it possible to conduct the welfare analysis of a particular intervention in an explicit "second-best" context, to study its income distributional implications, and to explore the sensitivity of the results to variations in key behavioral parameters, structural assumptions, and the government's distributional objectives.     

影响中国林业企业对俄直接投资的经济、资源和制度因素

以2005—2017年中国对俄罗斯的FDI数据为样本,建立多元回归模型,实证分析了影响中国林业企业对俄直接投资的经济、资源、制度因素。结果表明:提高中俄贸易关系紧密度和人民币对卢布汇率能够促进中俄两国的林业投资合作,俄罗斯森林资源禀赋和原木产量的提高推动着中国林业企业在俄罗斯开展直接投资,中俄两国的法律制度差异、话语权和问责差异与中国林业企业对俄罗斯的FDI流量为负相关,然而两国的腐败遏制差异、政府效率差异对于中国林业企业在俄罗斯开展直接投资有着显著的正向影响。因此,应加强中俄两国政府的政策沟通和经济合作,有效规避汇率风险;增加中国的人工林培育面积;积极完善俄罗斯的制度质量,降低中国林业企业在俄罗斯的投资成本。     

Payoffs from research and development along the Australian food value chain: a general equilibrium analysis

The payoffs and distribution of payoffs from research and development (R&D) along the food value chain depend on many interacting economic factors. To quantify these, we have developed a general equilibrium model of the Australian economy with detailed farming, processing and marketing information. We use the model to assess potential payoffs and distributions from various R&D scenarios that lead to demand expansion and productivity improvement. We find that productivity improvement caused by R&D is unambiguously beneficial to the whole economy while the benefits of export or domestic market demand expansion mainly accrue to the primary producers and processing industry, when the economy is at full employment. Also, productivity improvement from R&D on‐farm may benefit processors while improvements postfarm may benefit farmers.     

Dynamics of smallholder participation in horticultural export chains: evidence from Ecuador

We study the dynamics of smallholder participation in export value chains focusing on the example of small‐scale broccoli producers in the highlands of Ecuador. Combining cross‐sectional data from a household survey with 11‐year longitudinal data on export market transactions, we explain the hazards of dropping out of a high‐value export chain. We apply a multispell cox duration model that allows us to consider multiple entries and exits from the supply chain. We also provide evidence on the welfare impacts associated with participation. The results suggest that small‐scale farmers’ exit from the export sector is accelerated by high transaction risks experienced in the past. While we find no particular evidence for the exclusion of small‐scale farmers from the export sector, we do find that poorer households and female‐headed households tend to drop out faster, especially as long as the sector is still prospering. Finally, when considering welfare effects, we do not find evidence that participation translates into tangible benefits for broccoli farmers. We discuss some measures that could help improve the long‐term sustainability of smallholder integration in high‐value chains.     

Deregulation as (Welfare Reducing) Trade Reform: the Case of the Australian Wheat Board

State trading enterprises are distinguishable from private, commercial firms by the nature of their exclusive rights and objectives. Deregulation of the Australian Wheat Board is used to illustrate the effects of these rights and objectives on trade and welfare. Theoretical models are specified and the effects measured through calibrated, partial equilibrium models. It was found that the successive deregulations of the Australian Wheat Board caused it to switch from being equivalent to an export subsidy to, today, being equivalent to an export tax. At the same time, deregulation has not necessarily been welfare enhancing.     

On Exporting by Import State Traders and Peculiar Effects of Negotiated Minimum Access Commitments

It has been alleged that exportation by import state trading enterprises (ISTEs) must involve unfair trade practices. We show that such exporting may result from a rational use of market power by a sufficiently protected price discriminating ISTE. We argue that the flawed design and implementation of the tarffication process initiated in the last GATT agreement is providing ISTEs with incentives to export. The tariffication of import quotas and other related import restrictions was dirty in the sense that it permitted the setting of prohibitively high tariffs on many commodities. More importantly, it failed to eliminate quantitative trade barriers as the previous import quotas were replaced by minimum access commitments (MACs). In this paper, we use a simple partial equilibrium framework to explore the trade and welfare consequences of trade liberalization through tariff reductions and MAC enlargements under the small country assumption when domestic production and imports are controlled by an ISTE. We show that tariff reductions and MAC enlargements have very different effects on the behavior of the ISTE. MAC enlargements induce inefficient trade by encouraging the profit maximizing ISTE to increase its exports. In terms of welfare, MAC enlargements are immiser-izing. We conclude that tariff reductions are to be preferred to MAC increases as a means to liberalize trade .     

The Value of Dairy Quota under a Commercial Export Milk Program

This paper argues that under a commercial export milk program, the market value of quota will be determined by the spread between the domestic market price and the export price, rather than the conventional wisdom that it is determined by the spread between the domestic milk price and the marginal cost of production. Under this new economy, it is argued that ultimately the market price of dairy quota will be priced independently of firm marginal costs, which implies that low-cost (or high-margin) producers will not hold an economic advantage in bidding for quota over higher-cost producers. Regression results are consistent with the hypothesized positive relationship between quota values and the difference between domestic and export milk price. The average export price has generally increased over time and is approximately equal to the marginal cost for an average producer. The results have implications for a World Trade Organization (WTO) challenge. New Zealand and the United States feel the domestic program acts as an export subsidy by cross-subsidizing production of commercial export milk. The results here suggest that the prices for the filled export contracts are approximately the marginal cost of production for the average producer and not lower, as suggested by the challenge. Export contracts were found to have higher price risk than domestically produced milk. The risk is compounded by the short-term nature of most export contracts. The increase in risk for the commercial export milk program (CEM) implies that it is unlikely many farmers will greatly diversify into CEM contracts unless the uncertainty is reduced.     

Implications of a Tariff on Imported Canadian Softwood Lumber

The United States has been a net importer of softwood lumber for several decades, with more than 90% of its 1985 imports coming from Canada. A four-equation simultaneous sytem was developed to analyze the impact of a proposed tariff on domestic softwood lumber consumption production and on imports. The structural coefficients were estimated by two-stage least squares estimators using annual data from 1965 through 1985. The analysis indicated that U.S. softwood lumber consumption was price inelastic (-0.029) while import demand was highly elastic (-3.08). Consequently, the imposition of an import tariff or Canadian export tax on softwood lumber, as requested by the U.S. softwood lumber industry, will have little effect on total consumption, but will reduce imports significantly and will lead to higher prices for U.S. producers and consumers. Les États-Unis ont été un importateur net de bois ?oeuvre de résineux pendant plusieurs décennies et plus de 90% de leurs importations de 1985 provenaient du Canada. Nous avons élaboré un système simultané à quatre équations permettant ?analyser ?incidence ?un droit qu'on songe à imposer sur la consommation et la production intérieures du bois ?oeuvre de résineux et sur les importations. Les coefficients structuraux ont été estimés a ?aide ?une méthode ?analyse des moindres carrés à deux stades, à partir de données recueillies annuellement de 1965 jusqu'à 1985. ?analyse a démontré que la consommation américaine de bois ?oeuvre de résineux n'est pas élastique quant au prix (-0,029) mais que la demande à ?importation est très élastique (-3,08). En conséquence, ?imposition ?un droit à ?importation ou ?une taxe canadienne à ?exportation pour le bois ?oeuvre de résineux, telle que réclamée par le secteur américain de la production de bois ?oeuvre de résineux, aura peu ?effets sur la consommation totale mais elle réduira sensiblement les importations et mènera à une augmentation des prix pour les producteurs et les consommateurs américains.     

When Do Export Subsidies Have a Redistributional Role?

If an export subsidy is efficient, that is, has a surplus-transfer role, then there exists an implicit function relating the optimal level of the subsidy to the income target in the agricultural sector. If an export subsidy is inefficient no such function exists. We show that dependence exists in large-export equilibrium, not in small-export equilibrium and show that these results remain robust to concerns about domestic tax distortions. The failure of previous work to produce this result stems from its neglect of the income constraint on producer surplus in the programming problem transferring surplus from consumers and taxpayers to farmers.     

Economics of export subsidies under costly and imperfect enforcement

The present paper builds on the published literature on agricultural policy analysis under costly and imperfect enforcement by introducing enforcement costs and misrepresentation into the economic analysis of export subsidies. Specifically, the present paper examines the economic causes of cheating on export subsidies and the consequences of enforcement costs and misrepresentation for the welfare effects and the transfer efficiency of this policy instrument. Policy design and implementation is modelled as a sequential game between a government that designs and enforces the policy and the recipients of the payments. Two alternative policy implementation scenarios are considered. In the first scenario, export subsidies are paid to private trading firms while in the second scenario subsidies are paid directly to the producers of the subsidised commodity. Analytical results show that the introduction of enforcement costs and cheating changes the welfare effects of export subsidies and their efficiency in redistributing income to producers. The analysis also shows that, contrary to what is traditionally believed, the incidence of export subsidies depends on the group that is subsidised to export the surplus quantity – the way the policy is implemented. The results provide additional support for the contention that the economic consequences of cheating are highly policy-specific. Finally, the analysis reveals that when the government faces restrictions on either the volume or the value of export subsidies, cheating reduces the distortionary effects of the policy on international markets. This is true irrespective of whether subsidies are paid to trading firms or to producers.     

SOCIAL COSTS OF REGULATION OF PRIMARY INDUSTRY: AN APPLICATION TO ANIMAL WELFARE REGULATION OF THE VICTORIAN PIG INDUSTRY*

The effects of state government regulation of primary industry are modelled. An analytical framework is presented for estimating the costs of regulation in terms of changes in economic surplus. The model permits trade between regions of the total market. An illustrative application of the framework is applied to proposed animal welfare regulation of the Victorian pig industry. Some regulations that may provide large gains with regard to the welfare of farm animals involve only small social costs compared to the gross value of production of the industry. Conversely, other regulations that potentially confer only small gains in animal welfare impose large social costs. The distribution of these costs is important. In general, consumers lose, as do some producers. Other producers gain. In some cases, producers in aggregate gain from regulation. Major beneficiaries, such as advocates of animal welfare regulations, are likely to bear little of the cost of regulation.     

EU Food Safety Standards,Pesticide Use and Farm‐level Productivity: The Case of High‐value Crops in Kenya

This article provides an empirical analysis of the impact of European Union (EU) private food safety standards on pesticide use and farm‐level productivity among small‐scale vegetable producers in Kenya. We apply an extended three‐stage damage control production framework, accounting for multiple endogeneity problems, to farm‐level data collected from a random cross‐sectional sample of 539 small‐scale producers. Estimation results show that farmers producing vegetables for the domestic market use significantly lower quantities of pesticides than do export farmers. However, contrary to findings elsewhere, the econometric evidence here shows that both domestic and export‐oriented vegetable farmers in Kenya use pesticides at levels below the economic optimum. The results also show that the adoption of standards by export farmers does not have any significant impact on total pesticide use. However, adopter categories are distinguishable in terms of types of pesticide used, i.e. adopters use safer pesticides based on World Health Organization (WHO) classification. The third‐stage structural revenue model results demonstrate that adoption of standards has a positive and significant impact on revenue raised in vegetable production. Nevertheless, farmers producing for the export market are indistinguishable from those producing for the domestic farmers in terms of the total revenue earned from producing vegetables during the rainy season, on a ‘per acre’ basis. Although standards can potentially prevent resource‐poor smallholders from maintaining their position in the lucrative export markets, they can also result in positive changes in the production systems of those small‐scale farmers who adopt it, as shown by these results.     

中国原木进口的需求弹性及预测——基于月度时间序列的Johansen协整估计

鉴于中国原木进口需求弹性的参数值信息有限,利用月度时间序列数据构建中国原木进口需求函数,在Johansen协整框架下展开计量分析。向量误差修正模型的估计结果显示:中国原木的进口需求对所有变量都是缺乏弹性的,且在1%的统计水平上显著;中国国内经济产出和实际进口价格的弹性分别为0.86(±0.05)和-0.68(±0.15),短期对长期均衡的偏离的调整系数为0.61。基于估计参数的预测结果显示,受经济新常态的影响,2020年中国原木进口量约为5067万m3~6464万m3,并呈现平稳增长的态势。