Share allocations and performance of KLSE second board IPOs

We analyze share allocations in the Malaysian IPO market, which provide a unique instrument of economic policy for wealth redistribution amongst different ethnic groups. For a sample of Second Board IPOs, we find that Bumiputera investors and the Malaysian public receive almost an equal allocation and make similar profits per issue. However, institutional Bumiputera investors are allocated a significantly smaller proportion of the most underpriced issues and a significantly higher proportion of overpriced issues. IPOs with a higher share allocation to retail Bumiputera investors perform best in both the short and long run.     

IPO flipping in Australia: cross-sectional explanations

We access electronic share settlement records for each subscriber and aftermarket investor in 419 Australian IPOs to investigate whether initial subscribers flip their allocations, and we relate this flipping behaviour to issuer, shareholder, underwriter and market characteristics. We find that the main determinants are underpricing (consistent with the disposition effect, i.e., a tendency to realise gains before losses), whether the IPO market is “hot” (a proxy for the representativeness heuristic) and ex ante risk characteristics. When flipping is analysed separately for underpriced and overpriced IPOs we find that the most overpriced IPOs are flipped more than the less overpriced ones, a result which contrasts the disposition effect. This result is due to the action of institutional, rather than individual, investors. We also relate flipping activity to the firm's long-run return, and find that the flipping behaviour of large (informed) investors is unrelated to long-run returns, while uninformed investors consistently flip more of the IPOs that have better long-run returns.     

IPO Pricing and Share Allocation: The Importance of Being Ignorant

Since an underwriter sets an IPO's offer price without knowing its market value, investors can acquire information about its value and avoid overpriced deals (“lemon‐dodge”). To mitigate this well‐known risk, the bank enters into a repeat game with a coalition of investors who do not lemon‐dodge in exchange for on‐average underpriced shares. We (i) derive and test a quantitative IPO pricing rule (showing that tech IPOs were not excessively underpriced during the boom of the 1990s); and (ii) analyzing a unique multibank data set, find strong support for the conjecture that a bank preferentially allocates shares to its coalition.     

An investigation of the short-term performance of the Canadian IPO market.

This article explores the short-term return performance of the Canadian initial public offering (IPO) market. Historically, the Canadian IPO market has shown to be one of the least underpriced markets in the world. This paper uses recent IPOs from 2010 to 2017, and the results confirm that the Canadian IPO market remains one of the least underpriced IPO markets in the world. The mean (median) first-day returns show that Canadian IPOs are marginally underpricing at only 1.45% (0.24%) during the sample period. Additional short-run return measures indicate that Canadian IPOs underperform the market in their 1-month, 6-month, and 12-month holding periods. This research also contributes to the existing IPO literature by showing that restricted voting share offerings tend to be more underpriced and perform poorly over the short-term.     

IPO Pricing in “Hot” Market Conditions: Who Leaves Money on the Table?

This paper explores the impact of investor sentiment on IPO pricing. Using a model in which the aftermarket price of IPO shares depends on the information about the intrinsic value of the company and investor sentiment, I show that IPOs can be overpriced and still exhibit positive initial return. A sample of recent French offerings with a fraction of the shares reserved for individual investors supports the predictions of the model. Individual investors' demand is positively related to market conditions. Moreover, large individual investors' demand leads to high IPO prices, large initial returns, and poor long‐run performance.     

Investor Sentiment and Pre-IPO Markets

We examine whether irrational behavior among small (retail) investors drives post‐IPO prices. We use prices from the grey market (the when‐issued market that precedes European IPOs) to proxy for small investors' valuations. High grey market prices (indicating overoptimism) are a very good predictor of first‐day aftermarket prices, while low grey market prices (indicating excessive pessimism) are not. Moreover, we find long‐run price reversal only following high grey market prices. This asymmetry occurs because larger (institutional) investors can choose between keeping the shares they are allocated in the IPO, and reselling them when small investors are overoptimistic.     

Presidential Address: Issuers, Underwriter Syndicates, and Aftermarket Transparency

I model strategic interaction among issuers, underwriters, retail investors, and institutional investors when the secondary market has limited price transparency. Search costs for retail investors lead to price dispersion in the secondary market, while the price for institutional investors is infinitely elastic. Because retail distribution capacity is assumed to be limited for each underwriter‐dealer, Bertrand competition breaks down in the primary market and new issues are underpriced in equilibrium. Syndicates emerge in which underwriters bid symmetrically, with quantities allocated internally to efficiently utilize retail distribution capacity.     

The Benefit of Excluding Institutional Investors from Fixed-Price IPOs: Evidence from Taiwan

A simple way to mitigate the winner's curse in initial public offerings (IPOs) is to reduce the number of informed investors in IPO markets. In Taiwan, institutional investors are not permitted to subscribe to fixed-price IPOs. Excluding institutional investors raises uninformed investors' allocation rates. We show that the winner's curse is still present in Taiwan's fixed-price IPO markets even without the participation of institutional investors, but that IPO underpricing is reduced by at least 4 percent due to alleviating the winner's curse, as institutional investors are excluded from the fixed-price offerings.     

A friend in need is a friend indeed: Allocation and demand in IPO bookbuilding

This paper uses proprietary data on European IPOs with detailed information on the demand at different points of time and allocation for institutional and retail investors. The nature of the data allows us to analyze the reason of why institutional investors as a group get more allocations of underpriced issues than retail investors. By explicitly examining institutional and retail demand for different kinds of stocks, we find that this is due to institutional investors' superior ability to detect underpriced stocks rather than the underwriter's preferential treatment. At the same time, the subset of domestic institutional investors supports the underwriter in issues with weak demand and receives in turn favorable allocations in underpriced issues.     

Arbitrage Asymmetry and the Idiosyncratic Volatility Puzzle

Buying is easier than shorting for many equity investors. Combining this arbitrage asymmetry with the arbitrage risk represented by idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL) explains the negative relation between IVOL and average return. The IVOL‐return relation is negative among overpriced stocks but positive among underpriced stocks, with mispricing determined by combining 11 return anomalies. Consistent with arbitrage asymmetry, the negative relation among overpriced stocks is stronger, especially for stocks less easily shorted, so the overall IVOL‐return relation is negative. Further supporting our explanation, high investor sentiment weakens the positive relation among underpriced stocks and, especially, strengthens the negative relation among overpriced stocks.     

Does the media help or hurt retail investors during the IPO quiet period?

We examine how the media influences retail trade and market returns during the “quiet period” that follows a firm's IPO. We find that more media coverage during this period is associated with more purchases by retail investors and that such purchases are attention-driven, rather than information-based. Further, these retail trades are negatively associated with stock returns at the firm's first earnings announcement post-IPO. Our results suggest that media coverage, combined with market frictions that limit price efficiency in the post-IPO period, leads to worse investing outcomes for retail investors.     

IPO auctions and private information

IPO auctions, which provide an impartial way of determining IPO pricing and share allocations, offer a natural setting for examining whether institutional investors possess private information, and for measuring how valuable their information is. Analyzing detailed bidding data from Taiwan’s discriminatory (pay-as-bid) auctions, we find that, relative to retail investors, institutional investors tend to bid higher in auctions when IPO shares are more valuable, and that underpricing is larger in auctions with relatively higher institutional bids. These results imply that institutional investors are better informed about IPO value, and that they obtain higher information rents when they bid higher relative to retail investors. We estimate the value of institutional investors’ private information to be worth about 8.68% of return, which is the extra rate of return they command on their informational advantages over retail investors.     

The IPO and first seasoned equity sale: Issue proceeds,owner/managers' wealth,and the underpricing signal

Recent models of IPO underpricing suggest that high-quality firms underprice their IPOs to differentiate themselves from low-quality firms and, thus, receive a more favorable market response to subsequent equity offerings. We test this suggestion for 172 industrial firms that made an initial public offering during 1987–1991 and made a subsequent seasoned equity offering within three years of their IPO. We examine two measures of the impact of the hypothesized underpricing signal net of the cost of employing that signal. Inconsistent with the underpricing signal hypothesis, we find no evidence that firms recover the cost of an underpriced IPO in either higher issue proceeds or in greater wealth for the firm's initial owners.     

Market Feedback,Investment Constraints,and Managerial Behavior

This paper examines the joint role of market feedback and investment constraints on managerial behavior. Using a sample of UK fixed price initial public offerings, we show that underperformance of share returns at the IPO significantly affects managerial investment decisions in the period after the offering. Firms with better investment opportunities and proportionately lower fixed (higher intangible) assets are more sensitive to negative market feedback. Over the longer term, the more responsive firms perform significantly better than their non‐responsive counterparts. The findings contribute to the debate on the informational advantage of managers over investors and present strong evidence that the market, on aggregate, can provide a superior assessment of a firm's opportunities. Managers who are able to respond to negative market feedback can significantly improve their firm's future prospects.     

Underpricing of homecoming A-share IPOs by Chinese firms already listed abroad

Many Chinese firms have pursued overseas listings in Hong Kong or US without being first listed in China’s domestic market, mainly due to the regulatory constraints imposed by the Chinese government. Some of them eventually returned to mainland China through an A-share offering to Chinese investors. This unique feature of cross-listed Chinese stocks offers an experiment field to test some of the conventional theories of initial public offerings (IPOs) underpricing. Homebound IPOs are expected to be less underpriced than domestic only IPOs that are not cross-listed because being already listed in a developed market can mitigate the information asymmetry and issue uncertainty associated with their A-share IPOs. Nevertheless, we find that homecoming A-share IPOs are still substantially underpriced, with an average market adjusted first-day return of 96.53 %. Furthermore, their first-day returns are not significantly different from those of domestic only IPOs once firm- and offer-characteristics are controlled. This is in sharp contrast to the lukewarm aftermarket performance experienced in their overseas debuts. The mean market adjusted first-day return is merely 5.35 % in their US ADR offerings and 11.63 % in their Hong Kong H-share IPOs. Overall, our results suggest the importance of local market structures and norms as influential factors of IPO underpricing.     

Is sustainability rating material to the market?

This study examines whether information about a firm's engagement in environmental, social, and governance (ESG) practices is material to market participants. Evidence from a sample of 1856 initial public offerings (IPOs) by U.S. companies for the 2007–2018 period robustly documents that firms for which there is available ESG performance information prior to going public exhibit higher underpricing due to a positive market response. Such a reaction is validated by agency cost-reducing practices that ESG-rated firms follow prior to the IPO, the superior post-IPO market performance they exhibit in terms of equity financing, and the higher share of financially sophisticated investors they attract compared to their ESG-unrated peers. Overall, our results highlight that it pays off to do good and to have the right investors; however, firms’ good ESG practices need to be visible to the market, through rating practices, to reap the benefits.     

The Underpricing and Excess Returns of Initial Public Offerings in Taiwan Based on Noisy Trading: A Stochastic Frontier Model

Initial public offerings (IPOs) are typically offered at prices lower than the transaction price in the early aftermarket. With a stochastic frontier model, we measured the fair offer price of an IPO and then the deliberate IPO underpricing and the market misvaluation based on the estimated fair offer price. Our results show that IPOs are deliberately underpriced. The extent of noisy trading leading to significantly higher market transaction prices explains the excess IPO returns. We conclude that initial IPO returns result primarily from the noisy trading activities instead of the deliberate IPO underpricing.     

Clawback provision adoption,corporate governance,and investment decisions

We examine the effect of corporate governance on the likelihood of clawback provision adoption, and its consequences in terms of corporate investment practices and risk‐taking behavior. We find that firms with strong governance (as proxied by board independence, diligence, and size) are positively associated with the firm's adoption of a clawback provision; whereas firms with weak governance (as proxied by management entrenchment, i.e., CEO duality status and tenure) are negatively associated with clawback provision adoption. Using the propensity‐score matching, difference‐in‐differences research design, and inverse Mills ratio to mitigate omitted variables and self‐selection biases, we find that after adopting a clawback provision, firms’ abnormal investment decreases and the firms’ investments are less risky.     

The determinants of market-wide issue cycles for initial public offerings

This paper identifies the determinants of market-wide issue cycles for initial public offerings (IPOs) using an autoregressive conditional count model. We consider whether IPO volume is related to business conditions, investor sentiment, and time variation in adverse selection costs caused by asymmetric information between managers and investors. We provide evidence indicating that time variation in business conditions and investor sentiment are important determinants of monthly issue activity. By contrast, time variation in adverse selection costs does not significantly affect IPO volume.     

Initial Public Offerings and Underwriter Reputation

This paper examined the returns earned by subscribing to initial public offerings of equity (IPOs). Rock (1986) suggests that IPO returns are required by uninformed investors as compensation for the risk of trading against superior information. We show that IPOs with more informed investor capital require higher returns. The marketing underwriter's reputation reveals the expected level of “informed” activity. Prestigious underwriters are associated with lower risk offerings. With less risk there is less incentive to acquire information and fewer informed investors. Consequently, prestigious underwriters are associated with IPOs that have lower returns.