An Incumbent Country View on Eastern Enlargement of the EU Part I: A General Treatment

An eastern enlargement of the EU, from an incumbent country point of view,involves a fiscal burden from extending Union agricultural and cohesion policiesto new members, coupled with potential gains as well as adjustment problemsderiving from an extended customs union and a larger single market. Enlargementis controversial, because the net effect is unclear, a priori, and will certainly vary across individual countries. Our two-part contribution tries to do shed light on this controversy. In this first part, we present a general treatment of the likely effects on different incumbent countries, while a subsequent companion paper will take a closer look at the specific case of Austria. The general view of part I, in turn, first focuses on various empirical measures highlighting crucial differences between incumbents, pertaining to the fiscal burden on the one hand, and integration gains on the other. We then argue that a proper evaluation must rely on an explicit welfare criterion, and we use a general model of economic integration in order to identify the principalchannels through which aggregate welfare of an incumbent country is affected by an enlargement of the EU. We address traditional effects of trade creation and trade diversion, as well as growth effects arising from an abolition of trade barriers. In addition, we ask how enlargement affects foreign direct investmentand labor migration, and what this implies in welfare terms for an incumbent western European country. Taken together, these effects generate a certain presumption of integration gains, which need to be set against the fiscal burden. However, a final judgement requires a case-by-case approach, based on empirical implementations of enriched and parameterized models for specific countries. The companion paper, therefore, uses a suitably specified, calibrated dynamic equilibrium model, in order to take a closer look at the Austrian case.     

Eastern Enlargement of the EU: How Much Is It Worth for Austria?

For present member countries, eastern EU enlargement entails gains from integration as well as fiscal costs. The authors use a calibrated model to quantify the dynamic effects of discriminatory trade liberalization and immigration from eastern applicants. It is found that enlargement is expansionary and yields a remarkable fiscal dividend. Surprisingly, integration compresses the wage spread between skilled and unskilled labor. Overall, the (dynamic) gains from integration clearly outweigh the fiscal cost. While ambiguous a priori , enlargement is found to hold a remarkable net welfare gain for Austria.     

The welfare impact of migration with endogenous cross-border movement: An application to the European Union

In this paper, I examine the welfare impact of migration in a general equilibrium model with endogenous worker location choice. My framework incorporates labor productivity differences across countries, worker heterogeneity in productivity across skill and nativity types, as well as country-pair specific costs of migration. In a series of experiments, I predict the migration response of workers to an expansion or contraction in the number of European Union (EU) member countries. For the case of the United Kingdom (U.K.) leaving the EU, commonly referred to as Brexit, low skilled native-born U.K. workers suffer a drop-in income, whereas high skilled workers experience an increase. This result is driven, in part, by an increase in high skilled immigration to the U.K. from outside the EU, which helps to dampen the loss in income of low skilled workers.     

Gains and losses from potential bilateral US–China trade retaliation

Two closely related numerical general equilibrium models of world trade are used to analyze the potential consequences of US–China bilateral retaliation on trade flows and welfare. One is a conventional Armington trade model with five regions, the US, China, EU, Japan and the Rest of the World, and calibrated to a global 2009 micro consistent data set. The other is a modified version of this model with monetary non-neutrals and including China's trade surplus as an endogenous variable.Who may gain or loss from global trade conflicts spawned by adjustment pressures in the post crisis world is much debated. In a US–China trade conflict, Europe and Japan would seem gainers from preferential access to US and Chinese markets. The loss of markets would hurt the US, but moving closer to an optimal tariff could be the source of terms of trade gains. And the ease of substitution across trading partners' practices would determine costs for China.Results from the conventional model suggest that retaliation between the two countries can be welfare improving for the US as it substitutes expenditures into own goods and improve its terms of trade with non-retaliatory regions, while China and non-retaliatory regions may be adversely affected. Results in the endogenous trade surplus model from the central case model specification, however, suggest that both the US and the EU (the deficit regions) have welfare losses in most cases, while the surplus region, China, and the ROW have welfare gains. In both models, when the bilateral tariff rates are very high, gains accrue to the EU and Japan from trade diversion if the substitutions elasticities of imports are high. Costs are borne by the US and China in lost exports, lowered terms of trade and adjustment costs at home.     

The Dilemmas of Tax Coordination in the Enlarged European Union

This study evaluates the economic effects of corporate tax coordinationin the enlarged European Union (EU) using a computable generalequilibrium model. Our main findings are as follows: (i) Corporatetax coordination can yield modest aggregate welfare gains. The2004 enlargement of the EU has increased the potential gainsfrom tax harmonization, provided corporate tax rates and taxbases are harmonized at their unweighted averages. (ii) Allscenarios for coordination leave some EU Member States as winnersand others as losers. An agreement on tax coordination is thereforelikely to require elaborate compensation mechanisms. (iii) Thelarge and diverse country effects suggest that Enhanced Cooperationfor a subset of the Member States may be the most likely routetowards tax coordination. (iv) Identifying winners and losersfrom coordination for the purpose of a compensation mechanismmay be problematic, since countries experiencing gains in GDPand welfare tend to lose tax revenues, and vice versa. (JELcodes: H25, H73, H87)     

EU-Enlargement and Beyond: A Simulation Study on EU and Russia Integration

This paper examines the economic effects of the opening of the Russian Federation. The analysis carried out in the paper is twofold. First we simulate the impact of the eastern enlargement of the EU and, second, we analyse how deeper integration between the EU and Russia contributes to this. The analysis is carried out with GTAP, a computable general equilibrium model. We find that there is a trade-off between the two roads of European integration arrangements. Eastern enlargement seems, even in its very deep form, be beneficial for all EU regions without causing substantial welfare losses outside the Union. EU–Russia integration, on the other hand, has different impact. To be beneficial for Russia free trade between the EU and Russia requires improved productivity in the latter, which may be due to better institutions or increased FDI. This might make the negotiations of the agreement cumbersome and if agreed its implementation difficult.This study stems from a project Opening of Russia in which the authors participated at RECEP in Moscow. This paper is substantially revised and updated version of Sulamaa, P. and Widgrén, M. (2003): EU Enlargement and Beyond: A Simulation Study on EU and CIS Integration, CEPR Discussion Papers 3768. The authors thank Peter Havlik and Risto Vaittinen and an anonymous referee for beneficial comments on earlier drafts, Comments and discussions with Paavo Suni, Ivan Samson, Xavier Richet and Xavier Greffe are also gratefully acknowledged. The usual disclaimer applies.     

Benefits and Dangers of EU Enlargement

A new macroeconomic evaluation of EU enlargement is undertaken with a world macroeconomic model taking into account all possible integration effects: trade effects, Single Market effects, factor movements (FDI, migration) and the costs of enlargement. Due to the differences in size of the regions involved, on average the CEEC – measured in terms of real GDP – will gain around 10 times more from enlargement than the EU. Hungary and Poland can increase their real GDP by around 8 to 9 percent over a 10-year period, the Czech Republic gains a little bit less (5 to 6 percent). The EU on average would gain around 0.5 percent of real GDP over a 6-year period. Although, on average enlargement is a win-win game, the impact is quite different in the separate EU member states, with Austria, Germany and Italy gaining the most and losses for Spain, Portugal and Denmark. Hence, EU enlargement may not only be beneficial but might be a risky undertaking. Due to the regional different impact, enlargement acts like an exogenous shock leading to asymmetric disturbances in the EU. This could pause the process of business cycle synchronisation and might impair monetary policy in Euroland at the beginning of the enlargement process. A two-step integration of the CEEC into the EU – first the participation in the Single Market and only later into the EMU – is therefore preferable under the aspect of macroeconomic stability in Euroland.     

Quantitative analysis of health insurance reform: Separating regulation from redistribution

Two key components of the recent U.S. health reform are a new regulation of the individual health insurance market and an increase in income redistribution in the economy. Which component contributes more to the welfare outcome of the reform? We address this question by constructing a general equilibrium life-cycle model that incorporates both medical expenses and labor income risks. We replicate the key features of the current health insurance system in the U.S. and calibrate the model using the Medical Expenditures Panel Survey dataset. We find that the reform decreases the number of uninsured more than twice and generates substantial welfare gains. These welfare gains mostly come from the redistributive measures embedded in the reform, rather than from the regulatory changes.     

Implicit trade Costs and European single market enlargement

This paper investigates the deeper integration of the new EU accession states into the Single Market. Building on the assumption that observed trade patterns can be taken to reveal trading costs between members and non-members of a bloc, I develop a model-consistent Dixit-Stiglitz general equilibrium-based calibration technique. Using this, I investigate numerically the effects of the recent EU enlargement, suggesting that deeper integration, which removed the border costs implied by 1990s trade patterns, could raise trade by 50–100% and incomes in the accession states by 10–20%.     

Trade policies, concentration, growth and welfare

The aim of this paper is to analyse, through a theoretical model, the effects that the trade integration of two countries may have on industrial location, growth and welfare.The conclusions reached finally depend both on whether the import or the export costs are affected by the trade policies on which the integration process is based and on whether the rich or the poor country introduces them. In general, when integration leads to an increase of industrial concentration in the rich country, the growth rate increases and welfare improves in both countries. If integration means that industry moves to the poor country, the growth rate decreases; in spite of this, in this case the poor country can also improve its welfare.     

The costs and benefits of eastern enlargement: the impact on the EU and central Europe

Eastern enlargement of the EU is a central pillar in Europe's post-Cold War architecture. Keeping the eastern countries out seriously endangers their economic transition, and economic failure in the east could threaten peace and prosperity in western Europe. The perceived economic costs and benefits will dictate the enlargement's timing. There are four parts to the calculus – the costs and the benefits in the east and in the west. Here we break new ground in estimating the economic benefits of enlargement for east and west using simulations in a global applied general equilibrium model. Our analysis includes a scenario in which joining the EU significantly reduces the risk premium on investment in the east – with resulting huge benefits to the new entrants. We also review the existing literature on the EU budget costs and arrive at a surprisingly well-determined 'consensus' estimate, which we support with a new political economy analysis of the budget. The bottom line is unambiguous and strongly positive: enlargement is a very good deal for both the EU incumbents and the new members.     

The extension of social security coverage in developing countries

We study the dynamic general equilibrium effects of introducing a social pension program to elderly informal sector workers in developing countries who lack formal risk sharing mechanisms against income and longevity risks. To this end, we formulate a stochastic dynamic general equilibrium model that incorporates defining features of developing countries: a large informal sector, private transfers as an informal safety net, and a non-universal social security system. We find that the extension of retirement benefits to informal sector workers results in efficiency losses due to adverse effects on capital accumulation and the allocation of resources across formal and informal sectors. Despite these losses recipients of social pensions experience welfare gains as the positive insurance effects attributed to the extension of a social insurance system dominate. The welfare gains crucially depend on the skill distribution, private intra-family transfers and the specific tax used to finance the expansion.     

The case for international tax co-ordination reconsidered

In a world of high capital mobility, governments may be tempted to undercut each other's capital income taxes to attract capital from abroad. Since such tax competition may have detrimental effects for all countries, European policy makers have debated the introduction of a minimum capital income tax rate within the EU. This paper develops an applied general equilibrium model to estimate the effects of such tax co-ordination on resource allocation, income distribution and social welfare. The model allows for the concern of policy makers that a rise in capital taxes within the EU may cause a capital flight out of Europe. Capital flight will indeed reduce the welfare gain from tax co-ordination within Western Europe, but a positive net gain will remain, although it is likely to be well below 1% of GDP. The gain from co-ordination will be unevenly distributed across European countries, due to differences in economic structures and in the social preference for redistribution. Moreover, even if the median voter's gain from tax co-ordination may be small, the gains for the poorer sections of society may be quite large.     

Sectoral linking of carbon markets: A trade-theory analysis

The linking of emission trading systems (ETS) is a widely discussed policy option for future international cooperation on climate change. Benefits are expected from efficiency gains and the alleviation of concerns over competitiveness. However, from trade-theory it is known that due to general equilibrium effects and market distortions, linking may not always be beneficial for all participating countries. Following-up on this debate, we use a Ricardo-Viner type general equilibrium model to study the implications of sectoral linking on carbon emissions (‘leakage’), competitiveness, and welfare. By comparing pre- and post-linking equilibria, we show analytically how global emissions can increase if one of the ‘linked’ countries lacks an economy-wide emissions cap, although in case of a link across idiosyncratic sectors a decrease of emissions (‘anti-leakage’) is also possible. If – as a way to address concerns about competitiveness – a link between the EU ETS and a hypothetical US system is established, the partial emission coverage of the EU ETS can lead to the creation of new distortions between the non-covered domestic and international sector. Finally, we show how the welfare effect from linking can be decomposed into gains-from-trade and terms-of-trade contributions, and how the latter can make the overall effect ambiguous.     

EU Enlargement and the Future of the Welfare State

The eastern enlargement of the EU resembles German unification in its momentousness. Whereas the latter led to a 26% increase in the population of the Federal Republic, the former will increase the population of the EU by 28% if all ten entry aspirants are accepted. A special problem will be posed by migration. Given the existing wage differences between eastern and western European countries, a massive westward migration can be expected after enlargement. A temporary east–to–west migration until the eastern countries create an efficient capital stock makes economic sense if this is driven by wage differences and meets with a flexible labour market. Migration does not make economic sense, however, if, and to the extent that, it is induced by the current social assistance systems. Moreover, welfare–motivated migration would create competition among western European states to frighten off potential migrants, and this would lead to an erosion of the traditional social welfare state. If the EU plan incorporated limitation on the free movement of labour, beneficial migration would also cease. A better solution would be to limit access to the western social systems, at least for a transitional period, in order to filter out migration induced by differing social standards. An EU–wide application of the home–country principle in the granting of social benefits would achieve this goal.     

Comparison of deep integration in the Melitz,Krugman and Armington models: The case of The Philippines in RCEP

We estimate the welfare effects of a modern mega-preferential trade agreement--the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership--with three versions of market structure: (i) perfect competition, Armington style; (ii) monopolistic competition based on Krugman (1980); and (iii) monopolistic competition in the style of Melitz (2003). We develop a new numerical model of foreign direct investment (FDI) with heterogeneous firms and extension of the Krugman model that allows small countries to impact the number of varieties. We hold both the trade and FDI responses constant across the three market structures. We find that in all three market structures, there are substantial gains from deep integration, but virtually no gains from preferential tariff reduction. Both our Krugman and Melitz style models produce significantly larger welfare gains than the Armington structure, especially if third countries benefit at least partially from the deep integration reforms via either spillovers or wider liberalization.     

Technology transfers and the clean development mechanism in a North–South general equilibrium model

This paper analyses the potential welfare gains of introducing a technology transfer from Annex I to non-Annex I in order to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions. Our analysis is based on a numerical general equilibrium model for a world-economy comprising two regions; North (Annex I) and South (non-Annex I). In a cooperative equilibrium, a technology transfer from the North to the South is clearly desirable from the perspective of a ‘global social planner’, since the welfare gain for the South outweighs the welfare loss for the North. However, if the regions do not cooperate, then the incentives to introduce the technology transfer appear to be relatively weak from the perspective of the North; at least if we allow for Southern abatement in the pre-transfer Nash equilibrium. Finally, by adding the emission reductions associated with the Kyoto agreement, our results show that the technology transfer leads to higher welfare in both regions.     

Deconstructing the Gains from Trade: Selection of Industries vs Reallocation of Workers

In a Ricardian model with general distributions of industry efficiencies, the welfare gains from trade can be decomposed into a selection and a reallocation effect. The former is the change in average efficiency as a result of the selection of industries that survive international competition. The latter is the rise in the weight of exporting industries in production, owing to the reallocation of workers from non‐exporting industries. This decomposition, which is hard to calculate in the general case, simplifies dramatically with Fréchet‐distributed efficiencies, providing easy‐to‐quantify model‐based measures of these two effects. Selection (reallocation) turns out to matter mostly when welfare gains are small (large).     

Trade liberalization gains under different trade theories: a case study for Ukraine

We analyze the deep and comprehensive free trade area (DCFTA) between Ukraine and the EU using a multi-regional general-equilibrium simulation model. Three alternative trade structures are implemented: (a) a standard specification of perfect competition based on the Armington assumption of regionally differentiated goods; (b) monopolistic competition among symmetric manufacturing firms; and (c) a competitive selection model of heterogeneous manufacturing firms. Across these structures the DCFTA indicates relatively large gains for Ukraine of more than 3 percent. We show, however, that the gains for Ukraine are lower when we consider monopolistic competition in manufacturing. This is attributed to a movement of resources into Ukraine’s traditional export sectors to the EU, which produce under constant returns. While there is little danger of deindustrialization dominating the overall welfare gains, we do observe substantially lower gains when we consider monopolistic competition. To our knowledge, this is the first empirical confirmation of the theoretic predication that the relative gains from trade in monopolistic competition models might be lower than under perfect competition in the context of a numeric simulation of economic integration. Under the popular heterogeneous-firms monopolistic competition theory we find significant firm selection effects indicating welfare impacts for Ukraine that are less than under the Armington structure but above those found under symmetric firms and monopolistic competition. These results are important considerations for Ukraine’s overall development strategy.     

An analysis of Turkey's accession to the European Union

We build a two‐country dynamic general equilibrium model to study whether European citizens would benefit from the eventual accession of Turkey to the European Union (EU). The results of the simulations show that Turkey's accession is welfare enhancing for Europeans, provided that Turkish total factor productivity (TFP) increases sufficiently after enlargement. In the benchmark model with no capital mobility, the Europeans are better off if the Turkish TFP increase bridges more than 21% of the initial TFP gap between Turkey and the EU. This figure increases to 33% when capital mobility is introduced.