上市公司高管自利行为对资本结构的影响

资本结构理论一直是学术界和实务界关注的焦点,由于上市公司高管自利行为对企业管理的各个层面都会产生影响,因此上市公司高管自利行为对资本结构的影响以及影响程度如何也逐步受到学术界重视。从国外研究成果看,高管人员持股市值与资产负债率呈显著负相关,但对高管人员调节资本结构的能力却没有得到满意的实证支持。我国上市公司高管人员是否会出于自利动机影响资本结构,目前国内学者还较少涉及。本文通过分析我国2009年底以前上市的613家上市公司数据,对我国上市公司高管人员出于自利目的而影响资本结构的情况进行了探讨。     

股权结构与资本结构关系的实证研究

公司股权结构差异会对资本结构的选择产生影响,本文选取沪深上市公司2008²015年的股权结构数据,针对股权结构对资本结构的影响进行实证研究。研究发现国有股与法人股的影响力逐渐下降,而高管股正在逐步显现其对资本结构的影响。说明股改后国有股一股独大的现象已有好转,应该继续加强法人股、机构投资者和高管股的作用。     

不同成长机会下的上市公司股权结构、资本结构与公司绩效——以A股流通服务业上市公司为例

文章以我国流通服务业上市公司为研究样本,分析了上市公司资本结构和股权结构对公司绩效的影响,以及成长机会在其中的调节作用.研究结果表明流通服务业上市公司第一大股东持股比例、第二到第十大股东持股比例、长期负债资本比对公司绩效存在显著正向影响;国有股持股比例、高管持股比例、资产负债率对公司绩效存在显著负向影响.随着公司成长机会的增加,第二到第十大股东持股,非国有法人股持股对公司绩效正向影响作用增强;而第一大股东持股比例、国有股持股比例、高管持股比例、资产负债率与长期负债资本比对公司绩效的影响并不随着公司成长性的变化而变化.文章研究对于流通服务业上市公司股权结构和资本结构优化提供了有益的启示.     

高管政治背景对企业资本结构影响的实证研究

企业资本结构决策是财务管理的核心问题之一,全面识别企业资本结构决策的影响因素至关重要。本文以2007-2012年深沪上市公司为样本,研究了高管的政治背景对企业资本结构的影响。结果发现:具有高管政治背景的公司更偏好于提高资本结构;高管的地方政治背景更容易使公司获得贷款。本研究拓展了资本结构的研究范畴,有助于理解上市公司资本结构决策差异的政治根源。     

高管股权激励对公司绩效的影响分析

现如今越来越多的企业为了提高公司的绩效对高管及员工采取股权激励的方式,但与此同时带来的往往是一系列公司利益主体的变动。从理论分析来看,股权激励可作为稳定公司高管人员的一种长期激励方式,通常被认为是解决委托—代理矛盾的首要机制。在我国资本市场体系不断完善的背景下,已有越来越多的公司在经济管理过程中采用高管股权激励的方式来对管理层与公司股东之间的利益矛盾进行协调。本文基于上述背景,结合实例,对高管股权激励对公司高管的行为以及公司绩效的影响作了分析,以期能为公司管理提供借鉴。     

基于佃农理论的企业高管人员薪酬激励分析

文章认为企业高管人员的身份具有佃农的性质,高管人员的收入都是分成收入。运用佃农理论对高管人员的分成比例进行分析,得到了市场条件下均衡的高管人员分成比例,进而得出了降低资本分成比例有利于激励高管人员的结论,并提出了优化高管人员薪酬激励的建议。     

美国高管薪酬信息披露制度最新进展研究及启示

后危机时代高管薪酬信息披露问题引起了各国政府监管部门的高度关注和持续跟踪.充分、透明的高管薪酬信息披露将提高董事会对高管人员薪酬制定的有效性,增强公众对资本市场的信心,促进资本市场的稳定发展.近年来,美国证券交易委员会在高管薪酬信息披露的制度建设上取得了一系列重要进展.本文剖析了高管薪酬信息披露的作用机理,借鉴美国高管薪酬信息披露经验,立足我国制度背景,提出了完善我国上市公司高管薪酬披露制度的政策建议.     

非业绩指标存在性的理论分析和实证检验

从Holmstrom的标准委托—代理模型出发,可以得出高管人员报酬仅仅是业绩的函数,非业绩指标在契约中的存在只会增加代理成本;而从经理主义的经理人自利角度出发,可以对非业绩指标存在性给予充分解释。但在现实中,几乎所有国家上市公司的高管报酬契约中都存在非业绩指标,很难用这些公司股东都没有发现或者没有能力遏制经理的自利行为来进行解释。从理论和实证的角度,对非业绩指标在契约中的存在性进行探讨,阐述规模指标的存在,同样也是符合代理理论和股东利益的。     

基于委托代理理论下高管激励的研究

随着经济改革的不断深入,建立现代的公司治理机制已成为改革的重点.公司所有权和管理权的两权分离是现代企业最突出的特征.公司高管人员和公司所有者的目标利益不一致,加之公司高管和所有者存在信息不对称、利益不对称以及契约的不完备,导致二者之间的逆向选择和道德风险,从而产生了委托代理问题和高管人员激励约束问题.针对这些现象作为委托人必须思考适当加强激励,建立长期激励机制以减少委托方代理方之间的利益差距,最终使高管层的长期利益与股东的利益趋于一致.     

高管报酬影响因素的经济学分析——以中小板上市公司为例

高管报酬受很多因素影响,本文从反映公司盈利能力、资本结构、公司规模等财务指标角度,利用Eviews6.0软件就影响中小板上市公司高管报酬相关因素进行实证研究,有助于深入了解中小板上市公司高管薪酬水平差异产生的原因,并为公司制定高管报酬制度提供示范。再利用边际分析方法和替代效应等现代经济学的观点阐述了公司怎样制定高管薪酬,以保证高管报酬起到更好地激励作用。     

资本结构、投资者保护与国有企业的公司治理

资本结构与企业的公司治理总是密切地联系在一起,大量经济学文献从税收、激励、信息传递以及控制权方面来研究资本结构与公司治理结构之间的关系,但是现在经济学家们认为从投资者保护的角度才能真正建立起有效的公司治理机制。对于国有企业的公司治理,只有在民营化的条件下,通过加强对投资者权利的保护,才能真正地建立起有效的公司治理机制。     

Valuation and firm investment and financing policies with personal tax biases

In this paper we examine firm financial policies in the presence of personal tax biases (e.g., favoring capital gains relative to interest and dividends). A form of the value additivity principle (VAP) for the tax bias case is established and applied to the firm's merger, investment, financial structure, and dividend decisions. As with the neutral tax VAP, the revised VAP requires transaction costless capital markets but does not require capital market completeness or competitiveness. Share value maximization is found not to be the proper goal for a firm that seeks to maximize the shareholders' current expected utility; however, it is found that share value maximization is generally a good approximate objective. Firm investment policy with financial structure irrelevance (owing to offsetting personal and corporate taxes) is examined assuming that the revised VAP holds.     

社会责任、信誉资本与企业价值创造

信誉资本作为企业的一种无形资源,在社会责任与企业价值创造关系中发挥了价值传导的中介作用。社会责任通过信誉资本对企业价值的影响方向并不是单一的,而是一个相互影响、相互促进的循环和协同作用过程。企业承担社会责任对企业价值创造和财务绩效具有正向影响,而财务绩效的优化使企业具有更多的资源和能力进行信誉资本投资,反过来又可以推进企业社会责任活动的开展。     

新《公司法》修正内容及其影响分析

2014年3月1日新《中华人民共和国公司法》正式施行,引起了社会公众的广泛、密切关注。新《公司法》实行注册资本认缴制、放宽注册资本登记条件、简化登记事项和登记文件,进一步降低公司设立门槛。新修订的《公司法》,有效助推了相关法律法规的出台,对公司的设立、公司章程、企业年检制度、股东和债权人利益都有重大影响,同时进一步调整了中介服务机构的会计和律师行业的业务,从而能有效优化营商环境,维护公平竞争的市场环境,促进市场主体加快发展。     

Governance of Knowledge‐Intensive Firms in the Modern Market Economy

We model contracting for joint production between workers and shareholders when investment in knowledge is non‐verifiable and the resulting specific human capital embedded in the workers is non‐tradable. The model explains how the effective cost of human capital services will vary depending on whether the investment in knowledge is financed by the workers or by the shareholders. We apply the results of the modeling to identify which firms are expected to gain and which to lose from posted trends in higher employability and lower empowerment of workers in modern market economies. Finally, we present conditions on the self‐interest of current shareholders to empower workers as a way to stimulate their investment in firm‐specific human capital.     

Managerial Opportunism and Capital Structure Adjustments: Equity–for–debt Swap and Convertible Debt

This paper shows how capital structure adjustments through an equity–for–debt swap and convertible debt can resolve the inefficiency caused by managerial opportunism. We consider a situation in which a corporate manager's investment decision is affected by the firm's debt level. Although both an equity–for–debt swap and convertible debt can induce the self–interested manager to undertake only value–increasing projects through capital structure adjustments, there exists a significant difference between these two financial instruments. An equity–for–debt swap, which requires the agreement of both shareholders and debt holders, can change a firm's debt level only prior to the manager's investment decision. On the other hand, convertible debt, which gives debt holders a unilateral right to convert, can change a firm's debt level even after the manager's investment decision.     

How venture capital firms differ

Four potential sources of differences between venture capital (VC) firms were examined—venture stage of interest, amount of assistance provided by the VC, VC firm size, and geographic region where located. Through a questionnaire, 149 venture capitalists provided data about their firms, about what they look for in evaluating an investment, and about how they work with a portfolio company following an investment.Firms were divided into four groups based on venture stage of interest. The earlier the investment stage, the greater the interest in potential investments built upon proprietary products, product uniqueness, and high growth markets. Late-stage investors were more interested in demonstrated market acceptance.There were no differences by stage regarding the desired qualities of management. However, after the investment was made, earlier stage investors attached more importance to spending their time evaluating and recruiting managers. Earlier stage investors sought ventures with higher potential returns—a 42% hurdle rate of return for the earliest stage investor versus 33% for the late-stage investor.Late-stage investors spent more time evaluating a potential investment. However, after the investment was made, there was little difference in the amount of time spent assisting the portfolio company. There were, however, differences in the significance that VCs attached to particular post-investment activities. Firms were split into three groups based upon the amount of time the VC spent with a portfolio company after an investment was made as lead investor. The most active group averaged over 35 hours per month per investment, and the least active group averaged less than seven hours.The difference in assistance provided was not strongly tied to differences in investment stage of interest. There were major differences in the importance the VCs attached to their post-investment activities. Not surprisingly, high involvement VCs viewed their activities as more important.Based upon the amount of capital they managed, firms were also split into three groups. Average fund size varied from 278 to 12 million dollars. The larger firms had more professionals and managed more money per professional. The large firms provided the least, and the medium-sized firms the most, assistance to portfolio companies. Large firms also made larger individual investments. Even though they invested over half their funds in late-stage investments whereas smaller firms focused on the earlier stages, the large firms were still a major source of early stage financing.There were no differences between geographic regions in the proportion of investments where the venture capital firm served as lead investor. There were, however, major regional differences in investment stages of interest. Also differences were observed between regions that were not a result of differing size and investment stage.     

Capital structure and cost efficiency in the Taiwanese banking industry

By utilizing a sample of 44 Taiwanese banks, this study analyses whether banks can mitigate agency costs, to increase firm performance through optimization of capital structure. The stochastic frontier approach is adopted to determine cost efficiency as the firm performance indicator, an approach that is capable of controlling outside environmental factors. Furthermore, this study uses two-stage least squares to estimate two simultaneous equations that are then used to examine the relationship between capital structure and firm performance. This study includes indicators of ownership structure. The main results are: first, optimal capital structure is selected by the manager to combat the agency problem and thus improve performance, yielding results consistent with agency theory; and second, reducing managerial share ownership will decrease agency cost and increase firm performance, a finding that is consistent with the Entrenchment Hypothesis.     

我国零售业公司价值特征影响因素研究——基于零售上市公司的实证分析

自我国零售业全面对外开放以来,本土零售商在拥有更广阔发展空间的同时必须面对外资零售商的进入带给其的竞争压力。因此,零售企业不再只关注其目前获利情况,更为关注的是公司的长远利益,即公司价值。文章将公司价值与零售业相融合,力求探讨一个行业代表性的价值因素,使本土零售企业能够明确自身定位。研究选取零售业全面开放后2005-2010年六年零售上市公司的年报数据为样本数据,在国内外学者研究基础上从资本结构、股权结构、规模经济、人力资本、产业因素及财务因素综合分析零售业公司价值的特征因素,为今后有关零售业进一步研究提供参考价值并对其未来发展提出合理化建议。     

Financing the small firm

This study presents a framework to delineate financing the small firm. Special consideration is given to small firms' unique financing sources such as trade and bank credit, entrepreneur's own resources, informal investment, and venture capital. The small firm has limited or no access to many traditional debt and equity markets that supply long term financing to the corporate world, and therefore operates in segmented and imperfect financial markets. The links between small firms' financing opportunities and managerial goals are traced from the start-up stage through establishing a mature firm. As the small firm matures, it operates in a broader financial market. This study establishes the foundation for future empirical research.