Keynes and Wagner on government expenditures and economic development: the case of a developing economy

This paper investigates the Keynesian view and the Wagner’s Law on the role of public expenditure on economic growth for Malaysia (1970–2004). The empirical results using the Auto-Regression Distributed Lag (ARDL) model and the ‘bounds test’ (Pesaran et al. in J Appl Econ 16:289–326, 2001) showed evidence of a long run relationship between total expenditures (including expenditures on defense, education, development and agriculture) and Gross National Product. The results also show that with the structural break in 1998, the long run causality is bi-directional for GNP and expenditures on administration and health, supporting both Keynes view and Wagner’s Law. For all other expenditure categories the long run causality runs from GNP to the expenditures, which supports Wagner’s Law. An erratum to this article can be found at     

General equilibrium in economies with adverse selection

We model economies of adverse selection as Arrow–Debreu economies. In the spirit of Prescott and Townsend (Econometrica 52(1), 21–45, 1984a), we identify the consumption set of the individuals with the set of lotteries over net transfers. Thus, prices are linear in lotteries, but they may be non linear in commodity bundles. First, we study a weak equilibrium notion by viewing the economy of adverse selection as a pure exchange economy. The weak equilibrium set is non empty, but some of the allocations may be inefficient, and the equilibria indeterminate. Second, following Prescott and Townsend (Econometrica 52(1), 21–45, 1984a), we introduce an intermediary (firm) supplying feasible and incentive compatible measures. Equilibria are constrained efficient, but the equilibrium set is empty for an open set of economies containing the Rothschild and Stiglitz insurance economies. The research of A. Rustichini was supported by the NSF grant NSF/SES-0136556.     

Neighborhood structure and the evolution of cooperation

This paper deals with the problem of explaining the survival of cooperative behavior in populations in which each person interacts only with a small set of social ‘neighbors’, and individuals adjust their behavior over time by myopically imitating more successful strategies within their own neighborhood. We identify two parameters—the interaction radius and the benefit–cost ratio—which jointly determine whether or not cooperation can survive. For each value of the interaction radius, there exists a critical value of the benefit–cost ratio which serves as the threshold below which cooperation cannot be sustained. This threshold itself declines as the interaction radius rises, so there is a precise sense in which dense networks are more conducive to the evolution of cooperation.     

Information Structure and the Tragedy of the Commons in Resource Extraction

Synopsis This paper considers the well-known Levhari-Mirman discrete-time model of resource extraction, and investigates the effects of the information structure of the dynamic game – open-loop, Markovian or history-dependent – on the equilibrium consumption path and the overall utility of the agents. Due to the special structure of the model, the open-loop regime yields a Pareto-optimal outcome. The Markovian regime leads to the most pronounced version of the tragedy of the commons. History-dependent behavior yields an outcome set that is intermediate between the other two cases, and that may include the Pareto-optimal outcome in some cases. The level of efficiency of equilibrium behaviour is thus U-shaped as a function of the level of information the agents’ extraction strategies are based on. The analysis suggests that in environments characterized by a dynamic (and no market) externality, forcing agents to commit to open-loop behavior would constitute welfare-improving regulation.     

The Fallacy of Free Trade II

This paper argues that not a single proposition of the modern theory of free trade is upheld by the recent experience of the United States. Freer trade is supposed to raise GNP growth and productivity growth as well as the living standard. Until 1972, when the US was practically a closed economy with a trade/GNP ratio averaging a low of 12%, GNP growth was 3.8%, productivity growth was 2%, and real wages had been rising for 150 years. Since 1972, the trade/GNP ratio has been rising steadily, US GNP growth has been only 2.5%, productivity growth is below 1%, and real wages have been falling for over three-quarters of the labor force.     

Market Games in Large Economies with a Finite Number of Types

We study market games derived from an exchange economy with a continuum of agents, each having one of finitely many possible types. The type of agent determines his initial endowment and utility function. It is shown that, unlike the well-known Shapley–Shubik theorem on market games (Shapley and Shubik in J Econ Theory 1:9–25, 1969), there might be a (fuzzy) game in which each of its sub-games has a non-empty core and, nevertheless, it is not a market game. It turns out that, in order to be a market game, a game needs also to be homogeneous. We also study investment games – which are fuzzy games obtained from an economy with a finite number of agents cooperating in one or more joint projects. It is argued that the usual definition of the core is inappropriate for such a model. We therefore introduce and analyze the new notion of comprehensive core. This solution concept seems to be more suitable for such a scenario. We finally refer to the notion of feasibility of an allocation in games with a large number of players. Some of the results in this paper appear in a previous draft distributed by the name “Cooperative investment games or Population games”. An anonymous referee of Economic Theory is acknowledged for his/her comments     

Foreign aid and fiscal behavior in a bounded rationality model: Different policy regimes

We examine how the source of foreign aid affects the composition of the recipient government's spending. Does the source of aid – bilateral or multilateral – influence recipient policy-makers' choice between development and nondevelopment expenditure? We depart from previous literature by introducing strong asymmetries in policy-makers' preferences. With the financial constraints set by foreign aid and domestic revenues, this formalization allows us to model and estimate the fiscal behavior of government policy-makers in the presence of foreign aid.     

Predicting the pattern of international trade in the neoclassical model: a synthesis

I propose a framework that takes a set of conceivable outcomes as the primitive and a prediction is defined by identifying a subset on the set of conceivable outcomes. This notion of predictability serves as an organizing principle for characterizing pattern of trade predictions in single economy and integrated equilibrium formulations of the neoclassical trade model. I identify allocative efficiency as the unifying subset selection criterion for the different formulations of the neoclassical trade model, ranging from Ricardo’s (in Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, reprinted by J. M. Dent, London, in Everyman’s library, 1817) original comparative advantage formulation to the multi-cone Heckscher–Ohlin specification with multiple countries, goods and factors. I am grateful to comments from Jim Anderson, Chris Starmer, Catia Montagna, Peter Neary, two anonymous referees, as well as participants at the June 2007 GEP Conference on ‘New Directions in International Trade Theory’. I am grateful for financial support from NSF research grant SES-0452991 and from Leverhulme Trust Programme grant F114/BF.     

The bargaining set in strategic market games

This paper presents a hybrid equilibrium notion that blends together the ‘cooperative’ and the ‘noncooperative’ theories of competition. In particular, the Mas-Colell bargaining set has been modified in order to accommodate the features of strategic market games. In other words, allocations, objections and counter objections of the standard bargaining set theory are described for an economy, where trades among groups of individuals are conducted via the Shapley–Shubik mechanism. In the main part of the paper, it is proved that in atomless economies the allocations resulting from this equilibrium notion are competitive.     

Saving and habit formation: evidence from Dutch panel data

This paper focuses on the role of habit formation in individual preferences. In this study, the model of Alessie and Lusardi (Econ Lett 55:103–108, 1997) and its extension by Guariglia and Rossi (Oxf Econ Pap 54:1–19, 2002) are considered. Our empirical specifications are based on their closed-form solutions, where current saving is expressed as a function of lagged saving and other regressors. In our study, we use a longitudinal data set from the Netherlands that allows us to disentangle the role of habit formation from unobserved heterogeneity. Contrary to most other studies using survey data, we find evidence in favor of habit formation. However, the magnitude of the habit formation coefficient is rather small. Income uncertainty seems to affect saving behavior of Dutch households.     

Graphical causal models and VARs: an empirical assessment of the real business cycles hypothesis

This paper assesses the empirical plausibility of the real business cycle view that shocks to real variables are the dominant sources of economic fluctuations and that monetary policy shocks play an insignificant role in determining the behavior of real variables. I reconsider the vector autoregressive model of King et al. (Am Econ Rev 81:819–840, 1991), but propose an alternative identification method, based on graphical causal models. This method selects the contemporaneous causal structure using the information incorporated in the partial correlations among the residuals. The residuals orthogonalization which follows and the study of the impulse response functions confirm the results of King et al. (Am Econ Rev 81:819–840, 1991): permanent productivity shocks are not the dominant sources of aggregate fluctuations in US economy. I would like to thank Peter Spirtes, Marco Lippi, and Clark Glymour for helpful comments on early versions of the paper. I am also grateful to Valentina Corradi for providing me with an updated version of the King et al. (1991) data set. The usual disclaimer applies.     

The evolution of debt and equity markets in economic development

Summary. As noted by Gurley and Shaw, there is a typical pattern of economic development in which the evolution of the financial system is an essential aspect of the growth process. We focus on one component of this evolution: the increasing importance of equity markets as an economy grows. We develop a growth model where capital accumulation is financed externally through a combination of debt and equity. We illustrate why equity market activity might grow – often very rapidly – as an economy develops. We also illustrate why access to equity markets may not be needed in the early stages of economic development. Received: December 30, 1997; revised version: May 26, 1998     

Evolution of Walrasian equilibrium in an exchange economy

We study the stochastic stability of a dynamic trading process in an exchange economy. We use a simplified version of a trading model à la Shapley and Shubik (J Polit Econ 85:937–968, 1977). Two types of agents equipped with Leontief preferences trade goods in markets by offering endowments, and actual trades occur at market clearing prices. Better behavior tends to spread through the same type of agents by imitation, and agents also make mistakes occasionally. We provide a sufficient condition for the perturbed dynamic process to have a unique stochastically stable state that is a Walrasian equilibrium allocation. In this sense, we give a rationale for Walrasian behavior.     

The Arrow-Debreu model: How math can hide a fatal conceptual error

I argue that math, like love, can cover a multitude of sins, and I use the neoclassical object of adoration, the Arrow-Debreu model, as the case in point. It is commonplace that the Arrow-Debreu (AD) model of general equilibrium does not describe the real world, but it is equally commonplace to accept it as representing the pure logic of the competitive capitalist economy in an idealized world free of transactions costs. I show that the AD model fails even as an idealized model; it actually mistakes the logic of pure capitalism. Unlike McKenzie’s model of idealized general equilibrium under constant returns to scale, Arrow and Debreu claim to have shown the existence of competitive equilibrium under decreasing returns to scale and positive pure profits. The AD model (again unlike the McKinzie model) needs to assign the profits to individuals and this is done using the notion of “ownership of the production set.” But this notion suffers from a fatal ambiguity. If Arrow and Debreu interpret it to mean “ownership of a corporation” then a simple argument in the form “labor can hire capital or capital can hire labor” defeats the alleged necessity of assigning residual claimancy to the corporation. A given corporation may or may not end up exploiting a set of production opportunities (represented by a production set) depending on whether it hires in labor and undertakes production or hires out its capital to others (all by assumption at the parametrically given prices). In the latter case, residual claimancy is elsewhere. There is no such property right as “ownership of a production set” in a private property market economy. The legal party which purchases or already owns all the inputs used up in production has the defensible legal claim on the outputs: there is no need to also “purchase the production set.” At any set of prices that allow positive pure profits, anyone in the idealized AD model could bid up the price of the inputs and thus try to reap a smaller but still positive profit. Therefore,pace Arrow and Debreu, there could be no equilibrium with positive pure profits. In the Appendix, the property rights fallacy that afflicts the AD model is shown to also afflict orthodox capital theory and corporate finance theory. World Bank The findings, interpretations and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the author and should not be attributed in any manner to the World Bank, to its affiliated organizations or to the members of its Board of Directors or the countries they represent.     

The bargaining set of a large economy with differential information

Summary. We study the Mas-Colell bargaining set of an exchange economy with differential information and a continuum of traders. We established the equivalence of the private bargaining set and the set of Radner competitive equilibrium allocations. As for the weak fine bargaining set, we show that it contains the set of competitive equilibrium allocations of an associated symmetric information economy in which each trader has the “joint information” of all the traders in the original economy, but unlike the weak fine core and the set of fine value allocations, it may also contain allocations which are not competitive in the associated economy. Received: February 15, 1999; revised version: August 9, 1999     

外部性与重工业优先发展

In the framework of a dynamic general equilibrium model, this paper studies how vertical externalities affect the development of heavy industry in a developing economy. The model is comprised of an intermediate and a consumer product sector. The production of both types of goods has pecuniary externalities as they are featured by increasing return to scale. However, the production of an intermediate product has an additional advantage to have externalities through its technological linkage with the production of consumer goods. This is related to the nature of the roundabout production of consumer goods: a larger number of intermediate products lead to higher productivity in the production of consumer goods than do more inputs of a fixed number of intermediate products. Therefore, private investment in the intermediate sector is below the social optimal level. Government subsidies can restore the economy to the social optimum, but they become less needed as the consumer sector grows larger and the advantage of the intermediate good sector diminishes. __________ Translated from Nankai Jingji Yanjiu 南开经济研究 (Nankai Economic Studies), 2007, (2): 3–19     

Knowledge, consumption, and endogenous growth

In neoclassical theory, knowledge generates increasing returns – and therefore growth – because it is a public good that can be costlessly reused once created. In fact, however, much knowledge in the economy is actually tacit and not easily transmitted –and thus not an obvious source of increasing returns. Several writers have responded to this alarming circumstances by affirming hopefully that knowledge today is increasingly codified, general, and abstract – and increasingly less tacit. This paper disputes such a trend. But all is not lost: for knowledge does not have to be codified to be reused and therefore to generate economic growth.     

Equilibrium price formation in markets with differentially informed agents

We consider a pure exchange economy with a finite set of types of agents which have incomplete and asymmetric information on the states of nature. Our aim was to describe the equilibrium price formation and analyze how the lack of information may affect the allocation of resources. To do so, we adapt to an asymmetric information scenario a variant of the Shapley–Shubik game introduced by Dubey and Geanakoplos (J Math Econ 39:391–400, 2003 ).     

Codification,Abstraction, and Firm Differences: A Cognitive Information-based Perspective

Synopsis The resource-based view shares with population ecology, organizational systematics, organizational cladistics, and institutional theory a concern with why firms differ and with what keeps them different. These two questions only have meaning if – as has been the case in the eoclassical theory of the firm – similarities between firms are taken as the default assumption. This paper distinguishes between ontological heterogeneity – differences in the world – and epistemic heterogeneity – differences in the way that the world is construed. Focusing on the latter, it puts forward an argument for taking epistemic heterogeneity between firms as the default assumption. It starts with a general analysis of how living systems make sense of the world. It then goes on to identify the cognitive activities of codification and abstraction as key sources of epistemic heterogeneity. The findings are applied to those systems called firms where a dominant logic allows epistemic heterogeneity to persist. In some case this leads to competitive advantage, in others to a debilitating inertia. The implications for a knowledge-based theory of the firm are briefly explored.     

Research on the choice of RMB exchange rate regime

From the perspective of welfare, by synthesizing the normative and empirical analysis, this paper applies the framework of “new open economy macroeconomics” to the qualitative and quantitative researches on the choice of RMB exchange rate regime in the short and medium run. It sets up the structural model, takes the economical data during 1985–2005 to perform both the positive and simulative analysis, and it is shown that: with the increases of international real demand and international price index, in order to improve the welfare of people, the RMB exchange rate regime should be more flexible. __________ Translated from Jingji yanjiu 经济研究 (Economic Research Journal), 2007, (11): 45–57