The role of banks in the Czech monetary policy transmission mechanism

With this work, I aim to enrich the knowledge about the monetary policy transmission mechanism in the Czech Republic with empirical evidence on the impact of monetary policy on bank lending. Using a panel of quarterly time series for Czech commercial banks for the period 1996–2001, I study the overall effect of monetary policy changes on the growth rate of loans and the characteristics of the supply of loans. The characterization of the credit market's supply side allows us to make inferences on the operativeness of the credit channel (the bank lending channel and the broad credit channel) of the monetary transmission mechanism. I find that changes in monetary policy alter the growth rate of loans, with considerably stronger magnitude in the period 1999–2001 than in the period 1996–1998. From the analysis intended to capture the characteristics of the supply of loans, I conclude that the lending channel was operative in the period 1996–1998: I find cross‐sectional differences in the lending reactions to monetary policy shocks due to the degree of capitalization and to liquidity. For the subsequent period 1999–2001, the results also show distributional effects of monetary policy due to bank size and its bank's proportion of classified loans. In the context of steadily decreasing interest rates, this can bolster the supposition of financial frictions between borrowers and lenders and hence, that of an operative broad credit channel.     

A Monetary Target Model: The Case of Taiwan

This paper proposes a methodology to estimate the monetary target and the probability of monetary intervention in Taiwan. The methodology is based on the estimation of a regime switching model. Empirical results show that a target band between 0.95 and 2.17 percent per month has been in effect, and most often the monetary authority has followed a non-interventionist policy. It is probable that the monetary authority engaged in an expansionary policy when intervention was warranted. Adjustments of the rediscount rate by the central bank were found to be consistent with the magnitude of the intervention pressure as predicted by the model.     

Reserve requirements and the bank lending channel in China

This paper examines how reserve requirements influence the transmission of monetary policy through the bank lending channel in China while also taking into account the role of bank ownership. The implementation of Chinese monetary policy is characterized by the reliance on the reserve requirements as a regular policy tool with frequent adjustments. Using a large dataset of 170 Chinese banks for the period 2004–2013, we analyze the reaction of loan supply to changes in reserve requirements. We find no evidence of the bank lending channel through the use of reserve requirements. We observe, nonetheless, that changes in reserve requirements influence loan growth of banks. The same findings hold true for other monetary policy instruments. Further, we show that the bank ownership format influences transmission of monetary policy.     

Friction model and foreign exchange market intervention

The friction model is consistent with the hypothesis that a central bank intervenes in a foreign exchange market only if the necessity grows beyond certain thresholds. For this feature, the model is adopted in some recent studies as an attractive central bank reaction function. However, with official data on Federal Reserve and Bundesbank intervention, this paper shows that the friction model's advantage relative to a linear model may be negligible in terms of RMSE and MAE of in-sample fitting and out-of-sample forecasts. The implication is that intervention decisions are at the monetary authorities' discretion rather than dictated by a rule.     

外汇冲销式干预对中国货币政策独立性的影响研究

冲销干预对中国货币政策独立性的影响表现出长短期不一致的特征,在短期内有助于保持货币政策的独立性;但在长期内,冲销干预不仅会制约货币政策的操作空间,削弱其独立性,累积金融风险,导致恶性后果。对此,应优化央行票据的期限结构,完善以国债市场为核心的公开市场操作,发展外汇掉期交易,建立外汇平准基金制度,增强货币政策独立性。     

中国货币政策与股票市场的关系

本文提出的综合理论框架全面分析描述了以稳定物价水平、促进国民经济持续增长为目的的货币政策与股票市场的关系 ,着重对中央银行干预股票市场的必要性和有效性进行理论分析和实证检验。本文应用的动态滚动式的计量检验方法适应中国经济体制不断调整的特征 ,不但可以完成我们的理论分析 ,更可以检测中央银行对股票市场干预的机制及干预的有效性 ,从而分析进一步的政策含义 ,为中央银行的货币政策制订和预期效果提供一个前瞻性的预测分析框架。     

An empirical procedure to evaluate monetary management under exogenous changes in the money supply

This article proposes an empirical procedure to evaluate central banks’ monetary management in a presence of exogenous changes in the money supply. Monetary shocks deviate the market interest rate from the target, and the monetary authority decides its optimal intervention in the money market, bearing in mind the benefits and costs of re-establishing its target interest rate. According to monetary management theory, typically a central bank will allow for variation in the interest rate within a range around the target interest rate, thereby intervening in the money market when the interest rate trends toward a point outside that range. In this context, we develop an empirical strategy to analyse central bank’s reactions to exogenous money changes by making a statistical comparison of the actual and the estimated intraday shift in the money supply. We also employ our method to test the reactions of the Brazilian Central Bank to liquidity shifts caused by changes in the Treasury Single Account (TSA) balance. Using different metrics of analysis, the applications of our procedure confirms the predictions of the optimal monetary management theory.     

外汇市场干预信号渠道与投机头寸相关性研究

文章主要通过研究外汇市场干预操作与货币政策改变之间是否存在相关性,来考察中央银行在外汇市场上进行冲销干预的效果。在央行拥有内部信息,投机者拥有基本面私有信息的条件下,文章使用GARCH时间序列模型,以期货市场上能够反映市场参与者对公开及私有信息理解的投机净头寸(变化)数据作为预期的代理变量展开分析。文章的结论不支持信号渠道,外汇市场上的可预期干预结果更可能与央行期望的干预方向相反,并且过去的投机者净头寸持有量可以促使干预发生。     

Inflation targeting and exchange rate volatility smoothing: A two-target,two-instrument approach

This paper introduces a strategy to model a small open economy, whose central bank has established two simultaneous policy objectives: an inflation target, and a maximum limit for nominal exchange rate volatility. In line with the Tinbergen–Aoki condition, the monetary authority establishes two policy instruments, one for accomplishing each target: the monetary policy rate, and the stock of foreign exchange reserves. Monetary policy analysis is built around a non-microfounded augmented New Keynesian DSGE model estimated through Bayesian techniques for the Guatemalan economy. It is found that each instrument is efficient in accomplishing its own target. Nevertheless, a coordinated effort is required for central bank policymakers before employing both instruments simultaneously, in order to avoid sending mixed signals to economic agents about its monetary policy stance, and endanger the achievement of its inflation target.     

The Effectiveness of Unconventional Monetary Policy in Japan

Since the global financial crisis of 2007–2008, central bankers around the world have been forced to abandon conventional monetary policy tools in favor of unconventional policies such as quantitative easing, forward guidance, and even lowering the interest rate paid on bank reserves into negative territory. Japan, which faced a crisis in its banking sector and came up against the theoretical zero lower bound on interest rates nearly a decade earlier, was a pioneer in the use of many of these unconventional policy tools. This article analyzes the effectiveness of Japan’s bold experiment with unconventional monetary policy. Using a panel of bi-annual bank data covering the full universe of Japanese commercial banks over a fifteen-year period, this study analyzes the effectiveness of quantitative easing policy on the bank lending channel of monetary policy transmission. Our findings suggest that Japan’s unconventional monetary policy worked: there is a bank lending channel of monetary policy transmission in Japan. These results are robust to the inclusion of time fixed effects and generalized method of moments analysis.     

INTERACTION BETWEEN MONETARY AND FISCAL AUTHORITIES UNDER INCOMPLETE INFORMATION

This paper analyzes the interaction between monetary and fiscal authorities under incomplete information. The inflation goal of the central bank is assumed to be unknown to the fiscal authority and the public. The central bank signals the goal by choosing the first‐period monetary policy before the fiscal authority joins the policy‐making game. If the central bank would like the fiscal authority and the public to believe that it is wet (dry), the central bank would distort the money supply upward (downward) in order to reveal its actual type.     

货币政策、地区差异与信贷融资——来自中国上市公司的实证研究

本文采用2004—2007年沪深两市上市公司的季度数据,从地区经济发展水平和政治影响力等角度考察了货币政策对不同地区上市公司银行贷款的影响。实证研究发现货币政策越紧缩,企业获得的信贷融资额越少。货币政策宽松时,企业所属地区经济越发达或政治地位越高,企业获得信贷融资额也越多;相反,货币政策紧缩时,经济发达地区或政治地位高的地区的企业信贷融资额减少更多。     

Monetary policy with heterogeneous households and imperfect risk-sharing

This paper considers a sticky-price model with heterogeneous households and financial frictions. Financial frictions lead to imperfect risk-sharing among households with idiosyncratic labor incomes. I study implications of imperfect risk-sharing for optimal monetary policy by documenting its impacts on the monetary transmission mechanism, the inflation–output tradeoff faced by the central bank, the policy objective function, and the resulting targeting rule. The main finding is that while the central bank continues to have the conventional dual mandate — the output gap and inflation stabilization — it should place a greater weight on the later as the degree of financial frictions increases because price stability provides the additional benefit of reducing undesired consumption dispersion.     

“Core” and “Periphery” in a Monetary Union: A Macroeconomic Policy Game

We develop a dynamic game model of a two-country monetary union to study strategic interactions between macroeconomic policy makers, namely the central bank and governments. In this union, the governments of participating countries pursue national goals when deciding on fiscal policies, whereas the common central bank’s monetary policy aims at union-wide objective variables. The union considered is asymmetric, consisting of a core, with lower initial public debt, and a periphery, with higher initial public debt. For a symmetric demand shock, we derive numerical solutions of the dynamic game between the governments and the central bank using the OPTGAME algorithm. We show that mildly active cooperative countercyclical policies dominate noncooperative solutions and a scenario of no policy intervention. Optimal policies call for a brief expansionary action to bolster the effects on output and a return to a small fiscal primary surplus as soon as the crisis is over until the targeted level of public debt is reached.     

金融危机、货币政策与信贷供给*——基于公司层面银行信贷数据的经验研究

不同的银行特征会对金融危机和货币政策传导的银行信贷渠道产生异质性影响。本文运用2001-2015年公司层面银行信贷数据实证检验了我国货币政策传导的银行信贷渠道,随后进一步研究金融危机对不同特征银行信贷供给的影响差异。经验研究发现：我国货币政策银行信贷渠道主要通过非国有控股银行传导,并引起不同资产负债表特征银行信贷供给的异质性反应。银行规模越大、流动性越强、资本充足率越高,银行信贷供给对货币政策越不敏感。金融危机期间,银行信贷渠道的传导效率显著降低,高资本充足水平的银行和国有控股银行受金融危机的冲击较小,并且宽松的货币政策对国有控股银行信贷供给调控的效率更高。     

The influence of government ideology on monetary policy: New cross‐country evidence based on dynamic heterogeneous panels

Using data of 23 OECD countries over the 1980–2005 period, we examine whether government ideology affects monetary policy, conditional on central bank independence. Unlike previous studies in this line of literature, we estimate central bank behavior using forward‐looking and real‐time data in Taylor rule models and use estimators that allow for heterogeneity across countries. Our models with heterogeneous slope coefficients for the full sample do not suggest partisan effects. We also do not find evidence that central bank behavior is conditioned by the interaction of the ideology of the incumbent government and the electoral calendar.     

关于货币内生、外生问题的一般理论

货币内生性和货币外生性都是存在的,只是二者的出现分别需要具备一定的条件。货币的内生、外生取决于两方面行为主体的情况:货币需求者和中央银行的经济情况。货币需求者方面的货币内生性取决于货币需求者能否通过货币市场、货币乘数、基础货币满足交易货币。中央银行方面的货币外生性取决于两个方面:第一,中央银行能否控制货币供给;第二,货币供给改变以后能否改变货币需求。当经济由扩张转为收缩,或由收缩转为扩张,货币的内生、外生会有不同的表现,包括对称的货币内生、对称的货币外生以及不对称的各种情况。     

货币政策有效性与货币政策透明制度的兴起

本文着重探讨货币政策透明性与货币政策有效性之间的关系,目的在于说明货币政策透明制度能够兴起的一个关键因素在于货币政策的透明性有利于提高货币政策的有效性。在标准的“时间不一致性”理论里面,货币政策是否透明对货币政策的效应是没有影响的,因为在这类理论里面,经济主体能够使用所有可获得的信息形成与经济系统相一致的、无偏的估计。但问题的关键在于,这种假设的基本前提在实践中并不完全成立。当考虑到经济主体对经济运行结果和经济运行过程的不完全认知时,货币政策透明性对于促进经济主体的学习过程,稳定和引导公众的通胀预期,进而提高货币政策的有效性就起着至关重要的作用。     

Central bank intervention,the current account,and exchange rates

This paper seeks to explain exchange rate and current account or net foreign assets behavior under central bank foreign exchange rate intervention. To analyze central bank intervention we use the current account-net foreign assets identity, as well as the long-run monetary exchange rate model. The intervention function is one where exchange rate deviations from equilibrium are governed by nonlinear adjustments. That is, exchange rate deviations from their long-run equilibrium are such that the degree of reversion towards equilibrium increases with the size of the deviation from equilibrium. In this type of nonlinear function exchange rates determine the current account, and the current account in turn determines exchange rates. This iterative duality contrasts with several portfolio balance models where exchange rates are a function of trade, but trade is not a function of exchange rates. This two way causality is slightly more complex, but is also analytically richer than assuming that exchange rates change solely in a one step process as targeted by central banks. Managing exchange rates is posited to be an active iterative feedback process where intervention changes the current account, which may in turn make further intervention necessary.     

(Un)Conventional monetary policy and bank risk-taking: A nonlinear relationship

This paper investigates the effect of monetary policy - especially unconventional monetary policy - on bank risk-taking behavior in Europe over the period 2000–2015. Using a dynamic panel model with a threshold effect, we estimate this effect on two measures of bank risk: the Distance to Default, which reflects the market perception of risk, and the asymmetric Z-score, which corresponds to an accounting-based measure of the risk. We find that loosening monetary policy (via low interest rates and increasing central banks' liquidity) has a harmful effect on banks’ risk, confirming the existence of the risk-taking channel. Moreover, we show that this relationship is nonlinear, i.e., with the sustainable implementation of unconventional monetary policies, the effects are stronger below a certain threshold.