Hyperbolic discounting and the time-consistent solution of three canonical environmental problems

In this paper I propose a time-consistent method of discounting hyperbolically and apply it to three canonical environmental problems: (i) optimal renewable resource use, (ii) the tragedy of the commons, and (iii) economic growth and pollution. I show that, irrespective of potentially high initial discount rates, time-consistent hyperbolic discounting leads always to a steady state of maximum yield, or, if the environment enters the utility function, a steady state where the Green Golden Rule applies. While (asymptotic) extinction is a real threat under exponential discounting it is impossible under time-consistent hyperbolic discounting. This result is also confirmed for open-access resources. In a model of economic growth and pollution, hyperbolic discounting establishes the Golden Rule of capital accumulation and the modified Green Golden Rule.     

Capital Accumulation in an Economy with Dynasties and Uncertain Lifetimes

This paper studies how the lack of an annuities market affects savings behavior and intergenerational transfers in a dynastic overlapping generations economy. I find that the answer to this question depends crucially on altruism. On the one hand, if the altruistic bequest motive is operative, then the lack of annuity markets enhances capital accumulation. On the other hand, if the altruistic bequest motive is not operative, the absence of annuity markets can either increase or decrease aggregate savings. I characterize under which conditions capital accumulation is enhanced. I also prove that an overlapping generations economy with altruism and uninsurable lifetime risk faces capital overaccumulation relative to the modified Golden Rule. The efficient allocation corresponding to the modified Golden Rule can be decentralized as a competitive equilibrium by a pay-as-you-go social security system, and this can only be done if individuals are altruistic.     

Optimal education and pensions in an endogenous growth model

In OLG economies with life-cycle saving and exogenous growth, competitive equilibria in general fail to achieve optimality because individuals accumulate amounts of physical capital that differ from the one that maximizes welfare along a balanced growth path (the Golden Rule). With human capital, a second potential source of departure from optimality arises, related to education decisions. We propose to recover the Golden Rule of physical and also human capital accumulation. We characterize the optimal policy to decentralize the Golden Rule balanced growth path when there are no constraints for individuals to finance their education investments, and show that it involves education taxes. Also, when the government subsidizes the repayment of education loans, optimal pensions are positive.     

Going for the Gold

J. Patrick Rooney, the chairman of Golden Rule Insurance Co., has an idea that he says will curb health care spending--and make money for his company. Newt Gingrich and other congressional Republicans appear sold on it.     

What really matters: Discounting, technological change and sustainable climate

This paper discusses the interplay between the choice of the discount rate, greenhouse gas mitigation and endogenous technological change. Neglecting the issue of uncertainty it is shown that the Green Golden Rule stock of atmospheric carbon is uniquely determined, but is not affected by technological change. More generally it is shown analytically within the framework of a reduced model of integrated assessment that the optimal stationary stocks of atmospheric carbon depend on the choice of the discount rate, but are independent of the stock of technological knowledge. These results are then reinforced numerically in a fully specified integrated assessment analysis.     

On the road to the Golden Age

Summary To find a pattern leading to the Golden Age it is necessary to introduce a principle for the division of consumption between generations.The Golden Rule result gives the fraction of G. N. P. that each generation saves on behalf of future generations but since this fraction is constant, previous generations have made an identical sacrifice on behalf of the present one.In a similar fashion it is postulated here that every generation chooses the proportion of G. N. P. which it wishes to save while requiring previous generations to save in exactly the same way. This means that although very generations would like to increase its consumption, it does not wish earlier generations to do so since that would leave less total G. N. P. in the present.The part of G. N. P. to be invested is assumed to be a certain, to be determined, function of time. The production function is taken to be Cobb-Douglas with constant returns to scale. The optimal growth path is determined under various assumptions about labour supply. It is shown that the Golden Age results are obtained as time approaches infinity.With 1 FigureThis research has been financed by a grant from the Tri-Centennial Fund of the Bank of Sweden.     

Optimal Taxation when Consumers Have Endogenous Benchmark Levels of Consumption

I examine optimal taxes in an overlapping generations economy in which each consumer's utility depends on consumption relative to a weighted average of consumption by others (the benchmark level of consumption) as well as on the level of the consumer's own consumption. The socially optimal balanced growth path is characterized by the Modified Golden Rule and by a condition on the intergenerational allocation of consumption in each period. A competitive economy can be induced to attain the social optimum by a lump-sum pay-as-you-go social security system and a tax on capital income.     

Social Security Policy and International Labor and Capital Mobility

This paper studies the connection between social security policy and international factor movements within a two-country overlapping-generations model with production. Incentives for factor movements emerge because one country relies on private savings while the other country operates a social security system. The pattern of migration depends on the steady-state capital–labor ratios compared with the Golden Rule capital–labor ratios. Incentives to migrate do not vanish in the long run and one country might empty out. Capital always moves to the social-security country. Without compensation neither labor nor capital mobility represents a Pareto improvement for the economy.     

社会保障税与社会保障制度优化

社会保障税是指定用于社会保障的工薪税。本文分析了工薪税的税收归宿和劳动供给弹性的影响。当劳动供给弹性较小时 ,税收主要由劳动力负担 ,而且可能会增加就业压力 ;工薪税在劳动同质程度较高时可以取得较好的再分配效应。本文还描述了社会保障制度优化的理论过程。社会保障制度优化是指现收现付计划和强制储蓄计划的最优搭配 ,它以“黄金律”条件下的隔代帕累托改进为标准。就同代收入再分配而言 ,将收入再分配计划的目标定为提高受益人的受教育水平 ,而不是直接为其提供免费的社会福利 ,将有助于缓解收入再分配的代价。     

Inter-war trade cycle theories in a poem by James Meade

John Caruthers (1836–1914), the Scottish civil engineer who built canals and railways many parts of the world, was a good friend of William Morris and an active supporter of the Scoialist League and then the Hammersmith Socialist Society. He advocated a non-bureaucratic socialism, which had only a limited state machinery and made considerable use of the market system, with money, banks and flexible prices. His ideas were elaborated in a long boon Communal and Commercial Economy (1883) and in a substantial article (1884) in To-Day (a leading London socialist periodical of the time) and elsewhere. The paper sets out his economic ideas in some detail, including his (implicit) emphasis on the Golden Rule in he choice of technique. These ideas were a considerale achievement for the early 1880s and it is perhaps unfortunate that they did not have a greater influence on the socialist movement.     

Rule‐of‐Thumb Consumers,Productivity, and Hours*

In this paper, we study the transmission mechanism of productivity shocks in a model with rule‐of‐thumb consumers. In the literature, this financial friction has been studied only with reference to fiscal shocks. We show that the presence of rule‐of‐thumb consumers is also very helpful when accounting for recent empirical evidence on productivity shocks. Rule‐of‐thumb agents, together with nominal and real rigidities, play an important role in reproducing the negative response of hours and the delayed response of output after a productivity shock.     

Effects of Unilateral Climate Policy on Terms of Trade,Capital Accumulation,and Welfare in a World Economy

We present a two-good, two-country overlapping generations model where emissions arise from production and each country has a domestic emission permit system. When one country unilaterally reduces her cap on emissions, her output available for domestic and foreign consumption diminishes more than in the other country. With unchanged consumption expenditure shares for both goods the domestic terms of trade improve, while capital stocks decline in the reducing and less strongly in the non-reducing country. Improving terms of trade in the reducing country and falling capital stocks lead in total to welfare losses in both countries. However, if the country which unilaterally reduces her emission permits is a net creditor to the world economy and the Golden Rule applies, her own welfare loss remains below that of the non-reducing country.     

On government-created credit markets for education and endogenous growth

Interest in public loans to fund (higher) education has been increasing in the last decades. This paper explores the general welfare properties of government-created credit markets for education in a three-period overlapping generations model with physical and human capital. It shows that the mere existence of public credit markets is second-best in nature, and cannot decentralize the optimum. Achieving the first-best “Golden Rule” balanced growth path requires a government loan system that lends the amounts required for optimal investments in education and an optimally chosen pure pay-as-you-go social security system. Student loans and pensions thus appear as two inseparable elements of the policy that maximizes social welfare.     

Dynamically inefficient equilibria in the Auerbach-Kotlikoff model

The issue addressed in this paper is how robust dynamically efficient steady state equilibria in a 55 periods overlapping generations economy are to changes in the parametrization of the model. Numerical simulations are used to detect parameter constellations which lead to non Pareto optimal market solutions with the capital stock in excess of the so called Golden Rule level. The results suggest that rather unplausible values of the pure rate of time preference, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution or the annual population growth rate are required to obtain dynamic inefficiency.I would like to thank Prof. Roger Farmer as well as Albert Jäger for reading and commenting on earlier versions of this paper. The numerical model used in this work was programmed by Christian Keuschnigg. I am grateful to him for supplying me generously with his software.     

Taxation of capital income in overlapping generations economies

Whether capital income should be taxed in overlapping generations economies is vividly discussed. It is shown that intergenerational lump‐sum taxes cannot implement the Golden Rule allocation when agents have private information on their earnings potential. Hence, the seminal Atkinson–Stiglitz result that optimal income taxation pre‐empts any role for indirect taxation cannot be interpreted to imply that capital income taxation (affecting intertemporal relative prices) should not be taxed. Specifically, capital income should unambiguously be taxed in small open economies, and the optimal tax rate depends inversely on the elasticity of total savings to disposable income and the after‐tax rate of return.     

Public Debt,Terms of Trade and Welfare: The Role of Capital Production Shares,External Balances,and Dynamic (In)efficiency

In view of still large external imbalances across the world economy and dramatically risen public debts in major advanced economies, this paper reconsiders the relationship between public debt, the terms of trade and welfare in a two-good, two-country overlapping generations model with technological differences across countries. We find that the terms of trade effect of a public debt shock depends only on international differences in capital production shares and the dynamic (in)efficiency of the world economy. As in a model with similar capital production shares, domestic welfare rises and foreign welfare decreases when Home has a positive external balance and the Golden Rule holds. Under dynamic efficiency, welfare decreases in the debt-expanding, net foreign creditor country if she has a relatively smaller capital production share, and if the welfare effect through the accumulation channel is negative. In contrast, under dynamic inefficiency she can increase her welfare by debt expansion.     

The analytical solution of balanced growth of non-linear dynamic multi-sector economic model

In a one-sector neoclassical dynamic economic growth model, a reasonable ratio of investment to consumption exists, i.e., the “Golden Rule of Consumption”. This study is to extend one-sector neoclassical growth model to a multi-sector one. It is assumed that both the production function and the utility function are of Cobb–Douglas type, and the analytical expression of the balanced growth solution of the multi-sector model is provided, mainly including analytical expressions of the optimal distribution coefficient of fixed capital investment, the optimal distribution coefficient of labor hour, the proportion of production, the economic growth rate, the rate of change of the price index, and rental rates of different fixed capital.     

法治的内涵延伸与推进司法改革——对十八大报告中“法治精神”的品读

党的十八大报告中除了直接论及“法治”的段落外,法治精神贯穿全篇。法治既是一种宏观治国方略,又是微观治国理政的具体制度要求,所以执政党对“社会主义法治”内涵的理解和建设也历经了从“宏观方略的确立”到“具体制度的展开”的过程。司法制度改革是法治进程中的必然要求。依照“法治”和科学发展观的精神,当前我国司法制度改革的目的应是建构满足人民需求的司法制度。     

Voting and paying for public goods: An application of the theory of the core

Let any coalition with a majority of all voters have the power to choose the quantities of public goods. Under Rule I a majority coalition bears a cost of its decision that is proportional to its size. Under Rule II it must bear the whole cost of its decision. Thus, Rule I imposes costs on minorities although they have no power to choose the quantities of public goods while Rule II allows goods to have some attributes of semiprivate goods. It is shown that a nonempty core under Rule I implies a nonempty core under Rule II, but not conversely. Necessary and sufficient conditions in terms of the properties of the von Neumann-Morgenstern characteristic function are given.     

Advertising and sales promotion in electricity

Pooled firm data for 1959–68 provide the first evidence that both advertising and sales promotion have been statistically significant in increasing residential electric demand. The results indicate that advertising is principally informational, that new customers are most likely to be influenced, and that the effectiveness of a given expenditure in stimulating average per customer demand decreases with the number of customers to be reached. Finally, the findings are consistent with a theory of optimal advertising-sales ratios. The Dorfman-Steiner Rule does not hold, but the evidence is that it should not be ruled out in some modified form.