A note on the robustness of Card and Krueger (1994) and Neumark and Wascher (2000)

This note adds to the discussion originating from Card and Krueger (Am Econ Rev 84:772–793, 1994) and Neumark and Wascher (Am Econ Rev 90:1362–1396, 2000) by re-evaluating their results using the semiparametric difference-in-differences estimator introduced in Abadie (Rev Econ Stud 72:1–19, 2005). The note addresses the question of whether the differences in the original datasets can explain the differences in their conclusions. Although we observe heterogenous employment effects together with the differences in the distributions, the results show that the original findings on the overall employment effect of a minimum wage are fairly robust and just slightly changed when the differences in the distributions of the observed covariates are taken into account.     

Fictitious students creation incentives in school choice problems

We identify a new channel through which schools can potentially manipulate the well-known student and school-optimal stable mechanisms. We introduce two fictitious students creation manipulation notions where one of them is stronger. While the student and school-optimal stable mechanisms turn out to be weakly fictitious student-proof under acyclic (Ergin in Econometrica 88:485–494, 2002) and essentially homogeneous (Kojima in Games Econ Behav 82:1–14, 2013) priority structures, respectively, they still lack strong fictitious student-proofness. We then compare the mechanisms in terms of their vulnerability to manipulations in the sense of Pathak and Sönmez (Am Econ Rev 103(1):80–106, 2013) and find out that the student-optimal stable mechanism is more manipulable than the school-optimal one. Lastly, in the large market setting of Kojima and Pathak (Am Econ Rev 99(3):608–627, 2009), the student-optimal stable mechanism becomes weakly fictitious student-proof as the market is getting large.     

Transboundary Marine Resources and Trading Neighbours

The importance of space in analyzing issues pertaining to renewable resources can hardly be overstated. Many such resources are mobile and spatially heterogeneous with respect to bio-economic variables, with important implications for both domestic management regimes and for international externalities and policy interactions. This paper uses a simple general-equilibrium framework to show that acknowledging the inter-jurisdictional mobility of a resource such as fish has the potential to alter or qualify some of the conservation and welfare results obtained in the canonical models. The previous literature on trade and renewable resources has focused on cases where national resource stocks are independent. Brander and Taylor (Can J Econ 30(3):526?C552, 1997a; Resour Energy Econ 19(4):267?C297, 1997b; J Int Econ, 1998a; Am Econ Rev, 1998b) find that trade leads to resource stock depletion for an open-access resource-exporting country, while the non-resource exporter is necessarily diversified. In contrast, we find that the country with a comparative advantage in the resource good may gain from a conservation standpoint, while its partner can specialize in the manufactured good and may incur conservation and even welfare losses from trade.     

Are the treasures of game theory ambiguous?

Goeree and Holt (Am Econ Rev 91:1402?C1422, 2001) experimentally study a number of games. In each case, they initially find strong support for Nash equilibrium; however, by changing an apparently irrelevant parameter, they find results which contradict Nash equilibrium. In this paper, we study the five normal form games from Goeree and Holt (Am Econ Rev 91:1402?C1422, 2001). We argue that their results may be explained by the hypothesis that subjects view their opponents?? behaviour as ambiguous. Ambiguity-aversion causes players to avoid strategies, which give low out of equilibrium payoffs. Similarly, ambiguity preference can make strategies with high payoffs more attractive.     

Information revelation in competitive markets

This paper analyzes a market with multiple sellers and horizontally differentiated products. We investigate the sellers’ incentives to reveal product relevant information that affects the buyer’s private valuation. The main finding is that if the number of sellers is sufficiently large, there is a unique symmetric equilibrium with full information disclosure. Thus, unlike the results by Lewis and Sappington (Int Econ Rev 35:309–327, 1994) and Johnson and Myatt (Am Econ Rev 93:756–784, 2006) for monopoly, which state that the monopolist reveals either full information or no information, intense competition results in a single extreme with respect to information disclosure. We show that the market is always inefficient, but the magnitude of inefficiency converges to zero at a high rate as competition intensifies.     

Endogenous population with human and physical capital accumulation

This paper proposes an economic growth model with population growth and physical and human capital accumulation. The physical capital accumulation is built on the Solow growth model (Solow in Q J Econ 70:65–94, 1956). The education and human capital accumulation is influenced by the Uzawa–Lucas model (Uzawa in Int Econ Rev 6:18–31, 1965; Lucas in J Monet Econ 22:3–42, 1988). The population dynamics are influenced by the Haavelmo population model (Haavelmo in a study in the theory of economic evolution. Haavelmo, Amsterdam, 1954) and the Barro–Becker fertility choice model (Barro and Becker in Econometrica 57:481–501, 1989). We synthesize these dynamic forces in a compact framework, applying an alternative utility function proposed by Zhang (Econ Lett 42:105–110, 1993). The model describes a dynamic interdependence between population change, wealth accumulation, human capital accumulation, and division of labor. We simulate the model to demonstrate the existence of equilibrium points and to plot the motion of the dynamic system. We also examine the effects of changes in the propensity to have children, the mortality rate parameter, the propensity to receive education, the human capital utilization efficiency, and the mortality rate elasticity of human capital upon dynamic paths of the system.     

Pluralism(s) in economics: lessons from complexity and innovation. A review paper

My analysis focuses on two main observations. First, many competing schools of thoughts are currently present in economics with no predominant paradigm. We are experiencing an era of pluralism (Davis J Econ Methodol 14(3):275–290, 2007, Camb J Econ 32:249–366, 2008; Colander 2000; Colander et al. J Polit Econ 16(4):485–499, 2004). The term ‘pluralism’ is extremely interesting since, as I will show, it has different dimensions to it. These offer insights into interpreting the tangled universe of the economics. Second, there is a progressive intertwining of innovation economics with complexity economics, which I argue provides an instance of the above-described shift toward pluralism.     

A revisit on the tax burden distribution and GDP growth: fresh evidence using a consistent nonparametric test for causality for the USA

We revisited the evidence of Karagianni et al. (Int Rev Econ Fin 21:186–194, 2012) and Tiwari (Econ Bull 32:147–159, 2012) by employing a recently developed and more powerful nonlinear Granger-causality test proposed by Nishiyama et al. (J Econ 165:112–127, 2011) to investigate the existence of Granger-causality from a set of alternative tax burden (ratios) to GDP (per capita GDP), for the period 1947:q1–2009:q3 for the United States of America (USA). The nonlinear Granger-causality test provides strong evidence that personal current taxes and taxes on production and imports Granger-cause GDP and weak evidence that CR Granger-cause GDP. As a consequence, in order to influence (rebalance) the USA’s GDP through taxation, it is recommended to the USA government to adjust the tax structure, focusing on PCT and taxes on production and imports’ shocks. In this case, the tax policy is oriented especially on labour supply and investments.     

Geography, institutions, and the making of comparative development

While the direct impact of geographic endowments on prosperity is present in all countries, in former colonies, geography has also affected colonization policies and, therefore, institutional outcomes. Using non-colonized countries as a control group, I re-examine the theories put forward by La Porta et al. (J Law Econ Org 15(1):222–279, 1999 and Acemoglu et al. (Am Econ Rev 91(5), 1369–1401, 2001. I find strong support for both theories, but also evidence that the authors’ estimates of the impact of colonization on institutions and growth are biased, since they confound the effect of the historical determinants of institutions with the direct impact of geographic endowments on development. In a baseline estimation, I find that the approach of Acemoglu et al. (2001) overestimates the importance of institutions for economic growth by 28 %, as a country’s natural disease environment affected settler mortality during colonization and also has a direct impact on prosperity. The approach of La Porta et al. (1999) underestimates the importance of colonization-imposed legal origin for institutional development by 63 %, as Britain tended to colonize countries that are remote from Europe and thus suffer from low access to international markets.     

Kaldorian assumptions and endogenous fluctuations: a note on Schinasi’s IS–LM model

Results on Schinasi’s (Rev Econ Stud 48:649–653, 1981; J Econ Theory 28:369–375, 1982) variant of the dynamic fixed-price IS–LM model have remained so far confined to Kaldorian type economies, namely to those economies which present a greater-than-unity marginal propensity to spend out of income. This paper shows that, in the case of a negative interest rate sensitivity of savings, stable endogenous cycles can actually emerge as equilibrium solutions of the model also in the case of non-Kaldorian type economies.     

R&D, patents and stock return volatility

Recent finance literature highlights the role of technological change in increasing firm specific (idiosyncratic) and aggregate stock return volatility, yet innovation data is not used in these analyses, leaving the direct relationship between innovation and stock return volatility untested. The paper investigates the relationship between volatility and innovation using firm level patent data. The analysis builds on the empirical work by Mazzucato (Rev Econ Dyn 5:318–345, 2002; J Evol Econ 13(5):491–512, 2003) where it is found that stock return volatility is highest during periods in the industry life-cycle when innovation is the most ‘radical’. In this paper we ask whether firms which invest more in innovation (more R&D and more patents) and/or which have more important innovations (patents with more citations) experience more volatility in their returns. Given that returns should in theory be higher, on average, for higher risk stocks, we also look at the effect of innovation on the level of returns. To take into account the competition between firms within industries, firm returns and volatility are measured relative to the industry average. We focus the analysis on firms in the pharmaceutical industry between 1974 and 1999. Results suggest that there is a positive and significant relationship between volatility, R&D intensity and the various patent related measures—especially when the innovation measures are filtered to distinguish the very innovative firms from the less innovate ones.     

Estimating noncooperative and cooperative models of bargaining: an empirical comparison

This paper examines the issue of model selection in studies of strategic situations. In particular, we compare estimation results from a noncooperative formulation of government formulation à la (Baron and Ferejohn in Am Poli Sci Rev 87:34–47, 1989) with those from two alternative cooperative formulations (Nash in Econometrica 18:155–162, 1950; Shapley and Shubik in Am Poli Sci Rev 48:787–792, 1954). Although the estimates of the ministerial ranking are similar, statistical testing suggests that the noncooperative formulation is best fitted to the observed data among the alternative models. This result implies that modeling the noncooperative structure in bargaining situations is crucially important at the risk of possibly misspecifying the details of the game.     

The effects of the take-option in dictator-game experiments: a comment on Engel’s (2011) meta-study

In this paper, we report a replication of Engel’s (Exp. Econ. 14(4):583–610, 2011) meta-study of dictator game experiments. We find Engel’s meta-study of dictator game experiments to be robust, with one important exception: the coding of the take-option (List in J. Polit. Econ. 115(3):482–493, 2007; Bardsley in Exp. Econ. 11(2):122–133, 2008; Cappelen et al. in Econ. Lett. 118(2):280–283, 2013). While Engel reports this as having no statistically significant effect, in our replications, we find an economically and statistically significant negative effect on giving in line with the relevant literature.     

Definitions of ambiguous events and the smooth ambiguity model

We examine a variety of preference-based definitions of ambiguous events in the context of the smooth ambiguity model. We first consider the definition proposed in Klibanoff et?al. (Econometrica 73(6):1849?C1892, 2005) based on the classic Ellsberg two-urn paradox (Ellsberg Q J Econ 75:643?C669, 1961) and show that it satisfies several desirable properties. We then compare this definition with those of Nehring (Math Soc Sci 38(2):197?C213, 1999), Epstein and Zhang (Econometrica 69:265?C306, 2001), Zhang (Econ Theory 20:159?C181, 2002), and Ghirardato and Marinacci (J Econ Theory 102:251?C289, 2002). Within the smooth ambiguity model, we show that Ghirardato and Marinacci (J Econ Theory 102:251?C289, 2002) would identify the same set of ambiguous and unambiguous events as our definition while Epstein and Zhang (Econometrica 69:265?C306, 2001) and Zhang (Econ Theory 20:159?C181, 2002) would yield a different classification. Moreover, we discuss and formally identify two key sources of the differences compared to Epstein and Zhang (Econometrica 69:265?C306, 2001) and Zhang (Econ Theory 20:159?C181, 2002). The more interesting source is that these two definitions can confound non-constant ambiguity attitude and the ambiguity of an event.     

Unilateral Climate Policy: Harmful or Even Disastrous?

This paper deals with possible foreign reactions to unilateral carbon demand reducing policies. It differentiates between demand side and supply side reactions as well as between intra- and inter-temporal shifts in greenhouse gas emissions. In our model, we integrate a stock-dependent marginal physical cost of extracting fossil fuels into Eichner and Pethig’s (Int Econ Rev 52(3):767–805, 2011) general equilibrium carbon leakage model. The results are as follows: Under similar but somewhat tighter conditions than those derived by Eichner and Pethig (Int Econ Rev 52(3):767–805, 2011), a weak green paradox arises. Furthermore, a strong green paradox can arise in our model under supplementary constraints. That means a “green” policy measure might not only lead to a harmful acceleration of fossil fuel extraction but to an increase in the cumulative climate damages at the same time. In some of these cases there is even a cumulative extraction expansion, which we consider disastrous.     

More equal but not so fair: an analysis of Brazilian income distribution from 1995 to 2009

This study measures unfair inequality in Brazil between 1995 and 2009. To achieve that, we used the statistical tool developed by Almås et al. (J Public Econ 95:488–499, 2011) and the concept of “responsibility-sensitive” fairness proposed by Bossert (Math Soc Sci 29:1–17, 1995), Konow (J Econ Behav Organ 31(1):13–35, 1996) and Cappelen and Tungodden (Fairness and the proportionality principle, Discussion paper SAM 31/2007. Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, 2007). The results indicate that the fairness level in Brazil remained unchanged throughout the analyzed period.     

The welfare effects of pre-arrangements in matching markets

We study the welfare effects of different types of pre-arrangements (as identified in Sönmez in J Econ Theory 86:148–156, 1999) under the intern-optimal and hospital-optimal stable mechanisms in matching markets. First, both mechanisms are manipulable via Type-2 pre-arrangements. Regarding the welfare consequences, they might cause inefficient outcomes to arise, and the welfare effects on each side are ambiguous in the sense that there might be agents from each side, apart from pre-arranging ones, being better and worse off. Then, for Type-1 pre-arrangements, due to Kojima and Pathak (Am Econ Rev 99(3):608–627, 2009), we know that the intern-optimal stable mechanism is immune to this type of manipulations. In contrast to this result, the hospital-optimal stable mechanism turns out to be manipulable. More interestingly, they do not result in inefficient outcomes, and the welfare effects on each side are unambiguous: All hospitals (interns) are better (worse) off.     

Dominance testing for ‘pro-poor’ growth with an application to European growth

This article introduces statistical testing procedures to evaluate ??pro-poor?? growth. Our measure of ??pro-poorness?? follows Kakwani (J Quant Econ 16(1):67?C80, 2000), Kakwani and Pernia (Asian Dev Rev 18(1):1?C16, 2000), and Son (Econ Lett 82:307?C314, 2004), who decompose the generalized Lorenz ordinates into a growth effect and an inequality effect. We derive an asymptotic distribution-free covariance matrix for the decomposed generalized Lorenz curves. Using this decomposition (and our standard errors), we test for pro-poor dominance in the growth process. We illustrate our test for the pro-poor dominance by evaluating the degree of pro-poor growth in five European countries.     

Detecting multiple breaks in long memory the case of U.S. inflation

Multiple structural change tests by Bai and Perron (Econometrica 66:47–78, 1998) are applied to the regression by Demetrescu et al. (Econ Theory 24:176–215, 2008) in order to detect breaks in the order of fractional integration. With this instrument we tackle time-varying inflation persistence as an important issue for monetary policy. We determine not only the location and significance of breaks in persistence, but also the number of breaks. Only one significant break in U.S. inflation persistence (measured by the long-memory parameter) is found to have taken place in 1973, while a second break in 1980 is not significant.     

On a closed-form solution to the stochastic Lucas–Uzawa model

Bucci et al. (J Econ 103:83–99, 2011) argue that under two parametric restrictions, there exists a closed-form solution path to the two-sector endogenous growth model of Lucas–Uzawa. However, they assume that the value function is a function of both the current and the initial values of the state variables. As Wälde (J Econ Dyn Control 35:616–622, 2011a) argues, the value function should depend only on the current state variables when the technology follows a geometric Brownian motion. I follow Wälde (J Econ Dyn Control 35:616–622, 2011a) and obtain, under some inequality constraints, a different value function.