Over the cliff edge and on to the rocks below

• ? If Brexit negotiations were to break down, the UK would face a significant increase in trade disruption from March 2019, even if it were able to put some basic trading arrangements in place. In a scenario where key sectors face extra friction, we find that the level of UK GDP would be 2.0% – or £16bn in cash terms – lower at the end of 2020 compared with our baseline. The impact on the remaining EU countries, including Ireland, would be much smaller .
• ? This article focuses on what a cliff‐edge Brexit means for trade costs and prices. This is only part of the equation – such a scenario would also influence supply chains and migration, while there is also potential for policymakers to mitigate some of the negative effects via looser policy.
• ? The notion that the UK could simply walk away from Brexit negotiations and rely on WTO rules to trade with the world is deeply flawed. The UK would need to re‐establish more than 750 very complex international arrangements just to maintain the status quo. We expect only the most critical issues – such as air travel – to be resolved by March 2019. Exporters also face a substantial increase in non‐tariff barriers.
• ? A breakdown in talks would also see both sides levying tariffs on imports from each other from March 2019, raising the cost of importing UK goods into the EU by 3.5% and by 3.1% for goods imported into the UK from the EU. For the UK, this will apply to roughly 60% of its goods exports and imports, but for all EU countries except Ireland the share would be less than 10%.
• ? The additional trade frictions would knock around 1pp a year off UK GDP growth in 2019 and 2020, resulting in a period of very weak growth. And the risks to this scenario are skewed to the downside – a slump in confidence or failure to establish the necessary customs infrastructure in time could easily generate a worse outcome

     

Brexit and world growth – what are the risks?

• The initial global market reaction to the UK Brexit vote was very negative and in our view overdone. Nevertheless, we expect the uncertainty to linger for a while, with the vote having refocused investors on existing vulnerabilities in the world economy. Our new forecasts see the main negative impacts on growth being in the UK, the Eurozone and Japan. Risks to our new forecasts remain skewed to the downside, with a significant danger of world growth dropping below 2% this year.
• Our new forecasts see UK growth dropping to 1.4% a year in 2017–18, down from 2.2–2.3% a year before. In the Eurozone, growth will be around 0.2% a year weaker in 2017–18 and Japan is also a loser as a result of the risk aversion‐driven stronger yen, with growth at just 0.3% in 2017 from 0.5%.
• The size of the initial global market sell‐off makes no sense in the context of the likely impact from a weaker UK. In part, it seems to have reflected the pricing in of very negative scenarios in the Eurozone. But investors may also be worrying about other global problems glossed over in recent months.
• One risk to our forecast is that confidence effects on businesses and consumers are larger than we expect – but such effects are often overstated. Another danger is that more of the recent financial market weakness will ‘stick’ than our new baseline forecasts assume.
• Our world recession indicator is already at elevated levels and suggests a significant danger of world growth slipping below 2% this year; not a recession, but it might feel like one. Global policymakers need to act quickly to head off the risks.

     

Deciphering the UK's business investment performance

• ? Absent June 2016's Brexit vote, growth in business investment would have been much faster and the UK would be sharing in a global “investment boom”. Or so the Bank of England claims. But the reality is more complicated. What is striking is just how subdued investment growth has been across countries.
• ? Survey evidence presented by the Bank suggests that recent business investment growth has been less than a third of what might have been achieved absent Brexit. The UK has also been highlighted as an investment laggard among major economies.
• ? Headline investment growth has certainly been relatively weak since 2016. Uncertainty around future UK‐EU trading arrangements may have resulted in some investment being deferred or cancelled. And the Brexit‐related fall in sterling will have pushed up the cost of imported capital equipment, cutting demand.
• ? But a collapse in investment in the North Sea sector has had a significant effect on headline investment growth. On an excluding‐extraction basis, UK business investment rose at the same pace as the US (ex‐extraction) and faster than Japan in 2016 and 2017, while average annual growth rises from 1.0% to 2.4%.
• ? What is striking about the recent performance of business investment in the UK and other G7 members is how subdued growth has been across economies. Despite a favourable environment, no major advanced economy has seen investment rise at the type of rates that the Bank predicts the UK, but for Brexit, should be now enjoying.
• ? Sectoral shifts, the rise of intangible investment and the consequences of technooptimism offer some reasons as to why measured investment may have become less sensitive to economic upswings. These same factors suggest that 1990s‐style growth in private investment is unlikely in the UK (or elsewhere) even once Brexit uncertainty has cleared. Indeed, our own medium‐term forecasts see business investment growth across major economies continuing to run at a relatively subdued pace.

     

Canada‐style trade deal most likely Brexit scenario

• ? All options for the Brexit endgame remain on the table. A free‐trade agreement (FTA) along the lines of the EU's deal with Canada looks like the most likely outcome. The two sides will also need to reach agreements on customs and regulations, with the latter involving the UK compromising on maintaining a high degree of regulatory alignment, to provide a permanent fudge on the Irish border issue. But there is still a sizeable risk of a “no deal” outcome .
• ? We expect a transitional deal to be agreed relatively quickly. The UK has suggested it would prefer a bespoke arrangement, but the EU is unlikely to offer such an option. We expect the UK to remain bound by EU rules during the transition, with the transitional period ending on 31 December 2020.
• ? If the two sides continue to pursue the preferred option of a FTA, it is unlikely to be completed by the end of the transition period. We expect the EU to reject the UK's request for a comprehensive agreement including services and insist on a Canada‐style deal. The Irish border issue means that customs and regulatory agreements would need to accompany such a deal. We place a 40% chance on this outcome.
• ? The question of regulatory alignment and the time required to negotiate a detailed FTA could spin the talks off in one of two opposing directions. If the prime minister is unable to get her party to agree to maintain a high degree of regulatory alignment, the talks could break down. If this occurs, we think it's very unlikely that the UK would honour the phase‐one agreement to maintain regulatory alignment, and we see a 30% chance that the UK walks away from the talks, resulting in a “cliff‐edge” Brexit in 2019.
• ? If the UK accepts the need to maintain regulatory alignment with the EU, it could conclude that joining the EEA and participating in the single market are better than lengthy FTA negotiations, resulting in an inferior deal. But the need to respect the four freedoms means this remains a relatively low probability outcome (20%). Wth Parliament seemingly committed to Brexit, remaining in the EU looks unlikely (10%).

     

Brexit and FDI

• The potential for a departure from the EU to undermine the UK's attractiveness as a location for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is often cited as one of the key risks were the UK to leave the EU. In weighing up the threat to FDI posed by ‘Brexit’ we assess the net gain from inward investment and the role played by EU membership in attracting FDI.
• In theory, FDI benefits the economy via lower interest rates, higher wages for workers and ‘spillover’ benefits boosting economy‐wide productivity. But the evidence for these benefits is ambiguous. And FDI has potential drawbacks. These include an adverse effect on the tradeable sector, reflected in a wider current account deficit, the potential to ‘crowd out’ investment by domestic firms and the fiscal cost of subsidies paid to inward investors.
• That almost half of FDI in the UK comes from other EU countries suggests that EU membership is not the only driver of foreign investment in the UK. Other factors include the UK's business friendly environment, as reflected in global competitiveness surveys, and a relatively deregulated labour market. Of perhaps most importance is the lure provided by the UK's large domestic economy. 80% of FDI in the UK is in sectors where sales to the EU account for less than 10% of total demand.
• However, FDI in manufacturing does look vulnerable to Brexit, given the importance of the EU market. Granted, manufacturing accounts for a modest share of UK FDI. But to the extent that FDI boosts productivity, a loss of inward investment in this sector is likely to come at a disproportionate cost.
• Our modelling suggests that in a worst case Brexit scenario, the stock of FDI could ultimately be 7% lower relative to the UK remaining in the EU, potentially knocking around ½% off the level of GDP.

     

No-trade-deal Brexit would lower GDP by 1ppt by 2022

• ▀ A no-trade-deal Brexit would result in UK GDP being 1ppt lower than our baseline forecast at the end of 2022. Increased trade frictions and a negative reaction from financial markets would more than offset looser policy settings.
• ▀ Even if an FTA is agreed, trade between the UK and EU will be subject to new customs and regulatory trade barriers. If a trade deal is not agreed, tariffs will also be levied on UK-EU trade, while non-tariff barriers are likely to be higher.
• ▀ A no-trade-deal outcome would almost certainly see the BoE undertake further quantitative easing. A further, temporary, loosening of fiscal policy would also be likely, with higher government investment an obvious option.

     

Will Brexit speed a seismic shift in UK trade patterns?

• The UK's trade pattern has shifted significantly away from the EU since the 1990s. Our analysis suggests that this shift will continue in the decades to come, with the EU share in UK goods exports potentially slipping to around 35% by 2035. Shifts in relative prices from moves in tariff and especially non‐tariff barriers could lower the share further.
• Over 60% of UK goods exports went to the EU in the late 1990s but this has fallen to around 45%. Slow EU growth is partly to blame, with UK exports to the EU barely expanding since 2007. But our analysis also shows that a 1% rise in EU GDP leads to only around half the rise in UK exports to the EU that a 1% rise in GDP in the rest of the world induces in UK exports to non‐EU countries.
• Based on our findings and OE forecasts of long‐term growth in the EU and the world, the EU share of UK goods exports could fall to 37% by 2035 and around 30% by 2050 – back to its 1960 level. The share of services exports to the EU has held up better but is lower than for goods, at around 40%.
• Weakening growth of UK exports to the EU has taken place despite the development of the EU single market since the early 1990s. Indeed, based on our projections UK goods exports to the single market could drop below 5% of UK GDP by 2050. These projections make no allowance for Brexit effects, but the declining importance of exports to the EU single market could colour prospective Brexit negotiations.
• Simple income‐based projections of potential country shares in future UK exports suggest a further swing towards emerging countries (EM) in the decades ahead, especially China and India. Exports to EM could approach 40% of the total by 2035. A shift in the pattern of trade preferences and restrictions faced by the UK post‐Brexit could spark even larger shifts in the structure of UK exports.

     

Brexportgeddon?

• While a major market for UK exports, the EU is not quite as significant as the headline statistics suggest and one which is likely to continue declining in relative importance. The static tariff cost of a worst‐case ‘Brexit’ is estimated to be around ¼% of GDP, a modest sum.
• But the dynamic cost could be higher. And certain industrial sectors look vulnerable, notably aircraft and chemicals where sales to the EU account for over 40% of total (domestic and overseas) demand and EU tariffs are relatively high.
• Moreover, exports to the EU would also face non‐tariff barriers, which would be of particular relevance for the services sector. That services firms export much more to the rest of the world than to the EU suggests that they are well versed in overcoming such barriers. But financial services would face particular risks from Brexit.

     

Meagre house price growth may kill off a UK obsession

• ? Short of an unlikely jump in interest rates or a no‐deal Brexit proving more damaging than we expect, we think that positive but sluggish growth will continue to characterise UK house prices for the foreseeable future.
• ? Mooted reforms to stamp duty could prompt some upward price pressure, although stretched affordability and the end of ‘Help to Buy’ will work in the opposite direction.
• ? Meanwhile, compared to the dominant role interest rates play in driving house prices, fulfilling the government's housebuilding goals ‐ even if these very ambitious target could be met ‐ would make only a modest difference.

     

Why levelling-up is unlikely to solve regional disparities

• ▪ Under the UK government's plan to “level up” the regions, the Budget delivered an increase in capital spending on under-performing places. However, we think the overall impact is unlikely to be large.
• ▪ The extent to which regional imbalances have worsened in recent years is unclear. In fact, the large gap in productivity between London and the rest of the UK widened the most during the 1997–2010 Labour government. Disparity with the rest of the UK is largely due to London's special characteristics.
• ▪ At the local level, austerity policies have damaged many areas, while Brexit is posing new challenges. Other problems are very deep-rooted. Previous governments have struggled to address them and we expect this one will too

     

Brexit adds to gloom over long‐term growth prospects

• The prospect of continued weak productivity growth and less support from rising labour supply means we are relatively gloomy about medium‐term growth prospects. Our forecasts show potential output growth of just 1.6% a year from 2017–2030. This would be well below the average of the decade prior to the financial crisis (2.7%) and in line with our estimate for the 2007 and 2016 period which included the global financial crisis.
• We have become more pessimistic about the extent to which growth in total factor productivity is likely to accelerate. This is partly due to a judgement call that more of the weakness since the financial crisis reflects structural factors. Brexit is also likely to weigh on long‐term prospects, resulting in a degree of trade destruction and lower FDI inflows than would be the case were the UK to remain in the EU. Brexit is also likely to result in less capital deepening.
• Demographic factors also point to weak potential output growth moving forwards. High levels of inward migration have mitigated the impact of an ageing population recently. However, immigration is likely to fall sharply over the next decade, as first an improving European labour market reduces incentives to migrate and then the UK Government adopts more restrictive immigration policy. We are also coming into a period where there will be fewer increases in state pension age than of late.
• Since the mid‐1990s there has been a surge in the number of people going to university, resulting in strong contributions from human capital. But this will be less important moving forwards as university admissions reach a ceiling.
• Stronger growth in potential output would be possible if Brexit results in trading arrangements which are closer to the status quo, or if policy is more ‘liberal’, than our baseline assumptions.

     

Looser financial conditions carry a sting in the tail

• ? Against a long list of headwinds facing the economy, one apparent saving grace has been a relaxation in financial conditions since the start of 2019. Our UK Financial Conditions Index presently sits at its loosest in 18 months.
• ? Some of the lowest real interest rates in the world and a currency trading close to the weakest on record represent, all else equal, are powerful reflationary forces for the UK. But the fundamental cause of loose conditions ‐ the rising no‐deal Brexit odds ‐ mean they carry a sting in the tail.
• ? Conversely, the likely rise in market interest rates and sterling that would follow our expectation of a Brexit deal implies an overall positive for the economy could be dampened by tighter financial conditions.

     

How likely is a UK recession after Brexit?

• In the wake of the UK Brexit vote, forecasters have rushed to downgrade their growth forecasts for the UK, with some now expecting a recession. Using the Oxford Economics' Global Economic Model, we examine how likely a recession is by looking at the shocks the UK economy faces and the policy responses. We conclude that while a sharp slowdown is likely – in line with our own new forecasts – a recession is unlikely.
• Many UK forecasters are now predicting a recession in 2017, even though ‘stand‐alone’ recessions in industrial countries are rare. Our forecast is less downbeat. The UK faces a series of negative shocks including to consumers and business confidence, but growth will be supported by the weaker sterling and likely policy responses.
• Using the Oxford Economics' Global Economic Model, we show that to shift our baseline forecast of growth of 1.1% next year to zero would require a very severe negative confidence shock. Our new baseline already assumes a shock equivalent to one‐third of that seen in the global financial crisis (GFC). All else being equal, the shock would have to be around two‐thirds of that in the GFC to cut GDP growth to zero in 2017.
• Our new baseline also does not incorporate all the possible policy levers the UK can employ. We currently assume the Bank Rate drops to zero, but if a ‘rescue package’ of £75 billion of QE and a fiscal stimulus equal to 1% of GDP was also added, then the shock to confidence needed to get zero GDP growth would have to be similar to that seen in the GFC. We do not consider this likely given the scale of financial stress and credit restriction that occurred globally at the time of the GFC.

     

The Brexit Controversy; what light does evidence shed?

• ? There has been widespread misinformation in and outside Parliament about the economic case for Brexit. Outside Parliament, the rival groups – those with a negative assessment of Brexit and those with a positive one – have set out their arguments but these have huge differences in the factual and intellectual support they each bring to the debate. The group predicting a negative effect have published a wide set of empirical appraisals from academic and related research teams of the case for leaving and that against it. This, largely rigorous statistical analysis, finds strong and clear evidence of the large costs to leaving. The camp predicting a positive result for Brexit, in contrast, relies on one academic source for its case; the Cardiff University Macroeconomic Institute led by Patrick Minford. This has reported its predictions of the effects of Brexit which in contrast to the other camp, show large positive effects to growth and other key parts of the UK economy.
• ? We assess the empirical quality of these two cases and conclude that the economic modelling of the Cardiff group is insufficient for them to give an adequate empirical estimate of the costs and benefits of Brexit; the Liverpool model it uses has a sparse overseas sector and does not differentiate between EU and non‐EU trade for example, so is unsuited to analyse the effects of changes in these. Our verdict is that, based on the evidence, Brexit in almost any form would be damaging to the UK. ¹ 1 The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and may or may not be those of Oxford Economics
  

     

Brexit and immigration

• Net inward migration from the EU has been running at record levels in recent years, although the steep increase in new National Insurance numbers issued suggests that the official data may be understating the level of immigration. There was a clear step up in inflows after both expansions of the EU into central and eastern Europe, while the relative strength of the UK labour market has been an important driver of the more recent rise in inflows.
• High levels of immigration have helped to offset the impact of an ageing population and ensured that the UK has enjoyed stronger labour supply growth than many of its peers. With migrants typically being better educated than their UK‐born counterparts, the quality of the stock of labour has also improved, and migrants have been found to have a net positive fiscal impact.
• But there have been some downsides, with evidence that high immigration has had a small dampening impact on wages. That migrants tend to head to London and the other southern regions over other destinations has exacerbated the imbalances in regional housing markets.
• Given that a desire to have greater control over immigration is usually one of the key motivations for those favouring Brexit, a vote in favour of leaving the EU is likely to see the UK abandon the policy of free movement of labour. This would probably see the UK extend the points‐based system that it currently uses for non‐EU countries to include EU migrants.
• Our modelling suggests that the adoption of a ‘populist’ immigration policy which lowers net inward migration by 60,000 a year could reduce the level of GDP by 1.1% in 2030 compared with our baseline forecast.

     

Brexit deal and demographics drag on long-term outlook

• ▀ We have revised down our long-term forecast for GDP growth based largely on our expectation that the UK is headed for a much looser relationship with the EU. This will result in damage to trade and lower FDI inflows.
• ▀ We now expect potential output growth to slow to 1.4% a year from 2020–2030 down from 1.6% a year from 2010–2020. In the two decades after 2030 we expect the drag from Brexit-related effects to fade, but weaker contributions in labour supply and human capital will cut output growth to 1.2% a year.
• ▀ Demographics have been a key contributor to potential output growth over the past 30 years. But an ageing population and a more restrictive immigration regime are likely to mean the workforce grows far more slowly in the future.
• ▀ Our long-term growth forecast is weaker than the OBR's and implies that future governments will face a combination of disappointing growth in tax revenues and increasing demands for government spending from an ageing population.

     

Will the Bank of England turn dovish?

• ? Short of a sharp slowdown in the economy and/or inflation expectations, or a no‐deal Brexit, we think that the Bank of England is unlikely to follow recent moves by the Fed and ECB in signalling cuts to interest rates.
• ? Admittedly, the BoE's guidance on rate rises has gone awry before. And the UK has some commonalities with the US and eurozone, including declining core inflation and continued job creation without inflationary consequences.
• ? But growth projections paint the UK in a relatively favourable light, while stable inflation expectations and a relaxation of fiscal austerity offer two more reasons for the BoE to plough its own, more hawkish, furrow.

     

Government sets 2021 marker for EU trade deal

• ▀ We expect the UK and EU to agree an FTA that will take effect on 1 January 2021, two years earlier than we had previously assumed. The earlier introduction of trade barriers will dampen the post-coronavirus recovery.
• ▀ The economic case for delaying the implementation seemed to have been strengthened by the pandemic, which has left firms and the government ill-equipped to adapt. But political considerations have won out.
• ▀ We think a basic trade deal is more likely than not. The terms of the withdrawal agreement mean that failure to agree an FTA would increase frictions on trade between GB and NI. The UK will also be keen to protect vulnerable sectors.

     

Five ways the pandemic could alter the economy

• ▀ Economic crises are often turning points, and the upheaval triggered by coronavirus may prove one of them. A permanently bigger state and public borrowing, persistently cowed consumers, a more ‘national’ UK economy and the impetus for beneficial reforms are all possibilities.
• ▀ We think the scale of state intervention in the economy to protect public health will increase pressure to do more in aid of other social goals. The austere ‘Treasury view’ of deficits is also likely to wane.
• ▀ Meanwhile, evidence suggests that major economic shocks can exert a decades-long drag on consumers’ desire to spend, giving another reason why higher government borrowing may persist long after the pandemic has faded.
• ▀ Supply-chain vulnerabilities exposed by the virus may crystallise the more ‘UK-first’ approach to economic policy that Brexit ushered in. Although greater protectionism could threaten economic dynamism, the crisis could be the stimulus to structural reform, offering a potential growth upside

     

UK Overview

Following the vote to leave the EU, we have reduced our forecasts for GDP growth in the short and long term. In the short term, heightened uncertainty will dampen business investment, while the weaker pound will push up inflation and hamper consumer spending. Further out, we expect the UK to lose its access to the single market in return for the ability to limit immigration; both of these choices would limit prospects for GDP growth.