Tariff‐tax Reforms in Large Economies

This paper studies tariff‐tax reforms in a two‐region global New Keynesian model composed of a developing and an advanced region. In our baseline calibration, a revenue‐neutral reform that lowers tariffs in developing countries can reduce domestic welfare. The reason is that the increase in developing countries welfare due to higher output is dominated by the welfare losses stemming from the deterioration of the terms of trade. On the other hand, the reform increases output and welfare in the advanced countries and in the world as a whole. The effects that we highlight have not been studied in previous contributions to the literature, which looks at tariff‐tax reforms using a small open economy framework. Nominal rigidities have important implications for adjustment dynamics in our model. In the case of a ‘point‐for‐point’ reform, for example, price stickiness implies that the international dynamics of output is reversed compared to a revenue‐neutral reform.     

Welfare and market-access effects of piecemeal tariff reforms on environmentally preferable products

We examine how welfare and market access are affected by piecemeal tariff reforms on environmentally preferable products (EPP) in a small open economy. We define EPP as clean goods that, when consumed, have no impact on pollution. First, we show that a uniform reduction of all tariffs improves welfare if a country’s imports consist only of clean goods. If a clean good is a net substitute for all other goods in excess demand, then reducing the highest tariff on the clean good improves welfare. Second, we show that a proportional tariff reduction leading to a welfare improvement also increases the value of imports if all tariffs are set at the same ad valorem rates. If the clean good is a net substitute for all other goods in excess demand, then reducing the lowest tariff on the clean good increases the value of imports. Finally, we explore the link between the change in welfare and the change in the value of imports in response to the tariff reforms, and we show that unlike a proportional tariff reduction, a tariff reduction on the clean good does not necessarily lead to improvements in both welfare and market access.     

Trade liberalization, product variety and growth in a small open economy: a quantitative assessment

We develop a numerical growth model that quantifies the welfare effects of trade liberalization. Additional intermediate input varieties provide the engine of growth and dramatically magnify the welfare gains from trade liberalization. In our central model, a 10% tariff cut leads to a 10.6% estimated gain in Hicksian EV. Systematic sensitivity analysis shows that there is virtually no chance of a welfare increase less than 3%, but a 6.6% chance of a welfare gain greater than 18%. We show that complementary reforms are crucial to fully realize the potential gains from the trade reform.     

The impact of trade facilitation on poverty and inequality: Evidence from low- and middle-income countries

This paper using a trade model of imperfect competition and product differentiation, examines the welfare effects of two popular tariff-tax reforms: (i) a tariff cut combined with an equal increase in the consumption tax and (ii) a tariff cut combined with an increase in the consumption tax that leaves the consumer price of the imported good unchanged. It is shown that if tax revenues are lump-sum distributed and firms compete over prices, then coordinated tariff-tax reforms improve welfare for a low degree of product differentiation, whereas these reforms are welfare-reducing for any degree of product differentiation under Cournot competition. When, instead, revenues are used to finance the provision of public goods, then the total effect of these reforms on welfare depends, under plausible assumptions, on the strength of the consumer's valuation of the public good.     

On necessarily welfare-enhancing free trade areas

The well-known Kemp-Vanek-Ohyama-Wan proposition establishes that if two or more countries form a customs union (CU) by freezing their net external trade vector through a common external tariff and eliminating internal trade barriers, the union as a whole and the rest of the world cannot be worse off than before. Owing to the fact that a Free Trade Area (whose member countries impose country specific external tariff vectors) does not equalize marginal rates of substitution across its member countries (in contrast to a CU), the literature has been unable to provide a parallel demonstration regarding welfare improving Free Trade Areas (FTAs). The present paper eliminates this gap. In extending the result to the case with intermediate inputs, the paper also sheds new light on the rules of origin required to support such necessarily welfare enhancing FTAs. We show here that provided no trade deflection is permitted, all that is required by way of rules of origin is that the goods produced within the union - whether final or intermediate - be allowed to be traded freely. The proportion of domestic value added in final goods does not enter as a criterion in the rules of origin.     

Income distribution and unequal gains from trade

This paper studies welfare gains from trade in a tractable model with a nonhomothetic preference over product quality. We show that the welfare changes due to trade shocks are unequal across consumers and derive a parsimonious formula to measure these welfare changes as in Arkolakis et al. (2012, American Economic Review, 102, 94–130). We find that the welfare changes are larger for consumers with lower income. Moreover, this paper shows that the welfare implications are different between a change in (iceberg-type) variable trade cost and a change in tariff when tariff revenue matters. More importantly, we show that the difference varies across consumers with different income levels.     

Foreign direct investment and customs union: Incentives for multilateral tariff cooperation over free trade

The present article examines the implications of a customs union (CU) on the pattern of tariffs, welfare and the prospects for free trade when the non-member firm has an incentive to engage in foreign direct investment (FDI). First, I show that upon the formation of a bilateral CU, the non-member firm has greater incentives to engage in FDI. However, when FDI becomes a feasible entry option for the non- member firm under a CU, member countries have incentives to strategically induce export over FDI by lowering their joint external tariff. When fixed set-up cost of FDI is sufficiently low, this tariff falls below Kemp–Wan tariff and CU leads to a Pareto improvement relative to no agreement. Moreover, using an infinite repetition of the one-shot tariff game under a CU, I show that the presence of FDI incentive of the non-member firm makes the member countries more willing to cooperate multilaterally over free trade while the opposite is true for the non-member country. Finally, I find that, unless fixed cost of having an additional plant is sufficiently low, multilateral cooperation over free trade is easier to sustain when FDI incentive is present.     

Trade Unionism and Welfare Consequences of Trade and Investment Reforms in A Developing Economy

This paper explains the existence of intersectoral wage differential in a developing economy in terms of trade union behavior in the formal sector industry and analyzes its role in predicting the outcomes of trade and investment reforms on welfare. It provides theoretical explanations of certain real life phenomena e.g. why the developing countries are yearning for foreign capital despite the standard immiserizing result and why these countries are not reducing the tariff rates beyond certain levels although they have chosen free trade as their development strategy.     

The welfare effect of tariff rate reductions in a many country world

Consider a two-commodity n-country model without inferior goods where import tariffs are the only trade barriers. In this paper we establish that the world's welfare is improved if the country with the highest tariff rate unilaterally reduce its rate to the level of the second highest country or if all the countries of the world reduce tariff rates proportionally. The second rule serves as a theoretical justification of the Kennedy and Tokyo Round Tariff Reductions.     

Bilateralism, multilateralism, and the quest for global free trade

We develop an equilibrium theory of trade agreements in which both the degree and the nature (bilateral or multilateral) of trade liberalization are endogenously determined. To determine whether and how bilateralism matters, we also analyze a scenario where countries pursue trade liberalization on only a multilateral basis. We find that when countries have asymmetric endowments or when governments value producer interests more than tariff revenue and consumer surplus, there exist circumstances where global free trade is a stable equilibrium only if countries are free to pursue bilateral trade agreements. By contrast, under symmetry, both bilateralism and multilateralism yield global free trade.     

Optimum tariffs and retaliation: How country numbers matter

This paper identifies a new terms-of-trade externality that is exercised through tariff setting. A North-South model of international trade is introduced in which the number of countries in each region can be varied. As the number of countries in one region is increased, each government there competes more aggressively with the others in its region, by lowering its tariff, to attract imports from the other region. In doing so, all countries in a region exert a negative terms-of-trade externality on each other, collectively undermining their own terms of trade and welfare. This externality can increase efficiency if the numbers of countries in both regions are increased simultaneously.     

Regional Trade Agreements versus Global Trade Liberalisation: Implications for a Small Island Developing State

This study undertakes an empirical investigation of the macroeconomic and sectoral impacts of two forms of regional trade agreements vis‐à‐vis global trade liberalisation on a small island country, using Fiji as a case study. In order to capture the feedback effects of such a complex set of policies, we employ a dynamic computable general equilibrium model of the Fijian economy to investigate (i) the impact of the Pacific Island Countries Trade Agreement (PICTA), (ii) the impact of PICTA, the Pacific Agreement for Closer Economic Relations (PACER), and the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), (iii) the impact of full tariff liberalisation (i.e. tariff removal only), and (iv) the impact of full trade liberalisation, with removal of both tariff and non‐tariff barriers. While PICTA consistently provides the least benefits across a range of macroeconomic indicators including real output, welfare, trade volumes and employment, full trade liberalisation involving the removal of tariff and non‐tariff barriers provides the greatest benefits compared to the other scenarios in terms of real output. However, the latter scenario is outperformed by PICTA, PACER, the EPAs and full tariff liberalisation in terms of welfare effects, trade volumes and employment. The policy implications hold important lessons for developing countries considering trade liberalisation.     

Welfare implications of trade liberalization and fiscal reform: A quantitative experiment

This paper studies the welfare implications of revenue-neutral trade liberalization and fiscal reform programs for developing economies using a multi-sector dynamic general equilibrium model of a small open economy. We analyze how different combinations of tariffs – on imported consumption goods, intermediate inputs, and capital goods – and taxes – on consumption, labor income and capital income – affect the transitional and long-run welfare. We report three main findings. First, trade liberalization programs financed by consumption and labor income taxes tend to result in substantial welfare gains, but financing the lost tariff revenue through capital income taxes can have an adverse impact on welfare. Second, a significant fraction of welfare changes is due to transitional effects stemming from the allocation of resources in response to changes in tariffs and taxes. Third, trade liberalization and fiscal reform programs often translate into much larger welfare gains in countries that are more open to international financial markets.     

Welfare versus market access: The implications of tariff structure for tariff reform

We show that the effects of tariff changes on welfare and import volume are fully characterised by their effects on the generalised mean and variance of the tariff distribution, implying two “cones of liberalisation” in commodity price space. Because welfare is negatively but import volume positively related to the generalised variance, the cones do not intersect, which poses a policy dilemma. We present a new radial tariff reform rule, which implies new results for welfare- and market-access-improving tariff changes. Finally, we show that generalised and trade-weighted moments are mutually proportional when the trade expenditure function is CES.     

The effects of cross-regional free trade agreements under a vertical industry structure

This paper examines the effects of a cross-regional free trade agreement (FTA) on tariffs, welfare, and the incentives for multilateral free trade in a three-country model with a vertical industry structure. We show that the FTA induces member countries to reduce their tariffs on nonmember countries. On the other hand, a nonmember country lowers its tariff on final-good imports, but raises its tariff on intermediate-good imports. Also, the FTA makes member and nonmember countries better off. After the FTA is enacted, member and nonmember countries have an incentive to support multilateral free trade, so an FTA acts as a building block for multilateral trade liberalization.     

Trick or Treat? Development Opportunities and Challenges in the WTO Negotiations on Industrial Tariffs

Negotiations on industrial tariffs in the current WTO work programme have turned out to be surprisingly difficult. On the one hand, developing countries, particularly in Africa, are concerned about the potential negative effect on their industrial development of developed country efforts to push them into deep cuts in applied tariffs: after the disillusion of the Uruguay Round, promises of welfare gains seem unconvincing. On the other hand, a number of the more complex formula proposals for tariff‐cutting make it difficult for participants to evaluate what they have to do compared with what they hope to receive. The developing countries may achieve greater exports and welfare gains from the more ambitious proposals, but computations show that these also imply greater imports, lower tariff revenues, some labour market adjustments and reduced output in some politically sensitive sectors. Some way of assisting the developing countries in coping with these adjustments is required to take advantage of the opportunities presented by the negotiations.     

Politics of free trade areas: tariffs versus quotas

In this paper we compare and contrast the political viability of bilateral Free Trade Area (FTA) Agreements in the presence of tariffs and quotas. Assuming that the government maximizes a weighted sum of welfare and producer profits, we show that the political viability of FTAs varies according to whether trade restrictions take the form of tariffs or quotas. A key result is that whereas an FTA is unambiguously rejected by one of the countries under a tariff, it may be endorsed by both trading partners under a voluntary export quota or import quota that provides equal protection as the tariff.     

Tariffs and the most favored nation clause

In an n country oligopoly model of intraindustry trade (n≥3), this paper explores the economics of the most-favored-nation (MFN) principle. Under the non-cooperative tariff equilibrium, each country imposes higher tariffs on low cost producers relative to high cost ones thereby causing socially harmful trade diversion. MFN adoption by each country improves world welfare by eliminating this trade diversion. Under linear demand, MFN adoption by the country with the average production cost is most desirable. High cost countries refuse reciprocal MFN adoption with other countries and also lose even if others engage in reciprocal MFN adoption amongst themselves.     

Tariffs and formation of free trade agreements networks

This paper examines the formation of bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) on the basis of country heterogeneity in the tariff level. We demonstrate that a country's unilateral incentive to form an FTA depends on the relative magnitudes of the (negative) market concession effect and the (positive) market expansion effect, both of which are determined by the tariff levels of the two FTA partner countries. Global welfare is maximised when all country pairs form FTAs. Two countries in equilibrium are more likely to form an FTA when their tariff gap is smaller or when their tariff levels are neither very high nor very low. This finding is robust to several extensions of the model. Our preliminary empirical analysis provides some evidence for the finding.     

Welfare-optimal trade and competition policies in small open oligopolistic economies

Standard trade theory claims that free trade is welfare-enhancing. We show that this is not the case if at least one sector of the economy is a Cournot oligopoly. In a simple small open economy with one oligopolistic and one competitive sector, welfare is an inverted U-shaped function of tariffs. Hence, an optimal tariff rate can be determined. The optimal rate depends on the number of firms in the oligopolistic sector. Below the optimal level, the competitive sector overproduces, i.e. oligopolistic good have a higher marginal effect on welfare. Increasing tariff rates stimulate the production of the oligopolistic sector by dampening imports. Under balanced trade, this reduces exports and production in the competitive sector, thus shifting resources to oligopolistic goods production. We also find that given certain levels of protection, perfect competition is not welfare maximal and, hence, not desirable. The finding explains why developing economies with imperfect competition are often reluctant to embrace trade liberalization and why, conversely, countries with high levels of external protection may be unenthusiastic about competition theory.